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John Henry Newman (1801-90) is among the most renowned figures of Oriel College, 
Oxford. Beatified by Pope Benedict XVI in Birmingham UK on 19 September 2010, he 
is honoured in the Church of England liturgical calendar on 11 August, and celebrated in 
the Catholic liturgical calendar on 9 October. Just before his Beatification, Pope Benedict 
XVI said informally that Newman “appears as a doctor of the Church for us and for 
everyone.” 
  
Abstract 
Since the Enlightenment, with its dependence on “Reason” alone, faith has been rejected 
by growing numbers as a basis of religious knowledge. It was now less and less an age of 
Faith and much more of “Reason”. If you wanted to be sure of something, you had to 
prove it with strict evidence open to the scrutiny of rational examination. By this test 
religion was deemed to have failed. John Henry Newman was born into this intellectual 
situation, one that was eroding the sense of ultimate religious certainty, most obviously 
among intellectuals. He was a man recognized for his prowess in logic, but was highly 
sceptical of the power of mere reasoning to take a person to the truth – and most 
especially to the truth of revealed religion. Many more things were required, he thought, 
although it was of course necessary to reason logically. There was the question of the 
inquirer’s basic starting points. What were they? There was the question of whether the 
idea of God was a fruit of mere formal reasoning, or whether it was also an implicit or 
tacit perception prior to formal ratiocination and creed. What was it to “reason” in this 
real-life context, anyway? Reasoning to certitude involved, he thought, the perception of 
probability. There was also the question of a necessary mental preparedness, a right ethos 
of mind, if a person was to reason to the being of God and to the truth of his revelation.  
 
          Newman decided that the foundation and support of a real belief in God and in his 
Revelation was something accessible to all. It was the sense of moral obligation. 
Conscience, commonly regarded as the voice of God to the soul, was the foundation. But 
what did this mean and why did Newman think this?  This thesis takes up Newman’s 
view that the conscience is the essential principle and sanction of belief in God and his 
revelation. The conscience of man prompts the thought of God at its beginning and 
enables a natural apprehension of him. With this inchoate yet developing knowledge of 
God as Lawgiver, Judge and Friend, and supported by numerous other helps, one may 
proceed to “divine faith” in revealed religion, and in the Church its authenticated witness 
and exponent. This process is, though, sustained by grace. 
 
           This investigation does not purport to evaluate Newman’s position 
philosophically. There have been many such attempts. Its purpose is, rather, to track the 
course of his basic idea as it developed over his lifetime, as evidenced in his letters, 
diaries and publications.  
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Chapter One: Introduction     
“Thus Conscience does make cowards of us all” (Wm. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 1) 
 
1.1   Aim of the Thesis 
Newman was a thinker across a span of issues, but perhaps the deepest and most abiding 
of his concerns was the defence of religious faith in dogmatic, revealed religion. He saw 
the increase of agnosticism, scepticism and atheism around him, and in this context he 
strove to justify the assent to divine revelation. In his essay, “Revelation and its Relation 
to Faith” (1885), he wrote that ever since his mind turned to theological subjects his 
concern had been great at the drift of philosophy away from and against religion. It led 
him early to consider “the evidences …. of Religion generally, and the intellectual theory 
on which they are based” – with a view to “testing and perfecting the proofs in its 
behalf”.1  
          The conscience was an essential element in his defence. Newman wanted to lay 
before a modern audience a starting point, a basic principle, which if properly in place, 
and which if accompanied by other important considerations and evidences, ought to lead 
to that form of theism which positioned the believer for the assent to Revelation, which, 
he came to believe, subsisted in the Catholic Religion. In his celebrated though 
misleading work, Newman: Essai de biographie psychologique, Henri Bremond chose to 
put it this way: Newman’s philosophy is aimed at “establishing a fundamental identity 
between the voice of conscience and the voice of God”, and his theology is aimed at 
“showing in the God of revelation the God of conscience”.2  
          Since the Enlightenment, evidences for God and his Revelation were debated 
without end. The assumption was that to be sure of something, you had to “prove” it. 
Only if you did “prove” it were you entitled to be convinced of its truth.3 Newman 
                                                 
1 J.H. Newman,  The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty. Partly prepared 
for publication by H. P. de Archaval, SJ. Sel. and ed. by J. D. Holmes with a note of Introduction by C. S. 
Dessain. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976, p. 156. 
2 H. Bremond, Newman: Essai de biographie psychologique. Paris: Libraire Bloud & Cie., 1905 (8
th
 ed., 
1932), p. 199, quoted in S. A. Grave, Conscience in Newman’s Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 3. 
3 Perhaps we could place this in context. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, in his Editor’s Introduction to An Essay 
concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, abridged and edited  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924) 
states that with Locke ‘Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything’ (p. x). In Locke’s Essay, the 
“understanding itself is the subject investigated, or, as he puts it in another place, the subject of his inquiry 
is ‘the certainty, evidence, and extent’ of human knowledge. By this formulation of the question, Locke 
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pointed to the critical matter of a correct starting point – for Newman, the starting point 
for a defence of and path to Revelation was the awareness of being subject to moral 
obligation. There is something absolute about this, even sacred. Precisely here, God is 
sensed as being present. This is the foundation for belief in God and his Revelation – and 
it is not the result of a “demonstration”.  But, in Newman’s thought, there must also be 
correct moral dispositions for religious truth to be attained. There is also the important 
matter of the nature of the reasoning appropriate for religious knowledge. In both these 
latter issues, the conscience has an important part to play. Our aim in this study is to track 
his account of these matters over the course of his life.  
 
1.2   The importance of the topic 
1.2.1   Timothy C. Potts writes that “Conscience has been much neglected by 
philosophers.  It was not directly treated in ancient philosophy, while, apart from Bishop 
Butler, who was primarily interested in the aspect of self-deception, there is scarcely a 
philosopher from Descartes to the present day who has touched upon it more than 
tangentially.”4 In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, he continues, “conscience 
became a standard component of commentaries upon Peter Lombard’s Judgements and 
from there found its way into university seminars.”5 It must be observed, however, that 
the mediaeval men did not look to the conscience as part of a defence of theism and belief 
in Revelation. Whereas, according to John Henry Newman, the Conscience “is the 
essential principle and sanction of religion in the mind.”6  
          Selwyn Grave wrote that “Little work has been done on the conception of 
conscience we are calling the ordinary conception. It was neglected even by the 
Ordinary-Language philosophers … (and) goes unrecognized in the article on Conscience 
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy published in 1967”.7 He states that “the notion of 
                                                                                                                                                 
impressed upon philosophy the epistemological character which it has retained during most of the modern 
period. He has thus some right to be considered the second founder of modern philosophy. For Hume and 
Kant, as well as for most of the thinkers of the nineteenth century, philosophy has been primarily a theory 
of knowledge ….” (p. xiv). Newman is to be understood in this context, for he too offered a theory of 
knowledge – especially of the knowledge of religious truth. The obedient conscience and virtue, in his 
system, are essential for the knowledge of religious truth, and in this, together with his theory that valid 
certitude can be based on probability, he confronts and rejects the position of Locke. 
4  T.C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 1. 
5  Ibid.,  p.1 
6  J.H. Newman (1843). Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. Sermon II, no. 7.  
Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1966.  
7  S. A. Grave, Conscience in Newman’s Thought.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989, p. 4. 
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conscience has been largely relegated to the history of moral philosophy ... by British 
philosophers in the twentieth century”.8  This is despite the fact that the modern day is 
noted for its appeal to the rights of one’s conscience. The matter is very relevant.  
          The novelty of Newman’s thought on this matter is not merely that he argued for 
the existence and character of God from the testimony of the conscience, but that he took 
the matter further. He is looking for the starting point and foundation of certitude as to 
Revelation. His defence of Revealed Religion begins there, and it is empirical. The 
religious testimony of the conscience ought take a person, he thought, to the acceptance 
of Divine Revelation, and specifically to an assent to Catholic truth – provided it is 
understood that this had to be accompanied by other important factors and considerations 
(such as a right moral ethos which itself involves the conscience, a correct notion of 
reason, attention to history, Scripture, theology and philosophical speculation). The 
conscience begins the process and sets the direction by establishing an early, implicit 
relationship with the One who will be eventually recognized as the God of Revelation. 
Indeed, without a properly functioning conscience in which this implicit testimony is 
present and can be discerned, this assent is unlikely in real life. The importance of such 
an argument, if valid, is obvious. Its prestige is enhanced by its coming from Newman.  
          1.2.2  To a point, the importance of the argument is given impetus from the 
importance of Newman himself in many areas of thought9 – including the conscience. 
Newman had, to give but two examples of his influence, a seminal effect on the great 
Canadian theologian Bernard J. F. Lonergan,10 and on the eminent philosopher Alasdair 
                                                 
8  Ibid., p. 9. 
9 The Newman scholar, Sheridan Gilley, had this to say. In “John Henry Newman, who became a Roman 
Catholic in 1845, they (i.e., the principal figures of the Oxford Movement) had an intellectual leader who is 
simply the greatest English theologian in modern history. Thus of the making of books about Newman and 
his writings there is no end”. (S. Gilley, "The British Isles: Recent Developments in the Writing of Church 
History", in Anuario de historia de la Iglesia  4 (1995), pp. 331-352 (AHI g 4, 1995, p. 338). 
   In The British Critic of April 1842 (critiquing some of R. Whately’s works), William George Ward, a 
disciple of Newman and emerging leader of the second phase of the Oxford Movement (1841-1845), 
described the previous eleven years as “the most momentous perhaps in English theological history since 
the Reformation.” (W. G. Ward, The British Critic and Quarterly Theological Review, no. LXII, - April, 
1842, p. 300). Of course, he viewed Newman as the intellectual leader of the Movement’s theology. 
10  Lonergan declared that “My fundamental mentor and guide has been John Henry Newman's Grammar 
of Assent. I read that in my third year philosophy (at least the analytic parts) about five times and found 
solutions for my problems. I was not at all satisfied with the philosophy that was being taught and found 
Newman's presentation to be something that fitted in with the way I knew things. It was from that kernel 
that I went on to different authors.”  Bernard Lonergan, "Reality, Myth, Symbol," in A. M. Olson (ed.) 
Myth, Symbol, and Reality. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980, pp. 32-33. 
   Writing of Lonergan’s early studies in England, Gerard Whelan SJ of the Gregorian University states that 
“He felt an increasing attraction to ancient philosophy and, given his questions about how to establish the 
credibility of the Catholic faith, it was perhaps inevitable that he would be attracted to the thought of that 
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MacIntyre.11  Before them, Rudolf Metz had written that Newman “belongs beyond 
dispute to the first rank of the great intellectual leaders and awakeners of England in the 
XIXth Century … (and is) … the greatest apologist of Roman Catholicism that England 
has produced since the cleavage between the Churches”.12 He declares that “the first 
place in Newman’s doctrine is given … to the Conscience”.13  Many have voiced the 
expectation that Newman will be eventually declared a Doctor of the Church. 
          In their Introduction to their edition (a translation into Spanish with notes) of 
Newman’s Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, García and Morales write that “La autoridad 
doctrinal de Newman … se acerca a la de un doctor Cristiano de primer magnitude. 
Después de Santo Tomás de Aquino y de San Augustín, Newman es probablemente el 
autor más citado en los documentos y discursos papales de los últimos aňos.”14 These two 
authors especially emphasise Newman’s consideration of the Church as mystery, the 
reasonableness of the act of faith, and the various dimensions of the conscience of man. 
The second and third of these are considered in this study. It is worth remembering that 
Newman was quoted in the preliminary documents in the preparation for the Second 
Vatican Council more than any other theologian. J.H. Crehan SJ wrote that “Newman 
may be termed the doctor conscientiae, as others were termed ‘subtle doctor’ or 
‘irrefragable’ in the Middle Ages.”15 Joseph Ratzinger has written that Newman’s “life 
and work could be designated as a single great commentary on the question of 
                                                                                                                                                 
eminent English Churchman, John Henry Cardinal Newman. In Newman, Lonergan encountered the work 
of a mind that had been formed not in Neo-scholasticism but in classical studies and the Church Fathers. In 
The Grammar of Assent, Newman traced this process of his own conversion to the Catholic faith from 
Anglicanism in a manner that spoke of a personal quest for truth and which had echoes of St. Augustine’s 
Confessions—a work to which Lonergan also became attached at this time. From Newman and Augustine, 
Lonergan first acquired the insight that he would develop throughout his life: that philosophy should not 
begin with metaphysics but with an account of concrete, lived experience.” 
Whelan, Gerard. ‘The Continuing Significance of Bernard Lonergan.’ In “Thinking Faith”, 23 September, 
2008. 7 pages. Available online 6 February 2014: http://www.thinkingfaith.org/articles/20080923_1.htm 
(This article was first published by Gerard Whelan as ‘Importanza e attualità di Bernard Lonergan.’ La 
Civiltà Cattolica 159, III/17, no. 3797 (September 2008) 370-81). 
11 Following his landmark philosophical work, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (Duckworth, 1981), 
Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 3
rd
 ed., 2007, Alasdair MacIntyre promised to address 
the gaps and omissions in that well-known work. This promise was fulfilled in 1988, with his Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. Toward the close 
of this second important work, Alasdair MacIntyre acknowledges a “massive debt” to John Henry 
Newman, though he states that his theorizing is done independently of him.   
12 R. Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy.  London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1938, p. 185. 
13 Ibid., p. 193. 
14 V. G. Ruiz y J. Morales, John Henry Newman: Carta al Duque de Norfolk: Sobre el Desarrollo de la 
Doctrina Cristiana.  3
rd
 edition, translation and notes.  Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 2013, p. 9. 
15 J. H. Crehan, S.J. “Conscience” in A Catholic Dictionary of Theology, Vol II. London: Thomas Nelson 
and Sons Ltd., 1967,  p. 103   
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conscience.”16 On conscience and its religious implications, Newman’s authority is great 
– though he wrote no book exclusively on the subject. All this makes it important to study 
his idea of the conscience. 
         1.2.3   The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World of the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-1965) includes a well-known passage on the conscience. Among 
other things, it is there stated that “His conscience is 
man’s … sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose 
voice echoes in his depths”17. This text refers the reader 
to, and incorporates specific sentences in Pope Pius 
XII’s address of 1952,18 which constitute a sanction to 
the view of conscience as involving the echo of God’s voice. Joseph Ratzinger sees a 
significant connection with Newman – saying this about that passage (Gaudium et Spes, 
Part I, ch. I, no. 16) of Vatican II.  It “presents the general outline of a Christian doctrine 
of conscience. But merely by the weight it attributes to the subject of conscience within 
                                                 
16 J. Ratzinger, On Conscience: Two Essays by Joseph Ratzinger. Philadelphia, PA: The National Catholic 
Bioethics Center, San Francisco: Ignatius Press., 2007,  pp.  22-23. In 1990 Cardinal Ratzinger stated that 
Newman’s teaching on conscience ‘became an important foundation for theological personalism’ and made 
‘a decisive contribution to the renewal of theology’ (speech at the Academic Symposium, “John Henry 
Newman – Lover of Truth”, held in Rome in April 1990. See Benedict XVI and Cardinal Newman, ed. P. 
Jennings, Oxford: Family Publications, 2005, pp. 33-34) 
17 Vatican Council II  “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World”, Part I, chapter I, no. 16. 
In Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents. General Editor, Austin Flannery OP. 
Northport, New York: Costello Publishing Company 1975 (Fifth Printing December 1980), pp. 916-917. 
18 Pope Pius XII, “La Coscienza Cristiana come Oggetto della Educazione” (Discorsi e Radiomessaggi di 
Sua Santità Pio XII, Vol XIV, p. 20), 23 March 1952.  Acta Apostolicae Sedis no. 44 (1952), p. 271.   
Pius XII said in this address of 1952  (italics are mine):   
“La coscienza è come il nucleo piu intimo e segreto dell’uomo. Là egli si rifugia con le sue 
facoltà spirituali in assoluta solitudine: solo con sè stesso, o meglio, solo con Dio – della cui voce 
la cosciesza risuona – e con sè stesso. Là egli si determina per ill bene o per il male; là egli 
sceglie fra la strada della vittoria e quella della disfatta.  ….. con essa, … si presenterà al giudizio 
di Dio. La coscienza è quindi, per dirla con una imagine tanto antica quanto degna, un   ἄδυτον   
un santuario, sulla cui soglia tutti debbono arrestarsi…”  
We might translate the above statement (of March 1952) by Pius XII as follows:  
        "The conscience is the innermost and most secret nucleus of man. There he withdraws with his 
spiritual capacities into full solitude, alone with himself or better, alone with God – whose voice echoes in 
his conscience – and with himself. There he directs himself for good or for bad; there he chooses between 
the path of victory or of defeat. … with it … one presents oneself to the judgment of God. The conscience is 
therefore, to use an old, venerable picture, a sanctuary, on the entrance of which all must stop….." 
     Pope Pius XII had referred to the naturally religious dimension of the conscience in his first Encyclical, 
Summi Pontificatus, of October 20, 1939. He writes in No.28 of that inaugural document that the 
conscience   
“is that voice which teaches even to the illiterate and to uncivilized tribes what is good and what 
is bad, what lawful, what forbidden, and makes men feel themselves responsible for their actions 
to a Supreme Judge.”   (the italics are mine)         
These statements of Pius XII suggest that the conscience is a special meeting place with God where one is 
“solo con Dio”. It is that “voice” within which makes men feel “responsible” to God perceived as a 
“Supreme Judge”  –  “even” for  “the illiterate” and “uncivilized tribes”. 
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the framework of its doctrine of man, it takes its place in the line of thought deriving from 
Newman.”19 (italics mine).   
          The Catechism of the Catholic Church – one of the greatest fruits of the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-1965) – has an important Article on the Moral Conscience. It is 
stated therein that “when he listens to his conscience, the prudent man can hear God 
speaking”.20  The opening statement of this Article in the Catechism21 refers us (in 
footnote 47) to no. 16 of Gaudium et Spes as being its source (which in turn takes us to 
Pope Pius XII). But the Catechism’s very text then goes on (in no. 1778) to quote 
verbatim the famous passage from Newman’s Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, which 
includes the ringing phrase that the conscience is the “aboriginal vicar of Christ.”22 
          This notable passage of Newman’s, incorporated into the Church’s greatest official 
Catechism of Christian doctrine, suggests that the natural conscience speaks not only as 
representing God (present in the conscience), but somehow as representing Christ as the 
revelation of God, for the conscience is nature’s vicar of Christ. This is a striking 
assertion. It suggests that in its very essence the conscience over time equips the hearer, 
under grace, to look to, recognize and assent to Revelation. What is intimated in the 
authentic conscience can and ought lead to Christ. Conscience is a starting point and path 
both to theism and to faith in divine revelation. This is an important position to study. 
          1.2.4.    Let us see, then, what Newman made of this over the course of his life. It is 
to be borne in mind that we are not here undertaking a philosophical critique of the truth 
of Newman’s position – though this philosophical critique will be aided by an 
understanding of its history. What follows is an investigation of the history of Newman’s 
idea of the conscience, viewed in the context of his defence of religious belief, including 
belief in revealed religion, over the course of his life.23 Little of this broad, life-long 
developing perspective has been attempted.  
                                                 
19 J. Ratzinger, “The Dignity of the Human Person” in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II. 
Volume 5, Translated by W.J.O’Shea. London: Burns & Oates Limited, 1969, p. 134. 
20 The Catechism of the Catholic Church. (2nd edition). Part 3, Section I, Article 6, no. 1777.    
St Paul Publications/Libreria Editrice Vaticana.  English Translation from the Editio Typica. 1997, p. 438. 
21 Ibid., Part 3, Section I, Article 6, no. 1776.   
22  J. H. Newman,  A Letter Addressed to the Duke of Norfolk  (1875), Part V, “Conscience.” In Certain 
Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered in A Letter Addressed to the Rev. E. B. 
Pusey DD, on Occasion of his Eirenicon of 1864; and in a Letter Addressed to the Duke of Norfolk, on 
Occasion of Mr. Gladstone’s Expostulation of 1874.  Vol II.  London:  Longmans, Green, and Co. 1896. 
23 The importance of (Newman’s concern with) religious belief and its true foundations is perhaps 
highlighted by the atheist philosopher Bertrand Russell's remark that belief “is the central problem in the 
analysis of mind” and that "on the view we take of belief our philosophical outlook largely depends."  
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1.3    Methodology 
1.3.1     One of Newman’s great questions — from his Anglican University Sermons 
preached between 1826 and 1843 to the Grammar of Assent written well after his 
conversion to the Catholic Church — was: how can religious faith be justified, given that 
the evidence for its conclusions seems inadequate to the degree of its certitude. As 
already mentioned (1.2.2), Newman never wrote a book about the conscience as such. His 
treatment of this forms part of his defence of religious belief. Selwyn Grave writes that 
the unsatisfactoriness (as he judges it) of Newman’s writing on Conscience is due “very 
largely to its incidental character: it is ancillary to his treatment of other matters; he had 
no occasion to bring together various parts of his thought about conscience”.24 Yes, 
Newman’s writing on Conscience is very largely “incidental”, but Grave’s philosophical 
discussion would have been helped by a much greater acquaintance with the numerous 
references to the Conscience in Newman’s voluminous writings. I hope this investigation 
serves to provide this for other researchers with their preferred interests.  
          To glean Newman’s thought on the conscience “as the dictate of an authoritative 
monitor” as it developed over the course of his life, we must pursue him in his treatment 
of the reasonableness of belief in God and belief in his Revelation, which includes two 
key matters important for the attainment of revealed truth. They are the good moral ethos 
or temper of mind required to reason rightly in matters religious, and an understanding of 
valid reasoning appropriate to the question of God and Revelation. Valid reasoning 
involves not just objective, commensurate and demonstrative evidence. There is also the 
issue of strong antecedent probability.  
          So in terms of method, it is within the context of these issues that we shall track his 
position on the conscience – understood especially as the basic sense of duty, more than 
just as a practical ethical judgment,25 although this latter comes into the discussion too, 
especially when we consider conscience and reasoning to the very practical assent of faith 
(ch. 4.3). Newman claims that it is the conscience, considered “not as a rule of right 
                                                                                                                                                 
B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind . Lecture XII. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. 231. 
     Sir Anthony Kenny has written that “The great question with which Newman wrestled throughout his 
life — from his Anglican University Sermons preached between 1826 and 1843 to the Grammar of Assent 
written after his conversion to Roman Catholicism — was this: how can religious faith be justified, given 
that the evidence for its conclusions seems so inadequate to the degree of its commitment.” A. Kenny, 
“John Henry Newman” (ch. 25, sect. 3), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth 
Century, ed. W.J. Mander, Oxford University Press, 2014.  
24 S. A. Grave,   Conscience in Newman’s Thought.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989, p. 186. 
25 Newman, J.H. A Grammar of Assent. Part I, chapter 5, no. 1. New York: Image Book, 1955, p. 98. 
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conduct, but as a sanction of right conduct”,26 and containing the “materials for the real 
apprehension of a Divine Sovereign and Judge”,27 which is “the creative principle of 
religion”.28  
          1.3.2   To avoid too much repetition of ideas as they recur in the course of certain 
central subjects he pursued, I shall separate out the two subjects mentioned above (belief 
in God and belief in his Revelation), together with the two issues that are part of them (a 
moral ethos and reasoning to faith). My purpose will be to identify the function of the 
conscience in them. There is a caution which I have already made – Newman did not 
claim that it is conscience alone that takes a person to belief in God and his Revelation. 
But it is the critically important component. 
         1.3.3   Inasmuch as the interest of this thesis is in the historical development of the 
conscience in Newman’s thought, we must determine Newman’s notion of the conscience 
in his teenage conversion of 1816. This is because of the life-changing importance of this 
event, and also because a considerable number of the issues contained in the topic of this 
thesis will arise at the outset in the analysis of his first conversion. In treating this first 
conversion we shall consider proposals that stress one or other aspect of the religious 
conscience. Apart from bringing into view the range of notions of the conscience with 
which Newman probably became familiar at the start of his intellectual life, this will also 
introduce the multi-faceted character of the conscience as it played out in Newman’s life. 
That is to say, while we shall be determining the principal note or feature of the 
conscience as Newman perceived it at this start of his intellectual life, this by no means 
will exclude the presence of other elements of the conscience which our discussion of the 
conversion will introduce. The conversion of 1816 prepared decisively for what was to 
come.  
          Such is the method which will be followed: the Conscience as it featured in the 
conversion of 1816, the Conscience as it features in belief in God, the Conscience as it 
features in assent to Revelation, and the Conscience as it features in a right moral ethos 
and in the appropriate form of reasoning to faith. Throughout, we shall be engaged in an 
historical study, an intellectual biography, the history of an idea over the course of 
Newman’s life. The aim is to get at his understanding of the conscience as it developed. 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 99 
27 Ibid., p. 98 
28 Ibid., p. 101 
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Chapter Two:  Conscience and the Conversion of 1816  
“When I was fifteen … a great change of thought took place in me” (Apologia, p. 4) 
 
2.1.    The importance of the conversion of 1816 
All scholars agree that the mid-teen conversion of September 1816 is the starting point of 
any discussion of the thought of John Henry Newman. A. J. Boekraad quotes Henri 
Bremond who wrote that Newman’s first conversion is “the most important date in his 
life … his essential conversion”.29  Boekraad himself makes the significant comment that 
in this decision of 1816 there “were already present, however hidden, all the different 
principles which later influenced the development of his mind”.30 This will be shown in 
the following discussion, and it confirms the necessity of a lengthy analysis of his 
conversion. Sheridan Gilley writes that “Newman’s conversion was …. the beginning of 
his serious intellectual life”.31 Louis Bouyer describes Newman’s conversion in 1816 as 
“all-important”32 and regards Newman as an “outstanding example of those of whom it is 
said, “The Child is father of the Man”.33  Paul Vaiss observes that despite the lack of 
unanimity in the interpretation of Newman’s life and thought, all are agreed that his 
conversion was a seminal event.34  Frank M. Turner writes that “The most fundamental 
religious experience of Newman’s life was his adolescent conversion to Evangelical 
religion. His reception into the Roman Catholic Church almost thirty years later 
represented the final step in what had been a long process of separation from that 
adolescent faith”.35  It must be said that in describing the conversion of 1845 as the final 
stage “of separation from that adolescent faith”, Turner has misconceived both 
                                                 
29 A J. Boekraad, The Personal Conquest of Truth according to J. H. Newman. Louvain: Editions 
Nauwelaerts. 1955, p. 38 
30 Ibid. 
31 S. Gilley, “Life and Writings” in The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman, ed. by I. Ker and 
T. Merrigan,  Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. 2009, p. 2. 
32 L. Bouyer,  Newman: His life and Spirituality  (Translated by J. Lewis May). London:  Burns & Oates, 
1958,  p. 19 
33 Ibid., p. 22. 
34 P. Vaiss,  Newman: Sa vie, sa pensée, et sa spiritualité, première période (1801-1832).  L’Harmattan. 
1991, p. 43 
35 F. Turner, John Henry Newman: The Challenge to Evangelical Religion.  New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press. 2002, p. 11.  To speak of Newman’s 1845 entry into the Church of Rome as the final step 
of his separation from his adolescent (Evangelical) faith fits in with Turner’s thesis that Newman’s battle 
with liberalism during the Oxford Movement was really a battle against Evangelicalism. 
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conversions. Newman saw that the conversion of 1845 was the final step in what had 
been a long process of development of that adolescent faith, precisely because 1816 
involved a conversion to dogma and Creed.36 This subsequent development gives to the 
conversion a special importance in setting the stage for his thought on the conscience. 
          We must, therefore, consider the conversion of 1816 very carefully, for it is 
scarcely conceivable that was not significant in the history of his view of the conscience. 
After all, being on Newman’s own admission a “conversion,” indeed a radical and very 
great one that changed his life as few other things did, the conscience was in the nature of 
the case involved in the experience. It turned out to be one of the great conversions of the 
age.37 
          That having been said, it must also be pointed out that, notwithstanding the 
fundamental importance of the conscience in Newman’s thought on religious belief as it 
gradually developed, and despite Newman’s firm pronouncements on certain aspects of 
his conversion of 1816, he did not write much that specifically describes the role of the 
“conscience” in this event.38 If a view of it is to be gained, it must be from not only the 
very little that Newman did say, but also from what his testimony on his conversion 
seems to imply. There are different theories on the conversion in the field. 
                                                 
36 As Louis Bouyer writes in the Preface to Newman on Justification: A Theological Biography by Thomas 
L. Sheridan SJ.  Staten Island, N.Y: Alba House.  1967, p.12:   
Newman’s “conversion to Catholicism was in no way a repudiation of his first conversion, the 
one that changed him from a Christian of upbringing and habit into one of intensely personal 
faith.  For Newman did not become a Catholic – or at least did not want to become one – by 
denying anything of the substance of the Gospel message which he had learned from 
Protestantism, but only by clarifying this for himself and drawing the necessary conclusions”.  
37 Avery Dulles, speaking of Newman’s “three conversions” (those of 1816, 1827-1829, and 1845), writes 
that “he was an exceptional person, endowed with vast intelligence and erudition. Few of us can approach, 
even remotely, his intuitive capacities and dialectical skills. For all these reasons Newman is a giant more 
easily admired than imitated” (Avery Dulles, SJ. “Newman: The Anatomy of a Conversion” in Newman 
and Conversion, edited Ian Ker, Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark Ltd, 1997, p. 33). 
38 We must not imagine that Newman advocated the Conscience as alone taking a person to religious truth, 
as if to exclude Reason. The Apologia’s brief, public and famous account of his conversion to Revealed 
Truth in 1816 (pp. 4-7) does not formally mention the “conscience” – rather it gives the impression of 
reason hard at work, yet with great conscientiousness. In July 1842 William George Ward wrote an article 
in the British Critic attacking William Goode’s The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice, and in it refers to 
the Oxford writers of the “Tracts for the Times” (especially, of course, Newman) and their nine-year 
attempt to apply the principles of the early Church to the existing Church of England. He states that their 
“appeal is made rather to conscience than the reasoning faculty; though it is made to the latter also. And 
there may be ample grounds for satisfying the former, long before the definite series of arguments is drawn 
into shape, which shall fitly address the latter.” W. G. Ward, “Art. II. The Divine Rule of Faith and 
Practice; or a Defence of the Catholic Doctrine that Holy Scripture has been since the times of the Apostles 
the sole Divine Rule of Faith and Practice … By William Goode, M. A., London: Hatchard and Sons, 
Piccadilly”.    British Critic and Quarterly Theological Review, July 1842, pp. 83-84. 
11 
 
          Our chosen task here is to identify Newman’s idea of the conscience at this 
beginning of his intellectual life. We must say immediately that the intention here is to 
determine the most basic or dominant feature of the conscience at his conversion (as 
Newman perceived it), and certainly not to exclude the presence of other features that are 
to be discussed. Indeed, the discussion of the various features of the conscience which the 
following proposals in the literature introduce will help us appreciate the multi-faceted 
character of the conscience as it developed in Newman’s thought.  
          Let us begin by reviewing select portions of the literature that tell us what certain 
commentators have made of Newman’s references to his conversion of 1816, with a view 
to getting at Newman’s own idea of the conscience at this life-changing moment. This 
landmark event had to involve the conscience, for it was a religious (and moral) 
conversion.           
 
2.2     Conscience:  the sanctuary and voice of God? 
 
Our question is, at the time of his conversion how did Newman understand the role of his 
conscience? What would appear to be immediately relevant to our question is Newman’s 
striking account, provided later in the pages of the Apologia itself, of the relation between 
the conscience and belief in God. Newman famously states that “I am a Catholic by virtue 
of my believing in a God; and if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is 
because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of 
that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a 
Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience.39 (my italics). What I 
apprehend “in my conscience” is, then, the foundation of my belief in God which in turn 
is the foundation of belief in divine revelation. Newman’s sense of his very self 
inescapably included the sense of his conscience serving as the abode of God who sees, 
commands and judges all.  
          At the time of writing the Apologia (1864), Newman’s natural sense of and belief 
in God is based on his natural sense of his own self as subject to moral obligation. So 
evident is this divine presence “in my conscience” that the being of a God is as certain to 
                                                 
39 J. H. Newman (1864), Apologia pro Vita Sua: Being a History of his Religious Opinions. With an 
Introduction by Basil Willey. The World’s Classics. London: Oxford University Press. 1964, p. 206. 
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him as the certainty of his own existence,40 even though he admits to a difficulty in 
putting this argument (for God’s existence and nature) into logical form41 and thus 
satisfying philosophical correctness.42  Newman is very clear: “Were it not for this voice, 
speaking so clearly in my conscience and in my heart, I should be an atheist, or a 
pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked into the world”43 and saw the evil rampant in it. 
In its intimations, the natural conscience is host to the presence of God44 and its dictates 
serve to reveal his voice.45  Newman’s position, expressed in 1864, could not be plainer. 
          Perhaps, then, his mature idea of the nature of the conscience (as directly implying 
the presence and action of God) first came to him (as a clear and articulate conviction) as 
a result of his conversion experience of 1816. Why so? Perhaps it is precisely because it 
constituted the heart of his conversion to God. He converted to God in 1816, and this was 
because he then discovered him in a powerful way as present in the sanctuary of his 
conscience. If this is so, we have identified the origin in time of Newman’s developed 
idea of the conscience as the natural sanctuary and voice of God, and as the basis of 
belief in God.          
 
2.2.1     Authors representing this view              
There are authors who have espoused this view. In his work, Newman on Tradition, 
Gunter Biemer informs us that Newman’s first ideas of God derived from the Bible in his 
family.46  This “impression” (of God) was to some extent an unconscious one and, he 
then states, it became “clear and articulate” under the influence of Walter Mayers, a 
classics teacher at Ealing School. The influence of Walter Mayers was decisive.47 What 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 250. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 206. 
43 Ibid., p. 250. 
44 Ibid., p. 206. 
45 Ibid., p. 250. 
46 G. Biemer, Newman on Tradition (English translation of the 1961 original by Kevin Smith). Frieburg 
and London: Herder-Burns & Oates, 1967, p. 34.     
47 Newman described Walter Mayers as “the human means of this beginning of divine life in me” 
(Apologia, p. 4. World’s Classics ed. 1964).   Mayers had barely turned twenty-six at the time he converted 
the young Newman. He was a truly converted man, and he effected conversions himself. Born in 1790, he 
studied at Oxford. Due to the friendship of a person he knew at his College (Pembroke) he gained deeper 
views of religion. In 1814 he had a serious fall from a horse and, he declared, this occurrence greatly 
deepened his religious life. At the end of 1814 he became senior classical assistant at the Ealing school and 
was ordained by the Bishop of London in January, 1815. His decisive influence on Newman at Ealing took 
place during his second year in Orders, as a young clergyman of 26. He was a clergyman-schoolmaster 
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did Walter Mayers do, according to Biemer? “Newman received from him the impulse to 
reflect on the function of conscience, and to ask what it meant to be addressed by the 
voice which is heard in conscience, the primal organ of man’s religious experience”.48  
This act of reflection “on the function of conscience” involved an experience of God 
present in the natural conscience that drew forth from him a wholehearted conversion to 
God.  
          So, a “voice” was heard in the natural conscience, which acted as the “primal 
organ” of the experience of God. Newman’s conversion involved a discovery of God 
“who called him like an echo in his conscience.” The conversion as such was to the God 
of the conscience, and it was Mayers who initiated this. There was another aspect of this 
conversion. It involved a return to his childhood sense of God’s Providence – a religious 
sense normal to children but “lost for a while during a short lapse into rationalism at the 
age of fourteen.” The God he encountered by reflecting on his conscience was his 
“Creator,” whose existence he experienced “as an absolute certainty.” The Creator, 
speaking in his conscience, was then identified by Newman with the God of revelation in 
the Bible.  
         At age fifteen the dogmatic principle became fundamental in his religion,49 but this 
was because the God of Christian dogma was identified by him with the God he sensed in 
the dictate of his conscience. Presumably the identification occurred because the God of 
Bible and Catechism50 could only have been, in Newman’s youthful view, the God he 
had sensed all along in his conscience and who was now re-discovered. Biemer’s point is 
that the principal feature of the conversion was the dramatic recovery of his earlier sense 
                                                                                                                                                 
who, in view of its results, brought about one of the great conversions of the century and in English 
religious history. 
      Mayers also converted Newman’s younger brother Frank – and, it seems, other pupils too. In A Brief 
Memoir of his Life that introduces his posthumously published volume of Sermons (to which Newman 
subscribed), we read of “some of his pupils, who were eminently distinguished, for their superior talents 
and classical attainments, in the University of Oxford, having likewise become zealous servants of the 
Lord” (Sermons, by the late Rev. Walter Mayers, A.M.Formerly of Pembroke College, Oxford. To which is 
annexed, A Brief Memoir of his Life. London: James Nisbet  Berners Street. 1831). This included, of 
course, John Henry Newman and, for some years, Frank Newman. But it suggests others too. In 1822 
Mayers moved to Bampton in Oxfordshire, and in 1823 to Over Worton in the same county. Newman 
preached the first sermon of his life in the presence of Mayers at Over Worton on June 23rd 1824. Newman 
was still firmly Evangelical. He also preached the funeral sermon following Mayers' unexpected death in 
1828, when he was passing from the Calvinist-Evangelicalism of Mayers to the Caroline Anglicanism 
shared by his new friends, Froude, Wilberforce and Keble – although this process had begun before his 
serious relations with the Keble circle were under way. 
48 G. Biemer,  Newman on Tradition,  p. 34. 
49 Ibid., p. 35. 
50 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 1. 
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of the God of conscience – which was then identified as the God of revelation. It was the 
reality of the God of conscience, now rediscovered and experienced at special depth, 
which gave to the various elements of Revealed Religion their power and reality. We are 
not told how conscience apprehended God precisely as Creator. In due course we must 
consider this. But Biemer in effect asserts that (Newman’s mature theory of) the natural 
sense of God in the conscience – the starting point of religion both natural and revealed – 
was, together with a recovered sense of God’s providence, the basic and recognized 
source of his teenage conversion.  
          Biemer appears to accept this from his reading of Louis Bouyer’s Newman: Sa vie–
Sa spiritualité (1952), to whom he provides a reference. Accepting Bouyer’s thesis about 
Newman’s conversion and aware of Mayers’ decisive role, Biemer adds to Bouyer that 
the notion of the conscience that Newman’s conversion entailed came from Mayers’ 
prompting.  
          There have been others of this view – for instance, Terrence Merrigan, who has 
done important work on the thought of Newman. In 1985 Merrigan drew on various 
passages in the Grammar of Assent to show that Newman’s sense of God’s presence, his 
providence and his voice in the dictate of conscience, had its origins in the religion of his 
childhood and family. 51 Newman’s initial childhood image of God was acquired from his 
experience of the moral law – so there may be a difference here from Biemer, who 
understands Newman’s idea of God in his childhood to be drawn from family Bible 
reading. Then, drawing on Louis Bouyer, Merrigan understands Newman’s conversion to 
be a revival in him of this sense of the commanding presence of God in his conscience 
that was present since childhood, though diminished more recently.52 Merrigan takes 
Mayers to have been a principal influence in his profound realization of divine 
providence, and cites a sermon of Mayers that speaks of God’s providential use of our 
sicknesses.  
          He mentions in passing that in Newman’s system of thought the doctrine of divine 
providence is “grounded in the first place in his experience of conscience”.53 While he 
does not directly connect Mayers with this understanding of the conscience - as does 
Biemer - nevertheless Merrigan says that “the doctrine of conscience elucidated by 
                                                 
51  T. Merrigan, “Numquam minus solus, quam cum solus: Newman’s first conversion – its significance for 
his life and thought.”  The Downside Review, 103, (April 1985), pp. 99-116. 
52 Ibid., p. 110. 
53 Ibid., p. 108. 
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Newman in his major works represents the maturation of an insight first gained in the 
summer of 1816.” 54 According to Merrigan, then, the origin of Newman’s well-known 
theory of the conscience as the foundation of belief in God lies explicitly in the 
experience of 1816, though this had a foundation in his childhood. The theory was first 
perceived in 1816 when the impressionable young Newman, so very conscious of his 
inner self, discerned in his conscience the “echo of God’s voice”.55  Reflection 
specifically on the Conscience (rather than primarily, say, on the content of the Gospel) 
was the principal source of Newman’s conversion in 1816.  
         Apart from Biemer and Merrigan, other good Newman scholars could be cited. For 
instance, Vincent Ferrer Blehl SJ draws our attention to Newman’s note of July 26, 1826 
that his first conversion was a “returning to, a renewing of, principles ... which I had 
already felt, and in a measure acted upon, when young”.56  This refers, Blehl writes, to his 
childhood sense of God in his conscience and his childhood sense of God’s providence.57 
Why does Blehl say that the note of 1826 refers to a recovery of the God of conscience? 
The reason seems to be that “finding God in conscience and the realization of God’s 
personal providence became fundamental principles of Newman’s life and spirituality.”  
That is to say, the note referring to what he had “felt” and “in a measure acted upon” is 
best and most obviously interpreted in view of what later “became fundamental” to his 
“life and spirituality”. These later “principles” also “shed light on what he meant when he 
said that his first conversion was ‘a returning to, a renewing of, principles’… already 
felt” earlier.58 On these bases, the conversion of 1816 should be seen as a involving a 
profound awareness of the God of conscience re-discovered and recovered from 
childhood. This was then identified by him with the God of revelation with whom he was 
familiar from Bible and catechism in his family and religious upbringing, and spoken of 
by Mayers and his books. 59 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 113. 
55 Ibid., p. 113. 
56 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, ed. with Introduction by Henry Tristram of the Oratory.  
London and New York: Sheed and Ward.  1956, p. 172. 
57 V. F. Blehl SJ,  Pilgrim Journey: John Henry Newman 1801-1845.  London and New York: Burns & 
Oates. 2001, p. 5. 
58 Ibid., p. 5. 
59 It is a little difficult to know where Zeno stands on the matter, for though he gives great importance to 
the conversion of 1916, he does not discuss it at depth.  Dr Zeno, Capuchin, John Henry Newman: His 
Inner Life. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. 1987, pp. 22-24. 
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          These authors appear to be taking their cue from Louis Bouyer’s impressive and 
influential study, Newman: His Life and Spirituality.60  Bouyer’s standing as an eminent 
Newmanist, a respected and widely published general theologian, Catholic convert from 
Lutherism and student of Calvinism, authority on the spirit and forms of Protestantism, 
himself an Oratorian as was Newman, requires us to consider his view carefully.  
 
2.2.2    Louis Bouyer           
Bouyer gives us the circumstances surrounding the event of 1816 – and they are fairly 
clear. Due to the failure of his father’s bank Newman was left alone at school during the 
vacation of 1816. “That is,” Newman wrote years later, “it was a time of reflection, and 
when the influences of Mr Mayers would have room to act upon me. Also, I was terrified 
at the heavy hand of God which came down upon me”.61 Three elements are cited by 
Newman: isolation and personal reflection, the influence of Mayers, and some fearsome 
ordeal.62  Bouyer correctly observes that what Newman considered especially 
providential was his coming under the influence of the Calvinist-Evangelical Mayers.63  
          Recalling that the boy had contended with the notably devout Mayers in some 
religious discussions – in which, Bouyer quickly presumes, he actually outwitted his 
classics master – he asks how then did Mayers manage to convert Newman? Bouyer 
admits that “Newman has not explained (how, indeed, could he have explained?) the 
process by which his ideas, in this particular instance, underwent so complete a change.” 
64 Let us observe in passing that it is important to bear this point in mind. Newman does 
not give a detailed explanation of his conversion (possibly because he could not 
remember its elements in detail, and because it was not to his purpose which was to 
highlight but briefly its most significant feature). So in the nature of the case Bouyer has 
                                                 
60 L. Bouyer, Newman: His Life and Spirituality. London: Burns & Oates. 1958.  This book is a translation 
by J. Lewis May from the original, Newman : Sa vie – Sa spiritualité, Les Editions du Cerf, Paris. 1952. 
61 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings ed. with Introductions by Henry Tristram of the Oratory.  
London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956,  p. 150. (Early Journals: Book I). 
62 It seems that the ordeal was due to his bout of sickness and an associated serious desolation 
(Autobiographical Writings, p. 268: the first of “three great illnesses in my life” – “it made me a 
Christian”).  Paul Vaiss (who accepts the presence of an illness) interprets the ordeal as a typically 
Evangelical crushing “conviction de péché”. P. Vaiss, Newman: Sa vie, sa pensée, et sa spiritualité. 
Première période (1801-1832). L’Harmattan. 1991, pp. 50-54. 
63 L. Bouyer,   Newman: His Life and Spirituality,  p. 10. 
64 Ibid., p. 17. 
17 
 
to make many leaps if he is to divine the process of conversion. We must be grateful to 
him for his attempt. 
          How did the conscience function in this process of conversion to God, according to 
Bouyer? Bouyer regards “the books” Mayers “gave him to read” as the most influential 
factor in his conversion.65 What books were they? “Of the first of them … the main 
doctrine contained in it struck him very forcibly and at once commanded his assent.66 It 
was a book by the well-known Evangelical Romaine,67 the “main doctrine” of which was 
“final perseverance, conversion being regarded as a sudden consciousness, on the part of 
the convert, of his predestined salvation”.68   This doctrine converted him in a very precise 
sense. It brought to the fore – it triggered, we might say – a very different notion from 
that explicitly pressed by this famous preacher. It was a notion hitherto deep within his 
subconscious imagination and now brought to maturity by the stimulus of the doctrine of 
final perseverance. Newman, with a sense of his moral self which he had never lost, 
discovered anew and with powerful clarity what had been already sensed during his 
childhood.  
           Within the sanctuary of the moral self, there was felt the presence of a Master who 
in the dictates of conscience calls to obedience. All this the fifteen year old child of 
genius re-discovered but now as a formed and articulate conviction, under the accidental 
trigger of his reading of Romaine’s doctrine of election.  So it was that, to put it 
summarily, “he fell in with a man, and heard words and read books .. (and its) effect was 
to make him recognise that what belonged to his consciousness, belonged in the first 
place to God; to put it plainly, it was the presence of God within himself … What took 
hold of Newman and continued to hold him was the revelation that God was there, within  
him.” 69  
                                                 
65 Ibid., p. 17. 
66 Ibid., p. 18. 
67 William Romaine, (1714–1795), Church of England clergyman and evangelical preacher. The course of 
Romaine's spiritual conversion was complex, but it came. Though admired by many evangelical dissenters, 
he remained a firm Anglican, believing that the Thirty-Nine Articles were plainly Calvinistic.  In 1766 he 
gained the London living of St Anne Blackfriars, with St Andrew by the Wardrobe. Until the arrival of 
John Newton in 1780 Romaine was the sole beneficed evangelical in London. He remained rector of St 
Andrew's until his death at his home in Blackfriars, London, on 26 July 1795. Romaine's legacy is his 
classic trilogy on Christian spirituality The Life of Faith (1763), The Walk of Faith (1771), and The 
Triumph of Faith (1795). 
68 L. Bouyer,  Newman: His Life and Spirituality,  p. 18. 
69 Ibid., p. 24. 
18 
 
          That is to say, he was discovering “that all complete consciousness of self is moral 
consciousness”, and that “moral consciousness is the consciousness, the awareness, of 
Someone, of God”.70 So God as a living objective Being was discovered by Newman 
during his life-changing later months of 1816. This was due to his being prompted (by 
Mayers and his books – especially Romaine’s doctrine of final perseverence) to recall and 
reflect more profoundly on the implications of his natural moral Self. It was “a 
rediscovery of something he had already known, something he thought he had left behind 
him, but which now...appeared as something fully…thought out and established”.71 His 
own Self was experienced anew and with much greater power as being subject to the 
moral law, and the moral law thus apprehended was sensed in a renewed way as the voice 
of Another. 
          As a child Newman had vaguely felt this same divine presence and action in the 
dictates of his conscience.72 Bouyer thinks that it is in this sense that his conversion was a 
returning to what he had already “felt” and in a measure acted on, but had left behind 
especially in his early teens. At his conversion, through the sermons and conversations of 
Mayers and reading the books such as Romaine, the God who had revealed himself 
previously in the solitude of his conscience and now in full force, was identified as the 
God of Scripture and Creed.  
          How and why did this identification occur? Bouyer is not altogether clear on this. 
The “course of teaching” provided by Mayers on “the God of Holy Writ” enabled him to 
see “for the first time” “its full meaning” when “he became aware of himself in the light 
of it”.73  In this way, “it was not a mere discovery or rediscovery of God that he bore in 
remembrance”.74 It looks as if the reality of the God of Conscience, newly recovered 
under the prompting of Romaine, invested with his powerful reality and identity the 
testimony to the God of Revelation provided by Mayers and his books.   
          For all these reasons, Bouyer, himself very knowledgeable in Calvinism and in the 
revivals of the eighteenth century both in England and Europe, fully accepts Newman’s 
judgment of the 1870s (which I shall discuss next in this chapter) that “he never had been 
                                                 
70 Ibid., p. 24. 
71 Ibid., p. 24. 
72 This is clear from his references to his own childhood sense of God in the Apologia, and from various 
references to “the child” in his sermons and works, including the Grammar. 
73 L. Bouyer,  Newman: His Life and Spirituality, p. 25. 
74 Ibid., p. 25. 
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a genuine Evangelical”.75 His conversion was of a different kind than the Evangelical, 
and had its roots in a special action of his natural moral sense (with the aid of grace). The 
God present there now stood revealed, and Newman then understood that this was the 
God of Revelation.  
 
2.2.3        Newman’s testimony     
2.2.3   (a)   Bouyer’s account shows great imaginative effort and despite certain 
obscurities is a coherent and persuasive read. It links the thought of the mature Newman 
on the conscience with the beginning of his “formed religious convictions”. Thus we 
have a telling response to our question about the origins of Newman’s notion of the 
conscience. Newman’s description of his conversion at the start of the Apologia is brief 
with very many gaps and therefore it is unavoidable that many things need to be read into 
his brief account if the account itself is to be given full coherence. Moreover, Bouyer 
shows that Newman – as many a normal child – had, in his childhood, experienced the 
presence of God within his conscience, and of course we must presume this same 
awareness was at least present his conversion as a dimension of it. Indeed it would have 
been renewed at the time of his conversion. On the face of it, it is a very plausible 
account.  
     2.2.3   (b)     Before considering Bouyer’s proposal, there are a few initial observations 
we must make on Bouyer’s account. When we turn to the “books” Newman read at the 
time, Bouyer writes that “the first of them” struck Newman forcibly with its “main 
doctrine” and “at once commanded his assent”. It was a book “by Romaine, one of the 
few rigid Calvinists that were still numbered in the Evangelical fold”.76  But Newman 
writes that this book was but “one of the first” (i.e, not “the first”) and actually he had no 
recollection of “the title nor the contents, except one doctrine”.77  As a matter of fact, 
then, it was not (as Bouyer claims) its “main” doctrine but “one doctrine” in it. Indeed, 
Paul Vaiss maintains that this doctrine of final perseverance cannot be found in 
Romaine’s works.78  However, as against this, Bebbington writes that “the sermons of 
Romaine and Hervey seemed to suggest that there is no true faith without assurance”.79   
                                                 
75 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings  (Memoir III), p. 79. 
76 L. Bouyer,  Newman: His Life and Spirituality,  p. 18 
77 J. H. Newman, Apogia pro Vita Sua, p. 4. 
78 P. Vaiss, Newman: Sa vie, sa pensée et sa spiritualité,  p. 35. 
79 D. Bebbington,  Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s.  
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          It has to be also said that Newman does not explicitly say that Romaine’s book, or 
his doctrine of final perseverance, was the principal influence leading him to rest in the 
thought of himself and his Creator – which is an impression one may gain from Bouyer. 
It “had”, Newman believed (“I believe”), but “some influence on my opinions” in the 
“direction” of “resting in the thought” of himself and his Creator.80 This does not state 
that Romaine’s work was the principal influence in this “direction” – only “some 
influence”.  As a matter of fact, on the very next page he states that it was to Thomas 
Scott81 that he almost owed his soul.82 Scott’s works “made a deeper impression on my 
mind than any other”. Scott’s writings are given over wholly to Scripture and the content 
of divine revelation.83 It was Scott “who first planted deep in my mind that fundamental 
truth of religion” – the Holy Trinity. Other works deeply impressed him too, as we read 
in the same initial pages. 
          What must also be noticed is that, in his proposal about the influence of Romaine,  
Bouyer does not pick up what I believe is an important detail. Newman writes that the 
doctrine of final perseverance (from Romaine) “had some influence in making him rest in 
the thought of two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and 
my Creator”.84  This statement seems to speak of a renewed appreciation of himself 
before his Creator – fulfilled in his assent to Revelation. What was the place and origin 
of this sense of his Creator? We shall look at this more carefully when considering the 
                                                                                                                                                 
London: Unwin Hyman. 1989, p. 54. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Thomas Scott (1747–1821) was the influential Anglican-evangelical preacher and author principally 
known for his two works, A Commentary On The Whole Bible and The Force of Truth, both of which are 
mentioned by Newman in his Apologia as important in his early life. Scott was also one of the founders of 
the Church Missionary Society. Early in his career as a minister of the Church, Scott began a friendship and 
correspondence with the hymnwriter and author John Newton, who was curate of neighbouring Olney. This 
led him to the conversion which he related in his spiritual autobiography The Force of Truth, published in 
1779. In 1781 Scott transferred to Olney, Newton having gone to London. In 1785 Scott also moved to 
London to take up a post as chaplain at the Lock Hospital. He would walk 14 miles every Sunday, 
preaching and taking services at various churches as well as the hospital chapel. While in London he started 
publishing the Commentary On the Whole Bible that was to make his name. In 1803, Scott left the Lock 
Hospital to become Rector of Aston Sandford in Buckinghamshire where he remained until his death in 
1821. Newman knew of him in this last capacity. 
82 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 5. 
83 We read in Newman’s “Early Journals : Book II” (Autobiographical Writings, p. 204), the following:  
Monday Febr 21 (1825)  “The necessity of composing sermons has obliged me to systematize and complete 
my ideas on many subjects – on several questions, however, (those connected with regeneration) though I 
have thought much, and (I hope) prayed much, yet I hardly dare say confidently that my change of opinion 
has brought me nearer to the truth. At least, however, I may say that I have taken many doctrines almost on 
trust from Scott &c and on serious examination hardly find them confirmed by Scripture. I have come to no 
decision of the doctrines of election &c, but the predestination of individuals seems to me hardly a 
scriptural doctrine” (my italics). So “many doctrines” had been taken “from Scott &c”, and “on trust”. 
84 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4. 
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influence of Beveridge, and in our account of conscience and belief in God in the next 
chapter. 
     2.2.3   (c)    The main difficulty with Bouyer’s account is his making of this recovery 
of the God of Conscience the principal and essential element in Newman’s conversion. 
When one stands back and asks, but what are the facts and what is the evidence, one must 
regard this claim in Bouyer’s account as not supported by Newman’s text.  
          The most important fact to be remembered in evaluating Bouyer’s proposal is that 
Newman is emphatic that at his conversion he “fell under the influences of a definite 
Creed and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God’s mercy, 
have never been effaced or obscured”. Impressions of “dogma” were received into his 
intellect from without. They were not impressions of God gained primarily from within, 
from reflection on an interior Presence with which he had been familiar since childhood – 
even if occasioned by Romaine’s presentation of the doctrine of final perseverance. There 
is no mention of the God of the Self’s inner moral experience.  
          Newman is equally clear about the influences that effected this: there were “the 
conversations and sermons” of Walter Mayers and “the books….all of the school of 
Calvin” which he placed in his hands. While a case could certainly be made for claiming 
that elements of Newman’s later theory of the conscience (as being the first principle of 
belief in God, and thence of belief in Revelation) can be seen in some currents of 
Evangelicalism, one would be hard pressed to find in the posthumous writings of the 
young (and not especially intellectual) Mayers and the books he recommended the 
obvious foundations of Newman’s later doctrine. Nor is there in Newman’s own writings 
any direct confirmation of Bouyer’s interpretation of the conversion of 1816. 
          A plain reading of Newman’s unambiguous text leads one to understand that it was 
the great dogmas of Scripture and the Creed (expressing living realities of the Faith), as 
expounded by the genuinely spiritual Mayers and his books, that converted Newman. 
This conversion involved a profound realization of the doctrines of the one and triune 
God, the Creator and Redeemer who chooses each soul from all eternity, the Incarnation, 
the Atonement, the inspiration of Scripture and the judgment of God on all – with the 
person of Christ as the centre and source of these doctrines.85  
                                                 
85 The Christological focus of Newman’s conversion is clearer in Zeno, though it is not explored at length. 
Dr Zeno, Capuchin ,  John Henry Newman: His Inner Life, p. 22. 
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          It was the person of Christ and his revealed doctrine, perceived and accepted, not in 
occasional, piecemeal and haphazard fashion as one would expect of a child or youth in a 
Christian home, but now as a dogmatic Creed, which is to say as an integrated whole or 
system of living, unquestionable realities. In this way the religion of Bible and Catechism 
of his upbringing (with, now, an Evangelical stress) became a matter of personal 
conviction. The only element that is given emphasis in his conversion is the “impressions 
of dogma, which, through God’s mercy, have never been effaced or obscured”.86  
     2.2.3   (d)   On what basis were these “impressions” on his “intellect” accepted as 
“dogma”, and therefore as not subject to, nor a product of say, mere reason, sentiment or 
Christian and cultural upbringing? The terms used suggest that they were accepted on the 
basis of the authority of God who revealed them. Somehow Mayers and his books 
converted the young Newman precisely to the God of Revelation revealing himself.  
          In this sense Newman’s was a typical conversion for a youth who had been raised 
in a normally practising Anglican family. In his adolescence he came to a realization of 
the doctrines of the system of the Creed he knew so well. They were doctrines with which 
he had been familiar throughout childhood from family, from Bible and from Catechism, 
but which he had not, as a child, accepted seriously as a system of living, objective 
Revelation.  That is to say, Newman’s life-long dogmatic religion, of which in 1864 he 
was one of England’s well-known representatives, is given an exact date of origin: the 
autumn of 1816. He is saying to the British public that ever since then a Creedal system 
of Christian doctrines, and not mere personal feeling or the conclusions of mere “reason” 
or personal “conscience”, has been the fount and framework of his religious faith. On 
June 25, 1869, he wrote in The Journal 1859-79 that his first great illness – a “keen, 
terrible one, when I was a boy of 15, and it made me a Christian – with experiences 
before and after, awful, and known only to God”.87 So this illness of 1816 led him to be a 
Christian, and not just a convinced theist. 
      2.2.3   (e)  Bouyer refers to Newman’s conversion as involving “a rediscovery of 
something he had already known” 88 – which, he says, was Newman’s general childhood 
sense of God speaking in his conscience and moral life. Bouyer is drawing on Newman’s 
                                                 
86 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4 
87 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings,  p. 268. 
88 L. Bouyer,  Newman: His Life and Spirituality,  p. 24 
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memorandum of July 26, 1826.89  In that note, Newman observes that his conversion was 
not violent, “but a returning to, a renewing of, principles, under the power of the Holy 
Spirit, which I had already felt, and in a measure acted on when young” (Early Journals: 
Book I).  What were these earlier “principles” to which, without violence, he returned in 
this time? Were they the general sense of the God of his conscience which he had 
possessed earlier as a child? Doubtless they included this, but were they this primarily 
and distinctly, such as to initiate, drive and constitute his profound change to being a 
Christian?  
          On the very first page of the Apologia he plainly speaks of his early love for the 
Bible and his perfect knowledge of the Catechism. While the “principles” (i.e., doctrines) 
of Bible and Catechism had not yet become “formed religious convictions” in the way 
they would at fifteen, that is not to say that to a point he had not “already felt, and in a 
measure acted on” them “when young”. After all, as Blehl points out, “his parents were 
ordinary members of the Church, neither high nor low. They went to church on Sunday 
and participated in evening prayers”.90 Indeed, Newman in his Early Journals Book 1 
gives us an example of a hymn from his “evening prayers” and one from Sunday. He 
writes that “Two Hymns of Dr Watt’s formed part of my prayers as a child, perhaps more 
than two. I have never seen them since. The evening one began “And now another day is 
gone”; the Sunday hymn had in it “I have been there and fain would go ‘Tis like a little 
heaven below”.91  As a reading of it shows, that second hymn is quite Christological. All 
of this suggests that to a point, even if haphazardly, without maturity, without overall 
view and system, and in a way typical of a child of a normal Christian family, he “already 
felt, and in a measure acted on” elements of the Christian faith “when young”.   
      2.2.3   (f)   When Newman writes that “I had no formed religious convictions till I 
was fifteen”, does he mean that he had not “already felt” any doctrines of the Bible 
(which he took “great delight in reading”) nor any of the Catechism (of which he “had a 
perfect knowledge”), nor had in any “measure acted on (them) when young”? To begin 
with, Newman does not say this. When Bouyer endeavours to interpret the statement 
from the Apologia that “I had no formed religious convictions till I was fifteen”,92 he 
                                                 
89 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 172. 
90 V. F. Blehl S.J., Pilgrim Journey: John Henry Newman 1801-1845.  London and New York: Burns & 
Oates. 2001, pp. 1-2. 
91 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 150  (Sept 4 1881). 
92 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 1 
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states that their meaning is “perhaps conveyed at least implicitly”93 by the passage of the 
Grammar which he then quotes. Here he is conjecturing, of course, and searching for 
indirect support. The passage referred to is Newman’s description of the Bible Religion 
of the English people.94  “It consists not in rites or creeds” – but in the reading of the 
Bible. This is true, but that passage also states that this religion “has impressed upon (our 
people) … above all, the words, deeds, and sacred sufferings of Him in whom all the 
Providences of God centre” (my emphasis).  So the person of the Saviour – his “words, 
deeds, and sacred sufferings” are “above all” present in this Bible religion.  
       2.2.3  (g)  The impression of the person of the Saviour was not meant to be excluded 
when Newman wrote that “I had no formed religious convictions till I was fifteen.” In old 
age Newman wrote to George T. Edwards on February 8, 1883. In his letter he stated that 
“I have never, thank God, thro' my life for one moment doubted that our Lord died for our 
sins instead of us”95 (my emphasis).  He had always accepted the central Christian 
doctrine that Jesus Christ was the Saviour of mankind. This, of course, was a basic 
doctrine that was accepted in, we might say, the very air of the average practising 
Anglican family, such as that of the Newmans. To say that nothing of the Christian faith 
was “felt” by Newman as a child, nor acted upon “in a measure”, and that therefore the 
elements of the Christian faith were not among those “principles” to which his conversion 
returned him, is scarcely likely. Some doctrines of the Christian faith he would have 
“felt” as a child and “in a measure” would have acted on them (such as, say, in prayers 
and hymns to Jesus as Saviour), while of course many doctrines would have left him 
unaffected. This is normal in children of Christian families practising their faith.  
          What happened at age 16 was that the Christian revelation, the living doctrines of 
Bible, Catechism and Creed, bore down upon his intellect in a new way as 
uncompromisingly objective, real, living and true. Its doctrines were dogmas, and they 
involved a system, a whole view of things, which is to say a Creed. They presented a view 
of ultimate realities. They were accepted as an over-arching whole coming from God into 
which his life must be integrated. Prior to this, his religion was not perceived as firmly 
                                                 
93 L. Bouyer, Newman: His Life and Spirituality,  pp. 12-13        
94 Newman, A Grammar of Assent. Part I, ch. 4, no. 2. (Image Book edition)  U.S.A Doubleday & 
Company, Inc. 1955, p. 63. 
95 J. H. Newman, The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman,  Volume XXX,  p. 180.  This volume is 
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dogmatic, nor was it an integrated Creed in which doctrines were part of a whole. In 
1816, the living wholeness and the dogmatic character of the Creed, as the symbol of 
Christian belief and as presenting divinely-revealed realities, came home to him. His 
“religious convictions” as to the Christian religion and the divine revelation which shaped 
it, thus became truly “formed” for the first time in his life. The whole of Revelation was 
perceived as dogmatic, binding and having powerful implications for life’s lasting 
practice – which is to say for the conscience. Thus he fell under “a definite Creed”, and 
received into his “intellect impressions of dogma”. 
     2.2.3   (h)   What vindicates this point further is the (earlier) account of a somewhat 
similar (though as I shall later suggest, different) experience of Newman’s younger 
brother Francis 96 who was also influenced, and in a sense perhaps even more so, by the 
same classics master. Years after his own teenage conversion, Francis Newman has this 
to say in his Phases of Faith (1850). “I first began to read religious books at school, and 
especially the Bible, when I was eleven years old; and almost immediately commenced a 
habit of secret prayer. But it was not until I was fourteen that I gained any idea of a 
“scheme of doctrine”, or could have been called a “converted person” by one of the 
Evangelical school. My religion then exerted a great influence over my conduct …. An 
Evangelical clergyman at the school gained my affections, and from him I imbibed more 
and more distinctly the full creed which distinguishes that body of men”97. The 
Evangelical clergyman was Walter Mayers, of course. Francis’s mention of his gain of a 
“scheme of doctrine” may help us get at Newman’s meaning when he says that he “fell 
under the influences of a definite Creed.”  
     2.2.3  (i)  Francis states that he “imbibed” from Mayers “the full creed” (of 
Evangelicals).  He gained the “idea of ‘a scheme of doctrine’” which meant that “my 
religion then exerted a great influence over my conduct” (which is to say, his 
conscience). This looks similar to Newman’s case, and implies that when Newman writes 
that as a child he “had no formed religious convictions” he was especially thinking of the 
                                                 
96 Born in London, Francis Newman (1805 – 1897) and his elder brother John Henry were both educated at 
Ealing, and subsequently at Oxford, where Francis obtained a double first class in 1826. He was elected 
fellow of Balliol in the same year. His views developed rapidly in a direction opposite from that of his 
much more famous brother, and in 1840 he became Professor of Latin in Manchester New College, the 
Unitarian seminary. In 1846 he became professor in University College, London, where he remained until 
1869.  He wrote miscellaneous works – in 1849 there appearing The Soul, her Sorrows and Aspirations, 
and in 1850, Phases of Faith, or Passages from the History of my Creed. The latter details his journey to a 
mere theism.  
97 F. W. Newman, Phases of Faith, or, Passages from the History of My Creed. London : J. Chapman. 
1850, p.1 
26 
 
gain in 1816 of a credal system, all of which he now accepted with depth as expressing 
living divine realities, as dogmatic and as a divinely-revealed over-arching whole. It 
carried a unique aura and sanction. This perception he lacked in his childhood. His 
conversion involved “a returning to, a renewing of, principles, under the power of the 
Holy Spirit, which I had already felt, and in a measure acted on, when young”.98 There 
had been elements of the Christian faith which he had already “felt”, and on which he had 
acted “in a measure”. But these elements were renewed, integrated, embraced and 
extended under the power of the Holy Spirit. Revelation as a system, a Creed (as he then 
knew it as a Calvinist) was now appropriated by him with special power and resolution, 
under the impulse of grace.  
      2.2.3  (j)   This heartfelt perception of the Christian religion as a creedal system was 
life-changing. Years later, in his first (though at the time anonymous) publication as a 
Catholic, Newman would refer to possessing “views in religion”.99 In Loss and Gain, 
those lacking a “view” lack the “connection of fact with fact, truth with truth … all this 
they have yet to learn. …. They locate nothing; they have no system”.100  This Revealed 
“system” was one of the acquisitions of the conversion of 1816. Having a “view” in 
religion involved placing one’s “religion on an intellectual basis” 101 – and this 
intellectual basis of his religion, as we can see in the Apologia,102 clearly began at 
Newman’s conversion. He set out investigating things theologically – as a youth.103 
Revelation considered as dogmatic, as a Creed, which is to say as a divinely-revealed 
system, became the basis of his future intellectual life. Thus did Newman’s undergo “a 
great change of thought” and he “fell under the influences of a definite Creed”.104 
      2.2.3  (k)   Nowhere there, nor anywhere in the Apologia, does he give a date for or 
speak of his childhood sense of the God of Conscience as being that to which he returned. 
That is not to say that as a child he had not sensed God as present in his conscience, nor 
that he had not reflected at least a little on this, nor that this general sense of God as 
moral Obliger was not the more pressing in his childhood religious experience than were 
                                                 
98 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 172. 
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the doctrines of the Christian faith. Nor does it mean that this natural sense of God was 
not renewed and developed during the year of his conversion. As is shown in the 
Apologia, in later years Newman decided that this was indeed the natural, if hidden, 
foundation of the religious assent to dogmatic religion – and in due course we must 
explore the way in which this was so. This natural sense of God in the conscience for 
Newman was common in a religious child, though presumably greater in him. It would 
also have been strengthened at his conversion. One also has to say in passing that Bouyer 
offers no discussion of what appears in the Apologia as the young Newman’s existing 
perception of God as his Creator 105 – nor of how this related to the God of Conscience. 
We shall take up this important point later.  
     2.2.3  (l)  Bouyer argues that Newman’s acceptance of the doctrine of final 
perseverance from his reading of Romaine triggered in him a powerful resurgence and 
development of his sense of the God of conscience, such as to make this resurgence the 
principal event of the conversion. But it is not necessary to hypothesise in this way.  
Newman states that “the doctrine of final perseverance” which he received “at once …. 
had some influence on my opinions, in the direction …. of making me rest in the thought 
of two and only two absolutely and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my 
Creator”.106 What, let us ask, might be the connection between the doctrine of final 
perseverance (in Romaine) and “the thought of … myself and my Creator”? The 
fundamental point in one’s assured election to eternal glory, from the Calvinist 
perspective, is that the transcendent God is augustly sovereign in his being, in his saving 
plan, and in his action. Because God is altogether sovereign in every way, his saving and 
free grace is utterly decisive and all-prevailing for the one elected to glory.  
     2.2.3  (m)  The idea of the sovereignty of God was perhaps Calvin’s most central 
doctrine. It means that nothing is left to chance nor to (the vagaries of) mere human free 
will. This is what led him to put emphasis on the doctrine of predestination107 and what 
                                                 
105 Ibid., p.4. This matter of Newman’s early sense of a Creator will be discussed in this chapter in 
Newman’s reading of Beveridge’s book, and in the next chapter in Newman’s notes in “Proof of Theism”. 
106 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4. 
107 Explaining (his understanding of) the doctrine of predestination John Calvin writes,  
     “The covenant of life is not preached equally to all, and among those to whom it is preached, does 
not always meet with the same reception. This diversity displays the unsearchable depth of the divine 
judgment, and is without doubt subordinate to God’s purpose of eternal election. But if it is plainly 
owing to the mere pleasure of God that salvation is spontaneously offered to some, while others have 
no access to it, great and difficult questions immediately arise, questions which are inexplicable, when 
just views are not entertained concerning election and predestination. To many this seems a perplexing 
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led his successors to stress final perseverance of the elect108 — it is the idea that the 
august and sovereign God decides all, including whether we shall be saved. Final 
perseverance was influential among Protestants in the sixteenth century, becoming more 
controversial later. The point, though, is that final perseverance is a doctrine perceived as 
flowing from and portraying who God is. He is the utterly sovereign One. While the sense 
of assured final perseverance “gradually faded away” from Newman,109 it looks as if the 
vivid if temporary acceptance of this doctrine (that he was most assuredly saved) brought 
home to Newman most especially what was at the heart of this Calvinist doctrine, and 
what was at the heart of his conversion. This is that God is utterly sovereign in every 
sense, especially over oneself. Because of this basic truth, the elected one is (thought by 
the Calvinist to be) assuredly saved.  
          A sense of God’s utter sovereignty was by no means exclusive to Calvinism. But it 
was a very Calvinistic realization especially when marked by certain Calvinistic 
implications (such as Calvin’s doctrine of predestination and the later doctrine of final 
perseverance). It was manifestly a perspective on the entire Creed. Because of God’s 
sovereignty that was at the heart of the doctrine of final perseverance, Newman believed 
that “it had some influence on my opinions, in the direction of … making me rest in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
subject, because they deem it most incongruous that of the great body of mankind some should be 
predestinated to salvation, and others to destruction.”  
     Calvin draws support for his position from his reading of St Paul and St Augustine. He continues 
later in the chapter, “The predestination by which God adopts some to the hope of life, and adjudges 
others to eternal death, no man who would be thought pious ventures simply to deny …. By 
predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he 
wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are 
preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for 
one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.”  
     Further in the same chapter the point is repeated: “We say, then, that Scripture clearly proves this 
much, that God by his eternal and immutable counsel determined once for all those whom it was his 
pleasure one day to admit to salvation, and those whom, on the other hand, it was his pleasure to doom 
to destruction. We maintain that this counsel, as regards the elect, is founded on his free mercy, without 
any respect to human worth, while those whom he dooms to destruction are excluded from access to 
life by a just and blameless, but at the same time incomprehensible judgment…. But as the Lord seals 
his elect by calling and justification, so by excluding the reprobate either from the knowledge of his 
name or the sanctification of his Spirit, he by these marks in a manner discloses the judgment which 
awaits them.”  
J. Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, chapter 21. A New Translation, by Henry Beveridge, 
Esq. Printed at London by Arnold Hatfield, for Bonham Norton. 1599 (The Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library). 
108 The doctrine of final perseverance of the elect (which, as Newman states in the Apologia  p. 4, he took 
from Romaine) is one of the five points of Calvinism that were defined at the Synod of Dort (1618-1619) 
during the controversy over Arminianism, which objected to the general predestinarian scheme of 
Calvinism. 
109 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4: “I retained it till the age of twenty-one..” 
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thought of …. myself and my Creator”.110 It may also be noted that Newman does not 
here strictly state that this influence had its effect at his conversion. Once again too, we 
note the stress on God “my Creator”. This will be explored more fully later. 
     2.2.3  (n)   As a result of his contact with the Gospel as given by Mayers and his books 
of the school of Calvin, God became the overwhelming Reality before whom Newman 
found himself – but he was the God of Revelation, the august, holy, saving and supremely 
sovereign God (whose saving plan embraced Newman). This one and triune God eclipsed 
in importance all other realities in his life, and set forth two “beings, myself and my 
Creator”. This is what Romaine’s doctrine of final perseverance triggered. It triggered a 
realization of the august greatness of the God of Revelation – not primarily the God of the 
natural moral conscience. 
     2.2.3    (o)   However, this does leave us with the question of the role of the 
conscience in attaining this pivotal realization. As we shall see, the prior sense of the God 
who is ever present in the conscience was indeed intimately involved in Newman’s 
coming to his conversion to revealed truth. Bouyer is of assistance here, for he presses 
this very important feature of the conscience and it will have its part in Newman’s future 
theory. It does seem that at this time, especially during his desolation and ordeal prior to 
his conversion to Christian dogma, there was a special recovery of the God of conscience 
of his earlier youth. This was not the essence of his conversion, but as we shall see later 
in our investigation it prepared our teenager for his conversion and assisted in giving him 
the ethos of mind that rendered his “intellect” open to Revelation, able to sanction it, and 
able to recognize God present in it. To this we shall return later,111 for here we are simply 
reviewing the literature and specifically the theory of Louis Bouyer. 
      2.2.3  (p)   In his sermons and conversations, together with the books he placed in the 
boy’s hands, Mayers showed forth the living though unseen Christ as Saviour and Son of 
God. By means of these great books and the convincing personal testimony of Mayers, 
divine revelation in the Person of Jesus Christ was perceived by the youth as altogether 
real and ineffably sovereign. This perception was at the heart of the experience of 1816, 
and its fruit was the assent of “divine faith”112 in Jesus Christ and his Revelation. In due 
course (and having in mind what Newman later wrote) we shall consider more fully the 
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112 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4. 
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role of the conscience in the youth’s assent to the Gospel. At this point all we are doing is 
offering a critique of Bouyer by considering the plain testimony of Newman himself.113 
          The conversion of 1816 is not primarily to the God already obscurely known by the 
conscience, but to the God of Revelation. However, “this beginning of divine faith in 
me”114 was critically assisted by what his conscience had long intimated and recovered 
during his crisis prior to his conversion. In the event, this “divine faith” decisively 
developed and fulfilled those long-standing intimations. In the event of 1816, Newman 
was converted to Jesus Christ and his revelation, expressed in Scripture and Creed. 
     2.2.3  (q)   It may be noted that a few years later (June 1, 1821), his undergraduate 
studies over, he notes in his Memoir that “About a week ago I dreamed a spirit came to 
me and discoursed about the other world. … Among other things it said that it was 
absolutely impossible for the reason of man to understand the mystery of the Holy 
Trinity, and in vain to argue about it; but that everything in another world was so very, 
very plain that there was not the slightest difficulty about it. …. I thought I instantly fell 
on my knees that overcome with gratitude to God for so kind a message”.115  This 
experience suggests that it is dogma, based on the word of God and Christ, dogma as 
divinely revealed and received in faith, dogma as interconnected with and inseparable 
from the rest of the Creed, dogma as revealed by the saving and sovereign God, that is at 
the heart of the religion of the young Newman which began in 1816. It was then that 
“divine faith” began in him. It made Newman a Calvinist Christian – but ominously for 
his future Calvinism, one for whom revealed dogma, and not the Calvinist ethos and 
doctrines, was all-important. 
     2.2.3   (r)   If we turn to that important section much later in the Apologia where 
Newman explicitly mentions his argument for God and belief in dogma developing from 
the testimony of the conscience, there is this to be noticed. Having recounted the history 
of his investigation of doctrinal development,116 he tells us that “thus again I was led on 
to examine more attentively what I doubt not was in my thoughts long before, viz. the 
concatenation of argument by which the mind ascends from its first to its final religious 
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idea”.117 This “first” religious idea was that of God present in the conscience. We must 
note again that there seems to be a perception that the God present in the conscience is his 
Creator. This, as I have said, we shall take up later. The interesting thing is that Newman 
is vague as to the origins in time of this argument that ultimately appealed to the 
testimony of the conscience. He did not doubt that it “was in my thoughts long before”, 
but that is as much as he was prepared to say. But when it came to the origins of his 
assent to dogmatic religion, there is no doubt about that: it began “in the autumn of 
1816.” This fact is blazoned across the first pages of the Apologia and is the first great 
event in the “history of his religious opinions.” It is the fundamental event in the story. 
          He also gives some background to this event in his childhood. He cites written 
recollections “of the thoughts and feelings on religious subjects, which I had at the time 
that I was a child and a boy” which – significantly – had a bearing on his “later 
convictions”.118 In Bouyer’s theory, the childhood sense of God precisely in the 
conscience was what was recovered in powerful form to constitute the essence of his 
conversion in 1816. But there is no mention at all of this among these “recollections” 
which had “a bearing on my later convictions”.119  If this had had any significance for his 
experience of 1816 – which produced his first “formed religious convictions” – it would 
surely have been included in these opening recollections of his history.  
     2.2.3    (s)    Nearly sixty years later Newman placed a memorandum in the copy of 
Beveridge given to him by Mayers on 31 December 1816. In it he wrote that “I had fully 
and eagerly taken up Calvinism into my religion before it came into my hands”.120 The 
conversion of 1816, effected by December of 1816 and probably especially occurring in 
September, made of Newman a Christian who accepted the Creed, as understood by the 
school of Calvin. There is no mention in his references to 1816 of any newly recovered 
sense of the God of Conscience, though doubtlessly, in the process, this had occurred.  
 
2.2.4      Conclusion 
In his recollection of 1816, Newman himself did not regard a recovery of his earlier sense 
of the God of conscience – common to many religious children – as the essence of his 
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newly “formed religious convictions” gained at his conversion. In its dictates, Conscience 
had served to reveal and represent God, but his conversion was not, primarily, a recovery 
of this. This is not in any way to exclude this element at and during his conversion – and 
we must be grateful to Bouyer for advancing it for, as we shall see, it did play a part in 
the conversion. But it was assent to the God of Revelation which was the defining feature 
of his conversion, and there is no evidence that at the time Newman possessed his later 
theory of the intimations of the conscience being the actual foundation of belief in God 
and his Revelation.  
          As we shall see, this mature idea, undoubtedly present implicitly, came fully into 
its own later when he was probing for a rational justification of dogmatic religion, one 
grounded in his understanding of the moral nature of man and the centrality of the 
conscience, including the sense of sin. It developed only some time after his conversion 
and especially in reaction to the claims of the rationalists that Religion had to be founded 
on “Reason” – “Reason” being understood in a certain way. He was also reacting to the 
implicit claims of a foundation in religious sentiment – for Hume had reduced the 
Conscience to a mere feeling. The hard fact is that there is no explicit mention of his 
conversion being essentially a revival and appropriation of his childhood sense of the 
God of conscience. Nor is there any oblique mention of this in his correspondence and 
reflections in the few years immediately after. Rather, the event of 1816 was a full-blown 
conversion to the person of Christ and his revelation as conveyed by Walter Mayers and 
his books, which Newman summed up much later as the religion – i.e., the Calvinism – 
of John Newton and Thomas Scott.  
          There is every reason to presume that Newman had had a past sense of God present 
in his natural conscience, and this natural sense of God would certainly have been present 
in his conversion and deepened as a result of it.121 Indeed, it would have assisted in 
preparing him for it. But Bouyer goes beyond the evidence to assert that it was essentially 
a major recovery of this which constituted his conversion. He is correct that the God of 
his conscience was identified by him as the God of revelation. Still, even here, Bouyer 
does not explore with clarity the nature of this recognition. He writes that “the God who 
                                                 
121 It is also clear that Newman had gained a childhood sense that the God of his conscience was his 
Creator (J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 223). As I have already suggested and will suggest, 
because of his crisis prior to his conversion, we may presume his natural sense of the God of conscience 
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knew by conscience.  
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revealed Himself in solitude was the God defined by dogma in a course of teaching now 
for the first time fully understood, clearly recognized, the God of Holy Writ”.122  As has 
been suggested, Bouyer’s explanation of this is very brief, vague and scarcely 
explanatory.  
           
2.3     Conscience:  the accuser and judge of sin? 
2.3.1    An Evangelical conversion?  
There is a second possibility which is discussed in the literature and which is an obvious 
one. It arises from the Evangelical source and context of Newman’s conversion 
experience. What is to be said of the possibility that Newman’s was a typical Evangelical 
conversion? After all, as a result of his conversion he became a Calvinist-Evangelical. If, 
as against Bouyer’s proposal, his conversion was typically Evangelical in character,123 
then by implication we have a key to the role conscience would have played in it. We 
would therefore have the key to Newman’s notion of the conscience at the beginning of 
his intellectual history – his would have been a typically Evangelical idea of the 
conscience.  
          Sean O’Faolain sees Newman’s imagination coloured by his experience of 
Evangelicalism “perhaps to his last day”.124 Speaking of his conversion, O’Faolain tells 
us that John Henry cleaved “suddenly to the most narrow brand of Calvinistic 
Evangelicalism” – though “in later life John Henry would never have it that he had 
experienced the prescribed and passionate form of Evangelical ‘conversion’”.125 
O’Faolain is implying that the conversion was, actually, Evangelical in type and that 
Newman gave a false impression of it in the Apologia. He tells us that Newman’s “cool 
account of the matter is a bit too cool. It is that his conversion was simply an assent of the 
same kind that we give to all general propositions”.126  Newman “always transformed 
emotion into intellect, and … it was, in a sense, falsified”. O’Faolain concludes that “his 
                                                 
122 L. Bouyer,  Newman: His Life and Spirituality,  p. 25. 
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Evangelical – that is, Evangelical according to its commonly understood character, as soon to be described.  
124 S. O’Faolin, Newman’s Way. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1952, p. 33. 
125 Ibid., p. 36. 
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final summary of what he calls the ‘reality’ of his experience is pure intellectualism”127 – 
that is, it is quite untrustworthy as a proper account of what happened. Indeed, O’Faolin 
believes that “we may, without impertinence, think that we know more than he did” about 
Newman’s heart at the time.128  All up, O’Faolin discovers in Newman’s varied 
references to his conversion “the genuine, exaggerated vocabulary of Evangelicalism”.129  
Without formally stating it, and despite the lack of real analysis of the records, O’Faolin 
obviously thinks that Newman’s was an Evangelical conversion of the standard, 
emotional type, for Newman “always transformed emotion into intellect, and…it was, in 
a sense, falsified” (my italics).   
          Frank Turner’s study on Newman’s Anglican years might have been, one would 
have thought, a source of suggestions on this question. Turner tells us that the “main 
outlines of Newman’s early years are relatively familiar but not properly understood for 
their impact on his later development”.130  These early years include, of course, the 
summer of 1816 when “he underwent his first conversion through the influence of the 
Rev. Walter Mayers, a Calvinist evangelical classics master at Ealing School”.131 Turner 
recognizes its singular importance for, he writes, the “most fundamental religious 
experience of Newman’s life was his adolescent conversion to Evangelical religion”.132 
Then, through “the late 1820s, Newman remained, broadly speaking, within an 
evangelical frame of mind”133 – with Turner presenting his thesis that Newman’s great 
Oxford fight was not with liberalism but with “evangelicalism and all its works”.134  Still, 
we get hardly a thing on the conversion which made him “a narrow Calvinist 
evangelical”.135 What we are told is that Newman “came to believe himself embraced by 
a heavenly father whose promises were certain and who could provide an eternal 
home”136 – which “assured Newman of his election ‘to eternal glory’”.137 
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2.3.2     Paul Vaiss 
Paul Vaiss is much clearer, and what he has to say has much to be said for it. It is Paul 
Vaiss’s contention that Newman’s religious experience in 1816 has to be considered as 
“une conversion évangélique classique”.138 The very title of Vaiss’s book looks so similar 
to Bouyer’s139 as to give the impression that Vaiss’s publication is something of a reply. 
Prior to any discussion, Vaiss’s view has this going for it that Newman’s conversion 
indisputably entailed a turn, in a real sense, to Evangelical and Calvinist doctrines, and to 
membership in the Evangelical community. By 1817 Newman, now in Oxford, counted 
himself, and was counted as, Evangelical, and this he remained at least till he was well 
engaged in his parish work as a deacon in 1824-1825. Even then, the change from 
Evangelicalism was not immediate. In 1850 Newman remembered with emotion his 
ordination to the Anglican ministry (1824 diaconate, 1825 priesthood). He wrote of “how 
I wept most abundant, and most sweet tears, when I thought what I then had become; 
though I looked on ordination as no sacramental rite, nor even to baptism ascribed any 
supernatural virtue”140 (italics mine). In later years Newman regarded himself as deeply 
indebted to his Evangelical beginnings, as one can see even in the first pages of the 
Apologia. He spoke of Mayers and Scott with great gratitude and respect. 
          This teenage change to Calvinist-Evangelicalism in 1816 was due to the influence 
of the Calvinist-Evangelical Mayers and the books he gave him to read – those books 
were “all of the school of Calvin”.141 A decade after writing the Apologia he wrote in the 
copy of Beveridge’s Private Thoughts which Mayers had sent to him at the end of 1816 
that “I had fully and eagerly taken up Calvinism into my religion before it came into my 
                                                                                                                                                 
regards the 1816 conversion as “a basic moral conversion rooted in Christian values”. His perception of the 
essence of Newman’s conversion may be revealed (my italics) in his statement that the “conversion 
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Fundamental Issues: Festschrift for James P. Hanigan, ed. James Keating. New York: Paulist Press. 2004, 
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hands” (my italics).142  This suggests that he had taken up a few defining Calvinist 
doctrines during the last months of 1816. This is not to say, let us note in passing, that 
these defining Calvinist doctrines were accepted with genuine personal assent (which is 
to say as a result of personal judgment and not merely on the authority of his Calvinist 
mentor and his books), nor that his acceptance of them lasted. However, Newman did 
eagerly take up Evangelical-Calvinism at the time of his conversion. So, we might expect 
that his conversion was Evangelical in character – with implications for the idea of the 
conscience. Even so, the question also arises, Evangelical according to what type?   
          At about the very time of writing this note in his copy of Beveridge, Newman 
specifies elsewhere the kind of Calvinism he “received”.143 It was that of “John Newton 
and Thomas Scott”.144 Well, either of these individuals, iconic Evangelicals, might give 
us a clue as to the character not only of the Evangelical-Calvinist doctrines he received, 
but as to the character of his conversion – which may help us in evaluating Vaiss’s view. 
John Newton had been the acquaintance and disciple of Whitefield and a friend of the 
leaders of the great Revival. The well-known Thomas Scott, though very different, was 
Newton’s convert and friend – we shall consider him in a later section of this chapter, for 
his books influenced the young Newman. Both were of “the school of Calvin”. They 
were outstanding figures of Evangelicalism (within the Established Church) during 
Newman’s early childhood, and prominent pastors and writers both. Each had written a 
famous account of his conversion, read even to this day. The religion Newman came to 
embrace, following his 1816 conversion, was Evangelical according to their type – at 
least in doctrine. It must have been clear to him that his earliest mentor, Mayers, took his 
stand with them. For instance, among Mayers’ letters we notice his referring to Newton’s 
conviction that anyone can be converted by the grace of God.145  
          Does it not look as if, in such circumstances, Newman’s conversion as such was an 
Evangelical one, according to their type? Paul Vaiss insists that it was. If it was, then this 
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has implications for Newman’s idea of the conscience at this beginning of his career, 
because the conscience had a critical role in the typical Evangelical conversion, and it had 
a distinctive character. What, then, were the features of an Evangelical conversion as 
commonly understood, and what was the role of the conscience in it? To answer this let 
us consider a few well-known examples, while placing them in context. It will enable us 
to understand and review Vaiss’s position when he situates Newman’s conversion within 
this type. This in turn will enable us to see in what sense the conscience is implicated. Let 
us take, say, Calvin, John Newton and Doddridge. 
 
2.3.3.      John Calvin 
Let us begin at the font – with Cavin himself. After all, Newman writes that he had 
“eagerly taken up Calvinism into my religion”.146 In his Reply to Sadoleto, John Calvin 
describes the Reformed method of converting others to Christ, 
and in it we surely see the roots of the standard Evangelical 
conversion. Calvin specifically mentions the action of the 
“conscience” – which is obviously the guilty conscience and the 
sinner’s awareness of personal sin. The first goal is to bring the 
sinner before God’s judgment. Calvin explains that “we” start 
by asking a man to “present his conscience before the tribunal of God.” Then “when 
sufficiently convinced of his iniquity” he is to “reflect on the strictness of the sentence 
pronounced upon all sinners.” Aroused to the seriousness of his sins by the thought of 
God’s judgment he contemplates the doom that assuredly awaits him. He is “confounded 
and stricken with misery”, and “prostrated and humbled before God”. He then “groans as 
though given up to final perdition”.147 
          So the function of Conscience here is to be aware of personal sin and to set before 
the sinner the revealed doctrine of God’s judgment. The method is not, in the first 
instance, to become aware of the God of moral obligation within (as urged by Bouyer). 
Conscience accuses, convicts and then expects the divine retribution as revealed in the 
Scriptures – so an assent to Revelation seems presumed. Conscience acts like a judge that 
sentences in advance, arousing terror and despair at the thought of what is ahead. It 
                                                 
146 J. H. Newman, Correspondence of John Henry Newman with John Keble and others 1839-1845,  p. 
116. 
147 John Calvin, “The Reply to Sadolet”, in J.T.McNeill ed. John Calvin: On the Christian Faith         
(Library of Liberal Arts). Indianapolis, USA: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. 1957, pp. 193-211. 
38 
 
disposes the sinner to receive the doctrine of salvation, that “the only haven of safety is 
the mercy of God as manifested in Christ”. These then are the issues in effecting a 
conversion, as envisaged by Calvin: “all mankind are lost sinners in the sight of God” and 
“Christ is their only righteousness.” Calvin proclaims the message of Revelation on sin 
and its horrendous consequence. The state of depravity and personal sin has but one 
prospect – damnation, unless the offer of grace is accepted in faith. What is the action of 
the conscience? It instils a sense of guilt before the divinely-revealed Judge. 
          Writing of the Puritan preaching for conversion during the century following 
Calvin, Owen C. Watkins tells us that “the procedure was first to enlighten the 
unregenerate man about the nature of sin, then to lead him to a conviction of his guilt 
before God. Only then….was he encouraged to find comfort in the promises of the 
Gospel”.148  The “two essential elements” were “conviction of sin, followed by … an 
experience of forgiveness”.149  
 
2.3.4.      Evangelicalism 
That was Calvin’s method of conversion and the method in his immediate aftermath. 
How are these elements of conversion, and of the conscience within it, played out in the 
later Evangelical experience? Frank Turner states that Evangelical Protestant religion was 
the most dynamic force within North Atlantic Christianity from the middle of the 
eighteenth century through at least the middle of the nineteenth. It had a fluid and varied 
character – and the Tractarian portrayal of it, he decides, was not a complete and accurate 
reflection.150 Evangelicalism stressed personal holiness involving repentance and 
justification by faith in Christ’s atonement, after which followed good works.151  He 
states that “evangelicalism both inside and outside the Church of England was almost 
always equated, especially by its critics, with a religion of emotional conversion or 
incitement of intense religious feeling”.152  
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          David Bebbington judges the Evangelicalism that began in the mid 1730s to be 
the most important development before or after in English-speaking Protestantism.153  In 
Bebbington’s view, the common characteristics of Evangelical religion from its 
beginning were fourfold: the call to conversion, Christian toil especially for the 
conversion of others, devotion to Bible reading, and the centrality of Christ’s Cross. In 
the early days, he says, there was normally a stress on the first and the last of these.154 
There is the call to conversion from sin, and its term is faith in the Cross of Christ. It may 
also be mentioned in passing that a somewhat new doctrine became prominent as a result 
of the Evangelical Revival: that the new birth occurs at conversion and not at Baptism. It 
is a moot point whether this notion is to be laid at the feet of Luther and Calvin, but by 
the time of Mayers it was current in Evangelicalism, and early in 1817 Mayers pressed it 
on Newman.155 This, incidentally, suggests that Mayers himself hoped that Newman’s 
conversion was of this character.      
 
     2.3.4.    (a)     John Newton156 
          These elements of the Evangelical conversion are best 
considered by taking a couple of famous examples. John Newton 
(1725-1807) published the story of his conversion in his Authentic 
Narrative (1764). The Narrative quickly achieved popularity and went 
through numerous British and American editions and was translated 
into other languages. Many regarded it as Newton’s best work and it made him an 
international figure within Evangelicalsim. It was the story of how – as Newton 
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summarized his life on his tombstone – once an infidel and libertine, he was by the mercy 
of Christ preserved, restored, pardoned, and appointed to preach the faith he had long 
entirely neglected.  
          Conscience is named as a constant protagonist in the Narrative. It made its 
appearance early in Newton’s account, but at that stage its urgings had little effect. 
Despite a moderately religious start in life he became a libertine and a non-believer. The 
great day in the story was March 10, 1748, on the way back to England from Africa. A 
tremendous storm broke upon the ship, during which two great issues of his conscience 
finally burst upon him: his many sins and the objective truth of the Gospel. He was a 
sinner, he had neglected the truth of the Gospel, and God’s judgment was nigh. Then a 
wonder occurred: the weather unaccountably improved. By divine providence he had 
been preserved from the jaws of Hell. This effect on him of awesome circumstances 
bringing him to the threshold of damnation together with a particular providence 
preserving him for a converted life flowed, clearly, from his guilty conscience. It taught 
him of God’s judgment on sin and of God’s mercy for a new life. 
          He now turned to the Gospel and to Jesus who died “for the sake of those who in 
their distress put their trust in him.” On the basis of his conscience-driven need for 
salvation, he worked out the elements of his theology. That is, for instance, some 
“expedient” was needed “to interpose between a righteous God and a sinful soul@. In 
other words, there had to be an answer to the need of redemption from his sin. He began 
studying the New Testament and by the time the ship arrived in Ireland he was convinced 
of its truth. The insoluble problem of his sins was resolved by – and could be resolved 
only by – the divine mercy and justice revealed in the obedience and death of Christ. 
Moreover, not only was the truth of the Atonement thus vindicated (for it alone answered 
the need), but also the truth of the Incarnation for “I stood in need of an Almighty 
Saviour, and such a one I found described in the New Testament.” So Jesus is “God 
manifest in the flesh, reconciling the world to himself.” Socinianism would not answer to 
the need for salvation.  
          His conversion to Christ, and his understanding of Christ that resulted from his 
reading of Scripture, was powered and enlightened by his guilty conscience as answered 
by the Gospel. This made of him a Christian, a new man, regenerated, and it gave him a 
certain theology. It may be noted that it was not especially creedal, but strong in certain 
points only with the accusing conscience being pivotal. His conscience filled him with 
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fear and disposed him to accept the doctrine of God’s saving grace coming from the 
Atonement – and the doctrine of the Incarnation implied by it. His conscience, then, was 
the natural instigator and implicit teacher of much of his religion, including the fact of a 
Providence that cared for him and guided him to Christ, though he was a sinner. At the 
same time, it was not the conscience doing this of its own power. “Thus far the Lord had 
wrought a marvellous thing; I was no longer an infidel; ... I had taken up some right 
notions; was seriously disposed... Thus, to all appearances, I was a new man.” It was all 
“wrought by the Spirit and power of God.”  
          From this point he did not again question the truth of the Scriptures nor did he (as 
he had in the past) lose “a sense of the rebukes of conscience.” It was the beginning of his 
Areturn to God, or rather of his return to me.” A religious conversion had been 
accomplished, although an acceptance of the Evangelical doctrine of assurance was yet 
to come. This came with his contact some five years later with Calvinist Dissenters and 
then with Whitefield, who fast became his ideal. “Amazing grace saved a wretch” like 
him. His conversion, and the Christian doctrines he most vividly accepted, hinged on the 
accusing action of conscience.  
 
      2.3.4.    (b)    Philip Doddridge 
          Newton’s was the story of his own soul.  Well, let us 
turn to a different kind of declaration. We see this same 
pattern of a conviction of sin and terror at the prospect of 
Judgment, followed by faith in the free grace of Christ, 
described in the famous do-it manual of conversion, The 
Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul (1745), by Philip 
Doddridge. Philip Doddridge was born in London, June 26, 
1702, and died in Lisbon October 26, 1751. He was a 
generation earlier than Newton, a contemporary of Wesley and Whitefield, and an 
outstanding (Dissenting) pastor and writer on the Christian life. It is said that his Rise and 
Progress, published when he was about the age of 43, was one of the most translated 
works of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It converted William Wilberforce, the 
anti-slave campaigner and father of one of Newman’s future associates in the Oxford 
Movement. It is one of the three books Newman specifically mentions in his 
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Autobiographical Memoir: III157 as having been read by him during his Evangelical 
years.  
          What is Doddridge’s method of conversion, for this might indicate the role and 
nature of the conscience in it? The method of the manual is to instil in the sinner a sense 
of the hopelessness of his guilt, “if the Gospel does not at length deliver” him. It is to 
help him “feel something of the terror of it before you can be excited to seek that Gospel 
for deliverance”.158  An essential ingredient of this sense of guilt is the thought of the 
judgment of God on sin and the damnation it brings.  
          Here, of course, we notice a difference between the process outlined by Bouyer and 
that of the standard Evangelical conversion. Bouyer teases out the experience of God in 
the natural conscience and the moral sense. This is then connected with revelation – 
although the nature of the connection is obscurely stated. The God who is known in 
moral obligation is (somehow) identified with the God of revelation. Doddridge, 
however, directly confronts the sinner with the revealed doctrine of God’s judgment. 
Look at your sins! If you do not repent and turn to Christ the Saviour, you will be 
damned. The conscience is repeatedly named, but the accusing conscience is effective 
especially because revealed doctrine (on the judgment) has been accepted. Let us observe 
in passing that Doddridge does not explore the foundations of this acceptance of the 
dogma of divine judgment, as it is not his interest.  
         Doddridge is clear. “It is a terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God.” 
The sinner’s “own conscience” knows that there is nothing to “arrest” the judgment that 
is coming159. His “conscience knows it”.160  “The soul that sinneth, it shall die” (Ezech 
18:4). “But thou has sinned...” and Christ will say, Depart from me..” 161  Doddridge 
concludes with his dramatic warning: “And on supposition of thy continuance in thine 
impenitence and unbelief, thou art brought into this miserable case, that if God be not 
either false or weak, thou art undone, thou art eternally undone”.162  The conscience 
                                                 
157 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings, p. 79. 
158 P. Doddridge, (1745).  Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul.  Ch. 5, 11.  
Philip Doddridge, Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul: Illustrated in a Course of Sermons and 
Practical Addresses, Suited to Persons of Every Character and Circumstances: with a Devout Meditation 
Or Prayer Added to Each Chapter.  London : Printed by Richard Edwards, sold by R. Ogle, 1804 
159 Ibid., Ch. 6, 2. 
160 Ibid., Ch. 6, 3. 
161 Ibid., Ch. 6, 8, 9 
162 Ibid., Ch. 6, 11 
43 
 
convicts of sin, presents the doctrine of God’s judgment, and hauls the sinner before 
Christ as his only hope.  
 
2.3.5    Newman:   Conscience the accuser of sin?  
While Evangelical conversions ought not to be seen as invariably fitting into the pattern 
just described, at least by Newman’s time this was usually perceived as the typical 
process in an Evangelical conversion.163 If Newman’s conversion was typically 
Evangelical according to this type, there are implications for his idea of the conscience at 
the time. The fact is that Newman emerged from his conversion with a lively sense of sin 
and of Christ the Saviour. Sin had its place at the centre of his religious philosophy. His 
accusing conscience would have convicted him of sin and brought him to a species of 
fright at the thought of God’s judgment. It would have disposed him to turn from sin and 
accept in faith the doctrine of the free grace of Jesus Christ with the assurance of 
salvation it bequeathed, together with certain other doctrines intimately connected with 
the gift of that saving grace.  
         As has been mentioned, Paul Vaiss, who has studied Newman in great detail and 
depth, is emphatic: Newman’s conversion was “une conversion évangélique 
classique”.164  Vaiss flatly contradicts the Newmanists Dessain, Honoré and Bouyer who, 
arguing from well known passages, do not allow this. It is clear that Vaiss considers 
Newman’s conversion to be of the kind I have been presenting. This is because he insists 
– accepting the usual description of the conventional Evangelical conversion165 (as in 
Dessain) – that the conversion of 1816 fulfilled the three standard requirements: 
conviction of sin, terror and the acceptance of pardon and salvation in faith and joyful 
assurance.166 This pattern we see in Calvin’s recommended method, in Newton’s 
Authentic Narrative, and in Doddridge’s Rise and Progress.  
          Newman’s conviction of sin is shown, Vaiss writes, in his letter to Keble of 1844 
accusing himself of early sin, in his journal entries of 15 December 1859 and of 25 June 
                                                 
163 One gains the impression that this is typical for Evangelicalism in the modern day too. An Evangelical 
Protestant would commonly ask, “Are you born again?”  What does he have in mind here? He is usually 
wanting to know, “Did you have a moment in your life when you suddenly realized that you were a sinner 
and that you were on the road to hell and then by God’s grace you believed with all your heart that Jesus is 
your personal Lord and Saviour and that by trusting in Him, all your sins are washed away?” 
164 P. Vaiss, Newman: Sa vie, sa pensée et sa spiritualité, Première période (1801-1832),  p. 57. 
165 Ibid., p. 50 
166 Ibid., p. 57. 
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1869, and even in his prayer fragment of 1816.167  His terror and despair are indicated by 
his reference to “the heavy hand of God” in the first notation of 1821 in the Early 
Journals: Book 1 168 (and, were I also arguing for this view, surely also in the poem of 
1816 referring to “a wretch like me”169 – suggesting, too, a familiarity with John 
Newton). His sense of assured salvation is shown in the second notation of 1821 (Early 
Journals: Book 1: “I know I know I know”).170 There are other points in Vaiss’s 
argument, and he draws on various authors to support him, such as Sean O’Faolain 
(already mentioned) and John Linnan.171  
 
2.3.6.       Evaluation 
2.3.6.    (a)    There is no doubt that – as with Bouyer – a good case can be made for the 
position of Vaiss, drawing on various entries of Newman’s journals and notations. It is 
quite certain that there were many elements of the typical Evangelical conversion in 
Newman’s experience of 1816, just as there were elements of the experience that Bouyer 
describes. For instance, the fact is that Newman did emerge from his conversion with a 
new and life-long sense of sin and its evil which became central to his thought on man 
and religion. Indeed, as an Evangelical preacher in 1824, it was this sense of sin that he 
probed for a natural foundation to religion, seeing it as opening the heart to the Gospel.172 
At his conversion, his accusing conscience came into play as it had not done before. His 
conversion certainly involved a disillusionment with and disgust at sin (and scepticism) 
prior to and at his conversion to the Redeemer.  
       2.3.6.  (b)  For instance, in introducing “The Journals” with a note written on 
December 31, 1872, Newman explains that the “first part taken is from A.D. 1804 to 
1826. Misericordias Domini in aeternum cantabo. I am loth to destroy altogether the 
record of God’s great mercies to me, of the wonderful things he has done for my soul, 
and of my early moral and spiritual history. Yet on the other hand I know the difficulty of 
keeping it, and the delicacy and danger of making selection …” (Early Journals: Book 
                                                 
167 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
168 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 150. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 P. Vaiss, Newman: Sa vie, sa pensée et sa spiritualité, Première période (1801-1832),  pp. 56-58. 
172 We shall pursue this point in the next chapter. 
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I).173  So what we have in The Journal has been deliberately selected by Newman as 
being significant. He expresses dissatisfaction with the style in which it was written – for 
his tendency then was to compose with an eye to style, and his taste was bad, so he 
thought. His Evangelical tone contributed to this bad taste – but what he chooses to 
provide there is certainly not incorrect or misleading. On the contrary, it is “the record of 
God’s great mercies to me”. There is a deep sense of God’s mercy. 
          What is especially noticeable is the strong sense of sin and the acceptance of the 
sovereign will of God. For instance, very early there is a note giving a prayer he used at 
the end of 1816 (that is, at the end of his critical months of conversion). The prayer 
begins with praise of “my God & king / in Thy dear Name rejoice / And daily to Thy 
praises sing”. It continues with a tell-tale verse, “I am a work, and Thou art good / To 
save a wretch like me, / Who always has Thy grace withstood, / And turned his back on 
Thee”.174  It is very reminiscent of the Evangelical John Newton’s “Saving Grace.” The 
sense of sin is obvious. Immediately following this prayer in the Journal, there is a Latin 
prayer (December 1816) of his own composition, in which he asks that God keep him 
from sin. The sense of personal sin is manifest: “Dein, serva me carnis a [sic] illecebris. 
Heu miser ego! Peccavi. Aeternam damnationem mereor propter portentosa facinora 
mea.”  
          In the Letters and Diaries there is the entry “Spiritual notes” giving a prayer in 
Latin – again, with clear expressions of sin and appeal to the help of the Holy Spirit: 
“Debilis, infirmus, impotens, aut arrogans, superbus, elatus sum; mihi agion pneuma 
da...” 175  In another reflection at the end of 1816,176 he prays (the text is in Latin) asking 
divine aid to avoid sin and to seek holiness of life: “Et nunc obsecro ut me sinas (vitare) 
quod mihi est mali instrumentum..” In a further statement of resolve immediately 
following (in English), he writes of his intention to be strict in respect to certain 
recreations. There is in this statement of spiritual policy a certain maturity for his age. He 
admits his own weakness, the obligation of obedience to his parents, the seriousness of 
sin and its beginnings, and his readiness to give way if they command.  
         2.3.6.   (c)    The point here is his care in respect to sin. A little later (Spring of 
1817) he is writing sermonets. Regarding them, Newman wrote in 1851 that he was very 
                                                 
173 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings,  p. 149. 
174 Ibid., p. 150.  (Early Journals: Book I, “Transcripts of unconnected papers”) 
175 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol I, p. 29. [[1816 end]]) 
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fond of Beveridge’s “Private Thoughts” at the time and wrote reflections or sermonets in 
their style. We have a list of some of them (written in the Spring of 1817) in the Early 
Journals.177  Divine revelation, sin, the Athanasian Creed, feature among them. On 
November 1817, at College, he refuses to drink to excess.178  On 18 November he had his 
confrontation with one who invaded his room at Trinity – Newman is firm in his 
principles and is respected for it, notwithstanding his Evangelical tone.179  On October 
10, 1819, Newman states that “The doctrine of the Atonement (is) the key stone of 
Christianity”180 indicating the place of sin in his general religious outlook. He prays for 
holiness of life: on May 19, 1818, preparing to stand for the scholarship which he gained, 
he prays, “Give me grace, make me holy, for Thou alone canst…” 181  The sense of sin 
flows from a sense of the sovereign holiness of God. God is perceived as an objective 
Reality which governs his conscience, and requires of him avoidance of sin and the quest 
for holiness. 
          In his famous poem, Lead Kindly Light (entitled “The Pillar of Cloud”, written 
1833), Newman states that “I was not ever thus, nor prayed that Thou Shouldst lead me 
on; I loved to choose and see my path; but now Lead Thou me on! I loved the garish day, 
and, spite of fears, Pride ruled my will. Remember not past years!”.  In his letter to Keble 
of June 8, 1844 he refers to his “living a life of sin, with a very dark conscience and a 
very profane spirit” when he was “a boy of fifteen”.182  From this he was converted. In a 
letter to Sister Imelda Poole in 1856 he writes that “I was at Bridgewater (sic), forty years 
ago next July, an ungodly, unbelieving boy of 15.” Years later he told Henry 
Wilberforce183 that “It is 30 years this very month,184 as I may say, since God made me 
religious, and St Ambrose in Milner’s history was one of the first objects of my 
veneration”.185  Yes, Newman did gain from his conversion some marks of a converted 
Evangelical. Specifically, he was certainly converted from sin. The advantage of Vaiss’s 
proposal is that he has stressed this feature of the conversion of 1816.  
                                                 
177 Ibid., p. 154. 
178 Ibid., p. 156  (Early Journals – 1817, November 7)  
179 Ibid,  p. 157. 
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(according to the Apologia) from August to December, in some special sense happened during September.   
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History, and was nothing short of enamoured of the long extracts from St Augustine, St Ambrose ...” 
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        2.3.6.    (d)    Other typical features of Evangelical religion came to him, including 
the element of earnestness. For instance, we notice a reference to Newman’s early 
Evangelical life in the introductory Discourse I of The Idea of a University – delivered on 
Monday 10 May, 1852, over thirty-five years later, when a Catholic. He writes (of liberal 
education) that “Those principles which I am now to set forth under the sanction of the 
Catholic Church, were my profession at that early period of my life, when religion was to 
me more a matter of feeling and experience than of faith” (emphasis mine).186  Newman 
is not speaking here strictly of his conversion – he is speaking more broadly of the 
Evangelicalism of “that early period” of his Christian life and belief. It included, he tells 
us, the high emphasis (which he absorbed) of Evangelicals on being a spiritual man, a 
man of personal experience of Jesus Christ – although we must include within this (as we 
know from the Apologia), his critically important assent to revealed, dogmatic, creedal 
truth.  
 
          2.3.6.  (e)   Our question is, though, what notion of the conscience was primary and 
distinctive in the process of Newman’s conversion, a conversion that resulted in his 
“formed religious convictions”187 at this beginning of his intellectual career? But to 
identify what is primary, distinctive and essential is not to exclude other features of the 
conversion – such the typical Evangelical joy of pardon coming from an acute sense of 
sin and its answer in the Atonement by Christ, together with the resolve to pursue 
holiness in Christ.  
          2.3.6.  (f)   To begin with, we must ask, just as we did in respect to Bouyer’s 
position, what does Newman himself say about this claim of Vaiss’s? While Newman 
says nothing of Bouyer’s theory but simply gives a quite different account, in respect to 
Vaiss’s theory he contradicts it. The fact is that Newman, in full maturity, simply denies 
what Vaiss claims and does so with the greatest clarity. As a matter of fact, when looking 
back on his Evangelical years with the intention of judging on his early convictions, 
Newman states quite simply, and to our surprise, that “in truth, much as he owed to 
Evangelical teaching, so it was that he had never been a genuine Evangelical”.188  So, 
beyond the question of the character of his conversion, Newman judged himself not even 
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to have been “a genuine Evangelical”. This judgment on his Evangelical life was made a 
decade after the Apologia.      
     2.3.6.    (g)   More to our point here, Newman makes a similar denial in respect to the 
nature of his own conversion. While he had been converted by Evangelical teaching to “a 
spiritual life” (meaning a genuine Christian life with “experience and “feeling”), his 
conversion was not according to “that special way which it laid down as imperative, but 
so plainly against rule.” That is to say, his conversion was not according to the 
commonly-understood Evangelical pattern. The result was that it was “very doubtful in 
the eyes of normal Evangelicals whether he had been really converted at all.” Newman is 
saying that his conversion was not the typical Evangelical conversion as this was 
generally understood both at the time of his own conversion and at the time of his later 
writing about it. This is what we must now examine because it constitutes a flat denial of 
Vaiss’s position. 
     2.3.6.    (h)    Newman refers to various well-meaning Evangelical persons who had 
written to him at different times of his life (such as after the publication of his Apologia) 
telling him that he still did not understand what conversion meant and that this change in 
him had yet to come if he was to be saved.189  This verdict about the character of his own 
conversion, from the standard Evangelical perspective, Newman accepted. He had not 
undergone the special experience which the typical Evangelical called “conversion”.  
          What was this special experience? Newman spells it out: conviction of sin, terror, 
despair, news of the free and full salvation, apprehension of Christ, sense of pardon, 
assurance of salvation, joy and peace and so on to final perseverance.190  All these 
emotions Newton (and Scott) had experienced, and which Doddridge cultivates with 
great power in his manual of conversion, and which Calvin himself had recommended. 
These features Vaiss accepts, as does Dessain, as being typical of the Evangelical 
conversion. Bebbington appears to accept them as well.191  
          Of course, the question may be raised of whether there is a broader description of 
the Evangelical conversion, as discussed by Frank M. Turner.192 Sheridan Gilley points 
out that there was “a great range and variety of the understanding of conversion within 
the Evangelical world of the 1820s” – and Mayers himself “pragmatically insisted that 
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192 F. M. Turner,  John Henry Newman: The Challenge to Evangelical Religion,  pp. 28-45.  
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most conversions were not instantaneous but took time”.193  That is to say, a broader idea 
of it might allow us to situate Newman’s conversion within the Evangelical tradition, 
despite Newman’s own disclaimer of his having been typical. We shall take this point 
very much into account in our very next section. The point being made here is the 
rejection by Newman of the type that is pressed by Vaiss and others. This rejection by 
Newman tells against the action of conscience we are considering with is its dominant 
sense of sin, its consequent awful fear of God’s judgment, its thrusting of the sinner in 
faith at the feet of the Saviour, and its emergence with the relief and exultant joy of a new 
life.  
     2.3.6   (i)   In his Autobiographical Memoir: III,194 Newman refers to a memorandum 
on his own conversion among his Early Journals: Book 1, dated July 26, 1826.195  In this 
entry of 1826 he writes that during the past nearly two years he has “greatly changed” his 
views on many points. He then transcribes from loose notes points that were “written in 
1821 and appended to a description of the ordinary process of conversion, (i.e. the hopes, 
fears, despair, joy &c &c of the person under conversion,) which I then thought almost 
necessary to a true Christian”.196  So the note refers to a certain process of conversion 
described in his books as “ordinary”, and to the idea that this was “almost necessary to a 
true Christian” – that is, as being necessary for regeneration. This was the standard 
Evangelical view of regeneration, which pivoted on conversion. This idea was pressed by 
Mayers on Newman early in 1817.197  
          In the Memoir III he tells us that 1821 was a time when he was more devoted to the 
“Evangelical creed and more strict in his religious duties than at any previous time” – so 
Newman’s Evangelical fervour increased over the five years following his conversion, 
including his time at Trinity. It did not wane, and was manifestly authentic – as is shown 
in his impressive religious response to his failure in the schools at the end of 1820. 
          The context of the 1821 notation was his “drawing up (at great length) an account 
of the evangelical process of conversion in a series of Scripture texts”.198 The note of 
1821 reads, “I speak of conversion with great diffidence, being obliged to adopt the 
language of books. For my own feelings, as far as I remember, were so different from any 
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account I have ever read that I dare not go by what may be an individual case”.199 Vaiss 
interprets this as a lack of understanding of what a true Evangelical conversion really 
was. He was misled, Vaiss opines, by relying too much on his reading of the pre-
evangelical Beveridge.200  But this, I have to say, is not supported by the texts – and I 
shall have reason to discuss Beveridge soon.  
         2.3.6  (j)    In 1826 Newman judges this fragment of 1821 as referring to the typical 
Evangelical conversion process. In this Early Journal entry of July 1826 he writes that the 
reflection of 1821 shows he had accepted the Evangelical account of conversion not from 
personal experience but on authority (‘juxta praescriptum’) and that his own conversion 
did not involve violent feelings but “a returning to, a renewing of, principles, under the 
power of the Holy Spirit, which I had already felt, and in a measure acted on when 
young”.201 Indeed, this is not the only evidence Newman provides.202  Vaiss interprets 
this private note of 1826 as the product of Newman’s changing judgment on 
Evangelicalism. Unconsciously or otherwise, while in 1821 Newman was misled by his 
reading, in 1826 he was re-interpreting what had happened in 1816.       
 
2.3.7.    Conclusion 
2.3.7. (a)   Vaiss’s position (which is shared by others) simply does not do justice to 
Newman’s deliberate judgment about his conversion, a judgment made in the 1820s and 
again, with full deliberation, late in life. If we are to accept Newman’s firm assertion in 
the Apologia that his conversion was to a dogmatic religion (while not excluding the 
presence of other elements too), we have no reason not to accept and work with his 
equally firm assertion in the Memoir and Early Journals that it was not Evangelical as 
Evangelicals would normally have understood it.  
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          Of course, as has already been said, one may argue that Newman’s image of 
Evangelicalism in both his early life (1821 and 1826) and old age may not represent a 
more fluid reality of Evangelicalism obtaining early in the century, a reality that might 
include say, Beveridge, Mayers and, for that matter, Newman too. Granted – and in our 
next section (2.4) we shall look at whether we can situate Newman’s conversion within a 
Calvinist-Evanagelical type. But Newman’s early notes and later description of the 
standard Evangelical conversion are in accord with the great typical accounts such as 
Newton and Doddridge, and he is only meaning to compare his experience with this 
typical pattern. He denies that his conversion was “Evangelical” as this was normally 
understood.  
     2.3.7 (b)  Vaiss shows that Newman’s conversion shared elements of the Evangelical 
conversion (and for this we are grateful). His doing this places before our discussion this 
dimension of the conscience as Newman’s thought developed. But his contradiction of 
Newman’s calm and clear statement is unwarranted. We have no sufficient reason to 
reject Newman’s denial, and to attribute to the conscience in Newman’s conversion the 
type of primary and distinctive role it played in the classic Evangelical conversion – as 
exemplified in, say, Calvin’s Reply to Sadoleto, in John Newton famed autobiography 
and in Doddridge’s outstandingly effective manual. In this kind of action its principal 
character was accusatory, and it was this because of divine Revelation. It acted as 
Accuser and Judge of sin, and in precisely this way, as Dodderidge put it, it is God’s vice-
gerent in the soul. In dramatic fashion, conscience accuses and frightens by its accusation 
of sin and by its reminder of the revealed doctrine of God’s judgment. It drags the fearful 
sinner to the foot of the Cross and opens his heart to the joy and peace of salvation. 
Elements of this action of the conscience were present in Newman’s conversion but they 
did not constitute – as Newman himself makes clear – its essential, dominant and 
defining character. Newman wrote that he had not “been converted in that special way 
which it (i.e., evangelical teaching) laid down as imperative, but so plainly against 
rule”.203 
        Writing this observation with decades of experience behind him, he obviously 
regarded the typical Evangelical conversion as “against rule” and not the usual pattern of 
conversion to a living Christian faith for the normal child in the average Anglican family. 
Newman does not think that conversions are ordinarily of this kind. So then, in 
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conclusion, the origin of Newman’s theory of the conscience, expressed in works such as 
the Apologia, cannot be found primarily in what Vaiss proposes – although elements of it 
certainly can. 
 
2.4       Conscience:  Sanction and guardian of the truth? 
 
2.4.1.     Introduction:  Conversion to Truth 
Our task is to identify the principal features of Newman’s idea of the conscience at the 
beginning of his intellectual history, which is to say at his conversion of 1816. The plain 
meaning of the Apologia account of the conversion suggests a firm assent to revealed 
truth.204  (Cardinal) Jean Marcel Honoré states that “Hence, we discover the essence of 
Newman’s conversion: it is the doctrinal character of a religious certitude rather than of 
any feeling of consolation …. Newman at fifteen escaped the deism which held him 
captive until then and submitted to a revelation from on High”. So there was a passing 
from a deist disdain of a claimed Revelation to a heartfelt conversion to it. It was a 
conversion from the emptiness of doubt, scepticism and rationalist religion to 
wholehearted certitude about revealed doctrine. It was a conversion to dogma. But still, 
Honoré adds, “it had some Evangelical overtones”.205 It would indeed have involved 
elements of Evangelical “consolation”. For instance, Newman states that at his 
conversion he accepted (the consolation of) final perseverance even if for but a few 
years.206 But this was not its principal and essential component.  
          Edward Sillem, in his General Introduction to Newman’s Philosophical Notebook, 
interprets it thus: “Newman’s conversion was fundamentally a...turning from error rather 
than from sin”.207  This too is true, provided we understand it as a matter of emphasis, for 
there is clear evidence in the young Newman of a strong turning from sin. As has been 
said, the central place of sin in his philosophy of man is one of the life-long legacies of 
his Evangelical period. So while Newman’s conversion had as its primary emphasis the 
appropriation of dogmatic truth (about God, Christ and the divine plan of salvation), it 
                                                 
204 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
205 J. Honoré,  The Spiritual Journey of Newman (translated by Mary Christopher Ludden). New York: 
Alba House. 1992, pp. 18-19. 
206 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
207 E. Sillem, ed., The Philosophical notebook of John Henry Newman. Edited at the Birmingham Oratory 
by Edward Sillem. Volume. I (General Introduction to the Study of Newman’s Philosophy).   
Louvain:  Nauwelaerts publishing house. 1969, p. 170. 
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did have many elements that were to be found in the typical Evangelical conversion, as 
previously described. This broad point can be made of Bouyer’s proposal too. 
          Sheridan Gilley, in his Newman and his Age, has a chapter on Newman’s 1816 
conversion,208  but it is difficult to state what he sees to be the root of the conversion. He 
writes that “In short, Newman’s discovery of God was a rediscovery of the deepest neo-
Platonic yearnings of his childhood”,209 and “a reassertion of the sensations of an earlier 
(beginning)”.210 The “experience … was not an evangelical conversion at all”.211 He tells 
us that “The Calvinist experience of conversion was the beginning of Newman’s mature 
devotional life; the dogmas of Calvinism were the beginning of his intellectual life. 
Doctrine was the objective correlative to a living experience…”212 Perhaps we can take 
from Gilley a certain stress on doctrine (within the Calvinist tradition) as at the forefront 
of the Conversion. 
 
2.4.2.     The foundation: The sovereignty of God 
Let us try to probe the foundation of Newman’s conversion to dogmatic truth and, 
consequently, to a holy life, with a view to discerning the action of the conscience – and 
then Newman’s own stated view of it at the time. At his conversion, Newman became 
Calvinist-Evangelical. Having considered and set aside Vaiss’s view of what this means 
(in Newman’s case), we must ask in what sense was Newman a Calvinist-Evangelical as 
a result of his conversion?  
          Granted Newman’s acceptance of certain Calvinist doctrines and, as he said years 
later (in May 1852), the importance he gave to “feeling” (that is, conviction) and 
“experience” (heartfelt faith), let us recall a central point already alluded to. Perhaps the 
most fundamental and notable characteristic of Calvinism is its emphasis on the 
transcendent sovereignty of God. God is God – that is, he is sovereign over all in every 
sense and beyond all calculation and limit. He is sovereign in his saving action. This is 
the root of the doctrines of election and final perseverance: God sovereignly prevails in 
his will to save (those elected to glory). By the same token, his revelation is absolutely 
sovereign and must be accepted without cavil.  
                                                 
208 S. Gilley, Newman and his Age.  London: Darton, Longman and Todd. 1990, ch. 2, pp. 15-24  
209 Ibid., p. 20. 
210 Ibid., p. 21. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid., p. 24. 
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          On March 11, 1851, nearly thirty five years after his conversion, Newman stated in 
a letter to Henry Wilberforce that his original bias was “Evangelical-Calvinistic”.213  In 
view of the discussion in the previous section, what did he mean by this helpful 
admission? Importantly for our analysis, this original Evangelical-Calvinistic bias, he 
wrote in his letter, gave to him a sense of the “utter, infinite separation between the 
Creator and the creature,” a sense that we have no “claims on God”, and are nothing 
“more than what grace makes us”. If we can but “realize an eternal self-dependent God, 
from whom an impassible gulf separates all creatures, all mysteries vanish <are as 
nought>”.  
          So this is what Newman gained at his conversion – it was a profound realization of 
God. He came to know the one and only august, self-dependent, all-sovereign God who is 
beyond and above all, and yet who has revealed himself to his creatures. His conversion 
involved a realization of who the God of Revelation is, and his utter lordship as Creator 
and Redeemer.  
      
2.4.3.   The sovereignty of God in his revelation   
Now – and here is the critical point – it was this, Newman writes in that letter, that had 
always kept him from calling into question, let alone refusing assent to, any doctrine or 
any mystery contained in divine revelation. He readily went forward to accept dogmas 
that were discovered to be part of this revelation, no matter how far beyond the powers of 
reason they may be. This was because it was God who revealed them, the all-sovereign 
God. The religion of his conversion was one of God’s authority and obedience to him. It 
was his “Evangelical-Calvinistic” realization of the sovereignty of God, gained in 1816, 
which was the soul and root of his assent to revealed dogma, whatever be its mysteries 
and whatever the Christian Creed was discovered to include. With this realization of God, 
the fact that revealed doctrines are mysteries beyond reason is not an obstacle to assent. 
In this sense they are “as nought”.214  
                                                 
213 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries.  Vol. XIV, p. 235. 
214 As mentioned earlier, in his “Early Journals: Book I” Newman made a significant notation. On June 1, 
1821, the young 20-year-old wrote, “about a week ago I dreamed a spirit came to me, and discoursed about 
the other world. I had several meetings with it … Among other things it said that it was absolutely 
impossible for the reason of man to understand the mystery (I think) of the Holy Trinity, and in vain to 
argue about it; but that every thing in another world was so very, very plain, that there was not the slightest 
difficulty about it. I cannot put into any sufficiently strong words the ideas which were conveyed to me. I 
thought I instantly fell on my knees, overcome with gratitude to God for so kind a message.” 
(Autobiographical Writings, pp. 166-167).  
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          In the fullness of time Newman decided that divine Revelation is to be found in the 
doctrine taught by the Catholic Church. It was the realization of the sovereignty of God 
which was the foundation of his progressive path to the eventual acceptance of Catholic 
truth, with all its revealed mysteries. It was, so the Catholic Newman writes in his letter, 
their deficient realization of God which held Puseyites back from the full acceptance of 
the revealed mysteries taught by the Catholic Church.  What, then, Newman writes in his 
letter of March 11, 1851, must C. (probably J. D. Coleridge) do in order to accept 
Catholic truth, with all its difficulties for man’s reason? He writes that “If C. would 
meditate for a year on this great Sight, this Allglorious, Ecstatic, though most awful 
Vision, he would be a Catholic. O my Lord, keep me to the thought of Thee, and I am 
safe.” Whatever of Newman’s judgment on the Puseyites, the important thing here is that 
behind the conversion to a religion of dogma, so clearly highlighted in the Apologia, was 
the conversion to the august and ineffable God revealing his truth and his saving plan. 
         It is this personal knowledge of God, gained by meditation on “this great Sight, this 
Allglorious, Ecstatic, though most awful Vision,” that leads to the acceptance of all of 
revealed dogma, no matter how far it might exceed the limits of human reason. It was the 
protracted and prayerful meditation on the God of Revelation and his saving works 
(during the second half of 1816) which occasioned his conversion and brought him to a 
full assent to his revealed Truth. The reason, Newman thought, for the doctrinal 
liberalism in the person about whom he is commenting in the letter just mentioned and 
his cavil at accepting certain dogmas was a lack of this realization of God’s transcendent 
sovereignty (which he himself gained as a young Calvinist-Evangelical convert). He 
concludes by observing, “C. is in the way to be a liberal. I wonder whether he holds 
eternal punishment.” Assent to revealed dogma, whatever mysteries this might entail, was 
based on having possessed “this great Sight” – in other words, on a profound realization 
of the ineffable sovereignty of the God of Revelation. 
          Newman’s conversion was “Evangelical-Calvinistic,” not primarily according to 
the pattern of conversion described by Calvin in his Reply to Sadolet, as recalled earlier 
when discussing Vaiss (without excluding this pattern), but in another sense. It is here 
that we must bear in mind the fluidity of the “Evangelical-Calvinistic” conversion in 
history – and therein the action of the conscience. Newman’s conversion was to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
    Newman obviously thought that this was, indirectly, a message from God. It must have confirmed his 
conviction that the basis of faith in divinely revealed mysteries was that God had declared it. 
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realization of the all-sovereign God, and specifically of God as revealing his Truth. He is 
the utterly sovereign God of Revelation, so his revelation must be accepted whatever it 
might include. One’s response to the august God is manifested and tested by one’s 
response to his all-sovereign Truth with all its mysteries, and by living according to it.  
          In the account provided by the Apologia, Newman’s newly-energised Christian 
conscience was now defined by Christian dogma, as expressed in Scripture and Creed. 
Thus it was that his acceptance of (Romaine’s) doctrine of final perseverance “had some 
influence on my opinions, in … making me rest in the thought of two and two only 
absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator”.215 This was 
because at the root of the Calvinist doctrine of the salvation of the elect was the utter 
sovereignty of God, understood in the Calvinist sense.  
 
2.4.4.    The similarity with Calvin’s conversion 
It has already been pointed out that Evangelical-Calvinist conversions were not, in fact, 
all of a single type. When discussing Vaiss’s view that Newman’s conversion was 
classically Evangelical in character, I proposed that the typical Evangelical conversion 
with its special role for the accusing and crushing conscience can be seen prefigured in 
Calvin’s account of the Reformed method of converting sinners, as described in his Reply 
to Sadoleto (1539).216 Calvin reports that “we” start by asking a man to “present his 
conscience before the tribunal of God”.217  Then “when sufficiently convinced of his 
iniquity”, he is to “reflect on the strictness of the sentence pronounced upon all sinners.” 
He is “confounded and stricken with misery”, and “prostrated and humbled before God”. 
He then “groans as though given up to final perdition”. It was argued that, as Newman 
insisted, his conversion was not primarily of this kind, though elements of it were 
certainly present. The observation was made earlier that subsequent to Calvin there 
                                                 
215  J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
216 C. Bucey observed of Calvin’s Reply that “John Calvin’s 1539 reply to Jacopo Sadoleto is a very 
important exchange that encapsulates much of the essence of the debates surrounding Rome and 
Protestantism at the time. The two letters illustrate the deep divisions between each side and provide a brief 
testimony to the heart of the Reformation.” (my italics).   
Camden Bucey’s article (authored on 7 January 2010) was at: (accessed on Internet on January 16, 2014):  
http://historiasalutis.com/2010/01/07/calvins-reply-to-sadoleto/ 
       D. G. Hart writes of Calvin’s reply to Sadoleto that at the time it was “one of the clearest statements of 
Reformed Protestantism to date” (Calvinism: A History. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2013, p. 18). 
217 John Calvin, Reply to Sadoleto. In J.T. McNeill ed., John Calvin: On the Christian Faith.  Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1957,  “The Reply to Sadolet”,  pp. 193-211. 
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gradually emerged the doctrine that it was precisely at one’s conversion that regeneration 
occurred. Here, though, we are looking at types of conversion. 
         Now, if we are to go on Calvin’s admissions on the matter, it would seem that 
Calvin’s own conversion was not principally of this type 
either.218 It is a little difficult to discern but it looks primarily, 
though not exclusively, doctrinal. Its focus is on God’s Word 
and the rejection of error. We have two descriptions by Calvin 
of his conversion and both are tantalizingly brief. For the first, 
we must return to the text to which we have already referred. 
Six years after his conversion219 in about 1533, he wrote 
towards the end of his Reply to Sadoleto the following 
revealing statement.  
"Being exceedingly alarmed at the misery into which I had fallen, and much 
more at that which threatened me in view of eternal death, I, duty bound, made it 
my first business to betake myself to your way, condemning my past life, not 
without groans and tears. And now, O Lord, what remains to a wretch like me, 
but instead of defence, earnestly to supplicate you not to judge that fearful 
abandonment of your Word according to its deserts, from which in your 
wondrous goodness you have at last delivered me."220  
          The “way” to which he had previously felt “duty bound” to “betake” himself was 
fidelity to the Word of God and a renunciation of his “abandonment of your Word” (in 
the papal Church). God in his “wondrous goodness” had delivered Calvin from “the 
misery into which I had fallen”. The misery from which God had delivered Calvin was 
his having been stuck fast in the falling away of the papal Church from the word of God 
                                                 
218 Jean Calvin, born Jehan Cauvin (1509–1564) was the principal figure in the development of the 
Calvinist system of theology. Originally a humanist lawyer, he broke from the Catholic Church, with his 
own conversion from it taking place in about 1533. After an uprising against Protestants in France, Calvin 
fled to Basel, Switzerland, where he published the first edition of his seminal work The Institutes of the 
Christian Religion in 1536 – an apologia for the doctrinal position of the Protestants that was subsequently 
amended and improved in various editions. He moved to Geneva, and his authority there was uncontested 
during his final years. 
219 The date of Calvin’s conversion is disputed. D. G. Hart writes that “Calvin was an extremely private 
person, and so determining the point at which he converted to Protestantism has left his biographers 
guessing. Sometime between 1532 and 1534 Calvin gave signals that he was rejecting the Roman Catholic 
Church” (Calvinism: A History, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013, p. 15). 
220 “The Reply to Sadolet”, in J.T. McNeill ed. John Calvin: On the Christian Faith. Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Co. Inc. 1957.  This statement of Calvin’s on his conversion is also discussed in B. Gordon, Calvin. 
New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press. 2009, p. 34. 
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in the Scriptures. The passage from which our quotation is taken speaks of his conscience 
having being pricked by his connivance at the contradictions with the word of God 
abounding in his former Church. And so “My mind being now prepared for serious 
attention, I at length perceived, as if light had broken in upon me, in what a sty of error I 
had wallowed, and how much pollution and impurity I had thereby contracted.” The 
essence of his conversion was an authentic assent to the revealed word of God and a 
rejection of papal error. 221 
          In 1557, eighteen years later, Calvin referred again, also briefly, to his conversion 
in the Preface to his Commentary on the Psalms.222  The passage tells us that in his youth, 
his mind was more “hardened” than should have been expected. This was because “I was 
too obstinately devoted to the superstitions of Popery to be easily extricated from so 
profound an abyss of mire”. So his mind was hardened in error. Then “God by a sudden 
conversion subdued and brought my mind to a teachable frame”. His mind, previously 
hardened was, by his conversion, made teachable. This suggests a conversion from a 
false understanding of Revelation (due to “the superstitions of Popery”) to a correct one. 
The result was that he gained a “knowledge of true godliness”, having abandoned the 
“abyss of mire” of Popery.  
          He writes that “I was immediately inflamed with so intense a desire to make 
progress therein” that he left off, somewhat, his current studies to pursue with ardour true 
godliness. The result of it was that even though he had scarcely begun himself, “before a 
year had elapsed, all who had any desire after purer doctrine were continually coming to 
me to learn, although I myself was as yet but a mere novice” (my emphasis). While 
                                                 
221 D. G. Hart brings out that a few years before, in 1536, Calvin’s “temperament ran much more in the 
direction of scholarly than pastoral work. But Farel was belligerently persistent and threatened Calvin in 
ways reminiscent of the Old Testament prophets. According to Calvin’s own account: ‘Farel .. proceeded to 
utter the imprecation  that God would curse my retirement and the tranquillity of my studies which I sought 
if I should withdraw …’” (Calvinism: A History, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013, p. 
17).  All this suggests that Calvin’s focus was on the study of the Word of God and doctrine.  
222 J. Calvin, Preface to the Commentary on the Psalms. Vol I. (1558). The relevant passage is as follows:  
“God, by the secret guidance of his providence, at length gave a different direction to my course. 
And first, since I was too obstinately devoted to the superstitions of Popery to be easily extricated 
from so profound an abyss of mire, God by a sudden conversion subdued and brought my mind to 
a teachable frame, which was more hardened in such matters than might have been expected 
from one at my early period of life. Having thus received some taste and knowledge of true 
godliness I was immediately inflamed with so intense a desire to make progress therein, that 
although I did not altogether leave off other studies, I yet pursued them with less ardour. I was 
quite surprised to find that before a year had elapsed, all who had any desire after purer doctrine 
were continually coming to me to learn, although I myself was as yet but a mere novice and 
tyro.”  (italics mine).     
 Of course, the “doctrine” was that of “true godliness”, but at its heart there was the assent to Revelation.    
Internet access  September 16, 2013:    http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom08.vi.html 
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Calvin’s was a conversion distinguished by a greater “godliness”, the passage suggests 
that this meant an unremitting concern for “purer doctrine” and a teaching of it to others.           
          Calvin was fired with the fact and loftiness of Revelation as presented in Holy 
Scripture. Scripture alone – considered as freed from the mire of Popery (and Church 
Councils) – was the source of the “pure doctrine” he sought. He applied himself to the 
work of mastering directly its meaning, and discarded the guidance of the wayward 
Church he had abandoned. He possessed for his Guide in interpreting Holy Writ – so he 
had worked out and felt assured – the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit. It was this 
“purer doctrine” that he discovered because of his attention to Scripture. This revealed 
doctrine, as contained in and portrayed by Scripture, converted him to the august and all-
sovereign God whose redeeming grace was all-prevailing and sovereign. Conversely, this 
moral and religious change impelled him to investigate revealed doctrine further and to 
teach it to others. Calvin’s bent and gifts were in this direction, and his conversion too 
was in this direction. 
          Calvin’s reference to his own conversion to “true godliness” does not explicitly 
mention anxiety of conscience at the sight of his life of personal sin and the divine 
condemnation he could expect, followed by a profound and exultant joy on accepting in 
faith the Saviour’s Atonement for his sins. He does mention his sinfulness in the Reply – 
but it is the sinfulness of not accepting the light of God’s word (as proclaimed accurately 
by the Reformers) with more alacrity. Calvin’s conversion, if we are to go on what his 
own two accounts of it suggest, appears to be primarily doctrinal.  The revealed doctrine 
on God and his saving plan, as he interpreted it, struck home in a new way. It set him on a 
strongly doctrinal and Protestant course, and it involved, of course, moral attitudes and 
resolutions. It had direct implications for his conscience. For instance, it led to the 
practical step of his break from and combat with the Catholic Church. Another practical 
result was the Institutes of the Christian Religion, the Summa of Reformed doctrine.  
 
2.4.5.     The Puritan and Evangelical elements 
It appears, then, that there are two discernible streams or emphases in Calvinism. There is 
that conversion and subsequent Christian life which is primarily focussed on concern for 
the true doctrine of God and his Revelation. It is the godliness of hearing and accepting 
revealed truth, and rejecting “the superstitions of Popery”. This appears to be primarily, 
though not exclusively, Calvin’s own case as given to us in his Reply and in his 
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“Preface”. On revealed doctrine there was to be no compromise, and there emerged a 
tremendously tenacious adherence to certain central doctrines such as total depravity, 
election, the all-prevailing power of grace, faith alone and Scripture alone. There is also 
the second current or emphasis, conversion from sin and subsequent earnestness in the 
Christian life. This is represented in Calvin’s account to Cardinal Sadoleto of the 
Reformed method of converting others. It emphasises a turning away from sin and being 
a genuinely spiritual man who lives in Christ with true feeling.  
          Truth and holiness are scarcely to be separated in the authentic Christian life, but 
they can surely be distinguished as emphases and attractions. Both could be seen as 
deriving from a sense of God’s transcendent sovereignty, the one emphasising the 
sacrosanct purity and splendour of his Revealed Truth, the other emphasising the evil of 
sin and the lustre of adherence to the person of Christ (that is, with feeling and 
experience). It is a matter of emphasis, and one cannot simply categorize the Puritan or 
the Evangelical as merely one or the other. It would seem that the Puritan tradition bore 
along with it the special concern for the revealed truth of the all-sovereign God (as we see 
in, say, the book by Beveridge that the young Newman read so assiduously on his 
conversion, and also in Scott’s works). The great Evangelical revival two centuries after 
Calvin especially took up the turning away from sin and the embrace of a life of faith in 
the Saviour and personal holiness. Indeed, it went to the point of bringing into 
prominence what might be regarded as a doctrine not traceable to Luther and Calvin – 
that regeneration occurs precisely at a heartfelt conversion to the Saviour. In this view, 
baptism alone becomes a mere ceremony.  
          The danger of the one tendency was to neglect the other, and even to lose interest 
in the other. In Mayers we can see both working strongly, I think, with a very special 
commitment to the Puritan understanding of “Divine Truth”. However, he also stressed 
that regeneration occurs with conversion and the necessity of a holy life. He was an 
Evangelical, and looked fondly and with admiration on the Moravians.223 Newman’s 
good fortune was to have apprehended the intimate connection of both aspects of the 
Christian life, while seeing revealed dogma as being at the heart of the matter. He came 
to seek both truth and holiness – in his case we are speaking of a powerful, balanced and 
original mind. At the heart of the matter was the august and unique sovereignty of God. 
                                                 
223 We see this in his letters appended to his posthumous volume of sermons. 
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          In his Apologia, “above and beyond the conversations and sermons” of Mayers, 
“was the effect of the books” which Mayers gave him to read. Newman acknowledges his 
great debt to Thomas Scott, the famous Calvinist-Evangelical author living at the time of 
Newman’s boyhood, youth and undergraduate years – although it does not seem that 
Newman’s reading and re-reading of Scott was directly due to Mayers. He had “been 
possessed of his ‘Force of Truth’ and his Essays from a boy”.224 What was it in Scott (as 
portrayed in, say, his Force of Truth) which he especially speaks of? It is his search for 
and following of revealed “truth wherever it led him” and his “bold unworldliness” – 
issuing in maxims such as “holiness rather than peace”, and (spiritual) “growth” as “the 
only evidence of life.” The young Newman was especially admiring of Scott’s readiness 
to follow truth wherever it led him.225  There is here the image of a journey ahead in 
seeking to know and accept revealed doctrine. A holy life is inextricably linked with the 
conscientious pursuit of and obedience to revealed truth. As we shall see, this is also what 
Beveridge urges. 
 
2.4.6.       Assent to dogma and Creed 
So it was that Newman describes his adolescent conversion in the Apologia as “a great 
change of thought (that) took place in me. I fell under the influence of a definite Creed, 
and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God’s mercy, have 
never been effaced or obscured”226 (my italics).  In terms of what was primary, 
Newman’s conversion to a Christianity of dogma and Creed was according to a certain 
Calvinistic type, one that appears to be at least similar to that of Calvin himself. 
Newman’s conscience became profoundly alive to truth and error, most especially to 
revealed truth and to heresy – which is to say, to unquestionably revealed and divine 
facts.  
          However, the “impressions of dogma” and the “definite Creed” which he received 
at this early stage was that conveyed to him by his Evangelical and Calvinist influences – 
such as the living example of the Calvinist-Evangelical Mayers, and the moving account 
                                                 
224 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 5.  
In the edition of 1865, Newman added Scott’s “Force of Truth” to the Apologia’s 1864 text, which already 
had Scott’s “Essays”. Both of these books he had “from a boy”. His deliberate addition of the Force of 
Truth would suggest its importance to him. Scott’s Bible Commentary he “bought when I was an 
undergraduate” (Apologia, p. 5). 
225 Ibid., p. 5. 
226 Ibid., p. 4. 
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of Scott’s Force of Truth. As a result, so vivid did this dogmatic truth seem, so manifested 
in personal conviction and holiness of life, that his religion was “Evangelical” in that it 
was also a religion of real experience, real feeling and conviction (as referred to in the 
University Lecture 1, May 1852). This included the turning away from sin and a pursuit 
of holiness. Indeed, one suspects that Mayers (as a good Evangelical) hoped that 
Newman’s conversion was of this latter kind. Newman seems to have thought during his 
early Evangelical years that his conversion should have been especially of this kind227 – 
even though, he had later to admit, it was not this primarily. In any case, it was not just a 
matter of an absolute intellectual assent to a creedal system of propositions. It was an 
assent to a Creed which comprehensively represented the saving, triune and sovereign 
God, with his saving plan that involved a very personal redemption as portrayed in 
Scripture. Thus Newman became, in spirit, Calvinist and Evangelical. In this sense, his 
conversion cannot be reduced to the description that Calvin chose to give of his own.228  
          Being essentially of a dogmatic character, the way was now open that could take 
Newman far beyond his Calvinistic-Evangelical beginnings in 1816. That is to say, 
wherever dogmatic, revealed truth was discovered to lie, that is where Newman would 
believe the God of Revelation to be leading him.229 Like Scott, he would be prepared to 
follow truth “wherever it led him”.230 Scott got to the Holy Trinity – Newman got much 
further. It was not just a matter of being a converted and spiritual man who possessed a 
powerful feeling for and experience of the Saviour – with the objective and precise 
content of Revelation in its totality being put a little in the shade and not much pursued. 
                                                 
227 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 80 and p. 172 – referring to his memorandum of 1821, 
and his comments on this memorandum in July 1826. These notes suggest that the young Newman had 
thought he should have converted in the typical Evangelical way, and that perhaps he was expected to have 
done so by Mayers. But both the note of 1821 and that of 1826 show that his conversion was not primarily 
of this type.  
228 One cannot assume that the entirety of Calvin’s conversion is encompassed in the brief descriptions of it 
in the “Preface” and the Reply. But they depict a certain emphasis, and are referred to here to set Newman’s 
conversion in context. Newman’s conversion was, to a point, of the type suggested by Calvin as his own. 
229 One way of appreciating the dogmatic character of the religion embraced by the young Newman at his 
conversion in 1816 and to which he adhered during his Christian life, is to contrast it with that of his much 
older friend some 12 or 14 years later at Oxford – Joseph Blanco White. In Blanco White’s Life (Vol. I) we 
read his account of his religious opinions a few years after Newman’s conversion. He repeatedly attacks the 
view that “right opinions on dogmatic theology are necessary to salvation” (p. 363). He writes that in “this 
period of my mental life” he “felt on the verge of absolute disbelief in Christ. Yet the admiration which I 
preserved for his character, and the deep respect I felt for all his practical doctrines (including the habitual 
state of the mind in regard to God), I continued practically his faithful disciple. … I was a practical disciple 
of Christ; but had no definite, dogmatic Creed” (p. 367). The Life of the Rev. Joseph  Blanco White, ed. J. 
H. Thom, in three Volumes. London: John Chapman, 1845. Vol. I.   
230 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 5. 
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Objective, dogmatic, revealed truth was the basic issue – the question now being, what 
had God revealed, what did the Creed include, and how was one to live accordingly? 
Years later Newman would write that “one cause of corruption in religion is the refusal to 
follow the course of doctrine as it moves on, and an obstinacy in the notions of the 
past.”231 
          For these reasons, Ian Ker is nearer the mark when he writes that Newman’s 
conversion cut at the root of doubt and gave him a profound certitude.232 It did bring 
certitude, but certitude to dogmatic, revealed truth. Definite doctrines of Scripture – as 
authoritatively systematised in the Creed – were accepted as absolutely certain, and as 
being the principal issue in religious faith and assent. This certitude was founded on his 
acceptance of the utter sovereignty of God, Creator and Redeemer, and this was at the 
root of his conversion. This gave to divine revelation with all its mysteries, known now or 
to be known in the future, a sacred and untouchable character. It also meant that the 
whole question of religious certitude and objective truth became important to him.  
          His conversion was a fundamental turn-about from the dallying with (rationalist) 
deism and scepticism of his recent adolescence, as referred to in the Apologia. The 
thought of this rationalist stage of his recent experience undoubtedly preyed on his 
conscience and, with his conscience condemning him, contributed to his preparedness for 
the Gospel. He tells us there that when he was fourteen – in other words the very year 
before – he read “Paine’s Tracts against the Old Testament, and “found pleasure in 
thinking” of their objections. He “read some of Hume’s Essays; and perhaps that on 
Miracles”. He copied out some of what might have been Voltaire’s verses “in denial of 
the immortality of the soul”.233  He had been entertaining a scepticism in respect to the 
tenets of the Christian faith, a scepticism founded on the perceived requirements of 
sceptical “Reason”.234  
          At his conversion to God and probably during his crisis prior to it, he recognized 
that this recent adolescent scepticism towards revealed doctrine was a profound offence 
against the all-holy and supremely sovereign God. This questioning of Revelation had 
                                                 
231 J. H. Newman,  (1845). An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. Part II, ch.5, section I. no. 
8. Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1968. 
232 I. Ker, John Henry Newman: A Biography.  Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press. 1988,  p. 5. 
233 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 3. 
234 By “the perceived requirements of sceptical Reason” I mean to refer to “Reason” as presented by Paine, 
Hume, Voltaire and others with whom he dallied in his pre-conversion reading. The requirements of 
Reason, according to these authors, stipulated outright scepticism towards Christian dogma (Apologia p. 3). 
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been a serious moral failure, perhaps in turn preceded by other moral failures,235 which 
his conscience now condemned. Perhaps he now saw his moral and doctrinal lapses as 
causally connected – and, conversely, that the good life is deeply connected with assent 
to revealed dogma. As a result of this new moral readiness, Christian truth was now 
received into his intellect with power and heartfelt conviction because it was God who 
had revealed it. In 1821 Newman wrote of his conversion in his journal in this way: “The 
reality of conversion: - as cutting at the root of doubt, providing a chain between God and 
the soul. (i.e. with every link complete) I know I am right. How do you know it? I know I 
know. How? I know I know I know &c &c.”236   
          His conversion amounted to a profound realization of and assent to the truth of all 
Scripture doctrine, as enshrined in the Creed and expounded in the Catechism. It was 
true. There could be no doubt about it. Why? Because the ineffably sovereign God had 
revealed it. Dogma involved the authority of God and consequently the rejection of 
heresy and unbelief, which denied the reality of what was revealed. Years later Newman 
would write that “the essence of all religion is authority and obedience”.237  
          Thus it was that Christian truth had a profound impact on his conscience. He fell 
under the influence of a definite Creed 238 – the “influence” of the Creed, understood as 
the orthodox statement of revealed truth perceived by and governing his conscience, or 
the mind perceiving its duty. What Newman “admired in Scott was … the minutely 
practical character of his writings”239 – which is to say his application to personal living 
and action of the “truth of religion”. Dogma bore on Newman’s conscience, though 
Newman does not use the word here. The Creed became the over-arching truth to which 
his conscience submitted, and which his conscience applied to his life. His conscience, 
sanctioning revealed truth and intent on guarding it by knowing it better and obeying it 
generously, became Christian. It was founded on the objective and certain realities of 
dogma. 240  
 
                                                 
235 To which, as we have seen, he admitted in correspondence years later. 
236 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 150. 
237 J. H. Newman,  An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. Chapter II, Section II, no. 11.  
238 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
239 Ibid., p. 5. 
240 As we shall see, this acceptance of the revealed truth about God and his sovereignty also involved a 
recognition – based on the natural knowledge of God already present in the conscience. This function of 
recognition has already been alluded to but it will be elaborated especially in Chapter 4.1 (4.1.1 and 4.1.4). 
This action of recognition by the conscience is to be understood as part of its sanctioning function. 
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2.4.7.      Conversion and the further action of conscience 
We see definite indications of the action of his newly-formed Christian conscience. There 
is a recorded intention of living a stricter life, dated about the end of 1816. In it Newman 
refers to the authority of his conscience and to his sense of the evil of sin. He writes in his 
Early Journals: Book 1 241 that he hopes that he will not be ashamed when presenting his 
reasons for denying himself certain recreations. He intends (obviously if challenged 
within his family) to present “my scruples with humility and a due obedience to my 
parents, open to conviction, and ready to obey in a matter so dubious as this is, and to act 
against my own (judgment), if they command, thus satisfying at once my own conscience 
and them...” (my italics). 
          This written remark, not lacking in maturity, suggests certain perceptions of the 
nature of conscience. Conscience imposes the duties of revealed religion. Satisfying his 
own conscience requires of him that he be ready to act contrary to his own judgment as to 
those duties, if his parents command. That is to say, the dictate of his conscience is not to 
be identified simply with his own private judgment on the practical duty in question. 
There is implicitly suggested, then, that the voice of conscience represents a moral 
authority above oneself and one’s own judgment.  
          Moreover, his “own conscience” is something he must “satisfy”. This is a common 
expression, but it vaguely suggests that the conscience, though interior to oneself, is a 
demanding and higher obliger that requires obedience and that warns of sanctions. Its 
dictates are to be obeyed, and the youthful Newman clearly means to obey them. He sees 
something objective, external and ultimate reflected in the voice of his conscience. He 
respects the direction of his parents, too, as imposing on his conscience – and so we have 
in seed something of Newman’s characteristic recognition of a higher authority in human 
superiors.  
          Continuing the same reflection, the young Newman adds that “I have too much 
sense of my own weakness to answer for myself. The beginnings of sin are small, and is 
it not better, say, to be too cautious than too negligent?” So, conscience warns of the evil 
of sin even in its beginnings and also of his proneness to sin. The newly-converted youth 
is very aware of his conscience understood as the sense of sin. It is better to be “too 
cautious than too negligent.” There is a firm element here of the Evangelical accusation 
of sin and of its stress on its evil. 
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2.4.8.    Conscience the guardian of revealed truth 
What we are trying to do here is to gain an idea of Newman’s notion and image of the 
conscience as it emerged at the beginnings of the history of his religious thought, for it set 
the lines for future development. We must not expect that his full idea of the conscience 
would have been present at this beginning during the months of August to December of 
1816, and especially in September. But there is the start of it. The fact that his conversion 
occurred over nearly five months suggests that it was not a siezure of extraordinary 
emotion, but a protracted and profound meditation on God and his revelation. But now 
we must move to a more exact identification of Newman’s idea following on his 
conversion. 
          In January 1817, which was the immediate sequel to this period, the young 
Newman replied to the letter of Walter Mayers sent to him a few weeks earlier.242  He 
makes a significant remark on the conscience, one that must be examined. He writes that   
“I find I have very great need of some monitor to direct me, and I sincerely trust 
that my conscience, enlightened by the Bible, through the influence of the Holy 
Spirit, may prove a faithful and vigilant guardian of the principles of religion." 
243   (italics mine)        
          This statement constitutes a surprising insight in someone so young, and it 
certainly bears on our subject. It shows that the boy gives a decisive role to his 
conscience in the living of religion and one cannot help but think of his reading of Scott’s 
Force of Truth.244  He does not, of course, define the “conscience” because he has no call 
to do so, but he does use a revealing metaphor which describes his idea of the conscience 
at this dawning period.  
         The conscience is a guardian. It is a “faithful and vigilant guardian of the principles 
of religion.” Conscience is a kind of loving sentinel of the Truth that has been conveyed 
to him, and is at its service. Conscience, enlightened by the Bible and influenced by the 
Holy Spirit, is his foremost natural guardian in the living of his religion. Inasmuch as it 
guards “the principles of religion” (meaning the truths of religion) the implication is that 
conscience is especially responsible for the privileged place of revealed truth in one’s 
life. It guards faithfully and vigilantly these truths which have not come from oneself but 
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from above. It also suggests that the conscience is imagined as a distinct principle of the 
mind. 
          Conscience is subject to revealed truth as if this Truth is its superior, something 
much greater than itself. At the same time, Conscience is not self-sufficient as a guardian, 
but needs the help of Scripture and the Holy Spirit. Without this help conscience can go 
awry – which is to say that it could abandon or distort the “principles of religion.” So 
conscience alone is a fallible, weak and vulnerable guardian, but indispensable 
nevertheless. When assisted by the word of God and the Holy Spirit, conscience is the 
natural and immediate monitor directing him and guarding the place in him of the 
doctrines of revealed religion.  
         These statements do not formally exclude the presence of what Bouyer and Vaiss 
have said of the conscience in Newman’s conversion, and what Bouyer and Vaiss stress 
must have been present to a point in Newman’s understanding. However, in Newman’s 
revealing remarks to Mayers the conscience is primarily a vigilant and faithful guardian 
of Revelation (“the principles of religion”) – of what Mayers called “Divine Truth”.245 
With his new and unprecedented realization of the God of Revelation, Newman’s 
conscience recalled the doctrine of Bible and Catechism of his childhood and youth. It 
drew him to embrace revealed truth in its creedal system and above all, to subject his life 
and his conscience to it.  Profound as is the conversion, conscience is not acting violently 
in its emotional effect (at the sight of personal sin and its catastrophic consequences), 
leading to a terrible crisis and then to a profound peace and joy before the Cross – though 
there are elements of this. Nor is the conscience primarily revealing the grand moral 
Presence speaking (by nature) within its moral dictates, although this too is at work.  
          Rather, the conscience of his conversion, as Newman then perceives it, directs him 
to guard the “Divine Truth” that has been transmitted to him by Mayers and his books, 
and to living a holy life according to it. The point is continued in the rest of the letter. “I 
hope I shall continue firm in the principles, in which you, Sir, have instructed me”.246 
Conscience accepts, sanctions and guards revealed truth by insisting on living firmly in 
its principles. We see here in incipient form Newman’s characteristic respect for religious 
authority. It also looks as if the sanctioning and guarding of Revelation is its supreme 
activity. This having been said, it is to be repeated that we are getting at how Newman 
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saw the conscience at this point – a greater understanding of further roles of the 
conscience in respect to Revelation was to come in the years ahead, as we shall see. 
Indeed, this greater understanding of the future will enable us to see more in what 
happened, prior to and at the time of the conversion, than Newman expresses in 
correspondence at the time – though he probably had an inkling of it at the time. 
 
2.4.9.      The “books … all of the school of Calvin”247  
In telling us in his Memoir that he was never a genuine Evangelical of the order of 
Newton and Scott,248 Newman may have been referring, I have suggested, to a lack of a 
genuine and personally thought-out acceptance of certain of their doctrines. I refer to the 
doctrine of the signal place of conversion in regeneration, their understanding of the kind 
of experience which a true conversion entailed, and perhaps their exclusive focus on 
certain doctrines that answered very directly to the felt need of a Saviour from sin. But I 
do not mean that Newman did not hold these very doctrines subsequent to his conversion, 
but that (on his later testimony) his holding of them was not a true, genuine and personal 
conviction. Rather, he held them primarily because of trust in and deference to his 
mentors. In any case, in his denial that he had been genuinely Evangelical, he was not 
referring to other elements for which he was indebted to them – such as “the cardinal and 
vital truths of Revelation” and “the divine truths about our Lord and His Person and 
Offices”, together with the “habits of devotion” they had brought on.249  He owed a great 
deal to the Evangelicals. Walter Mayers “was the human means of the beginning of 
divine faith in me”.250  
 
2.4.10.    Thomas Scott (1747–1821) 251 
The Apologia tells us that, “humanly speaking”, it was to the works of Thomas Scott that 
“I almost owe my soul”. He was “the writer who made a deeper impression on my mind 
than any other”. But the feature of Scott’s conversion that impressed Newman was his 
following of the “truth wherever it led him, beginning with Unitarianism, and ending in a 
                                                 
247 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4. 
248 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 79.  (Appendix B.2 for a little more discussion of this.). 
249 Ibid.  
250 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
251 As mentioned before, Thomas Scott was Rector of Aston Sandford from 1803 to his death in 1821. It is 
in this capacity that he was known of by the young Newman at Trinity College, Oxford. 
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zealous faith in the Holy Trinity”,252 as well as, importantly, Scott’s “unworldliness” – 
which is to say his earnest attempt to live a holy life, without compromise, according to 
revealed truth as contained in Holy Writ.   
          Scott’s account was the story of his gradual conversion from moral slackness and 
irreligion to a hearty faith. In true Evangelical fashion – as does Newton in his conversion 
account – Scott insists on the decisive importance of a 
radical conversion. It involved a sense of sin aroused by the 
conscience warning of the judgment of God. In this respect 
Scott’s conversion and doctrine was typically Evangelical. 
But what emerges from Scott’s conversion is an all-out 
search for revealed Truth, vitally connected as it was with 
salvation. His grace-sustained conversion resulted in this 
doctrinal search. His turning from moral slackness involved 
a turn to dogmatic truth. In this we see the Puritan spirit. It is 
this doctrinal feature (together with its associated moral improvement) that took 
immediate hold of Newman’s imagination and to which he most related in his own “great 
change of thought”, when he “received into my intellect impressions of dogma,” and “fell 
under the influence of a definite Creed”,253 at the heart of which was the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 
          In Scott’s account it was pre-eminently his conscience that fuelled the search for 
Truth and led him to his wholehearted assent to the doctrine of the Trinity. This was not 
lost on Newman. That precisely this conscientious search for the Truth distinguished 
these months of 1816 is further illustrated by Newman’s telling us that “With the 
assistance of Scott’s Essays, and the admirable work of Jones of Nayland, I made a 
collection of Scripture texts in proof of the doctrine … before I was sixteen; and a few 
months later I drew up a series of texts in support of each verse of the Athanasian Creed. 
These papers I have still”.254  
          Rather than conscience primarily crushing and terrifying Newman with the 
conviction of sin, it was imposing as a most serious duty the consideration the vital truths 
of revelation and their practical implications for conscience and life. It was imposing the 
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duty of conforming his life to revealed realities. Indeed, what further impressed Newman 
about Scott was not only his “unworldliness” but “his resolute opposition to 
Antinomianism, and the minutely practical character of his writings”.255  That is, the 
revealed moral law had to be fulfilled. This practicality involved the conscience. 
         Apart from his own experience of moral decline in his adolescence followed (or 
preceded) by a doctrinal lapse into something like deism, it may also have been the story 
of Scott – his progressive following of his conscience resulting in doctrinal orthodoxy – 
which contributed to Newman’s theory of the link between the right moral ethos and 
virtue, itself dependent on the good conscience, and correct religious knowledge. If you 
want to know the truth, strive to be good by being faithful to the conscience. As we shall 
see, we have public evidence of this notion in his first published letter of 1821.256 I 
suspect he gained this notion – so important later on – in some formal sense in 1816. 
         In his (already cited) letter to Newman in mid-April 1817, Mayers mentions that 
“You have read Scott since (sic) I have and therefore your memory will supply my 
deficiency”.257  It implies that Newman had recently become well acquainted with Scott – 
and better than was Mayers at that point. Newman tells us in the Apologia that he bought 
Scott’s Scripture commentary a little later when an undergraduate.258 Scott’s commentary 
expounded the chief theological doctrines such as the Atonement, the Incarnation and the 
Trinity. He concluded his commentary on each chapter of Scripture with practical 
observations which related the passage to everyday life. That is to say, the Scripture 
doctrines, as grasped by the Calvinist Scott, were contemplated, realized and then brought 
to bear on the conscience.  
 
2. 4. 11.    Milner, Thomas Newton’s Prophecies, Mayers       
Apart from Scott, Newman informs us that — “in the same Autumn of 1816” —  he 
studied (the Evangelical) Milner’s Church History with its portrayal of the early Church, 
and Thomas Newton on the Prophecies bringing him to a deep conviction that the Pope 
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was the Antichrist of Scripture.259  A letter to his grandmother Elizabeth identifies 
October as the month when he was studying Newton’s Prophecies.260 This is in the midst 
of the few months of his conversion process – he is trying to get at revealed doctrine and 
apply it. Revealed truth was perceived as a system with moral implications, involving the 
conscience in a very practical way. Newman’s “Spiritual Notes” of the end of 1816 
written in Latin are deeply spiritual.261 The dominant, though not exclusive, feature in 
Newman’s conversion was the heartfelt appropriation of the objective truth of Revelation 
as set forth in Scripture, Creed, and classic dogma. This was present in Mayers too. In his 
letter to Newman of 16 June (already cited) Mayers advises that “…the slow and gradual 
progress to Divine truth is the favourite with me ... Seek then and you shall find...” 262 
(my emphasis).  
          The search for and “progress to Divine truth” was one current among others in 
Evangelicalism – illustrating the point that we must beware of speaking of 
Evangelicalism simplistically.263 As already said, this seems to have been especially 
prominent in Calvin’s own conversion and certainly in his subsequent history. The search 
for revealed Truth was present in Thomas Scott. But it is not the principal note sounded 
in the standard Evangelical conversion, nor in the method of conversion which Calvin 
himself promoted. Whereas it was the principal element in Newman’s conversion – 
without excluding other elements. As typically understood, the Evangelical conversion 
stressed a profound personal change from a life of sin to the seeking of holiness, rather 
than the appropriation of revealed truth. It is a question of where lay the emphasis. 
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2.4.12.    William Beveridge (1637–1708)  
2.4.12.  (a)   Newman’s reading of Beveridge (January 1817) 
I have spoken of the significance for Newman of Scott’s Force of Truth (and his Essays) 
during the months of his conversion.264 Mayers implies in his letter to Newman that the 
young convert had been reading Scott, and the Apologia indicates that the young 
Newman continued to read Scott’s writings during the few years ahead. When he was an 
undergraduate he “thought of making a visit to his Parsonage, in order to see a man 
whom I so deeply revered”.265  But in the immediate sequel to Newman’s conversion, the 
second great literary influence entered the scene – and this time it was at Mayers’ 
prompting. At the end of December (1816), with Newman now converted to Christ, 
Mayers sent him his gift of Beveridge’s Private Thoughts,266 as well as recommending to 
him Doddridge’s Rise and Fall and Law’s Serious Call.267   
          Newman replied in January of 1817 that “I have not yet finished reading Bishop 
Beveridge,268 but it seems to me, as far as I have read it, an excellent work”.269  That the 
converted teenager regarded it as an “excellent work” indicates the very effect of the 
book. It also indicates his own spiritual maturity. In the note that was written on this copy 
of Beveridge late in life, he wrote of it that “no book was more dear to me, or exercised a 
more powerful influence over my devotion and my habitual thoughts. In my private 
memoranda I even wrote in its style”.270  
          It seems that the two authors who exercised most influence on his Christian life at 
this point were Scott and Beveridge. “Above and beyond” Mayers himself, “was the 
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effect of the books”271 he read – and Scott and Beveridge seem to have been the principal 
ones. We may therefore say that they were the two most influential authors in respect to 
his idea of the conscience. While in the Apologia Newman extols the “minutely practical 
character of his (Scott’s) writings”, Vincent Blehl writes that “everything that Newman 
wrote in praise of Scott in his Apologia could be equally affirmed about Beveridge’s 
work. It is eminently practical”.272 This practicality of Beveridge relates to the bearing of 
Christian doctrine, understood as a system, on the conscience.  
 
2.4.12.     (b)     Conscience and Beveridge  
It is to be noted that Newman’s remark about his conscience guarding vigilantly and 
faithfully the truths (the “principles”) of religion was made precisely during his reading 
of Beveridge.273 To all intents and purposes, that is the function of conscience in the 
chapters of resolutions in Beveridge. It would seem that the role of the 
conscience in Beveridge’s presentation of the life of religion was 
reflected in Newman’s own experience – and it shaped Newman’s 
experience. Christian doctrine is presented, explained and defended. It 
commends itself to the conscience as eminently good. The duties 
flowing from this doctrine are expounded at length, section by section, 
and thus the conscience is expected to be profoundly involved.  
           In Newman’s reply to Mayers (January 1817, cited already), he hopes that “the 
Holy Spirit by whom Bishop Beveridge was enabled to establish his articles of faith, to 
form resolutions upon them, and to put those resolutions in practice, by whom also you 
were made the instrument of good to me, and by whom my heart was softened to receive 
your instructions, may he steer me through the dangers…” 274  We see that the young 
convert expects to be assisted by the Holy Spirit to receive revealed truth on the authority 
of God, and then that this truth will shape his conscience. Revealed truth is supreme and 
the conscience forms resolutions upon it. Conscience sanctions and guards the “articles of 
faith”, all the while needing the help of the Holy Spirit. We see here the origins of 
Newman’s ideal of truth and holiness. It will be shown later that the sanctioning role of 
conscience includes recognition.  
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2.4.12.   (c)     Beveridge and the Creator 
In his account of his conversion, Newman makes special mention of his sense “of two 
and only two absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator”.275  
He repeats this again later in the book, that “from a boy I had been led to consider that 
my Maker and I, his creature, were the two beings, luminously such, in rerum natura”.276  
This specific stress on my Creator and my Maker is not to be overlooked or undervalued. 
The beginnings of Newman’s sense of his Creator willl be considered later, and it is not 
looked at carefully by Bouyer. The doctrine of “my Creator” and “my Maker” is, of 
course, the first and fundamental dogma of Scripture, Creed and Catechism.  
          The doctrine of God as the Creator is not prominent in Evangelical thought and 
experience – its emphasis is on the Atonement by Christ. But it has a certain explicitness 
in Newman’s Apologia account, and in it Newman states that he had had a sense of his 
Creator and of himself as his creature “from a boy”. As just said, we must look at this in 
due course. It is evident that by reading Beveridge’s presentation of revealed doctrine the 
newly-converted Newman would have been greatly assisted in his sense both of his own 
creation – and the Creator. He may also have been assisted, as a kindred spirit, by 
Beveridge’s very approach to this doctrine.  
          Well then, how does Beveridge deal with this? Beveridge begins his presentation of 
the doctrine of God the Creator not with a consideration of the objective world and its 
need of a Creator – as does Calvin in the Institutes 277 – but with a consideration of the 
inner self or soul. In the vade mecum of Beveridge, I go “into the closet of my heart, and 
there begin to look within myself, and consider what I am”.278 Under Beveridge’s 
guidance I see that my soul comes from God and is to return to him. To him I am 
responsible for my happiness. One’s own soul is thus quickly brought before God 
precisely as its Maker.  
          The point here is that creation and the Creator is the first Article of the Creed 
which the conscience of the reader receives, and according to which he is to live. But as 
already said, Beveridge has his own way of bringing life and personal conviction to this 
                                                 
275 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
276 Ibid., p. 202. 
277 John Calvin, The Institutes of The Christian Religion  Book I, ch. 5. Translated by Henry Beveridge 
1845. The Institution of The Christian Religion, written in Latin, by master John Calvin, and translated into 
English according to the authors last edition. Introduction by the Rev. John Murray. Based on edition 
printed at London by Arnold Hatfield, for Bonham Norton. 1599.   
Internet access (Sept. 23, 2013) at:   http://www.biblestudytools.com/history/calvin-institutes-christianity/ 
278 W. Beveridge,  Private Thoughts on Religion and a Christian Life in two parts, (the) Introductory. 
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doctrine — and his method shows much similarity with the later Newman’s inner, rather 
than external, starting point. The first article, God the creator, is a reality. The reason I 
may say this is that I “think”. What does he mean? At first glance, it looks just a little like 
St Anselm – but it is different. My thinking is the starting point of a sense of personal 
existence, and thence of being created. That is to say, “in that I think, I am sure I am; and 
in that I am, I am sure there is a God; for if there  was no God, how came I to be?”  
          Beveridge is assisting the reader to appreciate the fact and presence of the Creator 
by beginning with the awareness of himself as thinking.279 Through this action of 
thinking, the self is led to be aware of its own being, and the obvious step is then made: “I 
am sure there is a God, for if there was no God, how came I to be?”280  It is a Way to God 
from limited, caused and contingent being, and the contingent being in the first instance 
is oneself. The reader is drawn into a fundamental experience of two realities, the first – 
myself – intuited, and the second – my Creator – almost sensed. My Creator is almost 
sensed because the step of accounting for one’s own being by recourse to the Creator is a 
natural and even implicit step of the reason – prompted by a natural question: how came I 
to be?  It passes from the awareness of oneself, the self that is so obviously contingent 
and unable to account for itself, to the abiding and ever-present Cause of itself.  “I am 
sure there is a God; for if there was no God, how came I to be?” 281  
          What Beveridge writes here looks rather like the reference in the Apologia’s 
account of Newman’s conversion to “the thought of two and two only absolute and 
                                                 
279 This approach from the awareness of self (in the act of thinking) to that of God features in Newman’s 
philosophical notes in his “Proof of Theism” in the early 1860s – we shall be examining this in the next 
chapter. 
280  W. Beveridge,  Private Thoughts on Religion and a Christian Life in two parts, Article 1. 
281 At this point we may mention a consideration that will be referred to more carefully later. One reason 
why Beveridge’s statements and approach may have especially resonated in the teenage Newman is that he 
had something of a natural sense of a Creator from his earliest years. It was the result of instinctive 
questions of the heart, assisted by grace. It seems that this sense of creation arose from early childhood 
questions about his own being, rather than of that of external things.We read in his “Early Journals: 
Original Notes” (written during his retreat of April 1843) that “God put it into my heart, when 5 or 6 years 
old, to ask what and why I was” (Autobiographical Writings, p. 223). This is very like Beveridge’s 
approach, as presented and discussed above. I regard this passing note as an especially significant record of 
the springs of the natural religion of Newman’s early childhood.  
    Obviously then, Beveridge and Newman were kindred spirits. We read in the “Introductory” of 
Beveridge’s Thoughts on Religion that  “WHEN, in my serious thoughts, and more retired meditations, I 
am got into the closet of my heart, and there begin to look within myself, and consider what I am …”    
From this question comes the awareness of my soul as distinct and different from the things of the world. 
Then, in Article I, regarding the “soul (which I call myself,)” Beveridge poses this question: “in that I am, I 
am sure there is a God; for if there was no God, how came I to be? How came I hither? Who gave me my 
being?”  
So, it seems that from the awareness of my soul, I ask a question about its existence, which leads me to its 
Creator. 
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luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator.”282 As we have seen, Newman’s 
reading of Romaine (“one of the first books I read) had “some influence” on this 
fundamental “thought”. This “thought … of myself and my Creator” was a prior 
perception fulfilled by revealed dogma at his conversion. It looks as if Beveridge 
encouraged in Newman not only the embrace of this basic dogma of the Creator, but 
Newman’s characteristically inner way to God (rather than from external things). This 
Newman explored many decades later in his Philosophical Notebook. Newman starts 
with the awareness of his own Self as thinking, and especially that mode of thought in 
which the Self is aware of being under objective moral obligation.  
          It may be noted that Beveridge, born some thirteen years before the death of 
Descartes, starts with a truth which was enamoured of Descartes – and one wonders if 
Beveridge had read Descartes’ Principia Philosophiæ (1644), written in Latin and, 
therefore, addressed to the learned everywhere.283 In it there was the famous Cartesian 
starting point for philosophical truth, the only one, so he thought, that was immediate and 
certain: my own thinking. Cogito ergo sum – Je pense, donc je suis.284 
          Very significantly for our discussion, the conscience, in Beveridge’s account, is 
immediately involved. That God is my Creator means that I am responsible to him. My 
happiness is bound up with him – and without using the word, Beveridge invokes the 
doctrine of the judgment of God, which, of course, prompts the conscience. My soul is 
“infused into me by God, to whom, after a short abode in the body, it is to return, and to 
live and continue for ever, either in a state of happiness or misery, in another life. But 
must it so indeed? How much then does it concern me, seriously to bethink myself, where 
I had best to lead this everlasting life, in the heavenly mansions of eternal glory, or else in 
the dreadful dungeon of infernal misery.@ The conscience is active in the mind’s 
                                                 
282 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
283 Beveridge certainly knew his Latin. In his twenty-second year he published a Latin treatise on the 
“Excellency and Use of the Oriental Tongues, especially Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, and Samaritan, together 
with a Grammar of the Syriac Language.” 1658, 2nd ed. 1664. He had graduated at Cambridge in 1656. It 
was during his 23
rd
 year that he began to compile his Private Thoughts, so useful to the young Newman. 
284 Did Beveridge read some of Descartes? Quite possibly. The Fansciscan friar and philosopher, Antoine 
Le Grand,  published in England his Philosophia Veterum e mente Renati Descartes, more scholastico 
breviter digesta, London, 1671 – with its attempt to make Descartes’ thought more scholastic, and so more 
palatable to traditionalists. After being expanded by Antoine Le Grand, this work was republished under 
the title of Institutio Philosophiae, secundum principia Renati Descartes, nova methodo adornata et 
explicata ad usum juventutis academico, London, 1672; 3rd edit, 1675. This work was much read in the 
University of Cambridge – and it is to be remembered that Beveridge had studied at Cambridge years 
before. An English translation of Le Grand’s edition of Descartes was published by Richard Blome at 
London in 1694. 
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apprehension of God the Creator: “What must I do?” The whole business of life is to seek 
my happiness with God. I must believe and I must obey, and of these two the first that 
must be determined is, what to believe.  
           This personal sense of my Creator to whom I am responsible refers to the first and 
most basic of the dogmas. It is the lead-in to Beveridge=s entire work setting forth the 
Christian system. There is an all-important duty, a great point of conscience, namely to 
know the Christian system well. Doctrine must be known if it is to be applied and lived. 
Article upon article of the Christian faith is then set forth with resolution after resolution 
following upon the exposition. Beveridge insists on the profound corruption and guilt of 
the human heart, a condition he says is evident to man “by the very light of nature.” On 
these grounds “I am fully satisfied in my conscience, that I am a sinner.” 285 We notice 
that Beveridge has it that man’s corruption is evident “by the very light of nature” – a 
position, as we shall see, that is present in Newman’s early sermons (ch.3). 
          It is an outstanding work of doctrinal and dogmatic presentation, and is practical 
all the while. Newman set it on record that it was of great influence on his mind, and, I 
propose, it was most congenial to the kind of conversion he himself had undergone.  
 
2. 4. 12.   (d)      Beveridge and the Creed 
Beveridge’s focus is not just on one or a few central dogmas (as with Newton, and with 
Scott’s Force of Truth), but of the entire Creed. His book, studied so soon after his 
conversion, must have assisted in bringing Newman “under the influence of a definite 
Creed”.286 Beveridge places before the intellect a detailed explanation of the sweep of 
Christian doctrine, including God, the soul, the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the 
Atonement, the Church and the living of the Christian life. While Scott’s book presents 
his journey especially to “that fundamental truth of religion” which was the doctrine of 
the Triune God, 287 Beveridge’s book explains not only the Trinity but the other doctrines 
of the Christian Faith as well. Thus did Newman receive into his “intellect impressions of 
dogma”.288  It is this appropriation of the Creed, as a system, which was especially 
important for Newman. 
                                                 
285 W. Beveridge,  Thoughts on Religion.  Article II. Secondly …. 
286 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
287 Ibid., p. 5.   
288 Ibid., p. 4. 
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           Beveridge shows at great length that the Christian has a serious duty to know 
doctrine as a system, for it is only then that he can live it. Thus was Newman set on a 
dutiful course of progressively identifying and mastering the doctrines of Revelation. But 
Beveridge also sets forth the implications of Christian doctrines for the conscience. 
Resolution after resolution is presented in detail before the reader, following the 
exposition of each Christian truth.  
          It is notable that while an important factor in John Newton’s conversion was his 
conversion to the truth of the Gospel, the doctrines which became important to him were, 
while central, directly related to the requirement of Christ being his Saviour (the 
Incarnation and Trinity). Matters of Church and Church order meant little to him. In 
James Stephen’s judgment (when writing of Newton’s study of Hooker and of his 
contrast with that authority in Anglican thought), Newton “became an absolute 
latitudinarian on all points of ecclesiastical polity”.289 Newton’s great mentor and hero, 
Whitefield, had little interest in traditional denominations (though certain Calvinist 
doctrines were important to him). The important thing was the power of the Gospel and a 
living relationship with the Saviour. “God help us, God help us all,” he once cried, “to 
forget party names and to become Christians in deed and in truth”.290 He introduced to his 
avid throngs an experience of Christ precisely as the Saviour, and his Calvinist doctrine 
related directly to this.  
          Beveridge, though, instils in the reader a concern for the fullness of doctrine and a 
definite Creed.  Conscience was seen to sanction the Creed it receives and to impose the 
duty of receiving and guarding it as good and holy, for it comes from God. It requires 
obedience to its implications – spelt out by Beveridge. It recognises revealed truth as its 
superior and guide. It inclines the reader to an enduring love for divine revelation as 
expressed in its dogmas and in the system of the Creed. Very importantly it insists on 
making it one’s business to study and to know Christian doctrine in its entire range.  
 
 
                                                 
289 J. Stephen,  Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography, by Right Honourable  Sir James Stephen,  K,C,B, in 
two volumes. Printed for Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans. 1849. New edition, 1875. Vol. II, “The 
Evangelical Succession”,   p. 106.  Accessed on internet 12 December 2013 at: 
http://archive.org/stream/ecclesiasticalbi02stepuoft/ecclesiasticalbi02stepuoft_djvu.txt 
290 J. Dillenberger and C. Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted through Development. 2
nd
 ed. New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, USA. 1988, p. 124, quoting W. W. Sweet, The Story of Religion in 
America.  New York & London: Harper & Brothers. 1939, p. 206. 
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2. 4. 13.    Conclusion 
As then perceived by Newman, the primary (though not the only) function of the 
conscience in the conversion of 1816 is to serve, sanction and guard revealed truth. A 
year after his conversion, he wrote in a prayer of thanksgiving: “for thy goodness in 
enlightening my soul with the knowledge of thy Truth; that whereas I was proud, self-
righteous … thou wast pleased to turn me to thee from such a state of darkness…”291 The 
conscience sees in Revelation the highest truth, an utterance of the divine. Newman’s was 
a Calvinist-Evangelical conversion of a type different from that which was commonly 
regarded as typical. The objective truth – specifically revealed truth (dogma) – was the 
object of the conscience, and this was to be the theme of his life.292 The stage was set in 
Newman for a life of uncompromising opposition to all liberalism in respect to revealed 
dogma (provided it is shown to be revealed).293  The stage was also set for a concern for 
the fullness of revealed doctrine which could in the event lead him out of 
Evangelicalism.294 These were matters of duty. The initial impetus for this lay in the kind 
of conversion that was his and in the direction his conscience was given. 
                                                 
291 V. F. Blehl, Pilgrin Journey: John Henry Newman, 1801-1845, Appendix of Prayers (17 Nov. 1817), p. 
410. 
292 Newman chose to have as an epitaph on his tomb the words, “Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem”. 
293 The exception to this was at about the year 1827 when, he later admitted, he was to a degree under the 
shadow of liberalism and preferring intellectual excellence to moral. This must not be overstated, though. 
294 I have suggested that in Calvin’s account of his own conversion the conscience has a role somewhat 
akin to Newman’s, with of course, various differences. I would observe, though, that in his insistence on 
the paramount importance of objective doctrinal truth, Calvin has a parallel in the Catholic Church which 
he implacably opposed. In fact, a case could be made for considering this doctrinal perspective in 
conversion as being Catholic in basic character and a direct heritage of the Church he renounced and 
opposed.  
      Newman’s conversion ought be placed within the context of this tradition which sets a high store on the 
fullness of Christian doctrine and its power to convert if perceived in vital and living terms, terms that 
convey divine realities. This is not the emphasis of (though it is not absent from) the typical Evangelical 
conversion. It had similarities with various Evangelical authors (such as Thomas Scott – and Mayers’ 
emphasis on “Divine Truth”), but it is to be situated primarily within the line of the Puritan Beveridge who 
gave a primacy to vital doctrine, considered as a system. It is a current of thought that, while transmitted 
within many Puritan and Evangelical channels, has its origins in a Catholic past and, in the fullness of time, 
would take Newman beyond where he began. In the tradition of Catholic thought, Divine Revelation was to 
be absolutely accepted precisely because it was God who revealed it, and God is the utterly sovereign One. 
     Newman, in his review of Wiseman’s 1836 Lectures on the Catholic Church, called Beveridge “truly in 
every sense of the word, one of the lights of our Church.” As Blehl notes, he defended him against the 
claim that he held the ultra-Protestant view of Scripture as the only rule of faith. Late in life he wrote to an 
acquaintance that “Beveridge’s book is a very impressive one, with very little Protestantism in it” (V. F. 
Blehl S.J., Pilgrim Journey: John Henry Newman 1801-1845. London and New York: Burns & Oates.  
2001, p. 15). This current within Puritanism that emphasised doctrine and creed was, at heart, Catholic.  
     Newman’s emphasis all through his life on “the Truth” as governing the conscience and in turn on the 
conscience as the critical factor in any readiness for “the Truth”, received its initial impetus from Mayers’ 
stress on the “Divine Truth” that was the Christian message. It also received inspiration from his reading of 
Scott and Beveridge, and from the Puritan-Evangelical current that stressed doctrine. 
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          We can now see the principal features of Newman’s idea of the conscience at the 
origins of his subsequent intellectual history. It is to be stressed, though, that we are 
speaking here of Newman’s idea of the conscience in 1816, for there would be 
developments in his understanding of the conscience in the years ahead. For instance, as 
we shall see, Newman would come to see the conscience as preparing the subject for 
Revelation and enabling him to recognize the God of Revelation. In a later recapitulation 
of the conversion of 1816 (in 4.1. 1), we must take this later thought on the conscience 
into account and include it. This action of the conscience, I suspect, Newman saw to a 
point at the time, but we have no record of it. There are other features of the conscience 
which Newman may have perceived too – and we are about to examine one such. 
Beveridge writes of it in the book that Newman studied.295 It is the naturally apprehended 
fact of sin (implying, we shall see, a natural sense of God). The conversion of 1816 was 
the principal turning point in his life. He later spoke of his then becoming a different 
person. By means of it he became a Christian. 
         The consideration of the views of Bouyer and Vaiss have introduced important 
dimensions of the conscience, and they certainly feature in Newman’s later thought on 
the conscience. At the time, Newman’s reading of the books which Mayers recommended 
to him, and others besides, doubtless brought to his attention the various functions that 
the conscience may play in the Christian and moral life, and which to a point certainly 
played in his own. They would have resonated in aspects of his personal experience of 
the conscience at the time of his conversion, and these aspects played their part in 
forming his thought in the coming years. These included authors Evangelical (such as 
Doddridge and Scott), non-Evangelical (such as Law) and (pre-Evangelical) Puritan (such 
as Beveridge) – all mentioned in passing in the Apologia. In these works, as in his 
personal experience, he became familiar with the various roles of conscience – such as 
accuser of sin and encourager of faith in the Saviour, and vice-gerent of God in the soul. 
          Most especially, though, at the time conscience was understood by the young 
Newman as the guardian and the approver of divine truth. This was its most important 
function.296   
                                                 
295 W. Beveridge, Thoughts on Religion. Article II, contained in the passage beginning with “Secondly 
…..” 
296 As already said, in Chapter 4.1 (especially 4.1.1 and also 4.1.4) it will be explained that the Conscience, 
with its sense of a Judge, prepared Newman for his assent to Revelation. It also served to enable the young 
man to recognize the God of Revelation. Revelation thus completed and fulfilled what was already known 
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Chapter 3:   Conscience and Belief in God   
 
“Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but 
which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to 
avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment. ....... For man has in his heart a law 
inscribed by God. ... His conscience is man's most secret core and his sanctuary. There he 
is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
no. 1776) 
                
 
As we have seen, at the outset of the Apologia we are told that Newman’s conversion was 
to a definite Creed and to dogma,297 which is to say to a definite Revelation. The role of 
conscience, he saw then, was to sanction and guard its supreme place in his life.298 Our 
task ahead is to analyse the relationship between the conscience and assent to divine 
Revelation as Newman saw it during the years that followed. There are two stages or 
aspects of this – for later in the Apologia he writes that “I was led on to examine more 
attentively what I doubt not was in my thoughts long before, viz. the concatenation of 
arguments by which the mind ascends from its first to its final religious idea”.299  
          So there was a “first” and a “final religious idea”. The “first” idea is the idea of 
God as intimated by the natural conscience, and the “final religious idea” is the revealed 
doctrine on God, which subsists in the Catholic religion. At some point Newman decided 
that assent to the Catholic and Christian faith is the natural and proper upshot of belief in 
God, which has its beginnings in the intimations and admonitions of the conscience. Our 
task is to track the development of this two-dimensioned theory.  
          To deal with this, I shall divide the two stages which are, though, intimately 
connected. In this chapter, the focus will be on the connection between the natural 
conscience and belief in God, leaving to the next chapter (ch. 4) the connection of 
conscience and its sense of God with the assent to Revelation. It necessarily involves a 
certain overlap, but these two issues must be considered separately. So then, taking up 
conscience and belief in God, let us begin with the Evangelical Newman, following his 
ordination to the diaconate in June 1824. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
by the conscience. But these dimensions of the conscience were not mentioned by Newman at the time of 
his conversion. His future writings show, however, that they are involved in the assent to Revelation. 
297 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4.  
298 As has been said, there were other roles too – and these will be brought forward in due course. 
299 Ibid., p. 206.   
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3.1  The Evangelical years  
 
3.1.1      The sense of guilt and the knowledge of God  (1824-1825)   
3.1.1  (a)   As a zealous young Evangelical at St Clement’s parish (1824-5), Newman was 
determined on the conversion of his parishioners.300 In his view, the inveterate sinfulness 
of each and every person, together with the results of this, had to be brought home to 
them if they were to be induced to turn to Christ as their Saviour. There had to be in them 
a renewed sense of guilt and sin with its consequences, if the Gospel was to be truly 
received. While his own conversion was at heart and primarily a conversion to “Divine 
Truth” (as seems to have been the case with Calvin), still, as has been said, for him this 
certainly included the apprehension of the fact of sin and disgust at its nature, together 
with a desire for a holy life. In terms of pastoral method, he was attempting to convert his 
parishioners in the way typical of Evangelicals – and as exemplified in Calvin’s Reply to 
Sadoleto. One had to begin inducing a conviction of sin. Let us then consider Newman’s 
early exposition of the conscience as a sense of guilt, and the idea of God that it implies. 
 
          Early in his pastoral work at St Clement’s, Newman had begun reading Hawkins’ 
301 gift to him of John Bird Sumner’s Apostolical Preaching.302  In his chapter III on the 
“Corruption of Human Nature”, Sumner states that human corruption is “the basis which 
St Paul has laid to the whole system of the Gospel; in which our Church too has followed 
the example of the great Apostle, placing the declaration of man’s natural corruption as 
the first of her doctrinal articles”.303 This position the Evangelical Newman shared.304 
                                                 
300 Newman’s theology of conversion and of regeneration gradually changed during the years 1824-1826, 
but of course his pastoral goal of converting his parishioners to Christ remained undimmed. 
301 Edward Hawkins (1789–1882), for decades Provost of Oriel College, Oxford. In 1811 he graduated 
B.A. with a double first class at St. John's College, Oxford (M.A. 1814, B.D. and D.D. 1828). In 1812 he 
became tutor of his college, and in 1813 he was elected fellow of Oriel. From 1823 to 1828 he was vicar of 
St. Mary's, Oxford, and on 2 Feb. 1828 he was elected by the fellows to be Provost of Oriel, in succession 
to Dr. Copleston. At the age of eighty-five he finally left Oxford, retiring to his house in the precincts at 
Rochester. He died on 18 Nov. 1882 within three months of completing his ninety-fourth year. 
302 On Newman’s own admission, this book had significant impact in turning him away from certain 
Evangelical doctrines.  J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 9.  
303 J. B. Sumner,  Apostolical Preaching Considered: In an Examination of St. Paul's Epistles,  (1817). 
London: John Hatchard & Son. Sixth edition, 1826., p. 121.      
       In his book On The Evidence of Christianity: Derived from Its Nature and Reception (1821), London: 
Printed for J. Hatchard (1824 ed.), Sumner repeats the point: “These, however, are the doctrines on which 
the religion of Jesus is built. The basis of the whole, is the alienation of mankind from God.”   Ch. 3, p. 66.     
304 For instance, as in “The Philosophical Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel” (July 2, 1826), the first of 
his Oxford University Sermons, Newman writes that “the whole system of the Christian faith depends on 
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Significantly for our discussion at this point, Sumner writes that to relinquish this “is to 
give up a truth which is declared by the world without, and receives a concurrent 
testimony from the experience of the heart within. That is, while the cause of the 
degeneracy is known from revelation”, “the fact is familiar to all: it meets our eyes 
abroad, and is felt by our souls at home; and requires only to be stated, to produce 
conviction”.305 (italics mine)      
          So “man’s natural corruption” is a fact of ordinary experience. This point is 
developed in Newman’s sermons. Though important to him because of his desire to 
convert his flock to the Gospel, it was probably also of relevance to his long-standing 
interest in the defence of religion. The corruption of human nature was a starting point 
open to the consciousness of all, and this corruption possessed significant features.  
          On September 19 (1824) Newman preached on “The Corruption of human nature. 
Rom. viii. 7”.306 He writes that “The corruption of our nature, and our extreme peril in 
consequence of it, may be proved as matters of fact and of moral certainty from what we 
see within and without it”.307  The fact of our sinful corruption is evident to ordinary 
experience. All can see it – it is not just a revealed doctrine.308 Further, the moral 
corruption of man and his consequent peril “may be proved” – (not so much by 
demonstration, but) as “matters of fact and of moral certainty” from what “we see”.309 
Newman is already placing an emphasis on proof, which, of course, must involve the 
reason. But the “proof” is attained by appeal to facts which can be seen, and this brings 
one to “moral certainty.” Newman is showing an interest in forms of proof and in the 
question of certitude in matters religious. 
          But there is a special dimension to this corruption of human nature. Man’s 
corruption is not just a fact or accident of life open to recognition and proof – as with any 
fact of life. There is not just the neutral circumstance of a disorder – the disorder of 
corruption – but personal guilt for it. Further, it is the conscience which perceives this 
                                                                                                                                                 
this doctrine” (no.13) (“this doctrine” is the doctrine of man’s sin).   Fifteen Sermons preached before the 
University of Oxford. Westminster,  Md.:  Christian Classics Inc.  1966.  
305 J. B. Sumner,  Apostolical Preaching Considered in an Examination of Saint Paul's Epistles, p. 121           
306 J. H. Newman,  “The Corruption of human nature”, in John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843 
Edited from Previously Unpublished Manuscripts  Volume 1: Sermons on the Liturgy and Sacraments and 
on Christ the Mediator.  Placid Murray OSB, editor.   Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1991.  Sermon 39 (no. 19). 
307 Ibid., p. 303. 
308 As noted in the previous chapter, and as will be repeated below, this is also found in Beveridge, who 
was so influential on the young Newman. Cf. W. Beveridge, Thoughts on Religion.  Art. II. “Secondly” 
309 J. H. Newman, “The Corruption of human nature”  John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843  Vol. 1, p. 
303. 
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guilt. In this, Newman distinguishes between “our natural reason” and our “conscience” – 
which is obviously the natural conscience. While reason perceives us that we are corrupt, 
conscience tells us that our corruption involves personal guilt.  
          Now, what is significant in this statement is that the guilt apprehended by the 
conscience is sin. “This view our natural reason may suggest to us – but conscience 
suggests a higher view, which is confirmed and brought out clearly by Scripture, viz that 
this corruption is not a mere misfortune, that this difference is not the mere accident of 
our nature such as want of ability might be, or bodily infirmity, but that it is sinful....”310 
So then, the fact of corruption, so manifest to the reason of all, is perceived by the 
conscience as “sinful.” In the perception of sin we have an especially relevant dimension 
of ordinary human experience. There is another matter here – it is that this is “confirmed 
and brought out” by Scripture”. This suggests that Revelation confirms and completes the 
testimony of nature.  
          This way of referring to the “conscience”, we may note in passing, seems to 
assume that it is a faculty or principle of perception separate from, say, the “reason”. It is 
also to be noted that Newman does not regard the conscience alone as leading a person to 
this sense of sin – there is both the reason and conscience. The precise nature of each and 
their relationship one with the other is not analysed. We also note, once again, that the 
“conscience” that is being here explored is not, formally, the practical judgment on what 
should be or has been done. It is the sense of guilt that informs this practical judgment 
once exercised. This sense of guilt is, we read, a sense of sin.  
          This, he continues, is confirmed by a more general testimony. “If indeed we wish 
fully to know what human nature really is when left to itself, we must turn to the case of 
countries unblest with the light of revelation - Consider e.g. the ancient heathen”. 311  So 
this pagan testimony offers fuller evidence of human corruption than does merely our 
own sense of personal corruption, which might not bring home to us “what human nature 
really is”. The point being stressed here is that the fact of man’s sinful condition is open 
to natural apprehension, and this is confirmed if the state and testimony of the heathen are 
considered. This pagan testimony illustrates the condition of mankind in general.  
          The following month the point is repeated, but now more openly expressed, that 
conscience suggests our corruption is sinful. In his sermon of October 24, 1824 (“Christ 
                                                 
310 Ibid. 
311 J. H. Newman,  John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843  Volume 1,  p. 307 
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has redeemed us from the law”), Newman reflects on the Atonement. Significantly, yet 
without any special emphasis, Newman refers to the conscience as involving a 
“consciousness of sin”. He writes that “my conscience tells me that I am guilty” and that 
it is only Christianity which provides relief for this sense of guilt. …..  None of the other 
religions provide “a remedy for anxieties arising from this consciousness of sin” (italics 
mine). So the conscience involves “a sense of guilt” which is actually a “consciousness of 
sin”.312 This is the view that had been expressed in passing on September 19. The 
conscience, then, prompts a sense of sin. Presumably Newman is being deliberate in his 
choice of words. The term “sin” implies an offence against God, and therefore this 
consciousness “that I am guilty” implies a consciousness of God precisely as offended. 
The natural sense of guilt, as perceived by the conscience, involves, for the one open to 
it, a sense of God as offended by one’s transgressions against the moral law. 
 
           So here we already have expressed by the young Evangelical Newman, but half 
way through his twenty-fourth year and barely a deacon, a theory involving the basic 
elements of a natural knowledge of God. It is not expressed in formal defence of religion, 
but as part of his efforts to convert and develop faith in his congregation. It comes from 
the Calvinist-Evangelical emphasis on the Fall of Man and on the sense of sin as the 
starting point for conversion – understood as a fact open to ordinary observation and 
experience. The sense of God as offended is thus viewed as a fact of nature and life. 
          This would not have been a recent idea in Newman. Beveridge’s Private Thoughts 
had made a deep impression on him following his conversion in 1816. Beveridge writes 
of sin being obvious to natural awareness and consideration.  
“That there is no such thing in nature, as virtue and vice, as good and evil, as grace 
and sin, is what I can by no means persuade myself to, for my conscience tells me, 
that there is: and not only mine, but every one that ever yet lived, upon the face of 
the earth; all people of whatsoever nation or language, still acknowledging sin to 
be sin, and that the displeasing the deity, which they worship, is indeed an evil that 
ought to be carefully avoided. And therefore, the very heathens did not only 
upbraid others with it, but likewise often checked themselves for it; and all men 
naturally desire to seem though not to be holy.”  Beveridge then adds:  “But let 
                                                 
312 Ibid., p. 320.  (Sermon 40 [no. 27] – i, 6). 
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others say what they will, I, for my own part, cannot but see sin in myself, by the 
very light of nature.” 313 (my italics).  
          That Beveidge teaches this implies that Newman probably gained the idea soon 
after his conversion, for he had read Beveridge very carefully. Conscience tells me that 
there is sin – which in turns suggests a natural sense of God as offended. This would 
imply that the natural conscience is a founding principle of a form of natural religion. Of 
course, just as guilt itself can go unrecognized, so too can the sinful dimension of guilt.314  
          The fact of a natural sense of God was the position of at least some Evangelicals, 
such as Sumner, but denied by others. Henning Graf Reventlow argues that some Puritans 
possessed the beginnings of a natural theology, attributing a certain knowledge of God 
and the moral virtues to fallen man even before his redemption.315  But this was not a 
universally held Evangelical position. In his discussion of Evangelicals and the Bible, 
Frank Turner refers to (the Calvinist) Thomas Scott’s view, that “no record existed of 
human beings unacquainted with the Bible having actually achieved the alleged insights 
of natural religion”.316  
 
          What we are primarily doing at this point is noticing Newman’s idea of the natural 
conscience and its connection with a natural belief in God. It appears in his earliest 
                                                 
313 W. Beveridge, Thoughts on Religion.  Article II, contained in the passage beginning with “Secondly” 
314 More than a century later Pope Pius XII referred to the growing loss of a sense of sin – and he said that 
this itself is “perhaps the greatest” modern sin. “Perhaps the greatest sin in the world today is that men have 
begun to lose the sense of sin.” That this sense of sin is something natural is implied in what he then states: 
“Smother that, deaden it — it can hardly be wholly cut out from the heart of man — let it not be awakened 
by any glimpse of the God-man dying on Golgotha's cross to pay the penalty of sin, and what is there to 
hold back the hordes of God's enemy from over-running the selfishness, the pride, the sensuality and 
unlawful ambitions of sinful man?” (my italics). Pius XII, Radio Message to the National Catechetical 
Congress of the USA, 26 October 1946.  Internet February 22, 2014: https://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-
xii/en/speeches/1946/documents/hf_p-xii_spe_19461026_congresso-catechistico-naz.html. 
315 H. G. Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press. 1985,  p.123. 
316 F. Turner, John Henry Newman: The Challenge to Evangelical Religion,  p. 37 
In the Preface to his Commentary on the Holy Bible (1804), Thomas Scott begins by saying that, alone in 
the world, man was created to be religious, and the Creator endowed man’s mind with all that was needed 
for Religion. This is the great business to which all should attend. But the facts show that man, left to 
himself, would never be truly religious. Indeed, at the end of the 5
th
 paragraph (p. 3) Scott asserts with 
emphasis “That without Revelation, there never was any true religion on earth since the fall of Adam.” He 
repeats the point, that “universal experience demonstrates, that no such  natural religion was discovered, 
and delineated, by men of any nation, who had never seen any part of the Bible, or anything deduced from 
that source” (p. 3) 
T. Scott, Commentary on the Holy Bible: The Old and New Testaments, Vol. 1, A New Edition. London:  
James Nisbett & Co. 1816.  
Accessed on the Internet, 22 Jan., 2014:  https://archive.org/details/holybibleaccordi01scotuoft 
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sermons. The key is the natural sense of sin, present in the sense of guilt. It is shown once 
again in his sermon of October 31. He writes that “We have an innate consciousness of 
guilt – the idea of God is connected in our minds with feelings of dread and apprehension 
– Hence natural religion is for the most part slavish and grovelling”.317 Man’s “innate 
consciousness of guilt” – suggesting that it is natural that man feel guilty – involves the 
idea of God. This idea of God, present in the sense of guilt, is of a God offended by our 
wrongdoing, and is therefore to be dreaded. Hence natural religion is for the most part 
slavish and grovelling – it is the offspring of terror.  
          Here again – as he has done before – Newman draws on his Oxford study of Greek 
and Roman authors (such as Lucretius) for external proof. It is a common experience. 
The classical authors bear testimony to “a guilty and timorous conscience which trembles 
at the idea of any intercourse with its Maker, and shrinks from the prospect of appearing 
before Him who is a holy and righteous and almighty Judge.”318 So then, the natural 
conscience perceives “its Maker” as a holy “Judge”, prior to (and even, as in the 
benighted Roman Church, subsequent to) the announcement of a divine Revelation. In 
due course we shall take up the perception of one’s “Maker” in Newman’s account of the 
conscience.319  
                                                 
317 J. H. Newman, “The effects on the mind of the doctrine of Christ” 1 Cor. I, 23. (Sermon 35 – no. 29). In 
John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843 edited from previously unpublished manuscripts. Vol. 1, p. 271. 
318 Ibid.   
319 Newman’s chosen stress on man’s sinful corruption as something evident to ordinary experience may 
also have been prompted, at least partially, by concern for the coincidental drift of thought and reading in 
his brother Charles – for Charles was denying it man’s sinful corruption. This too may have been a factor in 
his advancing reflection on the natural sense of sin, and on ways to belief in God and his revelation.  
       In his memorandum of May 1874 (Letters and Diaries, Vol. I, p. 182), Newman recalls his brother 
Charles’s attraction from the age of 21 or 22 to the teaching of “the Socialists.” This was, then, in about  
1823 – when Charles was 22. Coincidentally, we read in Newman’s Early Journals (Book II) a reference to 
his discussion with Charles on unbelief, which occurred on Saturday, August 9, 1823 (J. H. Newman, 
Autobiographical Writings,  pp. 192-193)  In this discussion Charles had questioned the seriousness of 
man’s moral corruption – “Man is not so bad;..” he had said. Well, who was Charles’ preferred author 
during these few years? In Newman’s Diary for January 14, 1825 (Letters and Diaries, Vol. I, p. 206) it is 
recorded that Newman was with his family at Strand. He writes that “During these days at Strand we read 
aloud 13 of my sermons, Pilgrim’s Progress part I, [(This was at Charles’s wish?]) Owen’s (of Lanark) 
Essays, and my article on Cicero)” So Charles had asked that the Socialist founder Robert Owen’s Essays, 
Part I, be also included in the family readings. The Essays of Owen is his New View of Society, or Essays 
on the Principle of the Formation of the Human Character (1813-16). The following month, on 23 
February 1825, Charles wrote to his brother John Henry saying that “I think Mr [Robert] Owen for practical 
motives to action … beats St Paul hollow” (J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, p. 212, footnote). What is 
to be said about Owen? 
      As is well known, Robert Owen (1771 – 1858) from an early age had lost belief in the usual forms of 
religion and had worked out a creed for himself. A chief point was that a person’s character is not the result 
of personal choice and actions, but of influences on him. As a basic principle, Owen has his famous dictum 
introducing his “First Essay” of A New View of Society. It is that “Any general character, from the best to 
the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the 
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          3.1.1. (b)    By the end of October 1824, well before his closer (but not initial) 
reading of Butler in the latter part of 1825, Newman has stated repeatedly that man, 
conscious of personal guilt is therefore (actually or is able to be) conscious of being a 
sinner. This must mean that man thereby has (that is, can have) a natural perception of 
the sovereign and holy God as offended. The roots of Newman’s theory of the conscience 
– understood here not as the practical judgment on what should be done but as the sense 
of guilt and sin being a first principle of religion and of man’s path to God – can be traced 
to his Evangelical days. Doubtless it was his view prior, probably well prior, to the 
preaching of these sermons in 1824. I suspect he picked it up from his early reading of 
Beveridge. 
          The point is kept up. A year later the same point is made about sin and the 
corruption of the human heart being a palpable fact open to natural perception. He states 
that “Adam had no need of a divine message to inform him that he had eaten of the 
forbidden fruit nor indeed shd we have need of being informed of our natural corruption, 
did we but look into our hearts – but lest this truth shd be forgotten (as from our 
carelessness it continually is) it was embodied in the revealed doctrines.”320 The 
following month he writes the same. “Scr is not our witness that we are sinful …. Scr 
does but remind us of it, calls our attention to it, leads us to search our hearts, and does 
                                                                                                                                                 
world at large, by the application of proper means; which means are to a great extent at the command and 
under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men” This principle is repeated in the “First 
Essay”, together with the declaration that this “is evident from the experience of all past ages, and from 
every existing fact”, and that “these principles require only to be known in order to establish themselves”. 
(R. Owen, A New View of Society Or, Essays on the Principle of the Formation of the Human Character, 
and the Application of the Principle to Practice.  (Essay I). 3rd ed. London: Printed for Longmans, Hurst. 
1817.   
      Owen believed that the character of man is, without a single exception, always formed for him. Of 
course, in such a system there can be no sin, and man is not to be praised or blamed for what he does. 
Owen, then, would not the legitimacy of a natural sense of sinful corruption. The thought of this drift in his 
brother Charles’ thinking may have been a factor in Newman’s mind in stressing at this time the observable 
fact of sinful corruption and its fundamental importance in religion, including (as we shall see) Revealed 
Religion.  
      There were different kinds of denials by other parties too. The day after his conversation with his 
brother (on August 9, 1823), Newman heard “a most pelagian discourse from St Martin (in the Fields) 
pulpit in the afternoon, - that we were born pure, and that original sin did not mean what we were born 
with, but what we acquired by habit” (J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings,  p. 193 – Sunday, August 
10, 1823). In this case, the sinful depravity consequent on the Fall was denied not only by many who 
rejected Revelation but even, to a point, by some who preached it. 
320 J. H. Newman, “On the principles common to all revelation”  Hebr: xi,6  “Without faith it is impossible 
to please Him - for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that 
diligently seek Him.” Sermon 70, no. 108. (5). S.3. Preached at St Clement’s S.M., Sept 25. 1825.  The 
quoted sentence above is taken from the MS, no.5, p. 8. (Copy of the MS being Sermon 8, Appendix).   
This sermon is also contained in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Edited from Previously 
Unpublished Manuscripts.  Vol. 5:  Sermons Preached at St Clement's, Oxford, 1824-1826, and Two 
Charity Sermons, 1827, ed. F. J. McGrath.  Oxford University Press. 2012, p. 316. 
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not propose our natural corruption as an article of faith, but as a palpable fact wh we 
cannot deny.” He continues, “The proclamation of the gospel is not that man is unholy, 
but that Xt is exalted to restore and justify the unholy - it implies, then & presupposes the 
first doctrine as the basis of the second”.321 As we shall see, these simple, experienced, 
empirical facts will be explored by Newman more profoundly.  
          The Evangelical Sumner, whom Newman had read thoroughly with great 
appreciation, argues that man is indeed corrupt, but not totally – showing, incidentally, a 
variety of positions within Evangelicalism on the matter of this Calvinist doctrine. 
Sumner denied that the doctrine of total depravity is the teaching of St Paul, and disputed 
that, in this, the Homilies accurately reflect Pauline teaching. Total depravity is neither 
copied from Scripture nor sanctioned by experience, he declares. He observes of St Paul 
that “I do not find him declare the consequence of the fall in terms like these: ‘Man, 
instead of the image of God, was now become the image of the devil: …Without any 
spark of goodness in him, only given to evil thoughts and evil deeds’.” 322 This is an 
important issue because it has implications for a natural sense of God and Natural 
Religion.323 Despite Calvin, a denial of total depravity would seem to account for a 
natural sense of God more easily. 
          Newman’s own position on the extent of man’s sinful depravity at this point of his 
career is a little difficult to determine.324  Newman had been moving away from Mayers, 
Newton and Scott in the matter of justification by mere conversion and personal faith in 
                                                 
321 J. H. Newman, “on the compatibility of spiritual feelings with scanty knowledge in the ancient 
believers”. -  Hos vi, 3. Sermon  73, no. 111. No.3, S.5.  St Clements S.M. - Oct 23. 1825. 
Manuscript of the sermon, p.15,  copied from Birmingham archives.  Appendix. Sermon 10. 
Also in John Henry Newman 1824-1843. Vol. V, ed. F. McGrath, p. 339. 
322 J. B. Sumner,  Apostolical Preaching,  pp. 131-132. 
323 There is a seeming paradox in Calvin and Arndt with their doctrine on total depravity and yet 
simultaneously on the natural sense of God. 
324 As an instance of this obscurity, we find Newman writing in his Sermon of September 19, 1824, that 
“The corruption of our nature, and our extreme peril in consequence of it, may be proved as matters of fact 
and of moral certainty from what we see within and without it. By corruption I mean our not having the 
inclinations, desires, and judgments which God approves - and by our consequent peril I mean that which 
arises from the prospect of passing from this life into God’s presence, without loving what He loves and 
hating what He hates, and thus not being able to take pleasure in His presence.”  
Newman, J. H. “The Corruption of human nature” Sermon 39 (no.19) in  John Henry Newman: Sermons 
1824-1843 edited from previously unpublished manuscripts.  Vol. I.  P. Murray OSB, ed. (1991), p. 303.   
  So, what is the extent of this corruption, as Newman sees it? It is hard to determine.  
   In his early sermons the Evangelical Newman certainly stressed man’s sinful corruption. We read his note 
that - ‘Pusey told me Lloyd had been informed by a friend on good authority that my parishioners said they 
liked me very much but I ‘damned them too much.’ Being conscious as having said little on the whole of 
future punishments (so Lloyd took it), I was at first perplexed - afterwards I thought it must mean I dwelt 
much on the corruption of the heart - and that explained it. - give grace!’ 
 Newman, J.H.  Letters and Diaries, Vol. 1. p. 203   Wednesday 8 December (Footnote)  [1824]. 
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Christ. As we have seen, he was also affirming the natural capacity of fallen man, man 
conscious of guilt, for religion. Man’s nature is not left bereft of all the elements needed 
for a true knowledge of God. That is, he is not totally dependent on faith in the revealed 
Word. By nature he is able at least to see his fallen condition, to sense his sinfulness and 
so to perceive, implicitly, the Being and presence of an offended God.   
          This is significant. Despite the paradox of total depravity, it is a line of thought also 
present in Calvin’s Institutes, and in Arndt. In the midst of his efforts from the pulpit to 
convert his flock at St Clement’s by helping them to realize their sinfulness, Newman is 
presenting, in passing manner, an initial account of the natural conscience and its 
religious implications. Newman is thus discovered to be on talking terms with Hume and 
the empiricists, and he will soon fault them with not taking into account certain facts of 
the moral order that are part of man’s ordinary experience.325 Within the sense of moral 
obligation and law, together with one’s guilt in not observing it – an empirical fact of 
Nature perceived by the natural conscience – there is a sense of God, Lawgiver and 
Judge.  
 
3.1.2.    Conscience and the providence of God (1824-1825) 
But there is more. St Paul spoke of the conscience as, implicitly, a religious sense. The 
Gentiles “show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their 
conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse 
them …” (Rom 2:15). But St Paul also teaches that God’s “eternal power and deity has 
been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse …” 
(Rom 1:20). What, then, was Newman’s position (as presented in his sermons at this 
stage) on man’s knowledge of God gained from “the things that have been made” – 
which is to say the external world? Does the conscience come into this? 
          In his very influential Natural Theology,326 William Paley,327 arguing from the 
objective world (especially the  biological design of living things), is interested not 
                                                 
325 This will be shown in the coming discussion of Newman’s article on the Miracles of Scripture. 
326 William Paley, Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected 
from the appearances of nature  (1802).  12th ed. London: Printed for J. Faulder. 1809.  
     Charles Darwin once wrote: "I do not think I hardly ever admired a book more than Paley's Natural 
Theology: I could almost formerly have said it by heart."  Charles Darwin, 15 November, 1859. Letter to 
John Lubbock. Quoted by K. Thomson in his Before Darwin: Reconciling God and Nature.  USA: Yale 
University Press. 2005. (It is one of the Darwin quotations given before the Contents page). 
    But as a matter of fact, Paley’s account of Design was problematic for Darwin. In a letter to Gray of 22 
May, 1860, he writes: “This issue of design is always painful to me. ... I own I cannot see as plainly as 
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merely in vindicating theism philosophically, but in thereby laying a foundation for 
personal religion. Paley thinks that “if one train of thinking be more desirable than 
another, it is that which regards the phenomena of nature with a constant reference to a 
supreme intelligent Author. To have made this the ruling, the habitual sentiment of our 
minds, is to have laid the foundation of every thing which is religious. The world 
thenceforth becomes a temple, and life itself one continued act of adoration”.328 The 
works of nature have only to be contemplated to lead the observer to a profoundly 
religious attitude to the being of God. That is to say, the rational contemplation of 
external nature is “the foundation of everything which is religious”. Paley’s ultimate 
purpose was the vindication of Revealed Religion, for which he argued in his Evidences 
of Christianity.329 
          There is little formal place for the conscience in Paley’s Natural Theology. It is an 
exercise of Reason – and it combats the rationalists who looked to external physical 
Nature. Blanco White330 (with whom Newman would soon form a friendship), a man of 
the Enlightenment and of Reason, had been converted back to theism by his reading of 
Paley’s Natural Theology – showing that Paley’s approach to a natural religion could be 
effective for many doubters, agnostics and even atheists. So enamoured was Blanco 
White of the worth of Paley’s book that he went on to translate it into Spanish.331 Paley 
                                                                                                                                                 
others do, and as I would wish to do, evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to 
be too much misery in the world …I see no necessity in the belief that the eye was expressly designed. On 
the other hand I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful universe, and especially the nature of 
man, and to conclude that everything is the result of brute force …I grieve to say that I cannot go as far as 
you do about Design. I am conscious that I am in an utterly hopeless muddle.” (C. Darwin, The life and 
letters of Charles Darwin, including an autobiographical chapter, ed. F. Darwin, Vol. 2, London: John 
Murray. 1887, pp. 311-312).  
327 William Paley (1743 – 1805) English clergyman, Christian apologist and philosopher, is best known for 
his Natural Theology, in which he expounded the argument for the existence of God from design – entitled, 
Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity. It is said that his Principles of 
Moral and Political Philosophy was one of the most influential philosophical texts in late Enlightenment 
Britain. His View of the Evidences of Christianity remained on the Cambridge University syllabus long 
after. 
328 W. Paley,  Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity; collected from 
the appearances of nature. Philadelphia: Printed for John Morgan. 1802.   Chapter XXVII – Conclusion. 
329 W. Paley,  A View of the Evidences of Christianity in three parts.  London: Faulder. 1794. 
330 Joseph Blanco White, born and baptised in Seville (Spain) as José Maria Blanco y Crespo in 1775 (died 
1841), was ordained a Catholic priest at the end of the eighteenth century. He soon renounced his 
priesthood and took advantage of the Peninsular War to leave Spain and the hated Catholic Church, and 
settle in England. Once there he renounced even the Christian religion itself. Having recovered from his 
atheism (with the help of Paley’s Natural Theology), he embraced the Anglican ministry and in his writings 
proceeded to attack the Catholic religion and the “intolerance” of much of religious orthodoxy. He would 
end his days a Unitarian, renouncing orthodox Christian belief. 
331 Blanco White describes the unusual circumstances surrounding his translation and publication of this 
work into Spanish in his Life. Cf. The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, 1845, Vol. I, pp. 337-339. 
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sought to vindicate theism by a meticulous exposition of evidences of design in the 
world. Things, especially living things, are manifestly contrived for purposes, and this 
design embedded in the visible, physical world offers clear evidence of a creating Mind. 
          We may observe, though, that for all his admiration of Paley’s Natural Theology, 
there is no talk by Blanco White of his gaining a sense of sin (nor does Paley’s book 
encourage it as such). Coincidentally, we notice that Blanco White also experienced 
much less personal conviction and readiness as a result of reading Paley’s other important 
book, his Evidences of Christianity. A theist once more (with the help of Paley), Blanco 
White had some difficulty taking the next step, which was assent to Revelation and the 
Gospel – which he had renounced when vigorously abandoning the Catholic 
priesthood.332 Newman’s own acquaintance with Paley dated back at least to 1819 when 
he added Paley’s Evidences of Christianity to his library, and Paley was recommended by 
Lloyd333 in his theological seminars which Newman attended. Newman was long 
interested in the defence of religion – undoubtedly he was familiar with the Natural 
Theology.  
 
           So then our question is, what was Newman’s approach to “the things that have 
been made”? Soon after his sermon on the Pharisee and the Publican, Newman preached 
his sermon on “the being & attributes of the One living and true God”.334  Newman asks, 
“Who on looking around at the works of nature, will hesitate to own there is a God? or on 
                                                 
332 Throughout the three volumes of Blanco White’s autobiographical Life, little is to be found of a 
profession of personal sinfulness. Newman would see in the sense of sin (within the conscience) the 
presence of that sense of God which grounds and leads to a readiness for Revealed Religion. As said above, 
Blanco White responded to Paley’s arguments from Reason to the Deity, but had difficulty passing on to an 
assent to Revelation. Later he discarded orthodox Christianity and embraced (or re-embraced) 
Unitarianism. Rather than any profession and consciousness of sin, his Life abounds with professions of a 
conscience filled with the conviction of a personal undying fidelity to duty and to the quest for Truth.    
333 Charles Lloyd (1784 – 1829) achieved a first at Christ Church College, Oxford in 1806, an MA in 1809, 
a BD in 1818 and a DD in 1821. Ordained in 1808, Lloyd held the curacies of Drayton (1810) and Binsey 
(1818), both near Oxford. In June 1819 he was appointed to the preachership of Lincoln's Inn, and in 
February 1822 he was appointed to the Regius Professorship of Divinity at Oxford. As Regius Professor, 
Lloyd revived theological studies in the university, supplementing his statutory public lectures with private 
classes attended by graduates, who included Hurrell Froude, Newman, Oakeley, and Pusey. On 4 March 
1827 he was consecrated as the Bishop of Oxford, and died in May 1829.  
334 J. H. Newman, “Character of God and His holy law” (Sermon 15, No.17, (B. 3. 6., 12 Sept. 1824).            
Manuscript sermon, p. 6.  For a copy of the MS sermon cf. the 2
nd
 sermon provided in the Appendix. 
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843.  Sermons preached at St Clement’s Oxford, 1824-1826 
and two charity sermons, 1827. Vol. V. Edited from previously unpublished manuscripts by F. J McGrath, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2012, pp. 92-96. (Above quote in John Henry Sermons 1824-1843, Vol. V, p. 94) 
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observing their harmony & connexion to own there is but one God?”335 There is 
obviously an interest here in the defence of religion.  
          He fully allows, then, that on “looking” at “the works of nature” and “observing” 
its “harmony and connexion” we shall “own there is a God” – and “but one God.” In this 
he is, of course, also reflecting the words of St Paul. But he doubts that our acceptance of 
these two truths is due in the first instance to our arguing from the world. Rather, “for 
these two truths wh are so familiar to our minds, we are almost entirely, if not altogether, 
indebted to revelation. It may indeed be questioned, if, of ourselves, we shd have found 
out either the one or the other.”336 So then, mere reflection on the external world will not, 
in the first instance and of itself, normally take us to the one true God. Mere reasoning 
will not do. Presumably Blanco White, a man of Reason, would have disagreed.  
           In support of his contention, Newman refers to the facts of pagan Classical 
thought. “Certain it is that amg the wise men of old, who had as acute and powerful 
minds as we can claim, who had the wonders of creation spread before their eyes and all 
the arguments open to us – yet of these wise men scarcely two or three believed in a God 
at all, and not even those two or three believed there was but one God..” 337  As with the 
knowledge of man’s natural moral corruption, so with the knowledge of God from 
creation, Newman draws support for his position from the evidence of Classical 
“heathen” thought as manifest in their writings. As he observed in his other sermons, 
heathen literature shows that natural man is able to know that he has sinned and therefore 
that God is offended. So too in these same writings it is shown, he thinks, that natural 
man does not come to know the one and only Creator simply by reflecting on the 
structure of the external world. Newman seems to mean, not that the things that have 
been made do not manifest a Creator, but that in fact he is not perceived, accepted and 
acknowledged.  
          While Newman was convinced of this from his own knowledge of the classics, he 
may have derived support from his recent reading of other authors. By this stage he had 
finished two of John Bird Sunmner’s works – his Apostolical Preaching and his 
Evidences. Hawkins had put him on to this author, and on Newman’s admission Sumner 
was a strong influence on him – specifically in leading him to Baptismal Regeneration 
                                                 
335 Ibid., Manuscript sermon, p. 6.  Appendix, Sermon 2. Some of its MS pages are missing.  
336 Ibid., Manuscript sermon,  pp. 6-7.  
337 Ibid., Manuscript sermon,  p.7 
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(despite Sumner being Evangelical).338 He may also have been familiar with Sumner’s 
Treatise on the Records of Creation, which compares the theories of classical 
philosophers with the doctrines of the Hebrew Bible. “They had arrived at no idea of a 
Creator,” Sumner writes (while pointing to support from Cicero), “whose relation to his 
creatures might induce him to regard their distresses with commiseration”.339  Thirty 
years later, in his novel Callista, Newman would say, in the words of the unbelieving 
Juba, that it was the Christians who brought in the idea of a (single almighty) Creator.340  
          In his sermon Newman observes that the greatest pagan philosophers did not 
attain the knowledge of God possessed by the poorest Christian child. Revelation, once 
accepted, 341  prepares the subject to recognize the all-pervasive fact of the world’s design 
and its Architect. The point here is that Newman does not appear in this sermon nearly as 
confident as Paley that unaided reason will take a person to the knowledge of the one true 
                                                 
338  Over forty years later Newman observed to a non-Catholic correspondent:  “I despair of giving you any 
book which will fully satisfy you on the  accuracy of that view of the doctrine, which is taken in the Office 
for Baptism, ....Indeed I doubt whether any book can satisfy you from the nature of the case. Yet I think 
Sumner's Apostolical Preaching might be of use to you. It is a very good book. When its author wrote  it, he 
was a mild high churchman, according to the character of his  day. He wrote it against 'Evangelical' 
Preaching, and there can be no doubt that, when he wrote it, he did profess Baptismal Regeneration.  His 
book would be of use to you as showing you the ground work on which that doctrine is commonly held   
and the place it holds in the system of Christian teaching...Sumner's book sets before you that whole....”  
(J. H. Newman. Letters and Diaries, Vol. XXIII, pp. 48-52, To an Unknown Correspondent. Febr 4/1867) 
     We notice that in this letter Newman describes Sumner, commonly acknowledged to be an Evangelical, 
as “a mild high churchman, according to the character of his day”. Evangelicalism was varied and fluid. 
339 J. B. Sumner, Treatise on the Records of Creation and the Moral Attributes of the Creator. 2 Vols.  
Volume I. (pp. 1-326). On the Records of Creation, p. 196.     
Volume II  (pp.1-393) On the Wisdom and Goodness of the Creator. London: Printed for Hatchard. 1816. 
Internet archive for the whole work, Volumes I and II, on 18 September 2013:    
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=wFsUAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary
_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
340 Newman, J. H. Callista: A Sketch of the Third Century (1855). Universe Books edition.  
London: Burns & Oates (1962), p. 18. 
341 Kevin Mongrain examines carefully Newman’s thinking about arguments from design. He shows that 
Newman was highly conscious of his historical context, and that for Newman arguments from design are 
compelling and useful only if they express what the eyes of faith can see. Mongrain traverses Newman’s  
writings such as his “Revelation and its relation to Faith (1885), his Biglietto Speech (1879), his sermon 
“The Infidelity of the Future” (1873), various University Sermons such as “The Usurpations of Reason”, 
and others. The physical universe proves the being of God to the one who has faith and this proof will 
deepen his faith, but arguments from design will not generally ignite faith in sceptics.    
K. Mongrain, “The Eyes of Faith: Newman’s Critique of Arguments from Design”, Newman Studies 
Journal, Vol. 6, No.1, 2009, pp. 68-86. National Institute for Newman Studies, USA. 
    I suspect that Newman’s idea of the argument from Design was formed from his reading of English 
philosophers such as Paley – and from English philosophers who rejected it. He thought the argument 
presumed far too much. Edward Feser has analysed Aquinas’ “Fifth Way” and sees it as very different from 
the Design argument of such men as Paley (E. Feser, “Between Aristotle and William Paley: Aquinas’s 
Fifth Way.”  Nova et Vetera 11 (2013): pp. 707-749). Feser sees the validity of the Fifth Way of Aquinas 
(rooted in Aristotle) as deriving from a philosophy of nature which sees a dynamic finality in all 
components of nature. Whereas the Paley-like arguments from Design interpret the design of nature in 
mechanistic terms. Presumably this means that Paley saw Design in terms of a static mechanistic structure. 
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God, Creator of all, by going merely on the things that have been made. Newman chooses 
to cast off “all subtle argument, all ingenious speculation” and regard as folly all “groping 
in the twilight of human conjecture”. The Evangelical Newman looks on mere “human 
conjecture” as a “twilight”. 342  
          What seems more telling for him is what God does in the world – which is to say, 
his providence. In respect to the world and the things which God has made, Newman 
seems more impressed by God’s “stupendous attributes as displayed in the ordinary acts 
of His providence.” What does God in his providence do? “He casteth down & raiseth up 
- He makes all things work together for His own glory. - in the most harmonious & quiet 
manner His purposes are brought about - just at the fitting season and often in the most 
unexpected way, His servants are delivered when all things were apparently against 
them.” Significantly, he continues” “Observe how bad men are overruled to do His will 
….. Consider too what wonderful & varied consequences result often fr one single action. 
Unlike the weak & vain governors of earth, who are obliged to have recourse to a 
separate scheme for every separate end they have in view, he at one stroke imparts 
comfort to one, delivers another fr trouble, alarms & awakens a third, and punishes a 
fourth…” 343  
          So then, Newman seems more disposed to observe and dwell not on structures in 
creation but on on the dynamic course of the world and human affairs. This offers 
evidence of a moral providence of One who rewards good and punishes evil in the course 
of human affairs. This point about the moral character of the course of the world is one 
that Butler is at pains to develop in his Analogy. With Newman, this perspective on the 
world and its course obviously assumes an awareness of sin in human history. This 
perspective seems prompted by the testimony of the conscience. The presence and action 
of God in the course of the world is recognized on the basis of what the conscience, with 
its sense of sin, suggests of him. He is a Judge, and in the course of the world this is 
discovered to be so too. He is a Judge in his providence.  
                                                 
342 Newman allowed that a sense of creation, and therefore of a Cause, was within the reach of normal 
reasoning. In particular, he seems to have been convinced that reflection on one’s own self and one’s own 
existence provides an intimation of creation. As mentioned earlier, he gained this in his childhood. (Early 
Journals: Original Notes. April 8, 1843. A.W, p. 223). But, so he seems to suggest in his writings, for this to 
involve a knowledge of the true God, Creator of all, a knowledge of Revelation and help from the Holy 
Spirit is normally also needed. As already mentioned, Kevin Mongrain shows that for Newman, arguments 
from design are compelling and useful only if they express what the eyes of faith can see. 
343 J. H. Newman, “Character of God and His holy law”, Sermon 15, no. 17, B. 3. 6, 12 Sept. 1824.  
Manuscript sermon, pp. 14-15:  Copy in the Appendix, Sermon 2. 
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843.  Volume V, p. 94.  
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          At this very time in his sermons the conscience is being described as naturally 
aware of sin and therefore of an offended God. The conscience with its sense of good and 
evil evoking a judgment seems, then, to prompt a sense of the Providence of God in the 
course of the world. God “at one stroke imparts comfort to one, delivers another fr 
trouble, alarms & awakens a third, and punishes a fourth…” 344  
 
        Newman does not encourage, however, the sweeping notion that our misfortunes 
are simply God’s judgments by which in his providence he punishes us for our sins. On 
July 24 of the following year (1825) Newman preached his sermon (Sermon 62, no.92) 345 
on the common belief that our misfortunes are God’s judgments on us and that God 
inflicts misfortunes on great offenders. He says that this belief arises in no small measure 
from the action of conscience. Newman is saying that while this is a mistake of reason, it 
rests on an intimation of the conscience. Though at times God does punish sin in this life, 
misfortunes are generally for our trial and discipline and not for our punishment. 
 
          Altogether, in the matter of God and natural religion, by the end of 1824 Newman 
already seems to take his starting point more from the testimony of man’s moral sense 
than from the structure of external nature. He views the world from that vantage point. 
 
3.1.3.    Conscience as the voice of God to the soul  (1825) 
To this point, Newman’s observations on the natural knowledge of God related to the 
sense of sin and on sin’s repercussions in the course of the world. 1825 appears as a year 
of significant intellectual activity – and early in the year we find him rethinking his 
Calvinist-Evangelical position.346 Coincidentally, early in the year he is also defending 
Christianity in correspondence with his brother Charles, a correspondence that continued 
                                                 
344 Ibid., Manuscript sermon p. 14: Copy in the Appendix, Sermon 2. 
      Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 94. 
345 J. H. Newman,  “God does not govern us by judgments”   1 Kings xvii, 17,18.  “And it came to pass 
after these things, that the son of the woman, the mistress of the house fell sick, & his sickness was so sore, 
that there was no breath left in him. And she said to Elijah, What have I to do with thee, O thou man of 
God? art thou come unto me to call my sin to remembrance & to slay my son?”   Sermon 62,  No. 92.  July 
24, 1825.      
   Manuscript sermon copy in the Appendix, Sermon 6.  
   Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, pp. 260.   
346 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. I, p. 211, footnote: see Autobiographical Writings, p. 204-205. 
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well into the year.347 On June 25 he began (again) reading Butler’s Analogy.348 In July he 
was reading various writers on miracles, including Hume, as a preparation for one of the 
two promised articles for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, on which he made a start in 
August. Towards the end of the year he was working in earnest on this Essay that would 
defend the miracles of Scripture.349 The conscience appears in several of his sermons this 
year – and they will be referred to as our study progresses. Indeed, as 1825 advanced, we 
notice a more explicit (yet still Evangelical) concern for and discussion of the Conscience 
and the elements of its inner structure. The Conscience has caught Newman’s serious 
attention. A year into parochial ministry and three weeks after his ordination to the 
priesthood on May 29, 1825, Newman preached for the first time exclusively on the 
Conscience. The point to be remembered is that we can see from his activities that 
Newman has the defence of Revealed Religion more in his mind. Recently ordained an 
Anglican priest, he was using (somewhat) for the composition of sermons the Evangelical 
Charles Simeon’s “Helps to Composition”,350 and for this sermon he drew on part of 
                                                 
347 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. I, p. 240.    To Charles Robert Newman   July 7th 1825. 
348 Ibid., p. 238. This was not Newman’s first reading of Butler’s Analogy – Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 10.  
       It is to be noted that the edition of the Analogy that Newman used at this point was that containing the 
Evangelical Daniel Wilson’s long critique. Though this suggests that Newman was retaining an Evangelical 
perspective and was not reading the Analogy uncritically, it also suggests that Newman’s interest in the 
philosophical defence of Revelation from Nature was growing. Edward Sillem in Vol I of The 
Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman (General Introduction to the study of Newman’s 
Philosophy) Louvain: Nauwelaerts Publishing House, 1969, writes that :  
“It may well have been the case that Newman was put on his guard against Dr. Whately’s 
rationalising proclivities in theology, as well as the dangers of the closed Aristotelian system of 
metaphysics, by his reading of Butler’s Analogy at a propitious moment, after he had finished his 
work on the Elements of Logic and before he had become the really close friend of Whately he was 
between 1826 and 1828.....It is possible in other words, that Butler cautioned Newman against 
following Whately into questions of metaphysics, and deepened his interest in those problems of 
knowledge he had already encountered in Aristotle’s Ethics and Rhetoric concerning ‘personal’ or 
‘moral evidence’, that is to say the kind of evidence which actually produces in the minds of living 
people, a certitude in matters of fact, which no amount of abstract reasoning will ever prove 
apodictically. Butler may also have deepened Newman’s understanding of the part conscience 
plays in guiding a man to certitude in the higher spheres of religious knowledge, but as Newman 
never mentions Butler’s name in connection with his doctrine about conscience, we cannot say 
what he really owes to him on this point.” (p. 180)  
Newman’s reading of Butler at this point suggests a growing interest in the philosophical defence of 
religion. Sillem has also noted that Newman never mentions Butler in connection with his own doctrine on 
the conscience. Newman employed the conscience in his defence of religion. 
349 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. I, p. 267. 
350 Francis McGrath writes: “When tackling sermon writing for the first time he turned to Charles 
Simeon’s Helps to Composition. His earliest treatment of conscience belongs in a sermon preached on 19 
June 1825.” F. McGrath, John Henry Newman: Universal Revelation.  London: Burns & Oates. 1997, p. 
27.     
We notice that on June 25 he began reading Butler’s Analogy of Religion (Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 
238. “- began Butler’s Analogy”).  In July he began reading writers on miracles, including Hume, as a 
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Simeon’s skeleton sermon on “A Good and Evil Conscience”.351 In mid 1825 Newman is 
still inclining to Evangelical sources, though not uncritically. 
         In this sermon of 19 June, 1825,352 the Conscience is stated to be “the voice of God 
to the soul” – a common and classic metaphor which appears in Simeon’s own sermon. 
Let us notice, incidentally, a distinction between the conscience and “the soul”. The 
“soul” (in this context) would seem to be the self at its heart – what we might simply call 
“the heart”. The conscience is the “voice of God” which is uttered to the “heart” of man, 
or alternatively it is the heart’s power of apprehending (through the conscience) the 
“voice of God”.  
          Simeon353 states that “the accusations of the conscience are the voice of God within 
us, calling us to repentance”.354 A good conscience “is, in fact, the witness of the Spirit of 
God: for it is the result of a divine illumination whereby we discern the agreement of our 
experience, with the word of God, and of a divine communication, rendering that 
agreement an occasion of joyful confidence”.355  These divine communications “assure to 
us a complete and everlasting possession” of heaven. “Even in the day of judgment itself 
this holy confidence will remain.”356 Simeon’s attribution of the good conscience to “a 
divine illumination” of the Spirit of God, together with an assurance of heaven, is, of 
course, typically Calvinist.  
                                                                                                                                                 
preparation for one of the two promised articles for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, which he started in 
August. 
351 Simeon’s sermon was his “A Good and Evil Conscience”. 1 John. iii. 20, 21 If our heart condemn us, 
God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things. Brethren, if our heart condemn us not, then have we 
confidence toward God.  (C. Simeon, Helps to Composition: or, Six Hundred Skeletons of Sermons, 
Sermon  CCCCXVIII, Vol. IV. Printed by Luke Hansard & Sons, for T. Cadell and W. Davies, in the 
Strand. 3
rd
 ed. 1815, pp. 299-303).   In Sermon 5 of the Appendix, I have provided a copy of this sermon of 
Simeon’s taken from his publication, Helps to Composition. 
352 J. H. Newman, “Conscience, its use etc”. 1 Sam iii, 10, “And the Lord came & stood & called as at 
other times, Samuel, Samuel. Then Samuel answered, Speak, for Thy servant heareth”. Sermon 58, no. 85 
(B. 3. 4)  St Clements.  (copy of the manuscript sermon is given in the Appendix, the fourth sermon). 
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843: Sermons preached at St Clement’s Oxford, 1824-1826 
and two charity sermons, 1827.  Vol. V, p. 236.   
353 Charles Simeon (1759–1836), English evangelical, was educated at Eton College and King's College, 
Cambridge. In 1782 he became fellow of King's College, and took orders, receiving the living of Holy 
Trinity Church, Cambridge, in the following year. He gained a remarkable influence among the 
undergraduates of the university. He published hundreds of sermons and outlines of sermons (called 
"sermon skeletons"), but his chief work is a commentary on the whole Bible, entitled Horae homileticae. 
354 C. Simeon, Helps to Composition, Vol IV, p. 301. 
355 Ibid., p. 302. 
356 Ibid., pp. 302-303. 
99 
 
          3.1.3 (a)   At the outset of his sermon Newman writes that the “Bible then is God’s 
voice to us, & calls us as it called Samuel, to listen & obey”.357  This, of course, is the 
testimony of the entire Christian tradition. But, he continues, “besides this, there is 
another monitor wh also may be called the voice of God, warning and directing us in all 
our ways – I mean conscience”.358  So then, the conscience is a “monitor” (as Newman 
called it back in 1817, when writing to Mayers) which has a unique dignity among the 
endowments of man’s mind, for it “may be called the voice of God.” By saying that it 
“may be called the voice of God” Newman is suggesting that it is such by analogy, or as a 
kind of reflection or echo of God’s will and voice. It warns and directs “us in all our 
ways”.359   
          3.1.3 (b)  Newman is interested in two features of the conscience that are obvious 
facts of experience, and that manifest its religious dimension. As before, he is referring 
not to the conscience as a practical judgment, but to the sense of duty and right or wrong 
informing the practical judgment. Firstly, he indicates what it is in the action of 
conscience whereby it “may be called the voice of God.”360 It is its peculiar power in 
causing pain or pleasure. “Conscience is / arises fr the comparison of what we do with 
what we believe to be our duty - and is attended with a feeling of pleasure when our 
actions coincide with our belief - with a feeling of pain when they fall short of it. Now by 
pain & pleasure our whole life is governed.” 361 So Conscience has a peculiar might. In its 
awareness of the wrongness of bad actions, conscience is “a stern & restless accuser” and 
“how mighty are its workings”.362  As an accuser “it is a powerful & divine principle in its 
nature,” and “we shd strive to act according to it”.363   
          So, in its distinctive power, as experienced in the pain it causes, it functions and 
appears as a “divine principle”. Newman clearly means that conscience, having perceived 
the duty, condemns and threatens as if it represents, or as would, a supreme power. The 
                                                 
357 J. H. Newman, “Conscience, its use etc”  Manuscript sermon, p. 3 (sermon 4 of Appendix A).  
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843, Vol. V, p. 236.  
(We notice that the word “then” is missing in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843, Vol. V, p. 236.) 
358 J. H. Newman, “Conscience, its use etc”.  Manuscript sermon, p. 3, Appendix A.   
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843, Vol V, p. 237. (F. McGrath, the editor, often completes 
words that are abbreviated in the manuscript – for Newman wrote quickly. For instance, at times in this 
sermon McGrath has “which”, whereas in the manuscript it is “wh”). 
359 Ibid., p.3  (Sermon 4 in Appendix A). 
360 Ibid., p. 3. 
361 Ibid., p. 4. Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843.  Vol V, p. 237.    
362 J. H. Newman , “Conscience, its use etc”.  Manuscript sermon, p. 6. (Appendix A) 
363 Ibid., p. 13.  Also John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843   Vol V, p. 240.   
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feeling which its action entails is such as to suggest the thought of a supreme power 
demanding obedience and threatening judgment. In the monitory and sanctioning 
dimension of its action, it gives the impression of being the “voice of God to the soul.” 364  
 In his earlier Evangelical sermons Newman had declared that the sense of guilt  
contains a sense of God. Here the point is pursued more precisely and the finger is laid on 
the element which provides this sense of God. It is the commanding and accusing 
character of its edicts, implicitly apprehended in the peculiar pain that is occasioned. This 
impact gives rise to the thought of a Power requiring obedience and threatening 
sanctions. The edicts of conscience have the character of importunate and unyielding 
power as manifested in the pain or pleasure it occasions. This peculiar authoritativeness 
in the action of conscience savours of an absolute Sovereign.  
          It is, as Newman will write decades later in his Grammar of Assent, (like) “a voice 
… imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience”.365 
Implicit in the 24 year-old Newman’s analysis is the assumption that if the Creator made 
the conscience of man to convey the clear impression of his authoritative and accusing 
dictate, a dictate as if coming distinctly from him though mediated by the conscience, 
then this impression of God present in the conscience is valid and reliable. Newman is 
not speaking here of the conscience as a practical dictate, but of the conscience as an 
absolutely obliging dictate. 
          3.1.3 (c)   There is a second point made about the Conscience in the sermon. It is 
that “the decisions of conscience are not unerringly correct: - because they depend, not 
upon the things we do being rt or wrong, but upon their agreeing with what we think right 
or wrong.” 366  So there is the obvious fact that the Conscience is not always correct in its 
judgments. It “is still at best an imperfect & fallible guide”, and “it is liable to mistake & 
ignorance”.367  
          This too, paradoxically, has implications for its religious character. A 
consciousness of this proneness to error ought lead the subject to attend to Revelation as 
its best and truest source of truth. For “there is but one true lt. wh lighteth every man that 
cometh into the world – there is a great & brilliant luminary set up by God’s mercy amg 
                                                 
364 Ibid., p. 17.  Also John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843   Vol V, p. 241.   
365 J. H. Newman, Grammar of Assent. Image Book.  Ch. 5, I, p. 99, 
366 J. H. Newman, “Conscience, its use etc”. Manuscript sermon, pp. 4-5. (Appendix A) 
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol V, p. 237.    
367  Ibid., Manuscript sermon, p. 13.   
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol V, p. 240. 
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us, & if we wd. have our conscience a lantern unto our steps & paths, we must go to lt. it 
at that glorious lamp wh God has provided – Xt must give us lt. – He enlightens by His 
word & His Spirit”.368 This point connects with the next chapter on the passing from 
conscience to Revelation. 
          3.1.3 (d)   However, there is a feature of the fallible conscience itself which 
suggests its divine character. It is that if the dictate of the conscience is respected, which 
is to say if the conscience is consistently obeyed (even if fallible), then its own 
apprehension of the truth will be progressively increased.369 The insistent conscience, if 
obeyed, will lead progressively to the acquisition of the Truth. Newman may have had in 
mind his own personal experience and the example of such biographies as Scott’s Force 
of Truth. As Scott’s case demonstrated, “the more we do our duty, the clearer we shall 
know our duty … For doing his duty is the way to know more & more of it”.370   
          This pattern, in which the commanding conscience is man’s teacher of religion if 
dutifully obeyed, is further evidence that the edictal and imperatival character of the 
conscience is, in a manner, a divine principle present in the conscience. God, present (as 
Creator and Guide) in the edict of conscience, prompts the subject to seek the Truth, 
draws him in its direction by conscience’s continued monitoring, and meets it as it nears 
its goal.  
          3.1.3 (e)   There would seem to be another implication of this, not explicitly made 
by Newman here. It is that if a person persists in moral and religious error when the Truth 
is available to him, then it is precisely because he has not obeyed the imperatival voice of 
conscience. Knowing moral and religious truth will depend on living according to 
conscience, and moral and religious error (such as heresy) will, to a point, be due to a 
failure in fidelity to the conscience. The good man, the man of conscience, will be led to 
know the Truth, and error will be the usual term of the bad man. This latter point, of 
course, is especially controversial but as we shall see, Newman will urge it. 
          In his sermon, Newman also introduces the idea of the “grand principles of duty” in 
the conscience: “since it is a powerful monitor, we must obey it. … Conscience is not 
likely to be very wrong in the grand principles of duty, & if after praying & serious tht. 
                                                 
368  Ibid., Manuscript sermon, p. 14.   (Sermon 4 in Appendix) 
Also in  John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 240.  
369  Ibid., Manuscript sermon, pp. 8-9    
Also in  John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 238. 
370  Ibid., Manuscript sermon, p. 8. 
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we act accord to it, we must in the main be rt .… It is, I repeat, the voice of God to the 
soul – He calls us as he called Samuel & our answer must be the same”.371 These “grand 
principles” would seem to be the basic and broad duties clearly intimated, rather than 
specific and practical dictates on what to do here and now. 
          In all this, Newman has been exploring principally the edictal character of 
conscience, which includes its intimation of a judgment. It is this which makes of the 
conscience an echo or reflection of the presence and voice of God to the soul, and, we 
may add, a foundation for a natural religious sense. 
 
3.1.4.    Conscience and miraculous interventions (1825) 
On February 10 of 1825 Newman had received a letter from Mr Smedley of the 
Encyclopaedia Metropolitana asking that, following his article on Cicero, he write two 
more articles – “Apolonius of Tyana” and as a sequel to this, one on the Miracles of 
Scripture.372  In July he started reading various writers on miracles, including David 
Hume. The article was finally sent off to Smedley in April of the following year (1826). 
By then he had moved into his rooms at Oriel to begin his new work as tutor. In his 
article Newman is engaged in a defence of the miracles portrayed in Scripture, especially 
against the likes of Hume. The article was entitled “The miracles of Scripture compared 
with those reported elsewhere, as regards their nature, credibility, and evidence.” 373 It is 
significant that during the course of his discussion, Newman employs a consideration of 
the perception of God by the natural conscience. 
          While his reading for his article on Miracles included Butler’s Analogy, the 
intensity of his pastoral work in St Clement’s 374 and his preoccupation with the topic of 
miracles for his article could not have allowed a lot of time for Butler at this point. The 
Apologia pinpoints two areas in which Newman most gained from his reading of Butler’s 
Analogy: the sacramental or analogical character of the visible world, and the principle of 
                                                 
371  Ibid., Manuscript sermon , pp. 16-17. (Appendix).  
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol V, p. 241.  
372 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. 1, p. 209. 
373 J. H. Newman, “The Miracles of Scripture compared with those reported elsewhere as regards their 
Nature, Credibility and Evidence.” Essay I (1825-1826), in Two Essays on Biblical and on Ecclesiastical 
Miracles.  London: Longmans, Green & Co.  New Impression. 1907. 
374 E. S. Ffoulkes,  A History of the Church of S. Mary of the Virgin Oxford.  London: Longman's, Green, 
and Co. 1892, p. 457. “Mr Hickman, the clerk of S. Clement’s when Mr Newman was curate there … says 
that Mr Newman’s labours in that parish far exceeded any that could be named in other Oxford parishes at 
that date”.  
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probability as the guide of life.375  We also notice that in the Apologia Newman tells us 
that the “main difference between my Essay on Miracles in 1826 and my Essay in 1842 is 
this: that in 1826 I considered that miracles were sharply divided into two classes … 
whereas in 1842 I saw that they were to be regarded according to their greater or less 
probability, which was in some cases sufficient to create certitude about them, in other 
cases only belief or opinion”. 376 
          Although Newman implies that Butler’s principle of probability did not much 
influence his article of 1825-6, it is not impossible that Butler’s principle of the 
sacramentality of Nature may have begun to tell during 1825. Nature bespeaks God. One 
suspects that Butler’s influence on Newman began in greater earnest in 1827, inspired by 
his reading of Keble’s Christian Year. Newman’s theological views were, by then, 
moving more rapidly in a High Church direction. His membership of the Oriel Common 
Room and his residence in the College as Tutor were having their effect. Butler, with 
whom he had been familiar since at least 1823,377 began to loom larger on his horizon.378   
          The task he set himself in his Miracles article379 was to determine how the 
miracles of Scripture can “with propriety” be referred to a divine agent. While this 
concerned assent to Revelation, an important element of Newman’s disagreement with 
Hume relates to the sense of God in the conscience, though the elaboration of this does 
not occupy much space in the article. Hence its relevance to our discussion here.  
                                                 
375 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  pp. 10-11. 
376 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
377 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 10. 
378 Newman states in the Apologia (p. 7) that at the time of his conversion of 1816 he began reading 
Milner’s Church History. As a matter of fact, Joseph Milner had written another work – an attack on 
Gibbon and Hume: Gibbon's account of Christianity considered:  together with some strictures on Hume's 
Dialogues concerning natural religion.  (York : Printed by A. Ward; and sold by G. Robinson ... and T. 
Cadell ... London;  J. Merrill, in Cambridge; J. Fletcher, in Oxford; W. Tesseyman, in York; T. Browne, in 
Hull; and J. Binns, in Leeds. 1781). In this book Milner draws on Joseph Butler’s account of the conscience 
and the moral character of the world in order to rebut Hume. One wonders whether, as a result of reading 
Milner’s Church History, the young Newman also went on to read Milner’s Gibbon’s account of 
Christianity considered at some early stage, and whether he was induced by it to become interested in 
Joseph Butler’s work. 
379 Regarding this article of 1825-26 on the miracles of Scripture, Maisie Ward writes: “now as always 
miracles were not specially valued by him as evidential, in the sense of proving the Christian revelation to 
the unbeliever, but as manifesting to the believer something of God’s character as moral governor of His 
Universe ….. as yet he confined belief in miracles to those of the Gospel and the very early Church.”  
M.  Ward, Young Mr. Newman.  London: Sheed & Ward. 1952,  p. 108. 
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          Hume’s objection380 was that the similarity of all “miraculous” narratives one to 
another (including fabulous and fanciful events) is a reason for rejecting them all. They 
are all absurdly out of character from the ordinary course of events (that is, Nature), and 
are to be classed with all other fables which all reasonable persons recognize could never 
have happened. Newman’s response was to begin with an area of agreement. As the 
“groundwork of the inquiry on which I am entering”381 Newman accepts with approval a 
principle supplied by Hume himself, which is that as  
“the deity discovers Himself to us by His works, we have no rational grounds for 
ascribing to Him attributes or actions dissimilar from those which His works 
convey. It follows, then, that in discriminating between those Miracles which can 
and those which cannot be ascribed to God, we must be guided by the 
information with which experience furnishes us concerning His wisdom, 
goodness, and other attributes”.382  
          We notice here a feature of Newman’s apologetic method – he engages with those 
in radical opposition to himself by liberally allowing features of their ground, on which 
he then proceeds to argue. Newman accepts Hume’s starting principle, that we be guided 
by our experience of God’s action, which Hume takes to be limited to the arena of 
external, physical nature. It is of the external world that we have experience. In response, 
Newman observes that “while writers expiate so largely on the laws of nature, they 
altogether forget the existence of a moral system”383 which, of course, is apprehended by 
the moral instincts of the mind. He says that “nearly all” antecedent objections against 
Miracles “arise from forgetfulness of the existence of moral laws”.384 Because of this 
exclusive focus on the laws of physical external nature as the field of our experience, it is 
deemed antecedently most improbable that genuine miracles will occur.  
          Newman is contrasting the concentration of writers on the religious implications 
of external nature and the course of the world with their lack of interest in the 
                                                 
380 David Hume (1711-1776), influential philosopher, historian and essayist. Hume was pleased with his 
argument against miracles. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding he states: “I flatter myself, 
that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an 
everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the 
world endures.”   
D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, On Miracles, Part I, no. 86. 
381 J. H. Newman, Two Essays on Biblical and on Ecclesiastical Miracles.  Essay 1. Section II,  p. 16. 
382 Ibid.  
383 Ibid.  
384 Ibid., p. 20. 
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implications of the “moral system” which is equally real, external and objective. It is this 
latter realm of experience which Newman especially chooses to argue from. The “moral 
system” – the moral law – is just as real and objective as is external nature and the “laws 
of nature”. Hume, of course, reduced the conscience and its perceptions to the level of 
feelings. 
          Quoting Hume,385  he observes that “the moral government of God, with the course 
of which the Miracle entirely accords, is altogether kept out of sight.” 386  Our experience 
of Nature encompasses more than an experience of the external and physical, for it 
includes the moral order and its laws. “Nature” embraces both systems.  A knowledge of 
the Moral Governor and his actions in the moral order is accessible in moral perception 
and moral experience, and they “correspond to the ordinary arrangements of His 
providence”.387 So it is that miracles of Scripture “demand our attention, as resulting from 
known attributes of God”.388   
          So, certain attributes of God are known from nature’s moral system. That is, 
Newman chooses to begin with the sense of God and his moral government implied in 
the moral laws as apprehended by a rightly functioning conscience. It is this same God, 
intimated by the conscience, who is recognized as also operating providentially in the 
course of the world, as well as in the miracles of Scritpture.389 Accompanying this, and 
behind it, is an expectation that God may so act – and this expectation itself flows from 
this natural knowledge of his character intimated in the conscience. There is a sense of its 
antecedent probability and then subsequent recognition because of the knowledge of the 
Moral Governor attained in moral experience. 
          This moral apprehension of God by the moral sense opens a person to the 
possibility and likelihood of God acting in the world beyond its ordinary laws, provided 
                                                 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid., p. 21. 
387 Ibid., p. 22. 
388 Ibid. 
389 We ought note this important point of recognizing God in creation (and in supernatural Revelation) on 
the basis of an existing impression of him. It will come up as this study develops. But it is not a point that is 
peculiar to Newman’s thought. For instance, in his review (in the British Critic, October 1841, pp. 327-
328) of Thomas Arnold’s volume of Sermons (Art. II – Christian Life, its Course, its Hindrances, and its 
helps, Sermons preached mostly in the Chapel of Rugby School. London: Fellowes), William George Ward 
(by then a disciple of Newman’s), quotes from the German Catholic theologian Johann Moehler “On the 
Unity of the Church”. Moehler wrote: “As the universe and as history are manifestations of God, yet do not 
teach knowledge of the true God except to him who has already the conviction of God in himself; so the 
words of Holy Scripture are revelations of the Holy Spirit, but are not intelligible except to him to whom 
He has already imparted himself…” (Ward’s italics, stressing the prior “conviction of God in himself”). 
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the event is consonant with his moral character and purposes. In his stress on the 
apprehension of the moral dimension of reality – the “moral system” – Newman faults 
the Humean insistence on the physical world as the exclusive scope of experience, and 
therefore of man’s knowledge of the Creator’s action and character. In doing so Newman 
widens the knowing faculty of the mind and also the range of objective experience. The 
mind can know the moral system of reality by a moral perception. Reality itself includes 
a great moral realm with its own objective laws. They are just as objective as are the 
physical laws of Nature. By means of the conscience and a right moral disposition, the 
mind and the imagination is attuned to the objective moral order (and not just to the 
physical), and implicitly to the moral Governor who is its Author. 
          As we shall see in the next chapter on Conscience and the assent to Revelation, the 
miracle “professes to be the signature of God to a message delivered by human 
instruments.” 390 It is true that, as with any signature, if it is to be recognized as coming 
from God it must be already known from his existing works. But physical laws are not 
the only laws of nature. Nature also displays moral laws and a moral system, and the 
Creator is present, active and knowable in nature’s moral activity – in both the conscience 
of man and the (moral) course of human affairs. After all, in the general course of things, 
Virtue is rewarded and Vice punished.  
          Newman’s article on Miracles, as with some of his early sermons (as discussed) 
reveals a view of the conscience as a natural power of religious perception, by means of 
which God is known. The Conscience is thus not just a power of knowing the moral law, 
but of knowing the moral Governor whose law it is perceived to be. Newman’s starting 
point of argument is broadly the same as Hume’s: it is personal experience. But he 
uncovers a realm of experience overlooked (and denied) by Hume as a possible source of 
the knowledge of God. It is ordinary moral perception.391  
          The critical step in Newman’s argument is that the knowledge of moral laws leads 
man to the perception of a moral Governor dictating in those moral laws. This, he would 
probably have said if asked, depends on the readiness or disposition to perceive it – a 
certain ethos of mind, we might say, lacking in reasoners such as Hume. As we shall see 
in the next chapter (ch.4), on the basis of this existing knowledge of God derived from 
                                                 
390 Ibid., p. 10. 
391 This critique of Hume by Newman is not picked up by Jeremy Joyner White in his A Humean Critique 
of David Hume’s Theory of Knowledge. Ed. by John A. Gueguen. Lanham – New York: Oxford University 
Press of America. Inc. 1998. 
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conscience, the miraculous action of the God of Revelation is recognized as being in 
character with the action of the One dimly known from the moral system of Nature.  
 
          If we take into account Newman’s sermons which refer to the natural sense of sin, 
his analysis of the divine character of the edicts of conscience, his observations on the 
moral course of the world (Providence) as more obviously indicative of God than is its 
structural design, and then the article on Miracles with its consideration of the moral 
system of nature and what it reveals of God to the moral sense, we have the beginnings of 
a way to God as moral Governor and holy Judge.  
 
3.1.5     Conscience as an instinct of the mind     
In the article on Miracles Newman refers to the “instincts of the mind”, by which one 
knows the moral Governor of Nature. In respect to instinctive apprehensions, Newman 
had, in his very first written sermon – which was his first one preached at St Clement’s 
on June 27, 1824 – referred to “the reproaches” of the conscience and the “bitterness” of 
the heart. In that sermon he writes that “The desire of happiness is natural to man, - 
instinctive apprehensions of judgment and hell seem natural to man – and how does he 
meet these innate conceptions? Alas, …..” (my italics) 392   
          In the article on the miracles of Scripture, just discussed, Newman refers to “certain 
instincts of mind, such as conscience, a sense of responsibility, and an approbation of 
virtue; an innate desire of knowledge, and an almost universal feeling of the necessity of 
religious observances.” 393 The conscience is an instinctive sense of responsibility and 
approbation of virtue. Presumably he means a spontaneous apprehension of duty, a 
natural and direct awareness of moral obligation that requires scarcely any conscious 
step from premises to conclusion. Newman contrasts “our instinctive sense of duty and 
moral obligation” with “the weak sanction which reason gives to the practice of virtue, 
and withal the uncertainty of the mind when advancing beyond the first elements of right 
and wrong”.394  
                                                 
392 J. H. Newman, “The work of man”,  Psalm civ, 23. “Man goeth forth unto his work and to his labour 
unto evening.”  Sermon 1, no.2.  John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843.  Vol. V, p.  21. 
393 J. H. Newman, Two Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles, Essay 1 (1826).  Section II. 
London: Longmans, Green, and Co.  New Impression. 1907, pp. 16-17 
394 Ibid., p. 19. 
108 
 
          It looks as if the “instinctive sense of duty and moral obligation” which contains a 
sense of God as commanding and as offended, as Moral Governor and as Judge, is part of 
“the first elements of right and wrong.” The “first elements of right and wrong” would 
appear to be the medieval synderesis,395 for which Luther came to have no use, but which 
the Pietist (and Lutheran) Arndt (without using the term), turned to account – while still, 
paradoxically, holding to a total depravity. Then there is the advance of the mind beyond 
these first elements to the practical application. In any case, this, then, is the testimony of 
the natural conscience at this basic level. Conscience, with its “instinctive sense of duty 
and obligation”, naturally suggests a Lawgiver and Judge. 
 
3.2   The early High Anglican years (1825-1833) 
Early in 1825 Newman was beginning to have serious doubts about certain Calvinist and 
Evangelical doctrines, as well as about his previous reliance on certain Evangelical 
authors – such as Scott.396  He was moving from the religion of Newton and Scott 
towards that of Hooker and Andrewes. At this time he was also entering more actively 
into a defence of religion. In July 1825 397 Newman began a more careful reading of 
Butler’s Analogy,398 although it was certainly not his first contact with this influential 
work – in his Apologia he supposes that it was in about 1823 that he read Butler’s 
Analogy,399 and certainly by that time he had been recommending the book to his near-
                                                 
395 The medieval writers threw into relief the distinction between two dimensions of conscience: its 
practical bearing, and its edictal character. This refers to the fact that the conscience determines what 
specifically must be done, and that it must be done (as expressd in, say, the proposition that good must be 
done and evil must be avoided). For each of these two dimensions of the conscience, the Scholastics had a 
special term, each of which (in terms of etymology) simply denoted “the conscience”. The former was 
conscientia, the latter synderesis. 
396 On February 21, 1825, Newman wrote in his “Early Journal” that “The necessity of composing sermons 
has obliged me to systematize and complete my ideas on many subjects – on several questions, however, 
(those connected with regeneration) though I have thought much, and (I hope) prayed much, yet I hardly 
dare say confidently that my change of opinion has brought me nearer to the truth. At least, however, I may 
say that I have taken many doctrines almost on trust from Scott &c and on serious examination hardly find 
them confirmed by Scripture. I have come to no decision of the doctrines of election &c, but the 
predestination of individuals seems to me hardly a scriptural doctrine”.J. H. Newman, Autobiographical 
Writings, p. 204. 
397 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 238.   (Saturday 25 June .... - began Butler’s Analogy) 
398 Joseph Butler (1692 –1752) Bishop, theologian, apologist, and philosopher, critiqued Thomas Hobbes 
and John Locke. During his life and after his death, Butler influenced many philosophers, including David 
Hume, Thomas Reid, William Paley, and especially the Tractarians. He is most famous for his Fifteen 
Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1726) and his Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed (1736).  
399 1823 was his first year as a full Fellow of Oriel, following his probabtionary year in 1822.   
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unbelieving brother Charles.400 But now in 1825 he is studying Butler more seriously – 
although this cannot be overplayed because at the same time, intensely busy as he is with 
both St Clement’s parish and Alban Hall, he was also reading widely for his Miracles 
article. He defended miracles by recourse to the moral system, as apprehended by the 
conscience.  
          Doubtless Butler stimulated a developing interest in the vindication of religion, 
both natural and revealed, by recourse to the moral character of the course and 
constitution of nature (which included the conscience). But Newman gave his own stress 
on the testimony of the conscience to this moral system, and elements of his Evangelical 
background would have assisted him in this.401 By 1825 there are appearing the elements 
of his own philosophy of religion. Mindful of Hume and his company, Newman is 
leaving the design manifest in the moral course and constitution of the world402 which 
was more Butler’s approach, and turning to a way from the voice of unavoidable personal 
experience – which is to say, from the importunate voice of conscience. 
 
3.2.1.  Conscience and the sense of a moral Governor and holy Judge 
On December 4 (1825) he preached his Sunday morning sermon at St Clement’s on 
Natural Religion.403  The notable point here is that in it the voice of conscience is set 
forth as evidence of a moral Governor and an observant and holy Judge.  It complements 
his considerations about the visible world. The visible course of nature allows us to 
deduce God’s existence, his unity, power, wisdom and goodness. But what of his moral 
                                                 
400 J. H. Newman,   Autobiographical Writings, p. 192. 
401 Newman’s own Evangelical environment and tradition would have introduced him to a certain stress on 
the Conscience as testifying to and vindicating the Being of God – apart from his reading of Butler (1823). 
Indeed, Butler had influenced Evangelicals – for example, Joseph Milner. As mentioned above, one of 
Milner’s early works was his attack on Gibbon and Hume: Gibbon’s Account of Christianity Considered, 
Together with some strictures on Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1781).  In this rebuttal 
Milner draws on Butler’s writing on the conscience and the moral system. One wonders whether, in view of 
his early love for Milner’s History of the Church, Newman was also led to read his attack on Gibbon and 
Hume. If he read this work of Milner’s, he would have been introduced to how conscience speaks of and 
for God. As Milner writes, “all around in this sorrowful world is speaking of God, and conscience fails not 
to speak for him within” (J. Milner, Gibbon's account of Christianity Considered, York: Printed by A. 
Ward; and sold by G. Robinson, etc. 1781. p. 218). But this possibility does not appear in any document.  
402 Hume attacked the argument from design, and Newman read Hume carefully – as an opponent, but he 
himself was somewhat hesitant about the philosophical validity of the argument from design. 
403 J. H. Newman, “on natural religion”, Rom I, 20: ..... the invisible things of Him, from the creation of. 
the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and 
godhead -    No.119, Sermon 9 - St Clements.  Sunday Morning Dec. 4, 1825. In  John Henry Newman: 
Sermons 1824-1843. Edited from previously unpublished manuscripts. Vol. II,  Sermon 50, Sermons on 
Biblical History, Sin and Justification, the Christian Way of Life, and Biblical Theology.  Ed. V. F. Blehl, 
S. J.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1993. 
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qualities, his holiness, justice, truth and righteousness? It is this which Newman regards 
as critical in our knowledge of the true God of Creation (and Revelation). It is this which 
makes God truly personal – a God with moral qualities. How is he revealed to be not just 
the Governor of the universe, but a moral and holy Governor, loving goodness and hating 
evil? Newman does not point primarily to the moral course and constitution of the world 
but to the Conscience. The “most striking evidence we have of [His] these moral 
attributes (as they are called) independent of that afforded by revelation, is one lodged 
within us, the voice of conscience. This, as far as it goes, is truly said to be the voice of 
an observant and Holy Judge.” 404    
          Newman does not say that the intimations of conscience provide the only evidence 
of the moral attributes of God – rather, they provide “the most striking evidence”.405  So, 
with its admitted limitations (“as far as it goes”), the voice of conscience is the best 
evidence to man from Nature that God is a moral Governor, an observant and holy Judge. 
The “evidence” is that conscience “declares to us in plain language the general character 
of our duty - it condemns vice and impiety and sin - it applauds <approves> obedience 
and virtuous principle.” 406 This is Nature acting importunately and being very specific 
in moral governance. Conscience does not argue against counter reasoning that sin is 
sinful. It simply and “boldly and as the messenger of God, declares that sin is sin”.407 It 
acts edictally, by issuing edicts – as if it is a messenger of God.  
          So then, conscience “boldly declares” – like a voice acting “as the messenger of 
God” – that “sin is sin” – that is, that it offends God. We observe once again that it seems 
due to the character or tone of the declarations of conscience that make its voice to be 
like “the messenger of God”. It “boldly” testifies to the fact and character of personal sin, 
and in this testimony Conscience speaks as God would speak. This inner voice is 
evidence that God is an observant and holy Judge before whom the sinner will one day 
appear. This is nature’s best testimony and it springs from the heart of man. It “thus 
evidences the being of an unseen but accurate Judge of actions, independently of the 
testimony of that Holy Scripture which reveals the same truth more fully.”408  
                                                 
404 Ibid., “on natural religion”  (section 4 of the sermon). John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. 
II.   
405 As already said, Butler’s preferred ground is our whole nature and the manifest moral course and 
constitution of the world, although he does at times mention the conscience as part of this evidence. 
406 J. H. Newman, “on natural religion”, (section 4 of the sermon).    
407 Ibid.    
408 Ibid.  
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          There is also, then, an accord between the testimony of Scripture and that of the 
Conscience – “Holy Scripture .. reveals the same truth more fully”. This fact would seem 
to be a further vindication of the divine principle in the action of conscience. This is the 
Evangelical (and Anglican) Newman taking his thought further than was typical of 
Evangelicalism, and in a philosophical direction, encouraged by his reading of Butler. 
          Butler ranks the conscience as supreme over man’s actions. It is the commanding 
faculty. But in the body of the Analogy and in his Fifteen Sermons he does not typically 
use the expression “the voice of God” specifically of the Conscience.409 He does indeed 
use the expression “voice of God” in his Introduction to the Analogy, but uses it of “our 
whole nature”410 – obviously because our whole nature is God’s creation. “Our whole 
nature” is “the voice of God speaking in us.”411 Because our whole nature ascribes moral 
perfection to God this is a practical proof of God’s moral character.  
         However, at the very end of part I, on Natural Religion, Butler has a sentence that 
would indeed have given an impetus to Newman’s thought on the voice of Conscience as 
the way to God, and would have resonated deeply with him. He writes that “the proper 
motives to religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages 
of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God under the character of a righteous 
Governor and Judge; a nature and conscience and apprehension given us by him; and 
from the confirmation of the dictates of reason…”412 So this is recognized but not 
developed by Butler, as Newman develops it. Presumably this is because Butler is intent 
on meeting the deists on their own ground, which is the design manifest in the world. 
Butler points to the design in the moral character of the world and its course. But one 
may presume that Butler’s passing observation would have given great encouragement to 
Newman in what was clearly his preferred way of defending belief in God and his 
Revelation. The proper motives of religion from our moral nature and conscience provide 
the best proofs of it. The young Evangelical Newman was very aware of the motive of 
religion from the conscience.  
                                                 
409 Nor, for instance, does Aquinas. 
410 Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: Also, Fifteen 
Sermons. With a Life of the Author, a Copious Analysis, Notes and Indexes, by Joseph Angus. London: 
The Religious Tract Society. 1860s. “Introduction”, p. 10. 
411 Ibid. This is repeated in the Conclusion of Part I, “Of Natural Religion”. In it, Butler writes, “Now, our 
whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to contemplate his will and character to be moral, 
just and good; so we can scarce in imagination conceive what it can be otherwise.” The Analogy of 
Religion, p. 141.  
412 Ibid., “Conclusion”, p. 146. 
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           A footnote to Newman’s sermon includes references to Roman and Greek authors, 
showing that Newman is speaking of the natural, and not just the Christian conscience. 
He makes points that have been made in his sermons, independent of his reading of 
Butler.413 Why did the heathen not draw these conclusions? The Evangelical Newman 
gives his answer. Sin was the cause of their ignorance: “the reason why the heathen world 
has never drawn those practical truths from a survey of life and nature, which are so 
evidently contained in them - why with the same heavens and earth, the same state of 
being and the same course of human affairs, even their wisest men were so ignorant in 
the first principles of religion as on a late occasion I endeavoured to describe. - Now sin 
was the cause of their ignorance.”414  
          By the end of 1825 Newman’s abandonment of Calvinist-Evangelicalism had 
begun.415 During this very period of his turning to Hooker and Andrewes, his embrace of 
the conscience as lying at the root of religion and its defence had also begun – and we 
may take his sermon on natural religion of 4 December 1825 as the formal signal of it. It 
constitutes a firm beginning of his defence of religion from the conscience and its idea of 
God. More, though, was to come. 
 
3.2.2.  The emergence of Newman’s theory of the conscience (1829-1833)  
Some six weeks after his sermon on natural religion – which is to say, on 20 January 
1826 – Newman accepted an invitation to become a tutor at Oriel after Easter. A few 
weeks later, during February, his friend Pusey thought Newman was becoming “more 
High Church”.416 In certain doctrines and respects, he had moved from the Calvinist-
Evangelicalism of the likes of Newton and Scott to the High Churchism of Hooker and 
Andrewes. Now new influences on him were to commence – those of Oriel.417 He lacked 
                                                 
413 J. H. Newman, “on natural religion” Sermon 50, no. 119. The footnote is Footnote 4 of section 4 of the 
sermon. On the left-hand page there is written in pencil: (case of heathen <video meliora etc etc>).   
       Blehl SJ, editor, explains that Newman is here referring to the lines of Ovid, ‘video meliora, proboque; 
deteriora sequor’, Metamorphoses, VII, ii, 20-1, probably based on Euripides, Hippolytus, 380. Horace has 
a similar expression, ‘Quae nocuere, sequar; fugiam, quae profore credam’, Epistles 1,viii, 11. 
414  J. H. Newman, “on natural religion”, Section 5 of the sermon. 
415 This took several years to complete. For a discussion of this process, and especially Newman’s relations 
with the Oxford Church Missionary Society, there is T. C. F. Stunt’s “John Henry Newman and the 
Evangelicals”, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. XXI, No. I, January 1970, pp. 65-74. Cambridge 
Journals.  
416 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 208. 
417 Newman resigned his curacy at St Clement’s in March 1826, and for the next two years (till his 
institution as Vicar of St Mary’s) he had no pulpit of his own – he was involved in University work and in 
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a pulpit till 1828, and till early in 1829 we have little from him specifically on the sense 
of God in the conscience – although, as we shall see, he had firm and significant things to 
say to Blanco White in March of 1828 on the moral dispositions needed for the 
apprehension of religious truth.  
          By early 1828, due to illness and bereavement, Newman’s dogmatic instincts had 
resumed and stiffened, and we may take his correspondence with Blanco White early in 
1828 – to be discussed in the next chapter (4.2) – as indicative of this. Further, in “the 
Long Vacation of 1828” he writes, “I set about to read … (the Fathers) chronologically, 
beginning with St Ignatius and St Justin”.418 His deep involvement with his Oriel 
companions (1826-1828) would have brought home to him the critical importance of a 
philosophical defence of religion, together with the spectre of a rising liberalism in 
                                                                                                                                                 
continuous association with the “Noetics” – i.e., his Oriel Common Room companions. He did continue to 
preach when invited or when supplying for other clergy, and occasionally at St Clement’s. This means that 
his thought as expressed in sermons during this time is relatively sparse. In July of 1826 Newman preached 
his University sermon on “The Philosophical Temper” – in which he spoke of the moral dispositions 
necessary and suitable for the pursuit of truth. We shall mention this in the next chapter which includes the 
moral ethos, for a moral ethos involves, of course, the conscience.  
   At a point during this time Newman was, on his own admission, somewhat in the “shadow of liberalism” 
– the “shadow”, it seems, was cast by his Oriel friends. I would date the so-called “shadow of liberalism” 
over Newman as lasting from middle to late 1826 (with the arrival of Blanco White) up until late 1827, 
when he fell sick, followed by the death of his sister Mary early in 1828. This period included, he tells us, a 
certain doctrinal laxity together with a certain preference for intellectual excellence over moral. With regard 
to his sickness of late 1827, Newman wrote on June 25, 1869 “that I have had three great illnesses in my 
life, and how they have turned out! … My second, not painful, but tedious and shattering was that which I 
had in 1827 … and it too broke me off from an incipient liberalism – and determined my religious course” 
(Autobiographical Writings, p. 268). The phrase “it too” refers us back to his sickness of 1816, suggesting 
that it had played a real part in his conversion to dogmatic religion. In respect to this period of 1827, one 
notices that Newman has written “This is a Whateleyan Sermon” on the first page of his sermon “On the 
Xtian law of liberty” (Sermon no. 161), preached on September 2,  1827. Because of this note, I give a 
copy of the manuscript of this particular sermon in the Appendix, as Sermon 11.   
   This stage of being under the “shadow of liberalism” ought not be understood as highly pronounced nor 
as especially noticeable – which is not to say that it was not present. It was. But Blanco White (who had 
been with Newman for well over a year) sensed clearly, in his letters to Newman in March 1828 – 
discussing his round robbin correspondence proposal – that his young friend in Oriel would have no truck 
with doctrinal heterodoxy. This does not look as if this firm orthodoxy was a notably recent feature in 
Newman, as far as Blanco White was concerned. 1828 marked the shaking off of this “shadow” and the 
beginning of 1829 was significant in terms of an alignment of new friends.  
     Newman writes in the Apologia (pp. 14-15) that it was then that “the formal break between Dr Whately 
and me” occurred. Mr Peel’s re-election was the occasion of it. Significantly, he adds that “by this time I 
was under the influence of Keble and Froude; who ….  disliked the Duke’s change of policy as dictated by 
liberalism”. The writing was on the wall: “Whately was considerably annoyed at me … he saw, more 
clearly than I could, that I was separating from his own friends for good and all”. Indeed, Whately 
“attributed my leaving his clientela to a wish on my part to be the head of a party myself (Apologia, p. 15) 
…. Whately then, an acute man, perhaps saw around me the signs of an incipient party, of which I was not 
conscious myself. And thus we discern the first elements of that movement afterwards called Tractarian” 
(Apologia, p. 17). We notice that while Newman declares himself to be under the influence of Keble and 
Froude, Whately saw him as the head of a future party. 
418 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 26. 
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religion. Due to Froude’s efforts, by August 1828 Newman’s friendship with Keble had 
begun.419 His finger was already on the Conscience – certainly since 1825. 
          Coincidentally, in 1829, by which time Newman had rejected the Liberalism about 
him, the conscience appears once again before us as a serious element in his sermons and 
observations. He is beginning an intellectual confrontation with Liberalism (and 
Rationalism), endeavouring to establish the reasonableness of religious belief and 
determining the foundations of religion prior to Creeds. Together with Keble and Froude, 
he saw in the Liberalism of the day (present also in the Church itself – as in some of his 
companions of the Oriel Common Room) a great threat to the Church and its testimony to 
Revealed Religion.420 The passing of Catholic Emancipation, he wrote to his sister 
Jemima, “is one of the signs of the times, of the encroachment of Philosophism and 
Indifferentism in the Church”.421  This is the context of his bringing to light the natural 
power of the conscience to know God.  
 
3.2.2. (a)   Conscience and knowledge of an “unseen Power” (1829)    
 Very much at issue, then, was the authority of divine revelation and of the Church as its 
witness and representative.422 Girding himself for its defence, Newman is pondering the 
sources of moral and religious authority – for it was this that was being attacked and 
usurped, especially by “Reason”. Newman is taking a stand for the appeal to authority. 423  
                                                 
419 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol II, p. 88.  
The diary entry reads: Thursday 14 August   Went off to Keble (Fairford) (this was the first symptom of our 
growing intimacy. old Mr Keble was then alive - and Keble was at his house.).  Friday 15 August  letter 
from Froude.   dined with Keble at Mr Beach’s 
420 Without having the space nor the need to pursue it, I reject Turner’s thesis that Newman’s fight against 
Liberalism was basically a fight against Evangelicalism (F. Turner, John Henry Newman: The Challenge to 
Evangelical Religion.  New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 2002). The fight (often against a 
Protestant/Evangelical ethos) was basically against Liberalism and rationalism in religion. 
421 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries.  Vol II,  p. 119 (February 8, 1829). 
422 William George Ward, in his Ideal of the Christian Church, writes of the beginnings of “that 
remarkable movement within our own Church” (i.e., the Oxford Movement) and its immediate focus on the 
defence of authority. He writes that when “certain English Churchmen” perceived where “religious opinion 
was hastening among us”, they “saw at once that authority was the element which was wanting, and they 
stepped forward as advocates for authority. There was a recognised and standard principle of authority in 
the English Church; to that they appealed, – on that as on a firm basis they took their stand, – on that they 
planted the lever which, so they hoped, might disturb, overthrow, revolutionise, the system then dominant 
in the Church”. He continues: “And what has been the result of this most pious and religious procedure? 
The course of rationalism has been driven backward with triumph and irresistible might..” (The Ideal of the 
Christian Church, London: James Toovey. 2
nd
 ed., 1844, pp. 564-565). 
423 In 1864, in the Apologia when looking back on this period in Oxford, Newman describes the conflict 
between reason and authority as exemplified in Keble. “Keble was a man who guided himself and formed 
his judgments, not by processes of reason, by inquiry or by argument, but, to use the word in a broad sense, 
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The following month he wrote to his mother about the sources of religious and moral 
truth and certitude, as against “perverse reasoning”. The bedrock foundation lay in a 
specific area of Nature. He had referred to it in publications of 1825: it was the moral 
instincts of man.  
“As each individual has certain instincts of right and wrong antecedent to 
reasoning, on which he acts – and rightly so – which perverse reasoning may 
supplant, which then can hardly be regained, but, if regained, will be regained 
from a different source – from reasoning, not from nature – so, I think, has the 
world of men collectively. God gave them truths in His miraculous revelations, 
and other truths in the unsophisticated infancy of nations, scarcely less necessary 
and divine. These are transmitted as ‘the wisdom of our ancestors,’ through men – 
many of whom cannot enter into them, or receive them themselves”.424  
Newman is drawing a parallel between the “instincts of 
right and wrong antecedent to reasoning” and the truths of 
the wisdom of the ages – which can be supplanted by 
“perverse reasoning”. He has grasped “the Usurpations of 
Reason” – “Reason”, that is, which is “perverse” – about 
which he would preach in his University Sermons.425  The 
significant point for our purposes here is that there are 
truths from God present in the instinctive apprehensions 
and implicit natural reasonings of the conscience prior to 
explicit and formal reasoning. Such truths are common to “the world of men 
collectively”. These “instincts of right and wrong antecedent to reasoning” would seem to 
be privileged and reliable utterances of Nature, and therefore very much the voice of the 
Creator. Newman seems to be speaking of that dimension of Conscience which the 
medievals called synderesis.  
          Two days later on March 15 he observed in his sermon that “Whatever is the first 
time persons hear evil, it is quite certain that good has been beforehand with them, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
by authority. Conscience is an authority; the Bible is an authority; such is the Church; such is Antiquity … 
What he hated instinctively was heresy … and such was the main principle of the school which in the 
course of years was formed around him..” (Apologia pro Vita Sua, pp. 302-303).  We also notice in this 
statement an opposition between “conscience” as an “authority” and “processes of reason”.  
424 . H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol II,  pp. 129-130 (To Mrs Newman  March 13, 1829). 
425 J. H. Newman, “The Usurpations of Reason”.  Sermon IV (December 31, 1831) in Fifteen Sermons 
preached before the University of Oxford. 
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they have a something within them which tells them it is evil”.426  Newman is looking to 
the basic moral sense as the sure foundation of the knowledge of moral and religious 
truth. It is testimony given in the first movement of the mind’s knowing, prior to the 
practical moral judgment and explicit moral reasoning. This is the true foundation of 
religion, morals and right reasoning. In this sense, nature – which is to say “certain 
instincts of right and wrong” – is the voice of God. Butler’s dictum that nature is the 
voice of God has been given a more precise focus. The foundation consists of those truths 
intimated by the natural conscience, which is to say Nature at the heart of man, thus 
coming from the Creator and naturally apprehended prior to formal reasoning.  
 
          On May 24, 1829, two months after his ruminations to his mother, and now firmly 
part of Keble’s circle – Newman is not long 28 years of age – he preached his Sermon 
“Religious Faith Rational” 427 on the reasonableness of faith.  Newman means to show 
that to believe on the authority of another – that is, to have faith or trust – is reasonable. 
He is defending, of course, the reasonableness of authoritative testimony by the Church. 
Newman, even as a youth, was familiar with the rationalist charge that faith in a 
supernatural revelation transmitted by witnesses or authorities does not meet the 
requirements of “reason” – and it is only on the basis of “reason” that certitude is 
possible.428 But as a matter of fact, Newman declares in his sermon (“Religious Faith 
Rational”), reason or intellect alone (separated from faith) has little to show for itself in 
what we truly know. 
 “Indeed, when we come to examine the subject, it will be found that, strictly 
speaking, we know little more than that we exist, and that there is an Unseen 
Power whom we are bound to obey. Beyond this we must trust; and first our 
                                                 
426 J. H. Newman, “The Praise of Men”, Sermon IV.  Parochial and Plain  Sermons. Vol VII, Westminster, 
Md.: Christian Classics. 1968, p.45. 
427 J. H. Newman,   Parochial and Plain  Sermons. Vol I, Sermon XV. Westminster Md. Christian Classics 
Inc. 1966. 
428 Thomas Paine – whom Newman had dipped into as a youth (Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 3) – rejected the 
credibility of Revealed Religion because “revelation is to the first person only, and hearsay to every other; 
and consequently they are not obliged to believe it”. That is, “it was not a revelation made to me, and I have 
only his word for it that it was a revelation made to him” (T. Paine, 1794. The Age of Reason; Being an 
Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology. Boston: Josiah P. Mendum.  1852. Part I, p. 8.) After all, 
Paine continues, “it appears that Thomas did not believe the resurrection; and, as they say, would not 
believe without having oracular and manual demonstration himself. So neither will I” (Ibid., p. 11). Faith in 
testimony to a supernatural revelation is not reasonable, and the only “word of God”, the only revelation 
which is granted directly to us, is the creation which we behold and can reason about. It is “this word, 
which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man” (Ibid., p. 30.) 
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senses, memory, and reasoning powers; then other authorities: - so that, in fact 
almost all we do, every day of our lives, is on trust, i.e. faith”.429   
          Newman would in due course reject his own talk of trust in one’s own powers of 
knowing. But we do see a scepticism in respect to the power and limits of natural reason 
alone, and the senses alone – for trust or faith is the basis of most of what we know. 
What is significant is Newman’s pronouncement on what we truly “know” if we exclude 
ordinary faith. If we exclude all trust, all faith – which is what the classic rationalist 
would want us to do for religious certitude – then there is “little more” that we “know” 
other “than that we exist, and that there is an Unseen Power whom we are bound to 
obey.”  
          This is consistent with Newman’s later statement in the Apologia. There he writes 
that “from a boy I had been led to consider that my Maker and I, His creature, were the 
two beings, luminously such, in rerum natura”.430  We are aware of our own existence 
and the existence of the one who dwells in our conscience. This was a core awareness 
which Newman had long had. 
          This sentence in his sermon, just referred to, is significant as a statement about the 
basis of religious thought, made in answer to the rationalist attack on faith. Our bedrock 
awareness of that which we indisputably “know”, as a simple certainty, is “that we exist 
and that there is an Unseen Power whom we are bound to obey.” In this brief but daring 
assertion, Newman shows that he already possesses a theory of the conscience as 
involving a basic and sure perception of an unseen Power which is objective to the 
knowing subject. It also links this perception of an unseen Power to his awareness of his 
own existence which itself implicitly suggests being sustained in existence by a “Maker”. 
          This appears to be a foundation not only of religious faith but of most of ordinary 
thought. Newman will later say (in the Arians, for instance) that this basic sense of God, 
known by the conscience, is the foundation of our assurance as to the reliability of our 
knowledge of the external world. 
          That Newman is referring to the awareness attained by the conscience is clear from 
it being knowledge of “an Unseen Power whom we are bound to obey.” It is a clear and 
quasi-immediate perception, though he does not say that it is an intuition. The term 
“Unseen Power” is not explicitly personal, but it is suggested by the personal pronoun 
                                                 
429 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain  Sermons. Vol I, Sermon XV, p. 193.  
430 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 202. 
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“whom”. He does hint that this basic perception of a Power whom we are bound to obey 
is somehow the basis of our knowledge of things we sense and reason about.  
          As one recognized as being gifted with subtlety of mind and introspective powers, 
it cannot be accepted that Newman was not able to distinguish between the awareness of 
an objective reality and the attribution of objective reality to a purely subjective state or 
thought. He was convinced that in the dictate of his conscience he perceived both his own  
existence and the commanding dictate of an objective Power which had the right to 
obedience. Its basis was the objective moral law as apprehended by the conscience. The  
dictate of this law was an objective fact. Newman would also seem to be attacking, 
indirectly, Hume’s reduction of the conscience to an emotional state. Conscience involves 
the perception of a “Power”, to which the subject is bound in obedience. This was clear to 
him, as involving neither trust in the word of another, nor trust in one’s own powers of 
reason and senses, nor the action of explicit reason and the senses. The one thing that is 
truly known is “the Unseen Power whom we are bound to obey.”  
         But how is “the Unseen Power” so clearly known? Plainly, it is not normally the 
conclusion of formal or explicit reasoning. It is not the fruit of memory, the senses, or the 
testimony of others. It looks like an act of implicit, instinctive or tacit reasoning. It is 
taken on the basis of, and contained within, that general sense of moral obligation which 
is present in, but not reducible to, the operating practical judgment of the conscience. It 
appears to be a natural implication of the conscience’s apprehension of the moral law. 
          The point comes through clearly in Newman’s statement of the ground for 
obedience to the will of God. Newman writes that “It is a mistake to suppose that our 
obedience to God's will is merely founded on our belief in the word of such persons as 
tell us Scripture comes from God”.431 So we do not obey God just because Scripture 
commands it – the authority of Scripture depending on those who tell us it comes from 
God. Rather, “We obey God primarily because we actually feel His presence in our 
consciences bidding us obey Him. And this, I say, confutes these objectors on their own 
ground; because the very reason they give for their unbelief is, that they trust their own 
sight and reason, because their own, more than the words of God's Ministers”.432  
          Newman is not saying that we do not at all obey God because the Church that tells 
us that Scripture comes from God. Rather, we do not obey God merely because the Bible 
                                                 
431 J. H. Newman, “Religious Faith Rational”.  Parochial and Plain Sermons.  Vol 1.  Sermon XV, p. 199. 
432 Ibid., p. 200. 
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commands it – the Church sanctioning the divine authority of Scripture. We obey God 
primarily and in the first instance because we feel his presence in our consciences 
commanding us to obey him.433 The feeling of conscience bears within it the marks of a 
divine edict. We “actually feel” the “presence” of God “in our consciences bidding us 
obey Him.” 
          This experience of the Conscience is, or ought to be, evident to “these objectors”. 
This is because it is a fact of ordinary experience. It therefore “confutes these objectors” 
who profess to “trust their own” powers of “sight and reason” (like, let us say, Paine). Let 
them consider their own experience of the conscience, Newman seems to be saying. The 
bedrock and immediate awareness in the conscience is of oneself being subject to some 
Power commanding obedience. On the basis of this awareness (involving implicit 
reasoning), one obeys. That is the experience of the dictate of conscience which ought to 
be evident to anyone.   
          Newman refers to the “feeling” of this Presence in our consciences “bidding us 
obey Him” – so he is emphasising the “feeling” of conscience. It is such as to involve the 
thought of a Power commanding with the right to obedience. The dictate of conscience is 
felt to possess this character, and it is this altogether special feeling that is associated with 
the dictate of conscience that makes its special character manifest. Newman expresses it 
quite strongly: “we actually feel His presence in our consciences bidding us obey Him.”  
          So we are brought once again to the uniqueness of the feeling of conscience. 
Clearly it is not just a sensation. It is the total perception, involving a distinct “feeling”. 
We saw some of this appearing in his sermon of June 1825 on the Conscience. It is 
imperatival, edictal, constraining, and involves the natural and unmistakable thought or 
perception of an objective Something which bears, in commanding manner, on the details 
of our conduct. This Something that is felt to dictate in the sphere of conduct is perceived 
instinctively and with a certain directness. This perception of an “Unseen Power,” present 
in the feeling aroused by the dictate, does not appear to be the result of formal 
ratiocination, as is arguing to God “from the things that are made.” It appears to be a 
perception which is present at the heart of the act of conscience, sensing the edictal 
                                                 
433 Geoffrey Rowell quotes a memorandum by Newman in 1829, noting that he had “been forcibly struck 
with the importance of insisting much on the moral sense etc. as a preparatory to religion”. G. Rowell, 
“Newman, the Church of England and the Catholic Church”, p. 136. New Blackfriars, Volume 92, Issue 
1038, March 2011, pp. 130-143. UK: The Dominican Council/John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
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character of its practical judgments. The “feeling” is so distinctive as to immediately 
imply, as if it is its Cause, an Unseen Power.  
          The conscience then, is a religious instinct as well as a faculty of the mind 
knowing and apprehending duty. Newman is not here referring to the practical judgment 
by which the conscience determines a specific course of action. He is referring to the 
sense of duty informing the practical judgment, whatever that practical judgment be. By 
it, man has, in some sense, a natural and reliable intimation of an Unseen Power, which 
later in the sermon Newman in passing identifies with God. He is perceived as an Obliger 
of what is right, and possessed of the right to obedience. This testimony of conscience is 
clear, and its testimony is at the foundation of all that the subject knows for it is perhaps 
the one thing that, more than anything else, he truly knows.   
          Conscience testifies, Newman continues in the sermon, that it is in the presence of 
a Master, that it is wrong to refuse obedience, and that disobedience is “hateful and 
ruinous.” It is also clear why it happens that this testimony of the conscience is not 
accepted and trusted. It is not accepted because of moral failure and fault, especially 
pride. “Now, let me ask, if they trust their senses and their reason, why do they not trust 
their conscience too? Is not conscience their own?” In questioning why they do “not trust 
their conscience too”, Newman is asking why they do not trust the testimony of the 
conscience to an “Unseen Power.” After all, “their conscience is as much a part of 
themselves as their reason is; and it is placed within them by Almighty God in order to 
balance the influence of sight and reason”. 
          The reason for their non-acceptance is plain: “they will not attend to it; for a plain 
reason, – they love sin, – they love to be their own masters, and therefore they will not 
attend to that secret whisper of their hearts, which tells them they are not their own 
masters, and that sin is hateful and ruinous”.434  So the reason for the lack of recognition 
of God present in the conscience is sin. It is infidelity to the dictates of conscience, 
sensed to be the voice of God to the soul. A culpable failure to act in accord with the 
conscience results in a lack of knowledge and recognition – a certain blindness. A certain 
moral character or ethos is, then, needed for the basic religious knowledge provided by 
the conscience, and the lack of this ethos betrays moral fault and deficiency. The ground 
of a right moral and religious perception is virtue. 
                                                 
434 J. H. Newman, “Religious Faith Rational”.  Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol 1, Sermon XV, p.200. 
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          Newman has highlighted a fundamental sense of God in the conscience and has 
given to Him a certain character (a Power we must obey). He has given to this a great 
certitude, a certitude that is the fruit not of formal reasoning, but of instinctive, tacit and 
implicit reasoning. He has brought to light the foundation, and on this he will develop his 
defence. But he has more still to say of it – as we shall now see. This focus on the 
conscience has its roots in the Evangelical appreciation of the conscience, and in Butler’s 
philosophy as an intellectual stimulus, for Butler gave to conscience the supremacy in 
man’s nature.435  
 
          3.2.2. (b)   Conscience the principle and sanction of religion (April 1830)  
          In the sermon just discussed and as part of his defence of religious authority, the 
conscience is described with bold and deft strokes. Newman is getting at the essence. It is 
in his sermon of April 13, 1830 436 (on Natural and Revealed Religion) that the 
phenomena of the Conscience are explored more philosophically and in greater detail as 
the basis of religion. Conscience is now declared to be “the essential principle and 
sanction of Religion in the mind” – and it is said to be “obvious” that this is so (no.7). It 
                                                 
435 The practical threat driving Newman’s analysis of the foundations of belief was the attack on the 
authority of the Church and her testimony – in the name of “reason”. He is defending divine and 
ecclesiastical authority. Three years before the commencement of the Oxford Movement, Newman’s 
capacity for leadership in this endeavour was clearly seen by those closest to him. Apart from what 
Whately himself had noticed early in 1829, early in 1830 there was another testimony. At that time he was 
voted out of the Secretaryship of the Church Missionary Society – because of his insistence on the position 
of the Church and on good Churchmanship. On March 14, 1830, Thomas Mozley wrote to his eldest sister 
Anne (Mozley) and said of Newman that   
He “has been completely discomforted in the matter of the Missionary Society...... He has, to be sure, 
given the Low Church party great provocation, beyond his proceedings in the committee, by setting 
forth on what principles a good Churchman might join a Society which admitted Dissenters, and by 
what management the Society might be exclusively attached to the Church, working under episcopal 
jurisdiction: ..... Very few indeed approve of this plan, or think it practicable; but Newman is not a 
man to be deterred by temporary failures. He is, indeed, better calculated than any man I know, by his 
talents, his learning, by his patience and perseverance, his conciliatory manners, and the friends he 
can employ in the cause - of whom I hope to be one - to release the Church of England from her 
present oppressed and curtailed condition”.  
(J. H. Newman, Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English 
Church with a Brief Autobiography. Volumes 1-2, Anne Mozley, editor (1890, 1st edition). London: 
Longmans, Green and Co.  New impression 1920, Vol. I, p. 199 (Thomas Mozley to Anne Mozley). 
March 14, 1830.  
Mozley sees Newman as the future spiritual and theological leader.  Newman had begun his defence of 
authority in revealed religion and his attack on the usurpation of Reason. His intellectual defence was 
grounded in an experience available to all: the sense of being subject to moral obligation, and implicitly – 
in view of the special reaction this sense evokes – to a Lawgiver and Judge. It was the experience of the 
authority of conscience. 
436 J. H. Newman, “The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion respectively”.  Fifteen Sermons 
preached before the University of Oxford. Sermon II.  Westminster, Md. Christian Classics. 1966. 
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would seem that this is “obvious” from a comparison of what the conscience intimates (a 
relation between the soul and an exterior excellence and tribunal gradually perceived to 
be supreme) with the essential elements of Religion (a system of relations existing 
between us and a Supreme Power claiming our habitual obedience). Secondly, it is 
implied (for Newman) in the testimony of the classical texts of Greece and Rome.437 It 
was probably “obvious” too because many whom Newman knew and knew of (and who 
read Butler 438 and thought under his influence) agreed that the conscience (as the most 
constitutive and guiding element of man’s moral nature) was the basic principle of 
religion in the mind.439  
                                                 
437 To give but one example of a remarkable classical text – there is the dialogue between Socrates and his 
friend Crito in Plato’s Crito. Socrates speaks of the first principles of right and wrong, their absolutely 
commanding character, and then of their application to a specific issue (his possible escape from unjust 
execution), and the strong sanction of the Supernatural for doing what he perceives to be right. Socrates 
ends his discussion with Crito with the words, “Leave me, then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to 
follow whither he leads” – which for Socrates meant submitting to the self-administered execution. See Sir 
R. W. Livingstone ed. Portrait of Socrates being the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Plato in an English 
Translation with Introductions and Notes. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1938 (reprinted 1966). 
438 Joseph Butler had certainly suggested the elements of what Conscience intimates. For instance, in 
Sermon II of the Fifteen Sermons, “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience--Rom. ii. 14”, Butler 
writes of the conscience that, “if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate 
a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own. But this part of the 
office of conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to consider. It is by this faculty, natural to man, 
that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself.” (my italics). Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls 
Chapel. Cambridge: Published by Hilliard and Brown. 1827. So then, the conscience intimates a higher 
Judgment.  
   Right at the end of Part I of his Analogy of Religion (Conclusion), Butler writes that “the proper motives 
to religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and our 
natural apprehension of God under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge; a nature and 
conscience and apprehension given us by him; and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life 
and immortality brough to light by the gospel.” The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of 
Nature: and Fifteen Sermons, with a Life of the Author, a Copious Analysis, Notes and Indexes. By Joseph 
Angus. London: The Religious Tract Society. 1860s.  Doubtless, this statement suggested much to 
Newman.  
439 For example, some fourteen years later, William George Ward, contending for the supremacy of 
conscience over reason in religious judgment, states in his Ideal of a Christian Church that the usual 
arguments for theism (eg. Paley’s arguments from final causes) will not convince us of God’s moral 
attributes such as Goodness, Justice and Mercy (nor of God’s Personality, referring the reader to this very 
sermon of Newman’s). He writes that “it is, I fancy, universally acknowledged by thinkers of the present 
day, that we must look to our moral nature for such a real and convincing proof as we are in search of.” (W. 
G. Ward, The Ideal of a Christian Church considered in Comparison with Existing Practice, 2
nd
 ed. 
London: James Toovey. 1844, p. 490). Ward avows he has drawn on Newman for his position (p. 582).   
     This reference to the “moral nature” of man as leading to a knowledge of a living and moral God is 
clearly in the line of Butler, even though Butler, who expatiated on the moral character of man and the 
world, did not develop his proof from the conscience as such. Butler writes, “Our whole nature leads us to 
all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. And this will ever be a practical proof of 
his moral character”. (In the “Introduction” (p. 10) of The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and 
Course of Nature: Also, Fifteen Sermons. With a Life of the Author, a Copious Analysis, Notes and Indexes, 
by J. Angus. London: The Religious Tract Society. 1860s). This point is repeated in the “Conclusion” of 
Part I, “Of Natural Religion”. Butler writes, “Now, our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, 
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        Newman, as a preliminary point about Natural Religion, states that he is not 
claiming that Natural Religion is simply the product of “unaided Reason” – which is to 
say, Nature alone without divine aid. Nature has always been assisted by forms of witness 
and revelation – God “has never left Himself without such witness as might anticipate the 
conclusions of Reason, and support a wavering conscience and perplexed faith” (no.5). 
That said, Newman explores what Nature (i.e., conscience and reason) can do in taking a 
person to God. 
          He begins his argument with a statement of what the dictate of the conscience 
implies, or involves. It “implies a relation between the soul and something exterior.” It is 
plain that, as before, Newman is thinking of that dimension of the conscience which is its 
sense of duty – as distinguished from the practical judgment as to what the duty is. When 
Newman says that “Conscience implies” this relation, he is referring to what is implied in 
the apprehension by Conscience of an objective moral obligation.  The act of the 
conscience implies a relation with “something exterior.” The character of this relation and 
of this “something” Newman then unfolds.  
          The Conscience involves not merely knowledge, but “a relation” between the soul 
and something external to itself which is dictating. The awareness that is the Conscience, 
takes the subject beyond himself to something else. It is not just a personal feeling, a 
subjective sentiment, an interior sense, nor just the possession of knowledge. It certainly 
does not keep the attention of the soul on to its own state or faith. It involves an 
apprehension of “something exterior.” At the same time, at this level it is but vaguely 
apprehended – it is but “something” that is exterior.  
          Moreover, this object is “superior to itself” (that is, superior to the conscience, 
which is to say the subject who is perceiving by means of the conscience). It has manifest 
authority over the conscience. It is also “superior” in the sense of being an “excellence” 
which the soul does not itself have. So the Object perceived by the conscience is not only 
one having power to command the soul, but it is morally superior to it. It is a moral 
authority which in goodness towers above the soul. Moreover, it is a “tribunal” which the 
conscience cannot influence and which will independently judge it for its actions.          
So then, the basic element suggested in the moral dictate is of something objective, 
having superior power and moral excellence, conveying to the soul a sense of its being 
                                                                                                                                                 
leads us to contemplate his will and character to be moral, just and good; so we can scarce in imagination 
conceive what it can be otherwise.” The Analogy of Religion, p. 141. 
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commanded and judged. This “something” is vague – perhaps because but implicitly or 
tacitly perceived – but the broad lines of its character are clear. The critical feature is its 
separate objectivity. Its basis is the apprehension of an objective moral dictate and law. 
          Further, the more faithful the soul is to the dictates of “this inward monitor,” the 
greater does the character of the objective Excellence emerge till “a moral conviction” is 
attained of its “supreme authority” (no.7). So the greater the obedience to the imperative 
dictate of conscience (which is to say the imperatival character of the law thus perceived), 
the more will the subject perceive the exalted character of the Authority that is dictating. 
It seems then that the sense that the Power and Excellence behind the moral law is 
“supreme” comes not immediately but gradually, and as a result of fidelity to the 
conscience over numerous individual acts. This tallies with Newman’s later account in 
the Grammar.440 
          Newman asks his reader, What is all this but the elements of a “religious system”? 
So, within this moral experience there are present “the elements of a religious system”. 
They are but the elements of it – presumably requiring other elements for the 
development of a religious system. These other elements would be apprehended in a 
variety of ways – through reason, authority, and so forth. The “power whom we must 
obey” mentioned in the sermon of 1829 (“Religious Faith Rational”) as the one fact we 
do certainly “know”, is thus gradually revealed to be a “Supreme Power claiming our 
habitual obedience.” The sense of its supremacy comes with fidelity to the conscience. 
          Moreover, present in the dictate that the soul must act in this way and not in that, 
and present in the awareness of moral improvement that this involves, there is “a 
presentiment of a future life, and of a judgment to be passed upon present conduct, with 
rewards and punishments annexed” (no.8). The conscience, then, has a natural 
“presentiment” of a future entailing a judgement with rewards and punishments. 
          Furthermore, there is this to be noticed, that conscience simply commands. Here 
Newman is describing the action of conscience in its capacity as distinct from reason. It 
expects obedience on the basis of a kind of faith in its authority. This is a feature of its 
dictate: it functions imperatively as would the dictate of a supreme, morally excellent 
Power. Precisely as the conscience, it does not justify itself by rational demonstration. It 
is supreme over “the murmurs of reason” (no.9).  Newman would appear to be referring 
here primarily to the basic moral instincts that good must be done and evil avoided, and 
                                                 
440 J. H. Newman, A Grammar of Assent, Image Books, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1955, p. 97. 
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the declarations that sin is sin, and perhaps other quasi-instinctive perceptions by the 
conscience – involving general dictates and instinctive perceptions such as the 
requirement to be just, etc. Obedience is commanded and expected on the ipse dixit of the 
conscience. As such the conscience is “essentially religious” (no.10), in the sense that this 
higher Something is acknowledged and felt instinctively – as also in “the remorse and 
vague apprehension of evil which the transgression of Conscience occasions” (no.10). 
          In this sense, conscience – understood as the sense of duty and of guilt – is the 
foundation of a natural religious sense. Newman is not here referring primarily to the 
practical judgment of conscience on what should be done. He is speaking, rather, of the 
basic sense of duty present in such practical judgments, and in the remorse present in 
failures of specific moral duties. That said, even so, “obedience to it is attended by a 
continually growing expertness in the science of Morals” (no.11). 
          The essence of Newman’s description of the action of conscience is simple and 
easily accessible to all. It is that Conscience “implies a relation between the soul and a 
something exterior, and that, moreover, superior to itself; a relation to an excellence 
which it does not possess, and to a tribunal over which it has no power.” In its sense of 
duty the soul is implicitly aware of, and put in relation to, a “something exterior” that 
possesses the contours of a supreme master and judge. Newman is pointing to the 
apprehension of the moral law and to what this implicitly suggests: the contours of a 
Lawgiver. The Lawgiver, perceived as one and supreme, is the result of many such 
perceptions. It is the assertion of objectivity which is, one would suppose, the most 
problematic claim. For why is the “something exterior” not just a subjective impression? 
Newman is saying that it is seen by the subject not to be such. 
          At the same time, Newman continues, reason is involved, especially in the 
development of the perceptions that are implied (no.12). Newman says that this “large 
and practical religious creed” is “attainable (as appears from the extant works of heathen 
writers) by a vigorous mind which rightly works upon itself, under (what may be called) 
the Dispensation of Paganism (no.12). Indeed, Conscience, and Reason subject to the 
Conscience, can go quite far in religious knowledge. He writes that very many of the 
truths of religion can be known by the natural conscience vigorously worked upon by the 
mind (i.e., the reason). It “may even be questioned whether there be any essential 
character of Scripture doctrine which is without its place in this moral revelation.” 
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Newman writes that these basic truths intimated by the conscience are attainable by a 
vigorous pagan mind reflecting carefully on its own moral experience (no.12). 
          It is clear that by April of 1830 Newman has worked out the foundations of his 
theory of the Conscience as being the basis (i.e., the “essential principle and sanction”) of 
“Religion in the mind”.441  He is just 29 years of age. He has decided that this is the 
foundation of religion and of its authority. 
          But at this stage, and at least in formal statement, Newman is cautious about the 
reach of the conscience. In this sermon of April 1830 the conscience is said to intimate, 
not a distinct, well-delineated Person, but a “something exterior.” Newman is being 
careful in his presentation here, and is sticking to the phenomena of conscience. What is 
perceived is an “Unseen Power”, to use the expression of the sermon of 1829, with 
certain basic characteristics. In terms of deliberate (and philosophical) statement, this is 
as far as Newman is prepared to go at this point in respect to what the natural conscience 
presents. What, then, is the nature of this Something which the natural conscience, which 
is to say Natural Religion, apprehends? 
          In his sermon of April 1830 Newman is attempting to distinguish the limits, the 
attainments and the mutual relationships of Natural and Revealed Religion. He tells us 
that Natural Religion, based essentially on the conscience (in tandem with reason), does 
not of itself apprehend the distinctly personal character of the divine. The external 
Something is sensed by the conscience as an impersonal Principle rather than as a 
personal Agent. It is Revealed Religion which shows God to be a Person. Newman has, 
then, chosen to draw back on what he had been suggesting at least up to his entry to Oriel 
as a tutor. He is being carefully philosophical, basing himself strictly on the phenomena.  
 
     3.2.2.   (c)   Conscience and duty to an “unseen Governor”  (1832)            
 Yet two years later, on April 8, 1832, there is a passing advance in formal statement – 
although it does seem clear that this advance had been Newman’s view all along. 
Newman writes in Sermon VI 442 of his Oxford University Sermons that “the notion of 
duty to an Unseen Governor” is “implied in the authoritativeness with which conscience 
                                                 
441 J.H. Newman, “The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively”, no. 7.  
442 J. H. Newman, “On Justice, as a Principle of Divine Governance”, Sermon VI. Fifteen Sermons 
preached before the University of Oxford. (April 8, 1832).  Westminster, Md. Christian Classics. 1966.   
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dictates to us”,443 suggesting “the approbation of our Maker”.444 It is still the imperatival 
character of the conscience (that is, its “authoritativeness”) which suggests this – but now 
a Person is implied. So what is perceieved is not just a Principle of Nature as in Sermon 
II of April 13, 1830.445 It is a Person – a Governor. Indeeed, this “Unseen Governor” is 
“our Maker.”  
          It ought be noted that in various of his statements Newman suggests that the 
conscience perceives God as “our Maker”.446 Perhaps here this is used as a mere 
synonym for “God,” without any special significance being given to his work of creation 
as such – but significantly it appears elsewhere too.447 It is, actually, of real importance 
and we shall discuss this feature of Newman’s account when we take up his much later 
notes in his “Proof of Theism” section in his Philosophical Notebook. There we shall 
proceed to identify the source of this sense of God as “our Maker”. 
          Conscience is the true foundation of religion, for it involves and reveals the 
presence, the authority, and the dictate of “an Unseen Governor”.448 Newman stresses the 
objectivity of the entire perception. As he will say a few years later in his sermon “Faith 
without Sight”, “a man of religious mind is he who attends to the rule of conscience, 
which is born with him, which he did not make for himself, and to which he feels bound 
in duty to submit.” The “rule of conscience” is the objective moral law being 
apprehended, but naturally implying a Lawgiver. This thought of a Lawgiver is 
immediate, perhaps in the sense that it is the result of instinctive, implicit reasoning. It 
“immediately directs his thoughts to some Being exterior to himself, who gave it, who 
evidently is superior to him, for a law implies a lawgiver, and a command implies a 
superior”.449 Such “is faith as it exists in the multitude of those who believe, arising from 
their sense of the presence of God, originally certified to them by the inward voice of 
conscience”.450    
                                                 
443 Ibid., p.105. 
444 Ibid., p.106. 
445 J. H. Newman,  “The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively”.  Sermon II, no. 14. 
Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. Westminster, Md. Christian Classics. 1966, p. 
22. 
446 J. H. Newman,  “On Justice, as a Principle of Divine Governance”.  Sermon VI,  no. 10,  p. 106.  
447 J. H. Newman,   Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 202   
448 J. H. Newman,  “On Justice, as a Principle of Divine Governance”, no. 10. 
449 J. H. Newman, “Faith without Sight.” Feast of St Thomas the Apostle.  21-12-1834.  Parochial and 
Plain Sermons, Volume II. Sermon II.  Westminster Md.: Christian Classics. 1966,  p. 18 
450 Ibid., p. 19 
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          This stress by Newman on the conscience – or the sense of duty to the law 
perceived by the conscience – is seen by him as providing the foundation for a religion 
based not primarily on one’s self-regarding consciousness of having personal faith (as in, 
so he now thought, forms of Evangelicalism), but ultimately on the awareness and 
contemplation of the Objects of natural moral perception. The outward gaze on Objects is 
characteristic of the ancient Catholicism, while the former self-regarding consciousness is 
“the modern school,” and contains the seeds of rationalism and atheism. The root of the 
difference lay in the supremacy of the conscience, understood as “a relation between the 
soul and a something exterior, … superior to itself; a relation to an excellence which it 
does not possess, and to a tribunal over which it has no power” – to an “Unseen 
Governor.” So the supremacy of the conscience is the supremacy not of the subject but of 
the law apprehended by the subject.   
 
          Sermon VI of his University Sermons, which declares that conscience implies “the 
notion of duty to an Unseen Governor”, was given on April 8, 1832. At this very time 
Newman was at work on his Arians of the Fourth Century451 – to be completed at the end 
of July, but published only in November of the following year. The vividness of the 
natural, if tacit, sense of God in the conscience is expressed in an interesting passage in 
this, his first book. That it is a special passage is shown in Newman’s reference to it on 
occasions in his future writing. The context of his remark is his discussion of the Patristic 
use of Economy in the expression of revealed truth. Truth is to be conveyed in a manner 
commensurate to the capacities of the hearer. God himself does this in his dealings with 
his creatures.  
          Accordingly, the “popular argument from final causes,” he writes in The Arians, is 
really an aid to teaching people “in the simplest way the active presence of Him who 
after all dwells intelligibly, prior to argument, in their heart and conscience.” Let us 
notice Newman’s mention of both the “heart and conscience” – not just the conscience, 
but also the heart. At the core of the self (the “heart”) there is the sense of moral 
obligation (the “conscience”). God is present in the abiding sense of moral obligation 
which is at the core of the self (as the self’s power of moral apprehension), prior to 
                                                 
451 J. H. Newman (1833). The Arians of the Fourth Century (with an Introduction and Notes by Rowan 
Williams).  Herefordshire and Notre Dame: Gracewing and University of Notre Dame.  2001. Published in 
the Birmingham millenary Oratory Edition in 2001. 
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argument – and prior to practical judgments by the conscience. This, the presence of God 
in the heart and conscience (i.e., at the core of the self by means of the conscience), is the 
basic and primary reality that is known prior to argument – though the reality of God may 
need to be taught to people with the aid of the “popular argument from final causes”.452   
           Newman is saying that the knowledge of God from the things he has made (as in 
Romans 1:20) will be for many the common and initial way, especially in instruction. But 
this will or should serve to highlight the surest and most bedrock source of the knowledge 
of God – and based on this, of the world itself – which is conveyed, “prior to argument, in 
their heart and conscience” (Romans 7:21-23). This sense of God present in the 
conscience confers “a sure confidence in the love of Him who cannot deceive,” of Him 
“who has impressed the image and thought of Himself and of His will upon our original 
nature”.453  It is this fundamental sense of a moral God (who loves and who, being moral, 
could not deceive) which enables us to accept with confidence the testimony of our 
senses and reason – for it is God who has arranged things so. Our “original nature”, on 
which has been “impressed the image and thought” of God, would seem to be especially 
that primary dimension of the “heart and conscience” which is “prior to argument.” This 
looks like the medieval synderesis, which is the fundamental sense of moral obligation 
speaking to the heart, which is the basis and soul of practical moral judgments and 
decisions. It is the immediate sense of moral obligatoriness. 
          Newman held to what he had said in The Arians. As, with an eye on Hume (and 
Berkely),454 he states in a letter to his sister Jemima two years later:   
“it seems to me, while a man holds the moral governance of God as existing in 
and thro’ his conscience, it matters not whether he believes his sense or not. For 
at least he will hold the external world to be a divine intimation, a scene of trial, 
(whether a reality or not) just as a child's game may be a trial. I have tried to say 
this in the Arians, ch i par.3. I conceive Hume denied conscience, Berkely 
                                                 
452 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753) of Cloyne, Anglo-Irish philosopher who advanced a theory 
which seemed to deny the existence of material substance. Instead, objects like chairs are ideas in the minds 
of perceivers and do not exist without being perceived. Berkeley is also known for his critique of 
abstraction.  In 1709 he published An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, in which the proper objects of 
sight are not material objects, but light and colour. This set the stage for his chief philosophical work A 
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710, which he rewrote under the title Three 
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in 1713. In 1732 he published Alciphron, a Christian apologetic 
against free-thinkers. His last major philosophical work was Siris (1744). 
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confessed it – To what extent B. denied the existence of the external world, I am 
not aware – nor do I mean to go so far myself (far from it) as to deny the 
existence of matter – tho' I should deny that what we saw was more than 
accidents of it – and say that space perhaps is but a condition of the objects of the 
senses – not a reality. (I am glad to have Dr. B's name.)”455 
          The point here is that for Newman, the fundamental certainty is not about the 
world but that obtained in the conscience about the being of God (“prior to argument”, as 
he says elsewhere). This basic certainty is not dependent on what is perceived by the 
senses. The “practical safeguard against Atheism”, Newman will write in respect to 
“scientific inquirers” some seven years later, is “the inward experience of that Power, 
existing in the mind before and independently of their examination of His material 
world”.456 
          
           Newman indicates in the Apologia 457 that for long, since he was young, he had 
viewed nature as a veil of an unseen reality and a pointer to it. The sacramental principle 
of reality was long the tendency of his thought. His, then, was a naturally religious mind 
by instinct, a characteristic that had perhaps been interrupted by a period of rationalism in 
early adolescence prior to his conversion to Revealed Religion. All of nature – and 
therefore, it is to be presumed, the conscience also – seemed vaguely to speak of God. 
This perspective in Butler’s Analogy resonated with him as did the same perspective in 
Keble’s Christian Year. It was this in Clement and Origin that “carried” Newman “away; 
the philosophy, not the doctrine; and I have drawn out some features of it in my volume” 
– i.e., The Arians.458  
          We notice that in this Newman is referring to “the philosophy, not the doctrine”.  
They (Clement and Origen) stressed that “Nature was a parable: Scripture was an 
allegory: pagan literature, philosophy, and mythology, properly understood, were but a 
preparation for the Gospel.  The Greek poets and sages were in a certain sense prophets; 
for ‘thoughts beyond their thought to those high bards were given.’ There had been a 
                                                 
455 J. H.  Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. IV, p. 253 (To Jemima Newman. Oriel. May 18, 1834). 
456 J. H. Newman, "Faith and Reason, contrasted as Habits of Mind", Epiphany, 1839. Fifteen Sermons 
preached before the University of Oxford.  Sermon 10,  no. 39 (5.).   
Westminster, Md. Christian Classics. 1966, p. 194. 
457 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua – for instance he writes on p. 27:  “… I had cherished so long..” 
458 Ibid , p. 27. 
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directly divine dispensation granted to the Jews; but there had been in some sense a 
dispensation carried on in favour of the Gentiles”.459  
          Newman’s natural philosophy, his instinctive and preferred view of reality began, 
we might say, with the proposition that “the exterior world, physical and historical, was 
but the manifestation to our senses of realities greater than itself”.460 This was the mode 
of thought that had attracted him when young, and was “the doctrine” he “associated with 
the Analogy and the Christian Year”.461 Ironically, it had parallels with the position of the 
typical rationalist who claimed that “reason” demonstrated that nature (with its design) is 
God’s voice, and who refused to accept supernatural revelation because it was dependent 
on testimony. Butler, with his audience of deists before him, argues from the likeness 
existing between the moral character of nature and the patterns in Revealed Religion to 
show that the Christian Religion is of God. But Newman lays his finger on a more 
immediate and fundamental indication of nature as a path to both Natural and Revealed 
Religion. It is the testimony of the Conscience, especially prior to reasoning.   
  
     3.2.2.   (d)  Conscience and coming to its “clear vision” (1833)              
But there is a point of great importance when considering Newman’s view of the 
conscience. It is that there is more to the natural realization of God than simply the action 
of the conscience. Having arrived back from his long Mediterranean trip, Newman 
preached on the Sunday immediately following Keble’s Assize Sermon of July 14, 1833 
– which Newman subsequently chose to consider as the beginning of the Movement. His 
own sermon was preached on July 21. It was Newman’s first of the Oxford Movement 
and hard on the heels of Keble’s own.  
          Its title was “The Immortality of the Soul”, and it was on the divine “judgment 
upon the eternal soul, which lives in spite of the death of the body”.462 It was the thought 
of God’s judgment which “awakened men to the necessity of having a better and deeper 
religion”.463 This revealed “doctrine of the immortality of the soul” is “the fundamental 
difference between our state and that of the heathen”.464  The problem is that the majority 
                                                 
459 Ibid., p. 28. 
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132 
 
of Christians do not “realize” this doctrine “in their own minds at all”465 – they “go on 
just as the heathen did of old”.466 What, then, Newman asks, is it “to bring home to 
ourselves that we have souls” that will face the divine judgment?467  
          Newman has previously stated that the conscience intimates a future reckoning. 
But in this sermon we can see at work more considerations than simply the intimations of 
the natural conscience. It illustrates the point that the sense of God involves more than 
just the conscience in Newman’s thought. There is also a form of natural and instinctive 
reasoning about the world, aided by grace.  
          To begin with, we naturally view ourselves as part of this world. This squares with 
the typical scholastic approach. “We look off from self to the things around us”, Newman 
writes, “and forget ourselves in them. Such is our state, – a depending for support on the 
reeds which are no stay”. This being our natural state of mind and heart, divine grace 
begins its work. “God begins His process of reclaiming us to a truer view of our place in 
His great system of providence.” Thus it is that “when He visits us, then in a little while 
there is a stirring within us”.468  The sense of our true self and of God comes to life by the 
action of God gradually detaching us from the things of this world.   
          What is involved in this work of detachment from the world? For one, there is 
disappointment. “The unprofitableness and feebleness of the things of this world are 
forced upon our minds”. That is, “they disappoint us … (and) do not satisfy us.” This 
limited world, in which we are naturally enmeshed by reason of dependence and 
affection, cannot answer the longing of our heart for happiness and peace. Secondly, the 
things of this world are forever passing away and are unable to offer us a true and stable 
repose. The very misfortunes that “come upon us (as they often do)” teach us “the 
nothingness of this world”.  
          So it is that “under God’s blessing” – which is to say, thanks to the prompting of 
his grace – it is forced upon us that our true self is radically other than the things of this 
world and cannot find its rest therein. We come “to feel our separation from things 
visible, our independence of them, our distinct existence in ourselves, our individuality, 
our power of acting for ourselves this way or that way, our accountableness for what we 
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do”.469 Thus we “are weaned from the love” of the things of the world, and led “to 
perceive that there are but two beings in the whole universe, our own soul and the God 
who made it”.470 We notice again that the soul is led “to perceive” the “God who made it” 
(my italics). There is a sense of God as Creator. 
          So then, there is more to the realization of “our own soul and the God who made it” 
than just the instinctive sense of moral obligation and an Obliger conveyed by the 
conscience. There is also disappointment and deprivation involved in the natural 
interaction with the world. Newman’s pronounced sense of self and self’s nature and 
existence is the fruit of a variety of considerations. When he speaks of there being “but 
two beings in the whole universe” – God and the self – Newman is not saying that the 
world of external things and persons does not matter. He is saying that experience of life 
and the world, together with the action of grace, can and ought to teach man that his only 
true end and happiness is God, for he himself is distinct from and more than the things of 
this world. Man’s heart is made not for this world but for God. 
 “Sublime, unlooked-for doctrine, yet most true! To every one of us there are but 
two beings in the whole world, himself and God; for, as to this outward scene, its 
pleasures and pursuits, its honours and cares, its contrivances, its personages, its 
kingdoms, its multitude of busy slaves, what are they to us? Nothing.” 471  
          That is, ultimately they are “nothing” to the purpose – the purpose being true 
happiness and fulfilment. The “things that have been made” (Rom 1: 20) alone will not 
do. This is what the “light of nature”472 can teach us about the world. The natural futility, 
contingency and transience of the world is perceived by ordinary experience and 
reflection – aided by the hidden action of grace. In coming to know God, man must also 
appreciate the limitedness and futility of the world.  
          We may observe that the way to God as described in this sermon of 1833 is by 
coming to see not so much the design, as, rather, the transitoriness and limitation of the 
world and its inability to answer the craving of the human heart. Newman does not 
mention the common way of the deists, rationalists and of Paley himself. It is a way to 
God from external nature, but it is different from Paley’s meticulous discussion of design 
in creation, particularly in the structure of living things. Newman’s approach 
                                                 
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid., p. 20 
471 Ibid. 
472 Ibid., p. 16. 
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contemplates other features of nature, those of the transience and contingency of the 
world, and we might say its consequent futility in terms of what the heart seeks. This 
futility of the world for man’s happiness is forced upon his reflection by hard experience.  
          Newman views these features of the world from a certain perspective and uses 
them in a certain way. What takes the soul towards God is not so much a rational 
accounting for these limited features of the created order, as if they are premises leading 
to the conclusion of the being of God as creation’s explanation. Of course, the world does 
indeed suggest what is beyond it – for, as he writes, “at length it floats before our eyes as 
some idle veil, which …. cannot hide the view of what is beyond it.”473 But what is to be 
noticed is that what leads to this perception of “what is beyond” the “idle veil” of the 
world is the yearning for happiness, for stability of soul, for love and for peace. The 
subject turns from the world in which it naturally but fruitlessly tends to rest (because of 
the world’s disappointing futility), and opens itself to “what is 
beyond it”,474 in whom it is sure it can rest. This looks very 
Augustinian. 
          But where is this God “beyond it” to be found? Again, 
the core teaching of the sermon of 1833 looks very Augustinian 
– God, who is the Answer to the yearning heart, is found 
primarily within. He is to be found by way of Nature still, but 
within – for Newman, within the Conscience – rather than out 
there beyond the self and reached as a conclusion based on the 
premise of the external world. Further, and very significantly, this way and this locale of 
God’s presence provide not so much a conclusion, as a clear vision of God. 475 This 
clarity of vision tallies entirely with his account of the conscience in “Religious Faith 
Rational” of May 24, 1829 – as previously discussed. 
           The word “vision”, indeed “a clear vision”, suggests that it is not a matter of 
formal reasoning to God – as Paley and others would have us do in arguing from the 
                                                 
473 Ibid., p. 20.  
474 Ibid. 
475 In discussing Aristotle’s notion of the logos, Jean Vanier states that “at its behest, our whole being … 
launches itself towards the real. This movement that carries us outwards is very different from a knowledge 
that proceeds from interiority, as argued by Plato, who was convinced that the good must be sought within 
oneself. It is very different from the effort directed at consciousness of self.”  
(J. Vanier, Made for Happiness: Discovering the Meaning of Life with Aristotle. Transl. K. Spink. London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd. 2001, p. 18).  
      In his way to God by nature, Newman appears somewhat Platonic, despite his education in Aristotle.  
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design of things to the Author of Nature. It looks like a tacit knowledge already present, 
perhaps an implicit reasoning, an abiding awareness implicit in some cognition, a kind of 
sensing rather than a concluding, something like memory but without involving recall of 
the past. It is these things, as part and parcel of the Conscience, which tell us that “we are 
answerable for what we do”.476 So Conscience tells us that we are “answerable”. There 
will be a reckoning. God is clearly sensed – so clearly as to be like a “clear vision” – as 
implicit within the thought of a judgment in the feeling of the conscience. 
          Thus the things of the world, discovered to be so insubstantial, “vanish before the 
clear vision we have, first, of our own existence, next of the presence of the great God in 
us, and over us, as our Governor and Judge, who dwells in us by our conscience, which is 
His representative.”477 As the “things that have been 
made” lose their substance and claims upon us, they 
give way before the Presence within – identified as 
“what is beyond” the “idle veil”478 that is the world – 
and who “dwells in us by our conscience”.479 The 
way to God of Romans 1:20 (from what has been 
made) is the way we begin. But that beginning gives way to God making himself known 
to us by the Conscience (as described in Romans 7: 21-22) – which is to say, by means of 
“the law of God in my inmost self” (Romans 7:21).  
          We also notice, in the statement that God “dwells in us by our concience” the 
distinction between the self and the conscience. There is (what we have noticed before) 
the “heart” and the “concience”. God dwells “in us”, or in the “heart”, and it is by means 
of “our conscience”. The conscience is the heart’s power of knowing God as present in 
moral obligation, and it involves a special immediacy and intimacy.  
          So it is that “the law of God written on our hearts bids us serve Him, and partly 
tells us how to serve Him, and Scripture completes the precepts which nature began”.480 
The world is gradually discovered to lack substance, promise and claim. This void gives 
way to what is most real – the testimony of Conscience to the Lawgiver and Judge within. 
Specifically, Conscience tells us that we are answerable for what we do, and that the One 
                                                 
476 J. H. Newman, “The Immortality of the Soul”, p. 21. 
477 Ibid.  
478 Ibid., p. 20. 
479 Ibid., p. 21. 
480 Ibid.  
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to whom we must answer is a righteous Judge. So persistent, imperative and edictal is this 
law and promise of a reckoning, that it provides a “clear vision” of the Lawgiver and 
Judge implicit in its tone and character. Ordinary experience and reflection on Nature as 
present in the Conscience, aided by the grace of God, can take us to this realization. 
 
3.3  Early Catholic Years (1845-1855)     
3.3.1     The feelings of Conscience (1845-1855)  
3.3.1  (a)    The Development of Christian Doctrine   (1845) 
With the commencement of the Oxford Movement, Keble, Newman, Froude and others 
set out to restore the Church’s entity by recovering for the Established Church the ethos 
and doctrines of Patristic Catholicism. Newman’s defence of religion continued with his 
explorations of ethos and the role of antecedent probability, but the conscience as a 
specific subject falls somewhat into the background during this heyday.  However, it 
makes an appearance again during the threshold of his passing over to the Church of 
Rome. I refer especially to The Development of Christian Doctrine (1845).481  
     This, Newman’s final book of his Anglican years, could also be regarded as the 
first book of his Catholic years, for his Catholic course was set, and the famous book was 
meant to explore and vindicate it. For this reason, we consider it at the beginning of this 
section of the chapter. The book was his most notable contribution to the understanding 
of Christian doctrine because it answered his own and the great Protestant objection that 
the doctrines of the Church of Rome are a system of corruptions. It is not precisely a 
work of theology – in the way his Justification and his Prophetical Office were. Rather, it 
is more a philosophical consideration of what is to be expected of authentic Christian 
doctrine, while buttressed by a consideration of the multitude of facts of the case.  
          At one stage in the work, Newman repeats his distinction between the general 
sense of duty and the judgment on what that duty entails in the concrete. Conscience 
“acts as a messenger from above, and says that there is a right and a wrong, and that the 
right must be followed; but it is variously, and therefore erroneously, trained in the 
instance of various persons. It mistakes error for truth; and yet we believe that on the 
whole, and even in those cases where it is ill-instructed, if its voice be diligently obeyed, 
                                                 
481 J. H. Newman, (1845).  An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.  Westminster, Md.: 
Christian Classics Inc. 1968. 
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it will gradually be cleared, simplified, and perfected, so that minds, starting differently 
will, if honest, in course of time converge to one and the same truth”.482 So then, it seems 
that it is especially in its general dictate that “there is a right and a wrong and that the 
right must be followed” that it “acts as a messenger from above”. If this basic command 
is “diligently obeyed”, specific truth will be progressively attained, and different minds 
will converge on the truth.  
          What is to be noticed is a return to the significance of the special “feeling” evoked 
by the conscience. It is such as to develop within us the thought of God. The point is set 
within the context of the development of ideas – which itself is the context for Newman’s 
general argument on the development of doctrine. Just as it is to be expected that our 
ideas will develop, so also dogma, which expresses the Church’s idea of divine 
Revelation, will be expected to develop. As an example of an idea that develops, 
Newman takes our idea of God. It “develops” from the phenomena of conscience. What 
is Newman’s argument here? 
     Newman considers the feeling of conscience and explicates the Object that it 
implies, and by which the feeling of conscience is caused. Newman is presenting the way 
by which a person is led to his notion of God – it is the way to God by the Conscience. 
The feelings of the authentic conscience imply for the mind the Object that is involved in 
and causing those feelings. That Object is a Moral Governor and a Judge. Thus it is that 
“conscience, the existence of which we cannot deny, is a proof of the doctrine of a Moral 
Governor, which alone give it a meaning and a scope; that is, the doctrine of a Judge and 
Judgment to come is a development of the phenomenon of conscience”.483 (my italics). 
The “phenomenon of conscience” is the complex of elements making up the experience 
of perceiving moral obligation. 
          The first part of this statement speaks of “conscience” as a “proof”. Conscience, 
“the existence of which we cannot deny, is a proof of … a Judge and Judgment to come.” 
The second part of it explains what he means by “a proof” in this particular case – it is a 
“development.” The “doctrine of a Judge and Judgment to come is a development based 
                                                 
482 Ibid., Part II, Chapter VIII, Section I, paragraph I, no. 5, p. 361. 
483 Ibid., Part I, Chapter I, Section. 2, no.7, p. 48. Newman writes, “A development, converse to that which 
Butler speaks of, must next be mentioned. As certain objects excite certain emotions and sentiments, so do 
sentiments imply objects and duties (Note: 1845 edition: As objects demand feelings, so do feelings imply 
acts and objects). Thus conscience, the existence of which we cannot deny, is a proof of the doctrine of a 
Moral Governor, which alone give it a meaning and a scope; that is, the doctrine of a Judge and Judgment 
to come is a development of the phenomena of conscience.” (in the 1845 edition: “that is, the doctrine of a 
Judgment to come is a development of the phenomenon of conscience.”)   
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on the phenomenon of conscience.” It is a “proof” or “development” by the mind 
reflecting instinctively (or deliberately) on the experience of the Conscience. The feeling 
of conscience involves the idea of a Judge and a Judgment to come.484 
    Newman appears to regard this suggested “proof” as his own. A little later in the 
Development,485 Newman writes that “The supremacy of conscience is the essence of 
natural religion; the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, is the essence 
of revealed;486 and when such external authority is taken away, the mind falls back again 
of necessity upon that inward guide which it possessed even before Revelation was 
vouchsafed. …. It may be objected, indeed, that conscience is not infallible; it is true, but 
still it is ever to be obeyed.”  
          Butler stressed the supremacy of conscience in ethics (in his Fifteen Sermons and 
his Dissertation on Virtue).487 Newman insisted on its supremacy in natural religion. 
“The supremacy of conscience is the essence of natural religion; ….. and when such 
                                                 
484 In respect to the validity of this method of “proof” – i.e., arguing from the the “phenomenon of 
conscience” to the Object which must be causing it – we notice that in John Paul II’s Papal Encyclical 
Fides et Ratio (1998), which is on the relation between Faith and Reason, there is the following argument:  
      Man is “the one who seeks the truth.” Now, “it is unthinkable that a search so deeply rooted in human 
nature would be completely vain and useless. The capacity to search for truth and to pose questions itself 
implies the rudiments of a response …. The same must equally be true of the search for truth when it comes 
to the ultimate questions.” (my italics).  Fides et Ratio. Nos. 28-29.  Strathfield. NSW. St Paul Publications.   
   There is, in this statement, an argument for the existence of objective truth that seems based on the 
tendency of man towards it, and man’s expectation of it.    
   Similarly, in his discussion of the ethics of desire in Aristotle, Jean Vanier states that “Aristotle has faith 
in nature in general, and in human nature in particular.” That is to say, “If in every human being there is a 
desire for happiness, then happiness is possible. Nature is not an exil genius that makes us see some 
inaccessible mirage.” J. Vanier, Made for Happiness: Discovering the Meaning of Life with Aristotle. 
Translated by Kathryn Spink.  London SW 18 4JJ: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd. 2001, p. 9. 
    So it seems that, for Aristotle, because there is the desire for happiness, happiness must be possible. 
485  J. H. Newman, The Development of Christian Doctrine. Part I, Chapter II, Section 2, no.11, p. 86. 
486  This assertion of 1845 that it is not the conscience which is supreme in Revealed Religion but 
“Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop” must be borne in mind when speaking of Newman’s insistence on 
the “supremacy” of the Conscience. In his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk thirty years later (1875) Newman 
famously stated that he would drink to Conscience “first” and “afterwards” to the Pope. He was arguing 
against Gladstone who maintained that because of the Vatican Decree on Papal Infallibility, the Catholic’s 
conscience was no longer his own, but replaced by the edicts of a foreign power. Newman declared 
rhetorically in his Letter that “Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, (which 
indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please,—still, to Conscience first, 
and to the Pope afterwards” (ch. 5, Conscience). Clearly, he did not mean that one’s personal “conscience” 
was not entirely subject to Divine Revelation, of which the Church is the divinely-appointed oracle. His 
statement of 1845, that ““The supremacy of conscience is the essence of natural religion; the supremacy of 
Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, is the essence of revealed” is ever to be remembered.  
487 In his Fifteen Sermons, Joseph Butler writes of the conscience: “This is a constituent part of the idea, 
that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, 
belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely 
govern the world.” – Sermon II, “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience -- Rom. ii. 14”. 
Sermon II of Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel. Cambridge: Hilliard and Brown. 1827. 
Internet archive, accessed on January 19, 2014:  http://anglicanhistory.org/butler/rolls/02.html 
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external authority is taken away, the mind falls back again of necessity upon that inward 
guide”.488 Again, when he speaks of “the supremacy of conscience” he is speaking of the 
supremacy of what conscience perceives: the moral law and the Lawgiver it implies. 
          Then comes a rationale. In referring to Butler, and slightly later to Aristotle, 
Newman quotes Butler’s statement that “as principles imply applications” so, “he tells us, 
do certain relations imply correlative duties, and certain objects demand certain acts and 
feelings..” 489 Then Newman applies Butler’s point specifically to the conscience. He 
observes that “A development, converse to that which Butler speaks of, must next be 
mentioned. As certain objects excite certain emotions and feelings, so do sentiments 
imply objects and duties. Thus conscience … is a proof of the doctrine of a Moral 
Governor”.490  
      Here we notice that Newman does not acknowledge Butler as a direct source of 
his doctrine (as here expounded) about the “feelings” of conscience.491 In the very next 
passage he cites Aristotle as providing “an instance of this kind of development in his 
account of the happy man”.492  Aristotle goes on to say that “external goods are necessary 
to it, about which, however, the definition said nothing.” What we are noticing is that 
Newman is making a case which he regards as his own, and not coming from elsewhere. 
Had Newman’s point – that the “phenomenon” or “feelings” of conscience imply a Moral 
Governor and Judge – come from some authority (such as Butler), he would have 
acknowledged it. He does not cite either Butler or Aristotle as the source of his 
                                                 
488 J. H. Newman, The Development of Christian Doctrine. Part I, Chapter II, Section II, No.11 (5), p. 86. 
489 Ibid., no. 6, p. 47. 
490 Ibid., no.7, p. 48. 
491 It must be remembered, as has been said before, that Joseph Butler affirmed that the conscience 
suggests a higher Judgment. So this, as such, was not new. Newman developed and explored the proof of it. 
We read in Sermon II, “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience--Rom. ii. 14”, of Butler’s Fifteen 
Sermons  that,   
“here is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which distinguishes between 
the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon 
himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; 
others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without being consulted, without being 
advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, 
accordingly; and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to 
anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own. 
But this part of the office of conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to consider. It is by 
this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself. By this faculty, I 
say, not to be considered merely as a principle in his heart, which is to have some influence as 
well as others; but considered as a faculty, in kind and in nature, supreme over all others, and 
which bears its own authority of being so.” (italics mine).  
So, according to Bulter, the judgment of conscience suggests a higher judgment, and implicitly a Judge. But 
he does not offer a “proof” of his assertion, and does not identify the feeling of conscience as its ground. 
492  J. H. Newman, The Development of Christian Doctrine. Part I, Chapter II, Section II, no. 7, p. 49. 
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argument.493 The argument appears to be largely his own,494 that is, it is perceived by him 
as his own In previous writings we have discussed, Newman does not acknowledge 
Butler for his doctrine on the conscience as the foundation of religion – although we can 
see occasional intimations of it there.  
          Inasmuch as it appears in the Development, we may assume he had thought this for 
some time before. He had decided that the conviction of the presence of God 
commanding in the dictate of the conscience arises from the “feelings” (for want of a 
better word) associated with that dictate. The feeling of Conscience (involving the 
apprehension of an objective moral law) unmistakably involves the apprehension of an 
objective Moral Governor. 
          Newman had definite views about his argument from the moral law which 
conscience perceives – that is, the law of conscience.495 In a letter to Dalgairns early in 
1847 when studying in Rome, and when preparing his University Sermons for possible 
re-publication as a Catholic, he observed that  
“(1) I hold reason can prove the being of a God – that such a conclusion is 
the legitimate result of reason well employed, which is I suppose what the 
Holy See meant, under the maxim that 'truth cannot be contrary to truth – 
but this is very different from saying that reason is the mode by which 
individuals come at truth. (2) Next I have denied that the argument from 
design is philosophically true – has the Holy See condemned this? 496 if so, 
                                                 
493  David Hume (1711-1776) speaks of an idea of something being always preceded by the feeling of it. In 
his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Section VII “On the Idea of Necessary 
Connexion”, Part I, paragraph 4, he writes: “It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, 
that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to 
think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses. I have 
endeavoured to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a proper 
application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what 
they have hitherto been able to attain” (my italics). Hume uses this principle to analyse the content of the 
connection involved in causation – his idea being to “produce the impressions or original sentiments, from 
which the ideas are copied”. Hume’s Enquiry was a revision of his A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739–40.  
494 That is to say, Newman seems to have taken up and considered for himself a common experience, that it 
is the “feelings” of conscience that normally suggest to people that God commands and judges them. 
495 When Newman says he bases his argument for God on the “law of conscience” he does not mean some 
interior law by which Conscience functions, but the objective moral law which Conscience apprehends, to 
which it is subject, by which it lives, on which it insists and which it applies to the circumstances of life. It 
is this objective moral law (not a mere subjective construct), apprehended by the Conscience, which 
implies and intimates the being and will of God as Lawgiver and Judge.  
496   Newman never did seem convinced of the philosophical argument for God from “Design”. He thought 
it presumed far too much. But his familiarity with it may have been derived mainly from the likes of Paley, 
who was so highly regarded in his time. Edward Feser has analysed what he considers to be the special and 
altogether convincing character of Aquinas’ “Fifth Way” and sees it as very different from the Design 
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of course I retract it – but else I say the philosophical argument of reason for 
the being of God is, not  from external nature, but from the law of 
conscience - and I had  fancied that I followed St Anselm here.497 It is not 
then that I deny the conclusions of reason, or say that faith and reason are 
contrary, but that a particular argument is good and another not good.  As 
you say taking reason for the power or habit of reasoning, I say it does not 
find its own premises - but this does not show that it cannot reason right 
when these premises are supplied.”498 
 
     3.3.1  (b)     The Idea of a University  (The lectures of 1852) 499 
          Some years later and now a Catholic, in certain of his Dublin lectures that became 
his Idea of a University, Newman is found developing at greater length his argument. The 
feelings of conscience imply for the subject a real Object, that Object being God. He also 
explores the different emotions that are associated with substitutes for the authentic 
conscience. Conscience, part of our very nature, can cause both fear and self-reproach.500 
The “civilized age” radically re-interprets the fear that conscience should arouse, and 
transforms it into mere “self-reproach”.  
      The context of his discussion is his mention of references to God in the literature 
and science of the modern age. In the second Discourse (no.7) of these Dublin lectures (in 
1852), Newman writes that the deity which features in literature, science, “physical” 
theology and much of divinity does not measure up to what the Catholic Faith means by 
                                                                                                                                                 
argument of Paley (E. Feser, “Between Aristotle and William Paley: Aquinas’s Fifth Way.”  Nova et Vetera 
11 (2013): pp. 707-749.  For something of a reply to Feser one might read: Chris Gilley, “Pleading the 
Fifth: Aquinas, Teleology, and the Existence of God” Dec. 10, 2013.  Internet archive on January 7, 2014:   
http://www.academia.edu/5380959/Pleading_the_Fifth_Aquinas_Teleology_and_the_Existence_of_God). 
497 This is an interesting interpretation of St. Anselm’s argument. For Anselm, the very idea of God takes 
one to the living and objective God. While the external world has a place in  his account of the way to God 
(as we have seen), Newman does not, in the first instance, argue to God from the external world. He passes 
from the apprehension by the conscience of the objective moral law to the reality of God, Lawgiver and 
Judge, who is suggested instinctively by that very Law (as apprehended by the conscience). So the 
apprehension of the moral law involves, and takes one to, the living God who is within. It shows that 
Newman had been delving into Scholastic thought and had discovered, so he thought, support in Anselm. 
Some have wondered, with great respect to Aquinas, whether he had misunderstood Anselm’s proof. 
Coming at it from his own chosen angle, so different from that of Aquinas, Newman found support from it. 
498 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol XII, p. 33.  To J.D.Dalgairns Collegio di Propaganda. February 
14/47 
499 J. H. Newman, (1852). The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated (Part I).  
Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics 1973.  
500 Ibid., p. 194. 
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God.501 It is not the God of Revelation and, by implication, the God apprehended by the 
authentic and natural conscience. In fact, Newman doubts that the spirit of the age is 
capable of a true apprehension of God, precisely because of its lack of anchorage in the 
authentic natural conscience. A true apprehension of God comes from the conscience, 
and it is the conscience which the present age ignores or explains away.  
        In Discourse 8 (“Knowledge viewed in relation to Religion”), Newman contrasts 
the emotions of the merely cultivated mind with those of the genuinely religious mind. 
While the cultivated mind scorns vice, still, this may have nothing of religion in it. The 
tendency of mere intellect – mere intellectual culture – is to “swallow up the fear” which 
conscience causes “in the self-reproach” which is “directed and limited to our mere sense 
of what is fitting and becoming”.502 An authentic conscience involves an apprehension of 
something objective that causes fear, whereas the remorse of self-reproach involves 
nothing more than a profound disappointment with oneself. The guilty conscience causes 
fear precisely because it is fear of an objective Obliger and Judge. When functioning as a 
purely subjective feeling with the thinking Subject as its concern, it causes the remorse of 
self-reproach. This obviously has nothing more behind it than the disappointed and 
embarrassed Self. In this action “the command of duty is a sort of taste”.503  
          Newman is arguing from the nature of the feelings to what they imply of the fact 
and character of the Object that must cause them. Depending on their character, they 
imply either God or the Self. But he is not arguing as if from a premise to a separate 
conclusion. It is a matter of the feelings manifesting the perception that is involved in 
them. The feelings of the authentic conscience are such that a certain perception is clearly 
involved – it is the perception of an objective Governor and Judge. All men have a 
conscience, but in those who do not think there is a God who commands and judges 
them, a God who sovereignly enlightens and guides them with his revealed truth – it 
causes a personal complex. “They call themselves fools, not sinners; they are angry and 
impatient, not humble.”504 In such a case, the authentic conscience is ignored, explained 
away or substituted by mere self-respect. Moral fault can be easily explained away by the 
cultivated and dominant Reason.  
                                                 
501 Ibid., pp. 35-39. 
502 Ibid., p. 191. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ibid., p. 192. 
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    Newman takes Julian the Apostate505 as a classic example of this kind of religion 
(Discourse VIII, no.6). “Such, Gentlemen,” Newman writes in describing the death of 
Julian, “is the final exhibition of the Religion of Reason: in the insensibility of 
conscience, in the ignorance of the very idea of sin, in the contemplation of his own 
moral consistency, in the simple absence of fear, in the cloudless self-confidence, in the 
serene self-possession, in the cold self-satisfaction, we recognize the mere Philosopher.” 
506 
          In those alive to the Living God, the fear instilled by the conscience brings home 
to them his presence as sovereign Lawgiver and Judge. Characteristically and typically 
the conscience causes fear, and instinctively conveys the thought of God. It takes them 
out of themselves to their Master and Judge. The fear caused by the authentic conscience 
is a most valuable feature of man’s nature because it is a manifestation of man’s 
apprehension of a living God. Mere “reason” replaces the Conscience, dismisses its sense 
of an objective Lawgiver and Judge, and makes of its dictates standards of mere self-
respect. To regain a true sense of God one must attend to the authentic Conscience, which 
shows a healthy functioning in a natural fear.   
           This analysis of the fear of transgressing conscience, and of fear at having 
transgressed it, Newman illustrates (in Discourse VIII, no.7) by analysing the thought of 
the 3
rd
 Earl of Shaftsbury (1671-1713) – specifically, his Characteristics of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times (1711).507 This is a specimen, as Newman sees it, of the 
“Religion of Philosophy” (no.8).508 Importantly, Shaftsbury attacked the motive of fear of 
punishment in the leading of a virtuous life. For Shaftsbury it is only love of virtue for its 
own sake which is morally good, but under Newman’s analysis it turns out that in 
Shaftsbury this “virtue” is simply a sense of beauty. “Accordingly, virtue being only one 
kind of beauty, the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience, but 
                                                 
505 Julian (Flavius Claudius Julianus Augustus), also known as Julian the Apostate, as well as Julian the 
Philosopher, was Roman Emperor from 361 to 363 and a philosopher and Greek writer. A member of the 
Constantinian dynasty, he was the last non-Christian ruler of the Roman Empire, and it was his desire to 
bring the Empire back to its ancient Roman values. He rejected Christianity in favour of Neoplatonic 
paganism. Julian wrote several works in Greek, some of which have come down to us. 
506 J. H. Newman, (1852). The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated (Part I), pp. 195-196. 
507 Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), English politician and philosopher. 
Among his works, in 1709 he published The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody, and Soliloquy, or Advice 
to an Author. In 1711, the Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times appeared in three volumes. 
508 J. H. Newman, (1852). The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated (Part I), p. 200. 
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taste”.509 At times Shaftsbury expressly gives the superiority to taste over conscience. 
Newman writes, “Sometimes he distinctly contrasts this taste with principle and 
conscience, and gives it the preference over them. ‘After all,’ he says, ‘tis not merely 
what we call principle, but a taste, which governs men.’” 510 
     Such, Newman says, is the religion of Philosophy and of a civilized age. It is the 
religion of the “gentleman” and is basically a substitution or re-interpretation of the 
dictate of the conscience for a sense of what is beautiful or fitting. This is one way in 
which “reason” has usurped natural religion. In all of this Newman plainly regards the 
conscience as the typical foundation in nature of authentic religion and the sense of God. 
He is warning against the substitution of the conscience by a sense of beauty, or a sense 
of what is fitting, or a sense of what is useful – all of which turns out to be basically self-
respect. God is lost sight of, and it is the Self that is the object of the heart’s concern. 
      We can say that by this stage Newman has attained and outlined the grounds of 
his basic argument on the conscience apprehending the idea and reality of God. There 
would come in the years ahead a flowering of its expression and a probing of its 
evidences. Among his most signal expressions of this would be contained in his 
publication a little after these Discourses, but still during his time of duties at Dublin. It is 
his novel, Callista.  
 
     3.3.1  (c)   The feeling of God in my heart: Callista  (1855)   
          In this his second novel, Newman’s account of the personal meaning of the 
conscience is extremely explicit and, we might even say, daring – and it is not easy to 
find its parallel in any Catholic author of the time. He had said in 1833 511 that the 
conscience provides a “clear vision” of the God who is Lawgiver and Judge therein. In 
Calista’s heroine this is powerful and clear indeed. It is the testimony of a character who 
truly hears the conscience and is subject to it.  
          In a University sermon twenty-five years before, on April 13, 1830 (“The 
Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion respectively”), Newman had written that 
Conscience “implies a relation between the soul and something exterior”.512 Two years 
later, on April 8, 1832, he had written that the notion of duty to an Unseen Governor is 
                                                 
509 Ibid., p. 198. 
510 Ibid., p. 199. 
511 J. H. Newman, “The Immortality of the Soul”, Parrochial and Plain Sermons. Vol. I. Sermon II,  p. 21. 
512 J.  H. Newman,   Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford . Sermon II, no. 7. 
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implied in the authoritativeness with which conscience dictates to us, suggesting the 
approbation of our Maker.513  The experience of the Conscience implies more than a 
relation between the soul and “something exterior” – that “something” is a person who 
governs, and who is supreme. This is implied because of the “authoritativeness” of the 
dictate. It is uniquely and supremely edictal, as if from a supreme Governor. 
In his second novel, Callista (1855), the conscience is openly declared to be the 
echo of a Person speaking, a Person who commands and whom we love and fear. Years 
later Newman referred to the philosophical and theological significance of the novel, 
commenting that “I don’t think Catholics have ever done justice to the book; they read it 
as a mere story book – and I think Protestants are more likely to gain something from 
it”.514 This perhaps reflects the newness of this position in common Catholic thought.515 
It was not how Catholics usually thought of the foundation of the sense of God and of a 
philosophy of religion. Despite this newness and lack of common Catholic support, 
Newman’s long-standing position reached its zenith of expression and elaboration during 
his Catholic years – and perhaps, as we shall see, precisely in Callista.  
          In Loss and Gain (written 1847, published 1848), the hero (Charles Reding) is a 
young Anglican studying at contemporary Oxford who becomes a Catholic. The setting 
of Callista is the first half of the third century AD in North Africa. One of its protagonists 
is St Cyprian, the famous Bishop of Carthage, martyr and doctor of the Church. 
Newman's thought on the testimony of the natural conscience at its best is expressed in 
the utterances of both the Catholic Cyprian (as we shall see later) and the pagan Callista. 
Callista is a personification of Newman’s idea of the naturally religious mind, responding 
to the intimations of conscience yet conscious of her moral limitations. She is Newman's 
imaginative expression of the best of Natural Religion. A pagan, she will become a 
Catholic martyr and saint. There are several dialogues in the novel which illustrate a 
highly personal understanding the conscience and its dictates.  
                                                 
513 J. H. Newman,  “On Justice as a Principle of Divine Governance”  
      Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford . Sermon VI, no. 6.  
514 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXVI, p. 130. 
515 It is generally thought that Newman, having started on Callista in 1848, was prompted to complete it in 
1855 by Charles Kingley’s attack on monasticism and Catholicism generally in his Hypatia (1853). So 
Newman probably had a Protestant audience in mind. A further stimulus was Wiseman’s Fabiola (1854) – 
Newman’s novel  being a kind of sequel. 
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        We see this especially in Callista’s conversation with Polemo.516 In her responses 
to Polemo we have one of the most remarkable statements of Newman’s position on the 
idea of God conveyed by the conscience and on the felt basis of it. Polemo is a 
philosopher, an acquaintance of Plotinus and very conscious that he is a man of mind. He 
had been brought in by Callista's worried brother (Aristo) to rectify her religious thinking, 
which by now seemed to be tending towards the acceptance of Christianity. Callista 
quickly summed up Polemo, and she fell silent. Any discussion with him, she could see, 
would be plunging her soul into further shadows when she sought realities.  
      Early in the conversation Callista asks Polemo if he believed in one God. 
“Certainly. I believe in one, eternal, self-existing something”,517 Polemo replied. Back in 
1830 Newman had described the conscience as implying “a relation between the soul and 
a something exterior … superior to itself”.518 The God of Polemo was “a something 
exterior” but not, it was evident, morally superior to him, nor his judge – so not, it would 
seem, springing from his conscience. “Well,” Callista said, “I feel that God within my 
heart.”519 Callista felt this. Both are pagans. Polemo’s knowledge of God is that attained 
by mere Reason. It is the religion of Philosophy which Newman had dealt with in 
Shaftsbury and Julian. Callista also – as Polemo acknowledges – is a child of 
Civilization, but she feels the presence of God within her heart. We are reminded of what 
Newman wrote some 26 years before, that “we obey God primarily because we actually 
feel His presence in our consciences bidding us obey Him”.520 
          Callista is not referring to a conclusion she has formally reached on the basis of 
premises, which is to say examinable evidence. There is the vivid and sure awareness of a 
Presence in her heart that she feels. Her “heart” is not simply the intellect, but the core of 
her moral self. What exactly, deep within her heart, does she feel? She feels the presence 
of a Person saying to her, “do this: don’t do that.” 521 This is what the “heart” recognizes 
as present in and behind the dictate. We notice that in this general dictate (“do this: don’t 
do that”), it is not a specific and practical moral course, as such, which is being referred 
                                                 
516 J. H. Newman, Calista: A Sketch of the Third Century.  London: Burns & Oates. Universe Books 
edition. 1962. Chapter 28, pp. 171-175. 
517 Ibid., p. 174. 
518 J. H. Newman, “Natural and Revealed Religion”. Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of 
Oxford,  Sermon II, no. 7, p. 18. 
519 J. H. Newman,  Calista: A Sketch of the Third Century. Chapter 28, p. 174. 
520 J. H. Newman,  “Religious Faith Rational”. (May 24, 1829).  Parochial and Plain Sermons. Vol. I.  
Sermon XV, p. 199.  
521 J. H. Newman,  Calista: A Sketch of the Third Century. Chapter 28, p. 174. 
147 
 
to here. Rather, it is the commanding character (‘Do this: don’t do that’”) of all the 
dictates of conscience whatever be their specifics, which manifests to the “heart” the 
Person within who is dictating. The feeling of the heart which the conscience gives rise to 
and which conveys the impression of a person commanding is not due simply to its 
dictating a specific course, as such. It is due to its uniquely and peculiarly commanding 
character, whatever be the practical judgments of conscience. The feeling, associated 
with this basic and general sense of duty, is such as to suggest unmistakably a Person 
commanding.  
     While it is the conscience commanding, the feeling it causes is exactly the feeling 
which a person who is a superior would cause when commanding. Callista recognizes 
that the dictate of conscience is a law of her nature (that is, the objective moral law), but 
it is not merely the law of her nature. It is “the echo of a person speaking to me.”522 
Callista declares that it is impossible for her to doubt that the dictate of conscience 
“ultimately” proceeds “from a person external” to her, though within.  
     Where lies the proof of this? What is the reason for this sure impression? The 
proof lies in the very garb or appearance of the dictate of conscience. It “carries with it its 
proof of its divine origin.”523 In what sense does it carry with it its religious appearance? 
God has created the conscience (apprehending the moral law) – this law of her nature – to 
look like him, to speak like him, to command what he commands and as he commands. 
The proof of this lies in the feelings that its utterances cause. “My nature feels towards it 
as towards a person.” That is, the feelings I experience are “just like that which I feel in 
pleasing or offending some revered friend.” When I obey, “I feel a satisfaction; when I 
disobey, a soreness”. It cannot be a mere “something.” It is indeed a mere “echo” – it is 
not the voice itself. But “an echo implies a voice; a voice a speaker. That speaker I love 
and I fear”.524  
    So Newman is not saying that in the dictate of conscience there is a simple 
intuition of God. Nor is the impression or idea of God therein a formal conclusion from 
premises, which is to say reasoning according to explicit logic. Rather, the feelings that 
the dictate of the conscience arouse are exactly what a person external to the subject 
would arouse. It is what is referred to in the Development of Christian Doctrine, and in 
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the Idea of a University, and what would be discussed in the Grammar of Assent. The 
“echo” appears to be a metaphor for the feelings of love and fear aroused by the dictate of 
the heart, which is to say the conscience. That “echo implies a voice”, and that voice 
implies a speaker whom the subject loves and fears – it is an implication which is tacit or 
implicit, quite natural, normal and unmistakeable. The feelings betray an unmistakable 
perception. 
 
           Callista is passionate in speaking about Him, so real is He to her. This presence in 
her heart and conscience is “more real to me than the sun, moon, stars, and the fair earth, 
and the voice of friends.” What is to be noticed is that there is more to this than the 
simple dictate of the conscience, baldly considered. She ardently desires converse with 
Him. “O that I could find Him” – and so her nature, her natural quest for love, is driving 
her search. In this sense Conscience involves a quest, a desire525 – for love, that is met 
and answered by the One speaking in her Conscience. “That speaker I love and fear”. Yet 
her knowledge of this Person within, this Person so precious, is pitifully vague. He is 
near, yet elusive:  “On the right hand and on the left I grope, but touch Him not.” She 
loves Him and needs Him, yet He causes fear and perplexity within her and remains 
beyond her reach. “Why dost Thou fight against me? - why dost Thou scare and perplex 
me?”526 There is the sense that she fears Him because of His greatness and mystery and 
also because, on her own admission, at times “I disobey” Him.  
It is especially her love and yearning for Him in the action of her conscience that 
comes through so vigorously. The God within is her “First and only Fair”. Importantly, 
she could “worship” no one but Him – “shall I say that He whom I see not, whom I seek, 
is our Jupiter, or Caesar, or the goddess of Rome?”527 As we shall see in the next chapter, 
this puts us on to an important clue as to the meaning and purpose of the Natural Religion 
that is implied by the Conscience. It enables a person to recognize the God of Revelation. 
The gods of other religions are not recognized, and are rejected as not being of the 
character of the God of Conscience. Importantly, there is now the note of a God of love: 
him “I love and I fear.” Callista is certain that the One whose word echoes in her 
                                                 
525 For more on (Newman and) Conscience as the desire for God because of his presence within, cf. W. E. 
Conn, “Newman on Concsience” in Newman Studies Journal, Vol. 6, no. 2, 2009,  pp. 15-26 (National 
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conscience is God, and she has derived from her conscience an image of Him, as a 
medium of worship. “I will sacrifice to Him alone”.  
    Her brother says timidly, “It's like the demon of Socrates”,528 as if Socrates' 
daimonion was the nearest instance to this in classical testimony, though far surpassed by 
the explicitly personal form of Callista's “inward guide”. Newman is not saying that the 
testimony of the conscience of Callista is or is not common, but he is saying that it is 
natural. It is within the scope and reach of nature. Obviously, the action of grace is 
critical. Callista warns Polemo that this “invisible Monitor” is our future judge, for he 
will “have something to say to all of us, to you, at some future day”. At this, Polemo, in 
what seems a panic, beat his hasty retreat with his miserably intellectual religion.529  
        This scene expressing Callista’s testimony could be seen as the most succinct 
picture ever drawn by Newman embodying his doctrine on the testimony of conscience to 
the being and nature of God, enabling the God of Revelation to be subsequently 
recognized. Callista represents the person who genuinely attends to the dictate of 
conscience without replacing it with some substitute. Here in 1855, though, there is a 
greater emphasis on the sense of a loving Person speaking in the conscience. Callista is 
not a detached observer of the intimations of her conscience. Her nature passionately 
seeks union with and knowledge of the inner Guide – whose inner presence she 
unmistakably feels. To such a person as Callista, conscience reveals the presence within 
of a Voice, a speaker, an inward guide, a divine Person and future Judge, the God to be 
worshipped and to whom one sacrifices, yet withal a revered Friend, the First and only 
Fair who is both feared and greatly loved.  
          It is of interest that Callista shows that she loves the God within, more than she 
fears Him. The truly personal character of the inward Monitor is very clear, clearer than 
before in Newman’s thought. This inner Monitor evokes love.530 He is a Friend, more of 
a Guide and revered Friend than a Lawgiver and future Judge, though He is certainly that 
                                                 
528 Ibid.   
529 Ibid.  
530 This loving character of the God of conscience seems clearer in Newman’s accounts of the conscience 
during his Catholic years – while continuing a stress on God as Judge. It is present in the Grammar of 
Assent (“we certainly have within us the image of some person, to whom our love and veneration look, in 
whose smile we find our happiness…” p. 101). It may be relevant that the Catholic Newman developed a 
great devotion to St Francis de Sales, the most prominent doctrine of whose writings was the love of God. 
One wonders if Newman’s early Calvinism (with its stress on the utter sovereignty of God) involved a 
deficiency in his sense of God’s tender love. Perhaps, by way of Catholic reaction, this was succeeded by 
his emphasis on love in his account of nature’s perception of God and of the teaching of Revelation itself.  
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also. The indicator of this are the peculiar feelings of conscience. They involve, contain, 
indicate and prove the presence of God commanding from within.531 
 
3.3.2.   Conscience as the foundation (1856-1864) 
The vividness of the apprehension of God in the Conscience, as presented in Callista, 
accounts for an unexpected facet of the apprehension even of the objective world. That is 
to say, so powerful and real is the sense of the God of Conscience, that for Newman it 
guarantees the validity of his natural perception of the world by means of the senses. 
More basically still, as we shall see, the intimations of conscience involve a kind of 
revelation of God – one that is intimately connected with one’s very sense of self. 
 
     3.3.2  (a)     Conscience and the apprehension of the world (1858) 
     As has been referred to already, Newman had made mention of this consideration 
a quarter of a century earlier in his first book, The Arians of the Fourth Century (1832).532 
In knowing God by means of the conscience, the mind is provided with a guarantee of the 
reliability of its apprehension of the world. What is to reassure the knowing subject that 
his faculties of apprehension are trustworthy? The God whom conscience knows with 
such immediacy is apprehended to be a moral God. It is he who vouchsafed to man his 
powers of knowing, and the conscience perceives the moral character of the God who 
speaks within – God would not allow a radical deception of the subject by implanting a 
deceiving faculty. On this basis, man’s apprehension of the world is reliable. 
      This is what Newman affirms in a letter to Frank Scott Haydon: “I assume then 
the being and presence of a Moral Governor of mankind, and I look at everything which 
comes to me as coming from Him”.533  The basis of this assumption is the testimony of 
the conscience. Philosophically – so Newman thought – it could not be automatically 
assumed that man’s apprehension of the world (by means of the senses) is a faithful 
reflection of it. What did reassure him, Newman tells Haydon in the same letter, is the 
                                                 
531 Several of Newman’s ideas, as expressed in Callista, recur in his Sermons Preached on Various 
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532 J. H. Newman (1833),  The Arians of the Fourth Century. Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, no. 4.  
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apprehension of God’s moral, holy and loving character provided by the conscience. This 
keeps him from scepticism.   
“This sense of God’s presence is the only protection which I have had (though an 
abundantly sufficient one) to keep me from unlimited scepticism. I expressed it 
in the first book I wrote, 26 years ago. In my work on the Arians, after speaking 
of the apparent unreality of all phenomena, I went on to say, ‘Though, on the 
mind’s first mastering this general principle, it seems to itself at the moment to 
have cut the ties which bind it to the universe, and to be floated off upon the 
ocean of interminable scepticism, yet a true sense of its own weakness brings it 
back, the instinctive persuasion that it must be intended to rely on something, and 
therefore that the information given to it, though philosophically inaccurate, must 
be practically certain, a sure confidence in the love of Him who cannot deceive, 
and who has impressed the thought of Himself and of His will upon our original 
nature.’534 – Where by ‘practically certain’, I mean, ‘practically sufficient for 
speculative certainty.”  
          Newman refers to other publications too. The sure apprehension of God by the 
conscience enables the subject to rest assured in the reliability of his knowing powers and 
therefore in the reality of the world as he apprehends it, for they are a moral (and loving) 
God’s creation and gift. This shows the power and vividness of the perception of God 
described so copiously in Callista. It is confirmed in the following letter to Ward. 
 
 3.3.2. (b)   Conscience the revelation of God  (1859 - to W.G. Ward)535 
          A year after his arrival back in England from Dublin, Newman received from 
William George Ward a draft of his coming publication, Nature and Grace. Judging from 
Newman’s reply to him, and from Newman’s entry of November 7, 1859 in his 
Philosophical Notebook,536  it seems that Ward recently wrote to Newman suspecting 
him of thinking that moral obligation depends simply on God’s command as expressed in 
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the conscience – and not on its inherent nature and truth.537  In his reply of 26th 
November, 1859, Newman gives an important summary statement of his position on the 
conscience. It is that “conscience involves the revelation of a God commanding”.538 This 
succinctly sums up the testimony of Callista about the God whom she feels to be 
speaking to her in the dictate of her conscience.  
It may be noted here that a few years later in a letter to an Anglican correspondent 
he writes in the same vein. “I do not think that any religion, as such, in the individual is 
without what may be called revelation – I mean that God reveals Himself to us directly, 
and we believe in ‘Him’ because he says ‘I am He’ to us whether it be through our 
conscience, or through Scripture or in any other way…” 539 
So then, Conscience is the revelation of a God commanding. But, as Newman 
continues in his reply to Ward (November 1859),540 it being a revelation of God 
commanding “does not oblige me to say that moral obligation depends simply on that 
command.” Rather, “I believe it to depend not solely on the command but on the nature 
of God.” What does Newman mean here? The ultimate basis of the law which conscience 
apprehends is the ethical character of God himself. That is to say, what the conscience 
commands is a truth, not merely because it is perceived to be a command of God. God 
acts, creates, speaks and wills in accord with, and because of, his moral nature. This is 
why the law (apprehended by the conscience), coming from his creative action, dictates 
what is right and wrong.  
                                                 
537 Wilfrid Ward in William George Ward and the Catholic Revival  (London: Macmillan. 1893) writes:  
“The lectures on Nature and Grace, based on the philosophical course at St. Edmund’s, were, 
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of further correspondence with Newman. Ward sent the volume to Newman before it was 
published, for suggestions and criticisms. One point - of interest in its connection with Mr. 
Ward’s later controversies with Mill - was the analysis of the apprehension of the Moral Law 
in Conscience. Mr. Ward strenuously protested against those thinkers who found in God’s 
command the final analysis of Right and Wrong, and he was at the outset disposed to attribute 
to Newman some sympathy in this view.” (p. 216). 
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   I have only said that my conscience is to me a proof of a God, just as a shadow is a proof of a 
substance. The shadow does not depend on the mere arbitrary will of the substance for its shape, 
but on the nature of the substance.  No illustration is exactly parallel...”. 
539 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXI, p. 122 (to R H Hutton, 18 June 1864). 
540 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XIX, p. 247 (to W G Ward, Nov 26, 1859).  
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    But there is a second detail to be noted in Newman’s explanation to Ward, and it 
is expressed in an illustration which he offers, throwing light on the sense in which the 
conscience is said to be a “proof” of the existence of God. The “immediate shape” with 
which the dictate of conscience comes to me is not that of a divine truth but of a divine 
command as well. It is a question of its immediate shape – and “the immediate form need 
not be the ultimate basis.” He then provides an illustration: “I have only said that my 
conscience is to me a proof of a God just as a shadow is a proof of a substance. The 
shadow does not depend on the mere arbitrary will of the substance for its shape, but on 
the nature of the substance. No illustration is exactly parallel.” The proof of the presence, 
and therefore the existence, of God that is provided by the conscience is that the dictate of 
the conscience is a reliable manifestation of him. Conscience, as apprehending the moral 
law, is like the shadow of a person, or to use another analogy, it is like the echo of a 
voice. The person whose echo it is, or whose shadow it is, could only be God.  
 
          In a letter to Ward about a week later, Newman mentioned that he had been 
considering what intellectual tasks he ought take up. He was in no mood for controversy, 
but two subjects had been in his mind: “1. An Argument for the Being of a God  2. A 
refutation of the doctrine of myths as applied to the Christian History.” On reflection, he 
is thinking “of leaving history for speculation”.541  In fact, it would especially be the 
question of the possibility of religious assent (as a certitude) that he would devote 
himself, using as his stimulation the letters of his friend, William Froude. The question of 
Assent was a burning one, and many – such as Froude himself – thought that absolute 
certitude was impossible. 
Newman’s attention turned to this fundamental question, and it meant that his 
preferred argument for the being of a God (from the conscience) was not explored to its 
full length sufficiently for publication. However, we do have his thoughts as they appear 
in his Philosophical Notebook, to which we now turn. They delve with more detail into 
what he had written on the subject in the Development, the Idea of a University, and 
Callista.  
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3.3.2. (c)   “Proof of Theism”: Conscience as a “Proof” of God.  
           On November 7, 1859 – a few weeks before the above-mentioned 
correspondence with Ward – Newman began a new section in his Philosophical 
Notebook, entitled the “Proof of Theism.”542 There is no doubt in Newman’s mind as to 
what is his preferred argument for the being of God, nor has he any doubt as to its 
validity – though he can see that the work of vindicating it is difficult. It is not that there 
is moral obligation because there is a God, but that there is a God because there is moral 
obligation.543 The fact of objective moral obligation is plain and indisputable, and 
because there is objective moral obligation, there is a God. What is involved in this step 
from the apprehension of moral obligation to the apprehension of a God? It goes this 
way. 
          “I have a certain feeling on my mind, which I call conscience. When I analyse this, 
I feel it involves the idea of a Father & Judge – of one who sees my heart &c. &c.” 544  By 
“a certain feeling on my mind” Newman is not denoting a mere feeling. He is referring to 
the abiding apprehension of objective moral obligation with its personal impact on the 
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    It may appear to some readers that there was an influence on Newman coming from Kant (and his 
categorical imperative). There was none. When corresponding on August 17, 1884, with W.S. Lilly about 
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developed what he drew from Butler.  The lack of influence by Kant on Newman may be indirectly 
indicated by references to Kant’s work in W. G. Ward’s 1843 review of John Stuart Mill’s A System of 
Logic. This long critique of Mill appeared in the British Critic of October 1843 (“Art III. – A System of 
Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods 
of Scentific Investigation. By John Stuart Mill. 2 Vols. Parker: London”).  In the footnote of page 958, 
Ward observes that, regarding Kant’s “general system”, he himself “has indeed no sufficient knowledge of 
it, extensive or intensive (as Kant would himself say), to warrant any opinion, beyond the very ordinary 
one, that his works are very difficult reading. Of course, his avowed scepticism makes great caution in 
reading them a plain duty.” Now, inasmuch as Ward was very much a disciple of Newman at that point and 
part of his Oxford circle, it suggests to me that Newman too had little familiarity with Kant.  
    Kant placed the emphasis on the imperative of duty, and this imperative duty is justified by a universalist 
criterion: can it be made absolutely universal? Newman is in the line of Aristotle and Butler. A true duty is 
imperative, but the right perception of this will depend on a person’s virtue – which manifests and depends 
on fidelity to a right conscience. There must be a right moral ethos if duty is to be rightly apprehended. It is 
the virtuous man who will know what is right. He will also have the ethos of mind to be naturally religious.    
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mind and heart. It is the feeling that involves and manifests the heart’s perception. It is a 
feeling that involves “the idea” of God. The response that is involved in this apprehension 
is exactly that which one has in apprehending a “Father & Judge” – that is, “of one who 
sees my heart” and who is very personal. Broadly, we are back to Newman’s insistence 
on the feeling of conscience, but we must not understand it to be a mere sensation as if 
unconnected with the apprehension by the mind of an objective though inner reality. 
          Newman is analysing what is a case, normally, of implicit reasoning. It is not a 
case of a simple intuition of God. Of course, an attention to implicit reasoning cannot be 
attributed exclusively to Newman. For instance, in the Preface of his The Rise and 
Progress of Religion in the Soul, Philip Doddridge writes that  
“some sense of sin …. must indeed be necessary to dispose us to receive the grace 
of the gospel, and the Saviour who is there exhibited to our faith; but God is 
pleased sometimes to begin the work of his grace on the heart from the first 
dawning of reason, and to carry it on by such gentle and invisible degrees, that very 
excellent persons, who have made the most eminent attainments in life, have been 
unable to recount any remarkable history of their conversion” 545 (my italics).  
So this action of the reason can occur very early, implicitly, and as involving the 
action of grace. 
       In his later unpublished paper on “Assent and Intuition” – to be dated probably in 
1860 – Newman explains that “By sensations I mean those impressions upon the mind, 
which are not sensible, yet are passive. Such is the coming and going of pure memory, of 
sense of conscience, right and wrong, of the sense of beauty, of shame..” 546 So the “sense 
of conscience, right and wrong,” is among “sensations”. It is “not sensible”. It being 
“passive” implies an impression on the mind of, and created by, something objective – 
such as objective moral obligation, which is real and objective but apprehended 
interiorly. It is not an external thing, as it were, out there. 
 
     His “Proof of Theism” jottings (Nov. 1859) continue the analysis. Having noted 
this “certain feeling on my mind” (implying a sense of God, “Father & Judge”), Newman 
moves to the direct awareness of my own being that it also involves. “I am conscious that 
                                                 
545 P. Doddridge, The Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul. Preface, p. 12.  
546 J. H. Newman, The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty / selected and 
edited by J. Derek Holmes; partly prepared for publication by Hugo M. de Achaval S. J.; with a note of 
introduction by Charles Stephen Dessain. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1976,  p. 63. 
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I am.”547  There is a clear awareness of self: “I am conscious of my own existence.”548  
This perception involves no trust in anything – the being (that is, the existence) of oneself 
is absolutely evident to one’s consciousness. Nor does this involve faith or trust in, say, 
one’s own consciousness, nor in one’s sensations such as my sensation of pain. I am 
conscious that I am precisely because I am conscious that I am thinking, whatever be the 
mode of thought or sensation.  
          In this particular sense Newman accepts Descartes’ dictum, cogito ergo sum. The 
“ergo” in this proposition does not denote a deduction, which might imply faith in the 
reasoning process or an advance from one premise (that I think) to a conclusion (that I 
am).  Rather, precisely in my act of thinking of which I am directly aware, I am aware 
that I exist. The one and same awareness of my thinking, and of my existence as one who 
is thinking, is expressed subsequently in two propositions (“I think” and “I exist”). My 
thinking is the mode in which my existence is known to me. The internal world (of my 
thinking and of my own being) is known, then, by a form of intuition. 
       This cannot be said of one’s awareness of the external world – so Newman thinks. 
He distinguishes the certain intuition he has of his own existence, as necessarily bound up 
with his various thoughts and sensations, from the knowledge he has of the external 
world through the senses. The senses, of themselves, do not give us, so he thinks, a 
philosophically unassailable and certain intuition of the reality of the external world. But 
there is a true and certain intuition of my existence involved in equally certain modes of 
thought and “sensations”, which are manifestly real. So there is a sense in which the 
direct data of consciousness (of myself and my thoughts) are more trustworthy than the 
impressions gained by the senses, such as the existence of external matter. What Newman 
is doing here is going to the being of God from internal (yet objective) realities perceived 
directly, rather than external ones perceived less than absolutely directly.  
         In respect to external realities, we have seen in earlier contexts the basis on which 
Newman is assured of the validity of his perception of the external world. It is especially 
because of his knowledge of (the moral) God apprehended by the conscience, the reality 
and holy character of whom guarantees the broad validity of one’s powers of perceiving  
                                                 
547 J. H. Newman, “Proof of Theism”, p. 1. In The Philosophical Notebook. Part II (The Text), p. 31. 
548 This consciousness of self was a notable natural feature of Newman’s mind even from his first days at 
Oriel, early in 1822. The “untowardness in him was increased by a vivid self-consciousness” – and this led 
certain of the Fellows to ask Whately to take him in hand. “Autobiographical Memoir”, ch. 3. AW, pp. 65-
66. 
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the world. God as Creator of my powers of perception would not deceive me – for he, as 
conscience testifies, is a moral God (because he commands what is moral). Let us note 
one point here – it assumes a perception of God as Creator. We shall turn to this very 
shortly. 
          Newman has shown that the certain apprehension of one’s own being is involved in 
the mind acting in several of its modes, such as the mind remembering, feeling, 
reasoning. Well, there is another act of the mind conveying an unmistakable sense of 
one’s own being. It is the conscience, which Newman here describes as the 
discrimination of acts as worthy of praise or blame.549  “Conscience”, Newman then 
explains – as he has explained elsewhere – can refer to one’s habitual awareness of 
rightness or wrongness in things, or it can refer to one’s judgment that this or that, in 
particular, is right or wrong. The former perceives the element of a binding duty in a 
certain course of action, the latter judges what particular course of action, in the 
concrete, is the duty.  
          It is the former aspect of the conscience which Newman considers to contain and 
prompt the inchoate sense of God and lead to religion. The “feeling” of conscience here 
primarily refers to this basic abiding imperative, the sense of duty. Newman’s 
concentration on the basic sense of duty (present in but) distinguishable from the practical 
ethical judgment identifies an inner experience to which all persons can relate, even if 
their practical moral judgments profoundly differ. If it is commonly agreed that there is 
something absolute or sacred about my sense of duty, we have here, for Newman, a 
common starting for an argument for the existence and nature of God.  
So then, it is especially the sense of right and wrong under a special sanction 
which suggests the thought of a God commanding. This is the sense that something must 
be done, under pain of sanctions. As we have mentioned elsewhere, this seems especially 
to approximate to the medieval synderesis.  This sense of a law commanding, threatening 
and implying a future, is the natural foundation of the implicit sense of God. Its character 
is such as to seem to come unmistakably from a “Father & Judge”. Importantly, this sense 
of a sanction on the rightness or wrongness of an action, is part of myself – and everyone 
has this feeling. It is not separate from me, as are the external objects of the world. It 
accompanies each and all everywhere, even though its practical and specific bearing on 
action will vary greatly among persons.  
                                                 
549 J. H. Newman, “Proof of Theism”, p. 8. 
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          Further and significantly, this feeling of conscience is bound up with, and conveys 
to me, the fact or idea of my own existence just as certain other “sensations” do. Newman 
begins with the awareness of his own existence. “I should begin thus. I am conscious of 
my own existence”.550 This is where he begins. Of this “I am directly aware,” and the 
reason is given: “I am conscious that I am precisely because I am conscious that I am 
thinking” – and one of the modes of thought is the conscience. As we shall now see, this 
sense of personal existence, present in the act of conscience, is the basis of a sense of the 
Creator – who, in the conscience, is perceived as “Father & Judge”.   
 
          Well then, whence comes the apprehension of God as Creator? After all, being the 
Creator would seem to be the distinctive feature of God as God – and in this account, it is 
God who is apprehended in the conscience.  Newman had often referred to the primary 
sense of myself and my Creator. He writes that “from a boy I had been led to consider 
that my Maker and I, His creature, were the two beings, luminously such, in rerum 
natura”.551 Can we date this being led “from a boy” to a sense of his own self in the 
presence of his Creator? Yes, we can. It occurred sometime in 1806 or 1807 – because 
Newman tells us so. “God put it in my heart, when 5 or 6 years old, to ask what and why I 
was”.552 Plainly, this was not the conclusion of a philosophical proof, mastered during 
childhood. It appears as the fruit of implicit and natural reasoning, aided by grace. I 
regard this notation as most significant. 
          How is it, then, that (in Newman’s account) I may have a primary and abiding 
sense of myself and my Creator to whom I am responsible?  The instinctive and natural 
sense of one’s own existence is present within one’s own act of thinking – including that 
act of thinking which is the conscience. It would not take much to perceive one’s self as a 
thinking person distinct from other things (that is, what I am) and to infer one’s existence 
as transient and contingent (and, therefore, why I am). The self is easily made conscious 
of the fact that it need not be, but is. One then sees (or may see), by a tacit and implicit 
act of reason, that one is essentially given – for the simple and obvious reason that one 
                                                 
550 J. H. Newman, “Proof of Theism”, p. 1, in The Philosophical Notebook. Part II (The Text), p. 31. 
551 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 202 
552 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 223. The statement on p. 202 of the Apologia (“from a 
boy I had been led to consider that my Maker and I, His creature, were the two beings, luminously such, in 
rerum natura”) surely leads us to interpret the notation on p. 223 of the Autobiographical Writings (“God 
put it in my heart, when 5 or 6 years old, to ask … why I was”) as referring to his dawning sense of having 
been created, rather than to a sense of  his call to union with God and a future destiny in heaven. 
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need not be. Why, then, am I? This question, with its intimated answer, could come 
precisely in that act of thought (containing the sense of personal existence) which is the 
conscience. Now, these steps are not intuited, but inferred.   
          Newman does not spell this out in his “Proof of Theism” notes, but it seems to be 
assumed. These tacit, instinctive and implicit steps of the reason upon apprehending the 
radical contingency and changeability of one’s own existence, take one to the sense of 
Something that is the Cause or Creator of oneself. The idea of a Creator being thus 
suggested as a result of this reasoning, the feeling and conviction of one’s contingent 
existence (present in the conscience, as in any mode of thought) is abidingly explained.  
          Thus there is a natural and implicit sense of oneself and one’s Creator – without 
there being as yet a reflex process of strict philosophical demonstration. That might come 
later. Further (as Newman explains in his Sermon of July 21, 1833), where there is also a 
sense of the passing and ephemeral nature of external things in one’s life, the two 
foremost realities in one’s mind become oneself and one’s Maker (sensed as present in 
the Conscience).553 
          As just explained, this abiding sense of oneself and one’s Maker was long present 
in Newman, clearly before his formal analysis of the logical evidence of its validity. In 
the chapter on Newman’s 1816 conversion (ch. 2) reference was made to the similarity 
between Beveridge and Newman’s instinctive approach to God as Creator – and, 
therefore, to Beveridge’s early influence on his possession of this basic belief. In his 
explanation of the revealed doctrine of God as Creator of all, Beveridge directs that I go 
“into the closet of my heart, and there begin to look within myself, and consider what I 
am”.554 Then comes the decisive consideration: “in that I think, I am sure I am; and in 
that I am, I am sure there is a God; for if there  was no God, how came I to be?” 555 (my 
italics). Beveridge is presenting not merely the dogmatic teaching of creation in the 
Creed, but a way of appreciating it. It is a way of inference to God from limited, caused 
and contingent being, and the perceived contingent being in the first instance is oneself – 
sensed in any act of thought.  
                                                 
553 This would seem to be the intellectual step described in his sermon (his first of the Oxford Movement) 
of 21 July 1833, “The Immortality of the Soul”. Sermon II. Parrochial and Plain Sermons. Vol. I. 
Westminster Md: Christian Classics, Inc. 1966,  pp. 18-21. The contingent and transient character of the 
world thus plays its part in one coming to the “clear vision” of God the Creator, perceived as present in the 
conscience. 
554 W. Beveridge, Private Thoughts on Religion and a Christian Life in two parts.  Introductory. 
555 W. Beveridge,  Private Thoughts on Religion and a Christian Life in two parts.  Article 1. 
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         Though Beveridge is referring to a dogma and not to a process of mere implicit 
reasoning, it is plain that Newman’s natural and instinctive sense of God was along this 
line. As explained just above, the question, how came I to be? arose in the child when he 
was but five or six. He was led to ask “what and why I was”.556  It was a question about 
his own self – what he was. It was prompted by his sense of self within the process of his 
very thought – perhaps in that mode of thought which was his dawning conscience. Then 
came the obvious question: why he was. Newman, then, had a very early intimation of his 
Creator – and doubtless it was to his Creator that he felt responsible. That is to say, his 
moral sense as a young child would have been naturally connected to his early sense of a 
Creator, who was “felt” (because of the action of conscience) to be a “Father & Judge” 
and Friend. It looks as if the early questions as to the contingent existence of his own self 
(suggesting that he was created) arose within or were deeply connected with his 
imperious sense of moral obligation. 
        At various points Newman makes it clear that for “so long” he had naturally 
considered that “Nature was a parable”,557 that external things were but a veil. He, “from 
a boy” had “been led to consider my Maker and I, His creature, were the two beings, 
luminously such, in rerum natura”.558 This, as just said, began to occur when he was five 
or six. In fact, it was the basic religious event of his childhood in terms of natural 
awareness (aided by grace) – and it seems to have been often overlooked by 
commentators. He was led to a sense of two primary realities, the first (his own self) was 
intuited and the second (his Creator) was sensed by implicit, tacit, instinctive reasoning 
from the contingency of his own personal existence – rather than that of external things. 
In his case, this came early. There were “two and two only absolute and luminously self-
evident beings, myself and my Creator”.559 (italics mine).                 
          The “Proof of Theism” notes seem to presume the sense of a Creator. They 
analyse his character as revealed in the dictates of conscience. How is the “feeling” of 
conscience – of being subject to the law of moral obligation – to be described? What is it 
like? It is like (“analogous or similar to”) that which we feel “towards a person whom we 
                                                 
556 J. H. Newman, “Early Journals: Original Notes”.  Autobiographical Writings, p. 223. 
557 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 27 
558 Ibid., p. 202. 
559 Ibid., p. 4. 
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have offended”, a “father or revered superior” whose approbation or displeasure is both 
the cause and the “object of the feeling”.560  
 
          At an earlier stage of our study, the significant sermon of May 24, 1829, 
“Religious Faith Rational” was noted and analysed.561 The knowledge “that we exist” and 
of the “Power whom we are bound to obey” was highlighted.  
“Indeed, when we come to examine the subject, it will be found that, strictly 
speaking, we know little more than that we exist, and that there is an Unseen 
Power whom we are bound to obey. Beyond this we must trust; and first our 
senses, memory, and reasoning powers; then other authorities: - so that, in fact 
almost all we do, every day of our lives, is on trust, i.e. faith”.562   
We see here Newman’s account of what is basically known. I know I exist – suggesting 
an implicit reasoning to the Cause of one’s existence, one’s “Maker”. We also know the 
“Power we are bound to obey”, implicitly reasoned to from the basic, immediate and 
common sense of duty. A Creator is implicitly and naturally reasoned to from one’s 
awareness of personal existence, which itself is part and parcel of one’s awareness of 
duty. There are thus two obvious beings, oneself and one’s Creator, and one’s Creator  
comes through (because of the sense of duty) as a Father and Judge. 
 
For Newman, conscience involves, by implication, a perception of Something 
objective. This is implied by the objectivity of the moral law apprehended by the 
conscience (the “law of conscience”). He is absolutely rejecting Hume’s assertion that all 
this is illusory and is but a subjective sentiment. In his Notebook probe, Newman 
examines the testimony of various classical authors, passages in literature and current 
authors, and Callista’s own striking testimony to Polemo. He also allows that the reason 
of science must complete the idea thus gained.563  
          Traditional Thomistic epistemology begins with the mind’s natural perception of 
the external world and understands that, included in this, is the awareness of one’s own 
self as apprehending it. The way to God is based on this.564 Newman chooses to begin 
                                                 
560 J. H. Newman, “Proof of Theism”, p. 14.  Philosophical Notebook,  Vol. II,  p. 60.   
561 Thesis, 3.2.2. (a)   Conscience and knowledge of an “unseen Power” (1829)      
562 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain  Sermons. Vol I, Sermon XV, p. 193.  
563  J. H. Newman, “Proof of Theism”, p. 14.  Philosophical Notebook,  Vol. II,  p. 60 
564  In his Summa Theologiae (Prima Pars, question 1, article 9, Respondeo), St Thomas Aquinas writes: 
162 
 
with what he thinks is more immediate, yet no less objective for all: the apprehension of 
objective moral obligation, with its awareness of personal, contingent existence (with its 
implicit sense of a Creator) and of the One who commands. This may be of greater appeal 
to an audience increasingly sceptical of the objective validity of man’s perception of 
external reality. This sense of an imperative moral law, which as a mode of thought or 
sensation brings home to me (as included in it) my own existence, involves an inchoate 
recognition of an objective Being commanding within the sense of moral obligation. The 
natural sense of unexplained personal contingency therein, points to the creating Cause – 
and this Creator is obviously the Obliger who comes across as “Father & Judge.”  
          So then, this recognition of God as “Father & Judge” comes close upon my 
recognition of my own existence as contained within the sense of duty – and is thus an 
especially clear, immediate and  unassailable perception, much more so than anything of 
the external world (so Newman thinks). While the senses take me out to the external 
world, the feeling of conscience – or the apprehension of the moral law with its 
concomitant sense of self – is immediate to me, as is any thought or sensation. In this way 
there are, in all the universe, two beings, my self and (by quasi-immediate implication) 
my Creator, who are especially immediate to me. “Thus the line is broad & deep between 
the reliance on reason or conscience and upon the trustworthiness of the impressions of 
the senses or the reality <existence> of matter. Hence the being of a God, arising out of 
what is internal, is an external fact different in evidence <proof> from every other 
external fact.”565 These two beings are the first and foremost realities of my 
consciousness, and impress themselves on me with an immediacy and reality not 
characteristic of any other beings.  
          This interior path to God is very characteristic of Newman, as he shows later in 
the Apologia and other writings – which we shall soon consider. He chooses to interpret 
St Anselm’s way to God from the very idea of God to his objective reality as being at 
least akin to his own. This allusion to Anselm was mentioned (in Section 3.3.1.a) as 
appearing in his correspondence while in Rome.566  It recurs here, years later, in his 
                                                                                                                                                 
It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons 
with material things. For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. 
Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible  objects, because all 
our knowledge originates from sense. 
565 J. H. Newman, “Proof of Theism”,  p. 6. 
566 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol XII, p. 33  To J.D.Dalgairns  Collegio di Propaganda. Febr 
14/47 
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“Proof of Theism”. He writes – “St Anselm’s argt. [9qu. that our thinking implies the 
fact])”.567 
 
     3.3.2. (d)  The Apologia  
          Soon after the “Proof of Theism” entries in the Notebook, Newman published his 
Apologia (1864), and the thinking of the Notebook is evident in the references to the path 
from conscience to God.  
“… and if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe 
in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact 
I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a 
Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience”.568  
Newman’s belief in his own existence involves a belief in the existence of God. Does this 
not look like a passing from the contingent and unexplained character of his own 
existence to the necessary existence of the Cause – the Creator – who is God? This 
inference occurs within that process of thinking that is the conscience, for the conscience 
also conveys a sense of one’s very self (which is contingent and transient). What 
conscience conveys, with its sense of contingent self, is that the Creator abides therein – 
and he has a certain profile. The intimations of the Conscience reveal the presence of the 
Creator (who sustains one’s existence) – but One who speaks of moral obligation, and 
who does so as “Father & Judge”. It is thus, with this character, that he reveals himself. 
He is a moral God. 
          Later in the Apologia Newman writes that “Were it not for this voice, speaking so 
clearly in my conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist … when I 
looked into the world.” 569  So, as has been said earlier, there is “my conscience” and 
there is “my heart” – the “heart” being the core of the self, presumably, and the 
“conscience” being the self’s power to apprehend moral obligation and moral realities. 
The heart apprehends God by means of the conscience, and God abides in the soul (or 
heart) by means of the conscience. 
The claim in the Apologia that the being of God is known by the Conscience is 
notable for its powerful and convincing expression. Its clarity and conviction in 
                                                 
567 J. H. Newman,  “Proof of Theism”,  p. 2a. 
568 J. H. Newman,   Apologia pro Vita Sua. Chapter 4, Section 2, no. 5, p. 206. 
569 Ibid., Chapter 5, p. 250. 
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statement, together with its coming from one who was admitted on all hands to be a man 
of integrity, lucidity and penetration, has been persuasive for very many. This is despite 
his admission that “I have not expressed myself with philosophical correctness, because I 
have not given myself to the study of what metaphysicians have to say on the subject”.570 
It is very much his own proof of theism as he has not studied others much on it – as he 
makes plain in the Notebook.571  Also, he has difficulty in putting “the grounds of that 
certainty into logical shape … in mood and figure” to his satisfaction.572  Nor, so it 
would appear, has Newman yet arrived at a publishable proof in his private notes on a 
“Proof of Theism.”  
 
     3.3.2. (e)    Observations  
   We may ask, prior to turning to the Grammar of Assent, what is now to be said of 
Newman’s search for the foundations of the idea of God prompted by the conscience?  
There is one critical step here – it is the identification of the dictate as not merely the 
moral law apprehended by the mind, but as God’s law, manifesting the presence and 
action of an objective personal Power whom we are bound to obey.   
As already narrated, on November 7, 1859 (in “Proof of Theism”) Newman 
begins his considerations by stating that “I have a certain feeling on my mind, which I 
call conscience. When I analyse this, I feel it involves the idea of a Father & Judge – of 
one who sees my heart &c. &c.” There is also the unclouded conviction that the “Father 
& Judge” is objective. It is not the projection of a personal, subjective construct or image.  
There is the perception of an objective Something (and not just a subjective sentiment as 
Hume would have it), and there is the perception of Something of a certain exalted 
character. 
          Now could not the intimation of conscience suggest something else to someone 
who is not religious, or someone from a profoundly different culture? In January 1859 
Newman began his entries in the Philosophical Notebook. On February 24 1859, in his 
                                                 
570 Ibid.  Chapter 4, Section 2, no. 5, p. 206. 
571 “Such is the argument for the being of a God which I should wish, if it were possible, to maintain. It has 
been my own chosen proof of that fundamental doctrine for thirty years past – as the extracts which I have 
made pretty well show. 
       I am led to it, not only by its truth, but by its great convenience & appositeness in this day …”  
J. H.  Newman, “Proof of Theism”, p. 18, in The Philosophical Notebook, Part II (The Text), p. 67. 
572  J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  Ch. 5, p. 250. 
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section “Elements of Thought”,573 he writes that ideas are not simply innate: “the soul 
would not think without some external stimulus.” He is noting the objectivity of what is 
known, but that what is known may be interior: “as soon as it is roused, it reflects upon 
itself, and thereby gains a number of ideas, quite independently [--] <of the>external 
world”.574  These ideas are grasped with great “intimateness” and directness.  
          On the next page he makes an interesting observation about “what we know, more 
directly and substantially by sensation. The idea of God being suggested, we discern in 
the suggestions of conscience His command. Also we gain at the same time the notion of 
justice, and that He is just”.575 This point of “the idea of God being suggested” seems to 
imply that the idea of God is a suggested explanation of the “suggestions of conscience.” 
That is, because the idea of God – having been “suggested” (by oneself or from 
elsewhere) – explains the character of the dictates of conscience, they are discerned as his 
command. The dictate, as a result of this suggestion, is understood to be God’s command 
and the echo of his voice.  
          This would be a normal intellectual step, especially if the idea of God continues to 
explain fully and exactly the interior phenomenon of the conscience and its dictates. After 
all, is not this how science itself operates and advances? But could not a person have 
something else “suggested” as the source of the dictate, and, on the basis of his 
convictions and past experience, be satisfied that it accounts adequately and permanently 
for the dictate of conscience as he experiences it?  Could not the explanation be, say, 
one’s early conditioning, or one’s social environment and culture, or the yearnings of 
one’s subconscious?  
          Newman appreciates this possibility because he explores various passages of 
classical and current literature that support his own view. He is looking for evidence from 
non-Christian sources. He is also aware that the doctrine of a Creator and Moral 
Governor is excluded or even denied by “aboriginal populations and widely spread 
populations. Neither the educated Chinese nor the Australian savage has a name to denote 
the God of Christians, Jews, and Mahometans”.576 He is aware of the work being done on 
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the far-away Australian Aborigines. On April 26, 1860, he asks whether the feeling of 
conscience “as involving a Personal Governor is peculiar e.g. to the Anglo-Saxons. Have 
the Germans it? have the Chinese?”577  
     In a footnote to this, he explains, “I have a feeling in my mind, which, as soon as I 
have occasion to recognize my feeling towards a parent or kind superior, I find 
interpreted by it.” 578 So the point of a suggested explanation, appearing in his “Elements 
of Thought” earlier in the same year, makes its appearance here too in the later “Proof of 
Theism”. My feeling toward a kind superior explains the feeling of conscience (as an 
hypothesis might explain or interpret a certain fact). It explains it immediately and 
permanently without any further doubts. That it explains it permanently (in one’s own 
life) is something known to the individual, and it is confirmed by the fact that so many 
others seem to think this, in some form. This is a common intellectual process in 
everyday life. 
          This seems, then, to function as does any “hypothesis” in the advance of human 
understanding: it answers the problem, and it answers it permanently, and it answers for 
most people. It emerges as the best answer (to the subject, and to numerous other persons 
and societies) and is never thenceforth in doubt. It seems, in Newman’s account, to be a 
natural and instinctive interpretation. Conscience is the voice of God for the ages. It is, 
furthermore, entirely supported by a host of other intellectual considerations. One 
wonders, though, whether a person of very different ethos and beliefs and culture – even 
whole societites and cultures such as the modern secular one – may find that a feeling 
towards something else interprets the dictate of conscience also. But this, of course, is the 
whole point of Newman’s stand on ethos – a right ethos supports and enables a right 
judgment and interpretation.  
          Newman writes of the feeling of conscience that it “is just what we feel in pleasing 
or displeasing a father or revered superior. So that contemplating and revolving on this 
feeling the mind will reasonably conclude that it is an unseen father who is the object of 
the feeling.”579 Newman is certain of what he perceives in the dictate of conscience, but it 
may look to an unbeliever that God is basically an hypothesis which to one person 
accounts for the feeling of conscience, but which to him is no more persuasive than a 
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different hypothesis. It seems to me that this is a basic question about Newman’s 
argument. Does Newman’s argument from “the law of Conscience” presume theism and 
theistic supports? On the other hand, Newman might say that the idea of God (as a father 
and judge) is the natural and instinctive thought which explains to the mind the “feeling” 
of conscience. It is its natural interpretation – such that the one who resists, discounts or 
lacks this interpretation is (because, perhaps, of his ethos) presuming a non-theistic basis 
to such phenomena. That person’s problem is his assumptions – which is the very charge 
he levels against Newman. 
          We must bear in mind the very important point made earlier that Newman’s long 
abiding sense, from the early age of 5 or 6,580 of a Creator seems to underpin his 
instinctive apprehension of a “Father & Judge” as implied by the conscience. It is the 
Creator, implied by a perceived personal contingency in being, who comes through in 
and because of the conscience, as a “Father & Judge”.581  
           Newman does not, incidentally, dispense with other proofs from reason582 – he 
maintains that Conscience teaches some attributes of God in which many more are 
implicit, and afterwards others are deduced by reason.583 As has been said, in his early 
childhood he seems to have apprehended the elements of a Creator. These basic elements 
of thought in the conscience provide an idea of God which brings God home to the 
subject as a living moral person. Newman observes that “Certain philosophers say that 
the first element [act] of thought is not a simple apprehension, but a judgment. What I 
have said here agrees with this idea.”584 Other rational arguments, though, are then 
needed to develop the idea coherently.  
All up, while in these private considerations of the Notebook and subsequently in 
the Apologia Newman shows how a person may gain a religious idea of a God 
commanding, if we are to understand Newman’s way as convincing, it seems that we 
must take account of an implicit reasoning to the Creator from the sense of one’s own 
(contingent) existence. This sense of personal (contingent) existence is present in the 
“feeling” of conscience – which is to say the entire apprehension of moral obligation. 
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There must also be in place the right moral ethos of the subject and his perception of 
antecedent probability if the feelings of conscience are to imply the Being of a God of 
this character. We shall explore the role of conscience in ethos and probability in sections 
2 and 3 of the next chapter. But granted this, the point here to notice is that the 
conscience involves a “revelation of a God commanding.”  
           There is no doubt that Newman is absolutely sure of his position, a position 
repeated throughout his life from before his Tractarian days, even if he is struggling to 
show its probative force to unbelievers. There is a remarkable consistency in his account 
over the decades, which he perceives he has difficulty making convincing – because of 
common secular assumptions. In his correspondence Newman occasionally refers to his 
life-long preference for this proof – because of the universality and importunity of its 
starting point, which is the sense of moral obligation. On 13 April, 1870, he writes to 
Robert Brownlow that for forty years the argument from design had not seemed to him to 
be probative (my emphasis). He accepted that the unbelieving class of the century did not 
accept the conscience either. It resolved the conscience into a taste of some kind. 
Nevertheless, Newman believed that the conscience was accepted by great numbers as 
being the interior sense of an objective moral law, and he was convinced that this leads 
naturally and validly to God.585 The perception by the conscience of the moral law as a 
dictate coming from a Person requires, though, right instincts, and these depend on a right 
moral disposition. A right state of mind, or virtue, will germinate right principles – and 
this is how the mind is meant by its Creator to function.   
          One can certainly see similarities between Newman’s approach and that of certain 
others of his era. An obvious earlier British parallel is Samuel Taylor Coleridge.586  
However, Newman rarely if ever acknowledges a debt to others for this preferred way to 
God from the testimony of the Conscience – despite his acknowledgement of debts in 
other matters. On the contrary, as has been mentioned before, he states that he has lacked 
this support. In his letter to John Campbell Shairp587 (after the appearance of the 
Grammar with its open presentation of the way to God via the Conscience), he is 
delighted that Shairp urges the view of conscience. He himself has not the time for wide 
reading because of his busy pastoral life, so he cannot determine the extent to which his 
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preferred path is held also by others.  But he has long felt alone in his insistence on the 
conscience.  
“To my perplexity, I have not fallen in with those who have sympathised with me 
in it. I mean, I have not found those who considered it as much an act of reason 
to believe in God as revealed in Conscience as to believe in Him as revealed in 
physical nature. For myself (without denying the argument from final causes), 
my reason would not lead me to Him from the phenomena of the external 
world.”588  
          Incidentally, it seems from this remark that Newman thought that commonly the 
argument from “physical nature” was “the argument from final causes”. In any case, his  
argument from conscience he understands to be his own, presented with absolute 
conviction yet with little obvious support. Newman’s way is not that of intuition – he 
allowed that many do not draw from the law of conscience these conclusions. In his 
sermon notes for July 24, 1864 (“The Pharisee and the Publican”) Newman extols the 
prayer of the Publican as containing the essence of true religion because it involves the 
“conscience as leading the mind to God” (Newman’s emphasis). So God is not intuited. 
All men have a conscience of right and wrong, he observes – which is to say, a 
conscience that accuses them. But it does not lead them to God. Rather, they are angry 
with themselves.589  This is the point he made in his Lectures on the Idea of a University. 
People know they are wrong and they are distressed, but it does not lead them to God. At 
most they understand a sin against their neighbours. The Publican understood that his 
wrongdoing was an offence against God. This step once taken, much more issues from it.  
     Newman does not explore in the sermon on the Publican why this step is 
philosophically valid as a step from nature and apart from revealed teaching. To one 
correspondent he writes that the mere fact of the being of a God is not of itself a mystery. 
Rather, “it is one of the most natural and obvious of all conceivable ideas.” 590 However, 
as he writes to another, one cannot prove the “doctrine of the Divine Being … except to 
minds under certain principles”.591  So a true “proof” for someone is only possible if 
certain starting points are granted, and if a person is properly disposed. For himself, “as 
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my writings show, I have never based the belief in a God on any argument from merely 
external nature, but simply as implied in the fact and deducible from the existence of 
conscience”.592 His own argument for God, then, has never been based just on (“merely”) 
external nature, but based simply on the conscience.593 But a mind must be “under certain 
principles” if the existence of God is to be proved to him.  
     As he explains in his letter to Louisa Simeon on June 25, 1869, “We have the idea 
of duty – duty suggests something or some one to which it is to be referred, to which we 
are responsible.”594 He observes to her that the conscience, by its very nature, is more 
closely connected with religion and God than the intellect. If religious truth can be found 
it lies not primarily by means of mere reasoning (comparing, classifying, inferring), but 
by the fulfilment of duty. “To gain religious starting points, we must in a parallel way, 
interrogate our hearts, and (since it is a personal, individual matter,) our wn hearts, 
interrogate our own consciences, interrogate, I will say, the God who dwells there”.595 
 
3.4.    Final Expression 
3.4.1.    A Grammar of Assent (1870) 
In a sense, the Grammar of Assent was a long time coming. It is the fruit of long 
consideration. Soon after it appeared, Newman wrote that  
“I have been writing it (it is not against Rationalism)596 this thirty or forty years, 
and never succeeded. I attempted it in my Oxford University Sermons - stopped 
after the first of these upon it in 1832, managed to get a little further in 1839 or 
thereabouts, and did no more. I have attempted it again more times than I can 
count, and have a pile of MS on the subject, in 1846, in 1850, in 1859, in 1861, 
in 1865 - but I could not get on - it was like tunnelling through the Alps. 
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Therefore I have long said 'I have not begun till I have ended.'….. The beginning 
of my success dates from 1866 - when in Switzerland.....and my first pages stand 
pretty much as I wrote them in August 1866”.597 
          In view of his attempts in private notes, in correspondence and in certain of his 
publications to explore the passage from apprehension of the moral law by the conscience 
to the apprehension of God, it is interesting to observe his account of this in the Grammar 
of Assent. An obvious step that had not been explored as fully as other matters (though 
referred to long before)598 is that made from the perception of a “Power” we are bound to 
obey to the recognition of this “Power” as the One who is absolutely supreme. In the 
Grammar this is explained by means of a comparison with our instinctive knowledge of 
the world. His description of how we gain a knowledge of the world (as a world) from the 
apprehension of particular things is meant to show how we gain a knowledge of the 
supreme God from the particular admonitions of Conscience.  
          Newman’s account goes like this. We know that individual beings surround us 
from “the phenomena which address our senses, and our warrant for taking these for 
evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence”599 of those individual beings. 
Newman is not prepared to say that these “phenomena” give us an “exact measure or 
character of the things” revealed by them. Rather, they provide “a certain 
representation”600 intended (by the Creator) for our powers of apprehension. Thus he 
distinguishes between the phenomena apprehended by our senses and our instinctive 
certitude (involving instinctive judgment) that they manifest real and objective things.  
          The pivotal factor is “our instinctive certitude” about the things we thus know – 
even though we do not argue or formally reason from the phenomena to the reality of the 
thing before us. In virtue of the phenomena, we instinctively know and judge that there is 
this specific thing before us, and we know its character by the phenomena which are 
impressed upon the mind.  This applies also to “intellectual and moral objects” – such as 
the writings of Cicero or Dr Johnson, of St Jerome or St Chrysostom. The objective 
reality of such objects is known instinctively, and that they are “such and such, we know 
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by the matter or quality of the impression”.601 Newman is giving an instance of 
perceptions involving certitude that are not the result of formal evidential reasoning. He 
is also distinguishing between the phenomena of a thing and the instinctive judgment that 
this particular thing is there. While he is not explicitly declaring that this kind of 
perception involves implicit inference, he does mean us to notice that certitude may not 
require explicit inference. 
       Then there is the next step. From a “multitude of instinctive perceptions, acting in 
particular instances, of things beyond the senses, we generalize the notion of an external 
world”.602 The process of attaining a knowledge of the external world as a world is, then, 
inductive – although this is not a studied, meticulous or scientific induction. It is 
spontaneous, tacit, implicit, and barely noticed by the knowing subject. We implicitly 
generalize to a world from particular impressions of things. Then, once we gain a picture 
of the world, we picture that world “in and according to those particular phenomena from 
which we started”.603  We know with certitude that these things are part of the world. 
Once again, he has pointed to implicit, tacit reasoning that is in no way explicit and 
formal, but it involves certitude.604 That is Newman’s account for what it is worth, and 
we need not delay in analysing its epistemological validity. It is meant to serve as an 
illustration which he uses to describe how we know God, Ruler and Judge, from the 
phenomena of conscience. 
       Well, “Can I believe as if I saw?”605 Of course, the reality of God is not 
instinctively perceived by means of the senses through sensible phenomena – he is not 
seen in the way the things of this world are seen. However, Newman writes, there is a 
parallel. Just as the phenomena apprehended by the senses are instinctively identified 
with external things, so the phenomena (or intimations) of the conscience are instinctively 
identified with an external admonition (i.e., one that is not just a subjective construct). 
That external admonition causes them. Then from “the instinctive power of identifying 
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the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external 
admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge”.606 
     The phenomena of the conscience would seem to be its intimations as expressed 
in the feelings occasioned. So the foundation of the knowledge of God (as provided by 
the conscience) is the instinctive sense that the intimation of conscience is the echo of an 
external admonition. I am sure, absolutely certain, that in the intimations and dictates of 
conscience I am being objectively admonished, commanded and judged. It is just a little 
unclear whether Newman means by “an external admonition” simply the objective moral 
law and its specific and practical bearing (perceived as objective), or whether he means to 
include in this external admonition a sense of an external Monitor giving it. I take the 
instinctive apprehension of “an external admonition” to be, in that very apprehension, 
tacitly interpreted as that of an external Monitor – a Power one should obey.  
          Anyhow, the mind knows, just as surely as it knows the objective tree from 
apprehending the phenomena of its appearance, that there is an external admonition 
commanding the subject in and by means of the phenomena (the dictate) of conscience. 
This “external admonition”, apprehended in the conscience by means of its phenomena, 
is perceived as objective in character and implying a Monitor – just as the impression on 
the senses of certain phenomena is an indirect notice of something specific in the external 
world. Then, just as from numerous instinctive impressions of external things, known by 
the senses, we come to know (by implicit inference) the external world as a world, so 
from numerous instinctive impressions of external admonitions as known by the 
conscience (each with its certain sense of a Monitor), we come to know one supreme 
Ruler and Judge. This is the result, then, of a kind of tacit and implicit induction – 
gradual, spontaneous, ordinary. The reasoning is implicit and tacit, but certain. We must 
assume, however, that precisely because there is an implicit reasoning process to the 
thought of a Monitor, indeed a supreme Ruler, it is possible that one who is aware of the 
external admonition of conscience may not in fact pass through these (implicit or explicit) 
reasoning steps to the supreme Ruler. 
          This account of the passage from individual impressions of the conscience to the 
generalized apprehension of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, involving a form of induction, 
looks to be a somewhat new addition to his account which Newman provides in the 
Grammar – at least in its developed form.  Perhaps it is not all that important – he is 
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helping the reader imagine how, from the impressions we have of an external admonition 
in the intimations of conscience, we can gain an image of a supreme Ruler and Judge 
(who, in both Callista and the Grammar, is also a revered Friend). The Ruler and Judge, 
naturally identified as the Monitor behind the external admonitions of the conscience, is 
then understood as acting universally in all of its intimations.  
      Newman hastens to point out that he is not attempting here (in the Grammar) to 
prove the Being of a God607 – his direct aim here is to show how we can gain an image of 
him from the mere intimations of the conscience, and how we are able to give a “real” 
assent (rather than a notional one) to the proposition that God is an objective reality of a 
certain character.608  Newman is showing also how tacit reasoning can attain absolute 
certitudes.609 Newman is not setting himself the formal task in the Grammar of offering a 
strict proof for the Being of a God from the conscience (what a pity he did not!). But he is 
very certain that he would look for such a proof from this quarter. It is from the quarter 
from which we apprehend God not just as a notion but as a reality. Newman sees the 
roots of this idea of God not in a conclusion that explains the fact of the external world, 
but in a sense of God emerging naturally from the intimations of the conscience and the 
beginnings of thought – meaning by this, implicit reasoning.   
          An impression of God that has its roots here – though needing much more 
consideration and help from other quarters, of course – provides a sense of God as a 
living Person whom we know, love and worship.   Newman’s starting point is his 
assumption that “we have by nature a conscience”.610 He means by this the instinctive 
perception of (objective) “things which excite in us approbation or blame, and which we 
in consequence call right or wrong; and which … goes by the name of a good or bad 
conscience”.611 In “this special feeling” lie “the materials for the real apprehension of a 
Divine Sovereign and Judge”.612 That is to say, it is not primarily the conscience 
considered as a judgment or “rule of right conduct”, but conscience “as a sanction of right 
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conduct”.613 It is, typically, the good or bad conscience, instinctively known as involving 
“something beyond self.” It “dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its 
decisions”.614  
     For this reason Conscience is commonly referred to as “a voice,” or “the echo of a 
voice, imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our 
experience”.615 Its essential prerogative is of dictating and commanding, and it leads to 
“reverence and awe, hope and fear, especially fear”616 – thus involving “the recognition 
of a living object, towards which it is directed.” This “dictating and commanding” 
prerogative reminds us that the root of this impression of God is the edictal character of 
the intimations.  
         An especially Catholic feature – that is, as appearing so strongly (though not 
exclusively) during the Catholic years – is that it portrays the Ruler and Judge as being 
also a revered Friend.617 This was noted in Callista. The Grammar sets forth the feeling 
of fear as the “most prominent teaching” of conscience about God, and states that “its 
cardinal and distinguishing mark is that he is our Judge”. His “special Attribute” is that of 
“retributive justice”.618 However, as in Callista, so too in the Grammar the child’s 
conscience “kindles in him love towards Him”.619 It is “the image of One who is good”, 
and the child is “moved to love the Lawgiver, who enjoins” the moral law upon him.620 
The most important point is that these “feelings in us are such as require for their exciting 
cause intelligent being”.621 The cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible 
world, so their Object “must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of 
Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme 
Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is the creative 
principle of religion, as the Moral Sense is the principle of ethics”.622  
     It is important not to mistake what Newman is referring to here. The impression 
of God gained from the sense “that there is a right and a wrong, and its sanction to that 
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testimony conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or wrong conduct”623 is 
inchoate. It has been scarcely reflected upon, though it is very real and pervasive. 
Importantly, it is the basis of the recognition of what is then and later told to, say, the 
child: “he has that within him which actually vibrates, responds, and gives a deep 
meaning to the lessons of his first teachers about the will and providence of God”.624 This 
recognition results from what is already known.  
          That is to say, what conscience intimates about God enables a person to recognize 
and receive (with love) – indeed to desire and expect – what he is told about God by 
others. This repeats what has been suggested above, that an important basis for the 
acceptance of and assent to revealed teaching about God is what the person already 
knows of him from the conscience. Nature (as in the Conscience) has already intimated 
what is then confirmed, completed and fulfilled by, as we shall see in our next chapter, 
Revelation.  
          To understand Newman on this, we must take seriously the point that what 
conscience provides are but intimations.  A few years after the Grammar, Newman 
declared in correspondence that “the truths in the natural order …. which point to a 
system of things beyond this visible world, as the law of conscience, the sense of religion 
etc., are delicate, subtle, fitful, mysterious, incapable of being grasped, easily put down 
and trampled underfoot. The initial truths of science can take care of themselves – but not 
so those of religion and morals … Revelation then is the aid and the completion of nature 
on that side of it which is weak”.625 
      Newman recognizes that many will disagree with his analysis of the conscience, 
but this does not surprise him, for is there anything which is not denied by someone? 
Does he have sufficient support, he asks? Yes, for that “conscience is the voice of God 
has almost grown into a proverb.” It is a “solemn dogma” recognized by the mass of men 
of all classes, and proclaimed in the history and literature of the nations.626  
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3.4.2.    The Letter to the Duke of Norfolk (1875) and further correspondence 
In his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk,627 Newman gives what is virtually his last public 
statement on the testimony of the conscience to the being of God and his Revelation. The 
Letter to the Duke of Norfolk bears on the phenomena of the conscience and its 
implications for the sense of God early in the text and only in summary fashion – for this 
is not Newman’s interest here. Here he is arguing against Gladstone’s accusations 628 and 
vindicating official Catholic doctrine and theology on fidelity to the conscience in a life 
of obedience to Catholic teaching. In the process he also appeals to what non-Catholic 
Christians accept.  
          Newman does not begin his account of the conscience by describing its phenomena 
from the perspective of the individual – as in, say, his sense of an objective Power he 
must obey. He begins with the objective fact of God and the Law of his divine being.629 
That Law is implanted in human intelligence by God. Its being implanted in human 
intelligence suggests that, in certain of its basic elements, it is naturally and instinctively 
apprehended, because it is already there in the intelligence. “This law as apprehended in 
the minds of individual men, is called ‘conscience’”.630 So the intelligence or reason of 
man, as apprehending God’s Law, is “the conscience” – and the Law of God, thus 
apprehended, is the supreme rule of all of man’s conduct. Only in this sense is the 
conscience the voice of God and ever to be obeyed. Thus Newman’s famous remark, at 
the end of the section, that he shall drink to Conscience first and to the Pope afterwards631 
is an insistence that the basis of obeying the Pope is obedience to the Law of God which 
is apprehended in the conscience.  
          Newman dismisses any account of conscience which reduces it to a “creation of 
man.”632 He repeats points which he had made at greater length in previous writings, that 
it is the voice of God in the nature and heart of man, a principle within us before we have 
                                                 
627 J. H. Newman, A Letter addressed to his Grace the Duke of Norfolk on occasion of Mr Gladstone’s 
recent Expostulation. By John Henry Newman DD of the Oratory. London: B. M. Pickering. 1875.   
In John Henry Newman: Conscience and Papacy (Letter to the Duke of Norfolk). Edited with an 
Introduction and Notes by Stanley L. Jaki. Pinkney Michigan 48169: Real View Books. 2002. 
628 W. E. Gladstone, The Vatican Decrees and their bearing on Civil Allegiance: An Expostulation. 
London: John Murray. 1874. 
629 J. H. Newman, (1875). A Letter addressed to his Grace the Duke of Norfolk, “Conscience”, 2nd 
paragraph. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Ibid.  last paragraph. 
632 Ibid., 3
rd
 paragraph. 
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had any training, the internal witness of the existence and the law of God, and is distinct 
from all other elements of our nature.633 He observes that apart from the “intellectual 
world”, in “the popular mind” this has been largely replaced by a view that makes of the 
conscience a license to act according to one’s own judgment or humour. The Lawgiver 
and Judge is ignored.634  
          Gladstone had said in his runaway pamphlet that Catholics must in conscience 
obey a foreign ecclesiastical power. They cannot, then, be trustworthy subjects of the 
State, and the State is therefore at risk with sincere Catholics among its citizens. We shall 
not follow Newman’s argument here on this point as it is not to our purpose. However, 
the Letter provides a famous statement describing the prerogatives and the sovereignty of 
Conscience as the Voice of God, and contrasting this position with the modern secular 
view of the conscience as nothing more than a subjective feeling or arbitrary personal 
judgment.  
          In this statement a great point is made bearing on our subject. It sums up what we 
have seen on Conscience and belief in God, and with its allusion to Christ introduces our 
next section on Conscience and belief in divine revelation. For the Conscience, Newman 
writes,  
“is a messenger from Him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind 
a veil, and teaches and rules us by His representatives. Conscience is the 
aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its 
peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the 
eternal priesthood throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal 
principle would remain and would have a sway”.635   
          Soon after the publication of his answer to Gladstone, Newman wrote to Miss 
Holmes, and in it he referred to the role of conscience in the beginnings of religion. “The 
idea of a judgment is the first principle of religion, as being involved in the sentiment of 
conscience – and as life goes on, it becomes very overpowering”.636 We notice in this 
statement the emphasis on “the sentiment of conscience” – the feelings it involves, and 
the “idea” that is contained and expressed in those feelings. It is a feeling, but not just a 
feeling. There is involved in it the idea of a judgment, and this idea is such as to suggest a 
                                                 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid., 6
th
 paragraph. 
635 Ibid., 4
th
 paragraph. 
636 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXVII, pp. 226-227 (February 21, 1875) 
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Judge. When Newman speaks of “the idea” that is involved in the “sentiment of 
conscience”, he is speaking of the subject’s act of judgment. It is the judgment by which 
the subject apprehends the divine judgment on him. There is the idea, however vague, of 
a Judge. It is this which is “involved in the sentiment of conscience” – indeed, it is the 
cause of “the sentiment” and it is the “first principle of religion”. He writes a few years 
later to Baron Friedrich von Hugel that,  
“I consider first that (however we come by it) we have a natural conscience, and 
next that this conscience implies a Lawgiver, and that therefore it is not merely a 
moral sense, but a perception of a command - not the recognition of a fitness, but 
of a Divine Law.  Then I should go on to say, that of course conscience may be 
deadened and, to take an instance, a man may be in a state of invincible 
ignorance that cruelty is a sin, on the ground that the Vendetta, and other cognate 
notions are the custom of his country, and there was nothing to give him the 
opportunity of discovering his error.”637  
          It is initially from this knowledge of the natural yet divine law, apprehended by the 
conscience, that we gain our basic knowledge of God as Lawgiver and Judge – and this is 
the foundation of the real assent of religion. It is in light of this primary knowledge that 
the reason functions and interprets evidences before it. 
 
3.4. 3.   The questions of Ethos and Antecedent Probability 
Newman has defended religious faith because it is the assent of faith involving implicit 
reasoning which was so much under attack by Reason, which demanded strict evidence. 
He has given an extensive, powerful and persuasive account, but not, as has been 
observed, what most would call a formal demonstrative proof of God. He has been 
showing that a living certitude about God is not dependent on formal proof but can arise 
from implicit reasoning – and then able to be examined for the formulation of an 
evidential proof. He begins with the conscience and its sense of an objective admonition – 
and, implicitly, a Monitor. Gradually, due to the multiplicity of such peceptions, a natural 
impression is formed of a Supreme Lawgiver and Judge who is involved in each such 
dictate.    
                                                 
637 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXIX, pp. 13-14  (January 26.1879). 
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          The impression of an objective, external admonition conveyed in the intimation of 
conscience is tacitly, instinctively, yet clearly interpreted by the subject. This sort of 
mental process (a natural and instinctive interpretation of what is perceived) is common 
in everyday experience. But herein, at this step of implicit or tacit perception and implicit 
or tacit reasoning, lies the crux of the question. Could not someone else think, with good 
reason at least to himself, that some other factor is behind the intimation of conscience 
and causing these “sentiments” and impressions? Yes, of course, someone else may 
interpret the impression of an external admonition in a radically different manner. For 
instance, Hume (whose philosophy Newman once referred to as “simply a disgrace”638) 
reduced it to a subjective feeling.  
           This brings us to the question of the foundations of the interpretation or judgment 
the subject makes on the phenomena of the conscience. On what basis is the judgment on 
the meaning of the testimony of the conscience made? That is to say, where is the subject 
coming from and in what light is he making his interpretation? It is plain that the starting 
points of thought cannot themselves be “proved” by demonstration. Further, what is the 
appropriate process of reasoning on this fundamental moral phenomenon? For example, 
is formal proof involving strict demonstrable evidence required for certitude? 
          This brings us to the very important matter of the fundamental ethos that gives a 
preparedness to the mind and heart of the subject, and his consequent capacity to interpret 
the converging probabilities apprehended by the reason. These probabilities and their 
bearing constitute a duty for the conscience. The mention of probability also brings us to 
the manner in which Newman determined how personal certitude is attained from what 
are, formally speaking in terms of strict logic, but probabilities. These matters, together 
with the role of conscience in recognizing the God of Revelation, bring us to our next 
chapter, which is on the action of conscience in belief in Divine Revelation.  
 
                                                 
638 “If we were to ask for a report of our philosophers, the investigation would not be so agreeable; for we 
have three of evil, and one of unsatisfactory repute. Locke is scarcely an honour to us in the standard of 
truth, grave and manly as he is; and Hobbes, Hume, and Bentham, in spite of their abilities, are simply a 
disgrace.” J. H. Newman, “Catholic Literature in the English Tongue” section 3, no. 5. The Idea of a 
University Defined and Illustrated, Part II, Unniversity Subjects, III (1854-8). Westminster, Md: Christian 
Classics Inc. 1973, p. 319. 
181 
 
Chapter Four: Conscience and Divine Revelation 
 
Newman ‘gave up his whole life to the truth’ (Pope Pius XII, 12 April 1945) 639 
 
4.1.   Conscience and the Acceptance of Revelation 
   
4.1.1   Conscience and the conversion of 1816.   
We have traced the function of conscience in the natural belief in God. We have done this 
at some length because it is the foundation of everything. Our task at this point is to 
observe its function in the assent to Revelation – as Newman came to understand it. It 
was precisely this assent to Revealed Truth which was pre-eminently the attainment of 
his conversion of 1816 – and the principal end of the conscience. So by way of 
introduction to this new chapter in our historical investigation, let us briefly review that 
pivotal event of 1816, but now including more light on the action of conscience as 
Newman later came to perceive it. The role of the conscience as Newman understood it 
early in 1817 has already been discussed in terms of what he himself stated at the time.640  
What we are doing here is adding to the earlier account of the conversion Newman’s later 
thought on the role of the conscience in preparing for and enabling a recognition of the 
God of Revelation. 641  This Newman may have perceived at the time – at least implicitly, 
but we do not have his word for it in his extant correspondence.  
         As we saw, his religious childhood lacked “formed religious convictions” (about the 
Bible and Catechism which he knew well) till he was fifteen.642 When he “was fourteen” 
he derived “pleasure in thinking of the objections” to Revelation by rationalist authors 
such as Paine, Hume and “perhaps Voltaire”.643 In the later months of 1816 came the vast 
change. Newman “received” into his “intellect impressions of dogma, which, through 
God’s mercy, have never been effaced or obscured.”644 The foundation of this assent was 
                                                 
639 Pope Pius XII, Letter to the Archbishop of Westminster, The Service of Truth, on the Centenary of 
Newman’s Conversion. 
640 Especially in his correspondence with Mayers in January 1817, describing his conscience as a vigilant 
guardian. This was brought forward in chapter 2. 4. 8.  
641 For instance, as described and analysed in ch. 4. 1. 2 (b) and in ch. 4. 1. 4 (b). 
642 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 1. 
643 Ibid., p. 3. 
644 Ibid., p. 4.  
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faith in the word of Jesus Christ as contained in the Scriptures,645 and as encapsulated in 
the (Athanasian) Creed.646 
          Our question has been, what was the place of the “conscience” in this assent to 
revealed truth? In the Apologia’s brief account (written in 1864) of this event, Newman 
does not formally say that he came to his teenage assent to Revelation simply on the basis 
of his personal “conscience” – that is, as if his “conscience” acted alone and distinct 
from, say, the action of “reason” and other dimensions of the mind. As a matter of fact, 
Newman scarcely mentions his “conscience” in the Apologia’s brief account of his 
conversion to Christian truth – though it is clearly implied.647   
          His “change of thought”, we read, was due to “the conversations and sermons of … 
Walter Mayers” and “the books which he put into my hands, all of the school of 
Calvin”.648  It is abundantly clear from the Apologia’s few pages on this event, that 
during this process the young Newman was exercising his “reason” and the various 
powers of his “intellect” on very objective material – but he was doing so very 
conscientiously. Conscience is implicitly presented (in 1864) as a foremost feature or 
function of the intellect. The Reason was (in morally upright manner) recognizing the 
imperative character of the truth of revelation – which is to say, his duty to assent to it. It 
is precisely because of this that his “intellect” received impressions of dogma – as the 
Apologia expresses it.  
          As we saw in the chapter on his conversion (Ch. 2), Newman clearly saw his 
conscience as now sanctioning and guarding what had been revealed. His conscience, 
the youth hoped, would be “a faithful and vigilant guardian” of these “principles of 
religion”.649 While his ambition was, (as a good Evangelical), to be a “spiritual man,” a 
man of “spiritual feeling”, the duty before him, that which impressed itself upon his 
conscience, was not simply to be deeply “spiritual” as if in any sense, but first and 
                                                 
645 Ibid., p. 6. “From this time I have held with a full inward assent and belief the doctrine of eternal 
punishment, as delivered by our Lord Himself, in as true a sense as I hold that of eternal happiness” (my 
italics). Newman often referred to the doctrine of eternal punishment as a test case of one’s acceptance of 
Revelation. He shows in this sentence that he accepts this difficult doctrine totally on the word and 
authority of Christ. 
646 Ibid., p. 5. “.. I made a collection of Scripture texts in proof of the doctrine (of the Trinity)…before I 
was sixteen, and a few months later I drew up a series of texts in support of each verse of the Athanasian 
Creed.”  
647  It is implied in such statements as on p. 4, that “a great change of thought took place in me. I fell under 
the influences of a definite Creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma” Newman writes of 
Scott that “what I also admired in Scott was … the minutely practical character of his writings” (p. 5). 
648  J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 4. 
649  J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 30. To Walter Mayers. 
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foremost to live according to what God had objectively revealed, as expressed in 
Scripture and Creed. The personal conscience must ever treat Revealed Religion as 
august, sovereign, objective and dogmatic. It is in this sense that the “conscience” is said 
(at times) by Newman to be supreme. What is supreme is that which conscience 
apprehends, that which is its law commanding it, that which is its object, which is God 
and his revelation. The end of the natural conscience is “divine faith”650 in what God has 
revealed – perceived by the intellect as a duty.  
          But Newman’s later accounts of the conscience in its movement towards the 
assent to Revelation651 suggest that there had been another and very important function of 
the conscience. That was that it also served to prepare for and enable, under divine grace, 
the conversion of 1816. This was part of its sanctioning function. While Newman does 
not formally mention this in extant correspondence and jottings of this date, he may well 
have been aware of it.  
          I have proposed that Bouyer misinterprets the essence of Newman’s conversion, 
seeing the conversion as a striking recovery of the God who was sensed by his natural 
conscience. But Bouyer’s insistence on the recovery and prominence of conscience’s 
long-standing sense of God is important. It would seem that precisely during his crisis of 
1816,652 which is to say prior to the conversion proper of August to December,653 the 
God of conscience loomed with special effect in the boy’s life. This prepared him for the 
grace that was soon to come. We can interpret the course of events in this way because of 
Newman’s subsequent thought on the role of the conscience in preparing for the assent to 
Revelation – as we shall see in the coming sections of this chapter.654 Because of this 
                                                 
650  J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 4. 
651 We shall consider these later accounts – such as in the novel, Callista –  later in this chapter. 
652 There is no doubt that he had this pre-conversion crisis – it is clearly attested in his journals.  
653 Obviously, this dating must not be interpreted too strictly, as if elements of the crisis that occurred 
earlier in 1816 were not present while the boy was contemplating the message of Revelation brought to him 
by Mayers and his books. The crisis was, broadly, part of the process of his conversion inasmuch as it was 
its prelude. Present in this crisis was the thought of God his Judge, informing his accusing conscience. This 
natural apprehension by the conscience of God his Judge (a dimension of conscience recovered during the 
crisis) prepared him for the Gospel and helped him recognize the God of Revelation as One he already 
dimly knew. This role of the conscience in helping prepare for and recognize God in his Revelation has 
been alluded to in the previous chpater (3. 1. 4, and 3. 3. 1 (c)). It will be explicitly discussed in later 
sections of this chapter. We must refer to it here, anticipating what will be shown later, for my proposal is 
that it must have been part of the experience of 1816, even though there is no documentary evidence to 
show that Newman understood this at the time. In this way, Bouyer’s proposal does have a place in an 
account of 1816. 
654 For example, when we shall look at Callista, in 4. 1. 4 (b). 
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action of the God of his conscience, he acquired the ethos of mind,655 with the readiness, 
desire and expectation that was necessary for his conversion. As a result, the God of 
Revelation, presented by Mayers and his books of the school of Calvin, was recognized, 
sanctioned and accepted as the God whom Newman had known in his sense of duty and 
guilt, especially (but not only) during the crisis of 1816 preceding his conversion. What 
was the course of events here? 
          During 1816, while still at Ealing though his schooling had finished, and prior to 
his conversion, Newman became ill. His father’s business had crashed, and he was alone 
at Ealing school. It was, Newman later recorded, a time of teenage personal crisis. As 
mentioned earlier, on June 25, 1869, he wrote that his first great illness – a “keen, terrible 
one, when I was a boy of 15, and it made me a Christian – with experiences before and 
after, awful, and known only to God”.656  Regarding this process, a sermon delivered 
years later may help us. Preaching at the threshold of the Oxford Movement seventeen 
years later (July 21, 1833), Newman traces the typical process of a person moving away 
from the things of the world towards religious truth. He tells us that the “unprofitableness 
and feebleness of the things of this world are forced upon our minds; they promise but 
cannot perform, they disappoint us”.657 Thus “at length” this world “floats before our 
eyes merely as some idle veil”.658 The world loses its promise; it disappoints; it loses our 
trust; it disgusts; it fails in substance and is seen to be an idle veil behind which lies the 
true Reality. 
          This looks to have been the case with the young Newman in 1816. The supports of 
his teenage life were giving way (personal health, family security, support from nearby 
friends, etc) – including the elements of rationalist deism with which he had dallied 
during the previous year.659 The boy, in his crisis and desolation, had little that was real to 
rely on. His world, such as it was, began to be seen in its true character – it was but an 
“idle veil.” He needed realities on which to take his stand, for his life was crumbling. As 
well as this, his later correspondence (not the Apologia) refers to personal moral failure. 
                                                 
655 The very important role of a moral ethos will be looked at in 4.2. It doubtlessly played its part in 1816. 
656 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 268  (The Journal 1859-79) . 
657  J. H. Newman, “The Immortality of the Soul”. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Volume 1, pp. 19-20.   
(Parochial and Plain Sermons. Vols. I to VIII. Westminster Md.: Christian Classics. 1966-68). 
658 Ibid., “The Immortality of the Soul”. Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. 1, p. 20. 
659 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 3. 
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In later years of high spiritual maturity he refers to it in dark terms.660 It looks as if a 
powerfully guilty conscience began to be operative in the heart of the boy, and with it the 
menacing sense of God as his Governor and above all his Judge. Thus to a point, he 
began, “by degrees, to perceive that there are but two beings in the whole universe, our 
own soul, and the God who made it”.661   
          There is here a reference to “the God who made” the soul. In fact, the boy had, very 
early in his childhood, gained a sense of God precisely as his Creator. It had not been 
acted on much, but it was there. 662  I have suggested earlier that this sense of his being 
created may have been gained from a dawning sense of the contingency of his own Self, 
precisely within his awareness of moral obligation which was also an early awareness. 
He had thus gained a new sense of his “own soul” and “next of the presence of the great 
God in us, and over us, as our Governor and Judge, who dwells in us by our conscience, 
which is his representative”.663  This sense of God – his Maker, Governor and Judge, 
especially his Judge – Bouyer shows to have revived at the time of his conversion. But it 
was prior to what was strictly the conversion as described in the Apologia,664 and it 
decisively prepared the boy for it.  
          The elements of this sense of God, implied in the action of the conscience, had long 
been with him due to his naturally exceptional inner life – though not much acted on. In 
1816, a newly-heightened sense of the God of conscience preceded and decisively 
disposed him for his conversion to revealed religion as such. As a result of his inner 
collapse, it looks as if the young Newman was now far more chastened, humble and 
serious. The divine shadow was over him. He “was terrified at the heavy hand of God 
which came down upon” him.665 With a more purified moral temper, he was now open to, 
wanting and expecting a higher Reality that he would recognize as his Salvation. Because 
of his renewed apprehension of the God of his conscience, he was more morally equipped 
to recognize, sanction and accept the Gospel.  
                                                 
660 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 250. (December 15, 1859  “..O my God, that Thy 
wonderful grace turned me right round when I was more like  a devil  than a wicked boy, a the age of 
fifteen … Thou didst change my heart”. )  
661 J. H. Newman,  “The Immortality of the Soul.” Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol I,  p.20 
662 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 223. 
663 J. H. Newman,  “The Immortality of the Soul.” Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol I,  p. 21 
664 Of course, this was all part of the conversion of 1816, broadly speaking, but we are considering what 
was primary and essential to it, as described in the Apologia – which was Newman’s formal account of it.  
665 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 150 (Early Journals: Book I, “On my conversion … ) 
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          The young Newman does not formally mention this at the time, but these attitudes 
of the conscience feature in his later accounts – such as in Callista (as we shall see). In 
view of this, his moral self, now emptied of its vanities and pretensions and possessed of 
a better moral ethos, looked for and expected something purer and more real. His natural 
conscience, with its sense of his Maker, perceived as his Lawgiver and Judge, readied 
him for the Gospel, disposed him for it, helped him recognize his need for it and led him 
to expect and desire it. Precisely because of his conscience, he now had a temper or ethos 
of mind prepared for the Gospel. At his encounter with it, he recognized the God he had 
known but dimly. We must remember, though, that this is not to say that at this point the 
youth formally perceived these  particular roles which his conscience was playing prior to 
his assent to Revelation – although I suspect he did, at least obscurely.  
 
          So it was that the grace of “divine faith”, which was the heart of the conversion of 
the last months of 1816 (particularly September),666 completed and fulfilled the natural 
perception of the God of conscience which he had long possessed, and which had re-
emerged during the crisis that preceded his conversion. Because of the testimony of his 
conscience, his mind gained the ethos it needed, and with this a decisive sense of 
Revelation’s overwhelming likelihood and probability667 which clinched his moral 
perception of the reasons for its truth. The God of Revelation came to him with tidings of 
an altogether new life of truth and holiness. Nature thus prepared for his welcoming of 
grace. Grace built on nature, completed it and brought it to an altogether new level in the 
assent of “divine faith.” In this sense, the foundation of his assent in conscience to 
Revelation (that is, his conversion properly so-called) was the natural sense of a 
Governor and Judge in the dictate of conscience. All of this, of course, was sustained by 
grace. 
 
 
                                                 
666 In old age, Newman remarked on the profound change involved in this conversion of 1816. He wrote to 
Anne Mozley that “Of course I cannot myself be the judge of myself, but, speaking with this reserve, I 
should say that it is difficult to realize or imagine the identity of the boy before and after August 1816, as 
the memoranda, still undestroyed, describe him. I can look back at the end of 70 years as if on another 
person”.  (my italics). J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXXI, pp. 30-31. To Anne Mozley, Febr. 
19. 1885. 
667 We shall be considering the development of Newman’s thought on probability and above all the action 
of conscience in it in 4.3. Doubtless this played a part in the experience of 1816, without necessarily being 
noticed. 
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4.1.2    The Evangelical years and the acceptance of Revealed Religion 
As we have seen, Newman’s explicit Evangelical period lasted more or less till 1825, 
when, due to his pastoral contact with ordinary Christians, his deeper study of Scripture, 
and the influence of certain persons and authors, a few key doctrines began to fall 
away.668 A central emphasis of his in this Evangelical period – one that endured – was the 
natural sense of sin, especially when it came to the business of converting others. 
 
     4.1.2   (a)     The sense of sin and the acceptance of Revelation 
          In the previous chapter, it was shown that in his Evangelical sermons Newman 
discovered a sense of sin in man’s natural sense of guilt. Implied in this sense of sin is a 
natural sense of an offended God. But as has also been shown, the Evangelical tradition in 
which Newman began his life of Christian conviction and in which he began his work as 
a busy parish curate, commonly understood the sense of sin as leading a man to accept 
the Gospel. The Gospel brought the forgiveness of sin. We see this in Newman. 
Obviously, what we are now looking at is closely linked to material examined in the 
previous chapter.  
          For instance, in his unpublished sermon of 29 August (1824) on the Pharisee and 
the Publican,669 Newman speaks of the sense of sin and the realization of the divine 
mercy. The Pharisee represents the man who, while professing belief in Revelation, is not 
at rights with God. This is because his conscience is blind to his sinfulness. By contrast, 
the Publican, alive to his sinfulness and need for mercy, “put off all dependence on 
himself and came as a lost & penitent sinner to the throne of grace - and thus was 
preferred by an heart searching God”.670 In the figure of the Publican we see the broad 
point that the conscience, enlightened as to its guilt before God, opens the sinner to God 
and his pardon – which is to say, to the divine revelation of mercy. The conscience of the 
                                                 
668 It is to be remembered that the “doctrine” of his election to eternal glory (final perseverance), picked up 
at his conversion of 1816, began to fade away in 1822 (Apologia, p. 4. The World’s Classics ed.) 
669 J. H. Newman, “Parable of the Pharisee and the publican” (Consulted Whitby, Scott, Pearce, 
Dodderidge, Horne, Trapp) Luke xviii, 9 & 10 - Sermon 13, no. 15 (B.O.A., A.17.1, pp. 18), 29 August 
1824.   
A copy of the manuscript of this sermon is given in the first sermon of Appendix A.  
 In John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Volume V.  Sermons preached at St Clement’s Oxford, 1824-
1826 and two charity sermons, 1827, ed. from previously unpublished manuscripts by F. J McGrath FMS,  
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2012, p. 76.             
670 J. H. Newman, “Parable of the Pharisee and the publican”.  Manuscript sermon, p. 9.  (sermon 1 of the 
Appendix).    Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 79. 
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Pharisee, blind to its guilt, trusts in itself. In these contrasting figures we see exemplified 
that the conscience is a powerful means of apprehending and assenting to the God of 
Revelation. But the precise role of conscience here is not stated nor analysed.   
           Newman’s cited Scriptural commentators for this early sermon are Evangelical, 
including Scott and Doddridge. That the acceptance of revelation is founded on the sense 
of sin is a notable feature of the autobiographies of Newton and Scott. It is prominent in 
the conversion tradition of Whitefield and, before him, of Calvin. The very first page of 
Scott’s Force of Truth671 – a book which went through twelve editions in Scott’s lifetime, 
and which Newman had been discussing with Pusey not long before his sermon on the 
Pharisee and the Publican672 – presents the absence in Scott of a sense of sin prior to his 
sixteenth year. It was only when he became conscious that he was a sinner, and therefore 
under threat of the judgment, that the long and uncertain process of his conversion to 
Revealed Religion (which is to say to the doctrine of the Trinity) began. The same can be 
said of John Newton.673 The Reformed tradition strove to instil in the conscience a sense 
of sin, as the first step in coming to accept the Gospel. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, 
in a much later sermon as a Catholic, Newman will see in this prayer of the Publican as of 
“the essence of true religion”.674 
          The following month the point is repeated. In his sermon of October 24, 1824 – 
the first part of which is based largely on Thomas Scott – Newman writes that it is only 
Christianity which provides relief for the sense of guilt. That Newman is speaking here of 
the natural conscience is clear because he is discussing the conscience seeking relief for 
its sense of sin from the various (non-Christian) religions. “I may look in vain to every 
other religion for relief of my apprehensions and uneasiness. – Some of them will profess 
to lead me to Heaven, and some perhaps to prepare me for it – but not one of them 
                                                 
671 T. Scott, (1779). The Force of Truth: an Authentic Narrative.  Boston: Published by J. Belcher; S. T. 
Armstrong. 1814.      Internet archive at December 12, 2013: 
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=h4sBAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_
r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false     
672 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings, p. 199.    
673 J. Newton (1764),  An Authentic Narrative of Some Remarkable And Interesting Particulars in the Life 
of (the Rev. John Newton) Communicated, in a Series of Letters, to the Reverend T. Haweiss.  
Printed for S. Drapier, T. Hitch and P. Hill. (3
rd
 edition), 1765.     Internet archive on 9 December, 2013: 
http://www.archive.org/details/anauthenticnarr00newtgoog 
674 J. H. Newman, Sermon Notes of J. H. Newman 1849-1878.  London: Longmans, Green & Co., p. 187. 
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provides a remedy for anxieties arising from this consciousness of sin. But the cross of 
Christ gives me that confidence of acceptance I so much desire”.675  
          Mention was previously made that Newman had at this time been reading John 
Bird Sumner’s Apostolical Preaching. In both this book and in his The Records of 
Creation, Sumner stresses that the “basis” of the Christian religion (italics mine) is the 
fallen, degenerate state of man.676 The sense of sin, which is a natural sense, is 
fundamental to the appreciation of the Gospel, and if there is no sense of sin, a person’s 
acceptance of Revelation is suspect. If man sees that he is a sinner, which is to say if his 
conscience is enlightened as to his sins, the door has been opened for him to proceed to 
the acceptance of and assent to Revelation. A couple of years later Newman declares of 
the naturally perceived fact of sin that “the whole system of the Christian faith depends 
on this doctrine, since it was to redeem man from deserved punishment that Christ 
suffered on the Cross.”677 
          By the following year the necessity of a sense of sin for belief in revealed dogma is 
being explained in greater detail. In his sermon on “Secret Faults” on June 12, 1825 
Newman writes that “it is in proportion” to our knowledge of our sinful condition that we 
shall grasp the meaning of an Infinite Governor and Judge, the blessing of the redemption 
and sanctification that comes with the removal of sin. In order to have a “real holding” of 
the doctrines of revelation – the forgiveness of sins, a new birth, a right idea of a Moral 
Governor and Saviour – “it is necessary to know our sinful hearts.” This is because “God 
speaks to us primarily in our hearts. Self-knowledge is the key to the precepts and 
doctrines of Scripture...” 678 The “heart” would appear to be especially the conscience in 
its primary awareness, for it is the person who is aware of his sinfulness who is equipped 
to really “hold” the doctrines of Revelation. It is the heart, conscious of sin, which hears 
and interprets God speaking in Scripture. “This is the only practical interpreter of 
                                                 
675 J. H. Newman, “Christ has redeemed us from the law”, in P. Murray, OSB (1991), John Henry 
Newman: Sermons 1824-1843, edited from previously unpublished manuscripts.  Vol. 1, p. 320. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
676 Newman was also reading on the broader evidences of Christianity. For instance, on September 7, 1824, 
Newman notes that he has finished John Bird Sumner’s Evidences (Letters and Diaries, Vol. 1, p. 190).   
J. B. Sumner, The Evidence of Christianity derived from its Nature and Reception. London: Printed for J. 
Hatchard, 1824 edition. 
As Archbishop, Sumner, though Evangelical, dealt impartially with various church parties until his death. 
677 J. H. Newman, “The Philosophical Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel” (July 2, 1826).  
Sermon 1 of Fifteen sermons preached before the University of Oxford between A.D. 1826 and 1841.  
Westminster Md.: Christian Classics. 1966, p. 13. 
678 J. H. Newman,  “Secret Faults”.  Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol I, Sermon 4.  
Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1966, pp. 42-43. 
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Scripture doctrine. Without self-knowledge you have no root in yourselves 
personally..”679 When the guilty conscience is ignored, sins become secret. We cease to 
know our sinful hearts, the sense of sin fades and with it a true knowledge of the precepts 
and doctrines of Scripture. Conscience as a natural sense of sin is the “only practical 
interpreter” of revealed religion.   
 
     4.1.2  (b)  Conscience and the acceptance of Scripture miracles  
          As was discussed in the previous chapter, in July of 1825 Newman started reading 
various writers on miracles, including David Hume. His article on “The Miracles of 
Scripture” for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana was completed in April of the following 
year (1826).680 His aim was to determine how the miracles portrayed in Scripture can 
“with propriety” be referred to a divine agent. The article, then, concerned assent to a 
feature of Revelation, namely the miraculous actions of the God of Revelation, 
considered as its evidence. He defends belief in Revelation by recourse to the conscience. 
          The discussion of Newman’s article on Miracles in the previous chapter (3.1.4.) 
was concerned with highlighting its mention of the conscience as the means of attaining a 
natural knowledge of the God who is Governor of the moral system of the world. This 
dimension of natural experience, the knowledge of the moral law attained by the 
conscience, was ignored by Hume. That analysis of the article was not focussed on the 
connection of the conscience with the knowledge of and assent to Revelation. But of 
course, the real point at issue was precisely evidence of a divine Revelation. The point we 
must stress here in this chapter is that, on the basis of an intimation of the moral character 
of God obtained in ordinary moral experience, the recognition of the God of Revelation 
who is active and manifested in the miracles of Scripture is made possible. The God who 
is active and revealed in Scripture miracles is recognized. This recognition is possible 
because he is already known in moral experience – and this is so because of a similarity 
in moral character. In the miracles of Scripture there is recognized the same signature of 
                                                 
679 Ibid., p. 55. 
680 J. H. Newman, “The Miracles of Scripture compared with those reported elsewhere, as regards their 
nature, credibility, and evidence.” Published in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, 1826. Essay I in Two 
Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles.  London: Longmans, Green, and Co.  New Impr., 1907. 
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the One whose dictates are expressed in the intimations of conscience. The dynamic is 
one of recognition. Of course, this is buttressed by other evidences.681 
          So then, Newman’s emerging approach as an Evangelical is to bring to light the 
natural knowledge of God in the sense of sin and in the perception by the conscience of 
nature’s moral system, and to show that with God thus known naturally, the God of 
Revelation is then recognized. It is a matter of recognition – the process of recognition 
being assisted and prepared for by other “evidences”. 
                   
4.1.3       Newman’s High Anglican position (1829 -1834)         
While our Evangelical curate at St Clement’s stresses the sense of sin, he also stresses the 
disposition of obedience to conscience as necessary for the acceptance of Revelation. It 
constitutes and forms an ethos necessary for the assent to Revelation.682 This point 
becomes pronounced as time passes.  
         As was discussed previously, on May 24, 1829 he preached his Sermon “Religious 
Faith Rational” – on the reasonableness of religious faith.683 Newman presents the 
rationalist objection against accepting Revelation:  
“But it may be objected; ‘True, if we knew for certain God had spoken to us as 
He did to Abraham, it were then madness indeed in us to disbelieve Him; but it is 
not His voice we hear, but man’s speaking in His name. The Church tells us, that 
God has revealed to man His will; and the Ministers of the Church point to a 
book which they say is holy, and contain the words of God. How are we to know 
whether they speak truth or not? To believe this, is it according to reason or 
against it?’” 684 
          Newman allows that this is a “very large and weighty question” but not, he 
asserts, “generally speaking, a very practical one”.685 That is to say, in practical terms, the 
decisive factor that will lead a person to believe in divine revelation (and specifically that 
                                                 
681 This appearance of recognition as part of the function of the conscience enables us, with other 
appearances of it in Newman’s writings, to attribute to it a role in the conversion of 1816. The natural sense 
of God the Judge played its part in a recognition of the God of Revelation, presented to Newman by 
Mayers and his books.  
682 We shall look more carefully at ethos in the next section of this chapter. 
683 J. H. Newman, “Religious Faith Rational”. Sermon XV. Parrochial and Plain Sermons. Vol. I.     
Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1966,  pp. 190-202. 
684 Ibid., p. 197. 
685 Ibid. 
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the Bible is inspired by God) is not primarily the weight of external evidences that can be 
produced in proof of it. What will matter most in practical terms is a person’s own 
religious and moral spirit – which is to say, his active desire to obey God. The real 
reason, by and large, why the unbeliever does not accept the word of Scripture as coming 
from God is because he does not want to accept it, and this is because he does not want to 
obey God.   
          That is to say, the fundamental obstacle to the acceptance of Revelation (as 
expressed in Scripture) is the unwillingness to submit to God and his will, and this has its 
origin in one’s response to the intimations of the conscience.  
“For ourselves, let us but obey God's voice in our hearts, and I will venture to say 
we shall have no doubts practically formidable about the truth of Scripture. Find 
out the man who strictly obeys the law within him, and yet is an unbeliever as 
regards the Bible, and then it will be time enough to consider all that variety of 
proof by which the truth of the Bible is confirmed to us. This is no practical 
inquiry for us. Our doubts, if we have any, will be found to arise after 
disobedience; it is bad company or corrupt books which lead to unbelief. It is sin 
which quenches the Holy Spirit”.686  
          Newman has long insisted on this – we see it in his first published letter in May of 
1821.687 There is, then, an intimate connection between obedience to the voice of 
conscience and assent to Revelation.688 This means that “if we but obey God strictly, in 
time (through His blessing) faith will become like sight; we shall have no more difficulty 
in finding what will please God than in moving our limbs, or in understanding the 
conversation of our familiar friends. This is the blessedness of confirmed obedience. Let 
us aim at attaining it”.689 Newman does not say that this alone accounts for the whole of 
progress in assent to Revelation, and that the intellectual examination of various issues is 
not necessary. He is placing his finger on a factor that is of decisive importance in the 
assent of faith in the word of God revealing, and of the acceptance of the word of those 
bringing these tidings.  
                                                 
686 Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
687 Ibid., pp. 102-105. 
688 Newman implies that obedience to the conscience forms in a person an habituation of the mind to moral 
truth, which enables its discovery (and prepares it for Revelation). On July 20, 1830 Newman wrote that 
“As moral truth is discovered, not by reasoning, but by habituation, so it is recommended not by books, but 
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          Perhaps we could sum up this stage of Newman’s thought by turning to a couple of 
his sermons given early in the Movement of 1833. Newman regarded Keble’s Assize 
Sermon as the beginning of the Movement,690 but that sermon was quickly followed by 
his own, “The Immortality of the Soul”, on July 21, 1833.691 The relevant point in the 
sermon at this stage of our study is that the testimony of Conscience finds its direct 
fulfilment in the testimony of Divine Revelation. Divine Truth, as present in the 
testimony of Scripture, tells us more completely “the precepts which nature began”.692 
So, Revelation (as expressed in Scripture) completes the testimony of Nature, and 
doubtless lights up more fulsomely its drift and true bearing. Revelation builds on, 
completes and fulfils the perceptions of Conscience which, we may say, gives voice to 
Nature. Nature – as in the Conscience – aided by the action of grace, prepares in the soul 
an openness to Revelation which in turn fulfils it.  
          The thought of a judgment as intimated by the Conscience is the starting point 
which opens a person to the God of Revelation, who comes to him in Christ with both his 
warnings of a judgment, and his offer of salvation.693 Thus it is that “both Scripture and 
conscience tell us we are answerable for what we do, and that God is a righteous Judge; 
and, above all, our Saviour, as our visible Lord God, takes the place of the world”.694 
Conscience prompts us to realize that we have a soul that faces judgment, and Revelation 
confirms and completes the truth. The recognizing and sanctioning role of the conscience 
is implied here. The bedrock natural foundation, oriented towards and completed by 
Revelation, is the “clear vision we have, first, of our own existence, next of the presence 
of the great God in us, and over us, as our Governor and Judge, who dwells in us by our 
conscience, which is His representative”.695 It is striking that Newman refers to the sense 
of God as Governor and Judge, provided by the conscience, as a “clear vision” (italics 
mine). 
                                                 
690 While Newman chose to regard Keble’s sermon as the formal beginning of the Movement, with the 
Tracts Newman himself was quickly perceived as the co-leader. Six months later (January 31, 1834) over in 
Dublin, Joseph Blanco White (living with his friend Archbishop Whately) made a passing reference to 
Newman among his observations on piety in his Journal. He writes: “Allow the piety which Keble and 
Newman wish to introduce; - lay it down that having service at church three times a-week is desirable for 
the promotion of Christian piety, and then exert your ingenuity to discover why we should wish for so 
much and no more” (The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, ed. J. H. Thom, Vol II, 1845, p. 34).  
691 J. H. Newman,  Parochial and Plain Sermons. Vol I. Sermon II. Christian Classics Inc. 1966, pp. 15-26. 
692 Ibid., p. 21. “On the other hand, the law of God written on our hearts bids us serve Him, and Scripture 
completes the precepts which nature began.”  
693 Ibid., p. 22. 
694 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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          What then is Newman’s position on this point during his Anglican years? 696 His 
sermon, “Faith without Sight”697 may be said to sum it up. It was given on the Feast of St 
Thomas the Apostle, 21 December 1834. The religious mind is one who attends to the 
law of conscience, to which he feels bound to submit – and this inner law obligating his 
conscience leads him immediately to think of an exterior Being, superior to him, who is 
commanding him in the intimation of conscience.698 There is, by means of the conscience 
and its apprehension of the moral law, a sense of a superior Being external to him 
commanding and judging him. 
         The point here, though, is that this inner voice speaking within leads him to look out 
of himself for its Author, wherever he might be amid “this shifting scene of time and 
place”.699 So sure is he of his reality that he is expects to find him somewhere external to 
him, and speaking – which is to say, granting a Revelation. There is a sense of 
expectation, a sense of its antecedent probability. Thus he is already disposed to 
recognize him and his voice in the Gospel when it is presented to him. Not so those who 
are not open and subject to the Voice of the Lawgiver and Judge within: “they feel no 
antecedent desire or persuasion that God may have made a revelation of Himself in the 
world”.700  We notice in this statement the tell-tale Newman reference to “antecedent 
desire or persuasion” – which in turn involves a moral ethos enabling the discernment of 
converging probabilities.701  
         But there is another side to this, expressed in the same sermon. The person who 
makes the law of conscience his rule – which is to say, is obedient to the moral law – will 
find that “he cannot do it perfectly”.702 That is to say, he will have a true sense of guilt. 
So for this reason too he instinctively looks beyond himself, expecting a judgment upon 
him for his sins. He hopes and seeks for some means of God’s relenting – and when a 
message comes to him announcing these tidings of pardon and holiness, he readily 
listens, hoping and expecting that it may be true. He will regard this message as probably 
true, as likely. In such a practical matter, one which bears on the salvation of the soul, the 
                                                 
696 That is, as illustrated early in the Oxford Movement, the Movement of 1833. 
697 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol II, Sermon II,  pp. 13-25. 
698 Ibid., p. 18. 
699 Ibid.  
700 Ibid., p. 19. 
701 This issue of antecedent probability and  the action of conscience in it will be considered in 4.3. 
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wise man alive to his conscience will act on the benefit of any doubt, and regard as the 
safest thing to expect and act as if the tidings were true.  
          Without this obedience to conscience and consequent sense of sin, there is little 
interest, and certainly a much greater demand by him for “proof” – a “proof” that will 
subdue the intellect. There is little expectation and little sense of likelihood that the 
message conveys revealed truth. For such a person the case is well-nigh hopeless.   
 
4.1.4.  The Catholic years    
4.1.4   (a)   The sense of God’s sovereignty and the assent to Revelation 
In Discourse XIII of his Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations (1849),703 entitled 
“Mysteries of Nature and Grace”, Newman, now a Catholic, explains more of the 
connection between conscience’s natural sense of God and the acceptance of divine 
revelation. In the Discourse, he is speaking of the acceptance of mysteries in revealed 
religion – which is to say, of the assent of faith to revealed dogma. The first and 
fundamental difficulty in respect to accepting Christian doctrine is belief in a Living God, 
in spite of the darkness surrounding him.704  But it is not the holding to “God” in just any 
sense that Newman has in mind, nor even to the holding of merely orthodox notions of 
God, for he is also referring to the spirit with which such notions are held, and the depth 
of meaning invested in them.  
          God is the Creator, Witness and Judge of men – he is “a Power above” the 
mind.705 This is reminiscent of his sermon of 1829, which states that the only thing “that, 
strictly speaking, we know” is “an Unseen Power whom we are bound to obey”.706 
Newman places great emphasis on the transcendence of this Power: God is in every way 
“above” the mind. Newman is insisting on a perception and an acceptance of the ineffable 
transcendence of God, and on the utter self-abasement of man and his mind before him. 
God and his revelation is the measure of all things, not the judgment of man. The point 
here, though, is that this humility and obedience of mind before the revealed mysteries 
presumes an apprehension of God as God – that is, God for who he really is. Then, “once 
it (i.e., the mind) understands that it is not itself the measure of all things in heaven and 
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earth, it will have little difficulty in going forward”707 – which is to say, going forward in 
the assent to Christian doctrine, whatever be its doctrines.  
          So it seems there must be some inkling of transcendent sovereignty in the natural 
notion of God, somehow gained in principle in the intimations of conscience – through, 
perhaps, its sense of the utter absoluteness of moral obligation. Conscience and reason, 
sustained by grace, humbly accepts God as the supreme Power above the mind. When 
this has been done, its “proud, self-sufficient spirit” is broken. When a man “really …. 
recognises his Creator, he has passed a line; …he has bent his stiff neck and triumphed 
over himself”.708 This point sets forth the importance of dispositions. One can then accept 
revealed mysteries whatever they might be revealed to be, and however much they might 
collide with present notions, because he, God, has revealed them. Man is as nothing 
before the Living God revealing.  
         Newman here is grounding divine faith in the prior and fundamental acceptance of 
the truth of God as God. It must be God himself who is accepted, and not a substitute for 
him. This is the foundation of the acceptance of whatever God has revealed. If this is not 
done, the full extent of revealed religion will not be embraced. There will be this or that 
revealed mystery which will not be accepted because deemed preposterous, unreasonable, 
or whatever. If a person balks at this or that revealed truth, and stops along the way, then 
it is fundamentally because his perception and acceptance of God is flawed. He has not 
accepted God in all his sovereignty and his transcendence. The point is that this radical 
weakness in the embrace of Revelation has its roots in his response to the intimations of 
the conscience.  
          Newman goes further. Not only is belief in divine revelation the natural upshot of a 
true apprehension of God, but “belief in God and belief in his Church stand on the same 
kind of foundation”.709 So much is this so that “when a man does not believe in the 
Church, then (the same accidental impediments being put aside as before), there is 
nothing in reason to keep him from doubting the being of a God”.710  
          Many of these ideas on the conscience, and others he had previously presented, 
are covered in his discourse “The Religion of the Pharisee, the Religion of Mankind”, and 
                                                 
707 J. H. Newman, “Mysteries of Nature and of Grace”,  p. 274. 
708 Ibid.  
709 J. H. Newman  (1849). “Mysteries of Nature and Grace”. Sermon XIII. Discourses addressed to Mixed 
Congregations.  Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. (1966), p. 260. 
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in his “Dispositions for Faith”, both contained in Sermons Preached on Various 
Occasions (1856). A couple of years later, in his letter to Mrs F R Ward711 Newman 
writes that if God is perceived as “a Moral Governor,” One “who speaks to him by his 
conscience,” One “on whom he intimately depends,” One “whom he must please,” One 
“by whom he will be judged, he goes a great way towards being in a fit state to think of 
Catholicism”.712  The foundation of faith in Revelation (that is, “being in a fit state to 
think of Catholicism”) lies in the knowledge of God attained in the properly-functioning 
conscience. If the God who dictates in the conscience is accepted as he ought to be, the 
way lies ahead for the acceptance of the fullness of his Revelation.  
          Newman would repeat this point with trenchant clarity a few years later in the 
Apologia (1864). I am a Catholic, he writes in a famous sentence, “by virtue of my 
believing in a God”.713  The connection between his belief in a God and his belief in 
himself as subject to moral obligation (as in his “Proof of Theism” jottings) has been 
considered in the previous chapter. But the connection between belief in Revelation – 
which Newman came to equate (in its fullness) with Catholicism – and a primary belief in 
the God of Conscience is in line with his former remark, considered earlier. That was, 
that “It is a mistake to suppose that our obedience to God's will is merely founded on our 
belief in the word of such persons as tell us Scripture comes from God. We obey God 
primarily because we actually feel His presence in our consciences bidding us obey 
Him”.714  
 
      4.1.4  (b)  Conscience and yearning for Revelation: Callista (1855)715 
         As we have seen in a previous chapter, the heroine Callista is Newman’s 
personification of the best of Natural Religion. Our interest here is the assent to divine 
revelation. That Natural Religion can and ought issue in “divine faith”716 is shown in the 
fact that Callista will die a martyr and saint. In Chapter XIV, after his conversation with 
Agellius, St Cyprian engages with Agellius’ unbelieving brother, Juba, who has now 
                                                 
711 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XIX, pp. 126-128, (May 8, 1859). 
712 Ibid., p. 128. 
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arrived on the scene and is hostile to the visitor whom he guesses is a Christian priest. In 
the confrontation, Cyprian directs Juba to the testimony of his conscience. We see in the 
conversation that follows between the two the connection between fidelity to the 
conscience and assent to Revelation, which is our subject here. It summarises Newman’s 
doctrine.  
          Juba had been under Christian instruction years before, but, Cyprian tells him, in 
him “pride in bodily shape, (is now) treading down faith and conviction.” “You believe in 
God,” Cyprian warns him, “Creator of heaven and earth, as certainly as I do … but you 
set yourself against him”.717 Cyprian does not say that Juba has come to believe in God 
the Creator of heaven and earth through the conscience alone, but his conscience 
certainly bears witness to Him. Importantly, it is the conscience that insistently summons 
Juba to go forward and accept the Christian faith, just as his brother has accepted it. But 
Juba will not submit. Newman takes pains to show that it is pride in Juba that leads him 
to disobey the voice of God in the conscience.718 His will resists accepting the Gospel 
because he will not accept in obedience God as his absolute Sovereign, who manifests 
himself in the “voice” of conscience.  
          Juba recognizes that the dictate of conscience is the voice of God,719 and this same 
voice summons him to accept his word in the Christian revelation. But Juba refuses to 
submit for the simple reason that it would mean submitting to One who has authority over 
him. Religion is a matter of “authority and obedience”,720 and Juba is refusing both. 
Fundamentally the issue in religion is that of humble obedience to One who has full 
authority. That One is a Power who must be obeyed, and if obedience is not forthcoming 
there will be a judgment. Indeed, there is now a judgment. “There is that within you 
which speaks as I speak. That inward voice takes the part of the Creator, and condemns 
you”.721  
         Conscience, then, represents God. It is the inward “voice” which “takes the part of 
the Creator.”722 As such, it condemns Juba for his refusal to submit and assent to his 
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719  Ibid.  
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revelation, and Cyprian invites Juba to reflect on his experience, as if what he, Cyprian, is 
saying is easily recognizable. Notably, Juba does not deny that the conscience is as 
Cyprian describes it, but he proudly refuses to bow nevertheless. So then, Conscience as 
the inward voice of man acts the part of God, and directs the subject to the Christian 
Faith as coming from him. It is naturally recognized as being such. Juba has recognized 
the God of his conscience, and has also recognized that the same God calls him to assent 
to his Revelation. But he refuses. 
         While the dialogue between Cyprian and Juba shows the connection between the 
God of conscience and the call to assent to Revelation, the later dialogue 723 between St 
Cyprian and (the pagan heroine) Callista is especially revealing for the fact that other 
elements of man’s (moral) nature are shown to lead him to look out for God and a 
Revelation from him. 
         Cyprian’s first words to her attributes to her “some sparks of the Christian flame in 
her own breast,” suggesting an interior ethos or spirit which possesses the disposition that 
can lead to divine faith. Callista replies that she is no Christian, and never could believe 
it. “It seems too beautiful to be anything else than a dream” – meaning its “maxims are 
too beautiful” while “its dogmas are too dismal…to be believed. They revolt me.” 
Especially revolting is the thought of all her people being condemned to an eternal 
Tartarus.724 She cannot accept the Christian doctrine of Hell – as she understands this 
doctrine. This was the common objection to Revelation of Newman’s day. 
          Cyprian takes up the matter and asks her to recognize that this life alone, especially 
if understood as a life with and by oneself, cannot bring happiness. So, Cyprian now 
appeals to reason – and we notice that Cyprian reasons on behalf of Revelation from the 
natural yearnings of man rather than from external evidences. These yearnings are not 
physical, but, broadly speaking, moral. He is arguing from man’s moral nature. The 
longer a person lives of oneself and by oneself – that is, alone – the deeper will be his 
natural unhappiness. This is so, whether on this side of the grave or on the other. If, added 
to this, one did not like God, and if there were only God, how great would be the misery 
of existence! It would be nothing less than Hell. That is to say, “the soul ever needs 
external objects to rest upon”. We notice the argument which moves from the fact of 
                                                 
723 Newman, J. H. Callista: A Sketch of the Third Century,  p. 118. 
724  Ibid., p. 121. 
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man’s need to the strong assumption (likelihood and probability) that there will be 
Objects or a realm answering to that need.  
         In fact, the whole of man’s nature demands an external Object “to rest upon.” This 
itself, this very demand of man’s nature, implies the real existence of such an Object. 
Man has a presentiment that the Object of his yearning and happiness – God – actually 
exists. As a result he expects that He does exist, and if a message professes to come from 
God about Him and offering the remedy he craves, there is plainly a duty to inquire and 
ask for His help. The difficulty is that “we have no love for Him who alone lasts. We love 
those things that do not last”. However, “He whom we ought to love has determined to 
win us back to Him. With this object he has come into His own world, in the form of one 
of us men. ... This is our Worship, this is our Love, Callista”.725 So Revelation is the 
answer to the yearning of the human heart for an Object that loves and is to be loved. 
This yearning of the heart expects it and gives it a high antecedent probability. But grace 
also comes in. 
         Callista recognizes that this God is the Greek ideal of “the First and only Fair, yet 
embodied in a substance”. He is “the Lover of souls,” answers Cyprian.726 He is the 
answer to all our aspirations and needs, and he summons us to leave the creature for him 
who is the Creator, in “an espousal for eternity.” Cyprian is speaking not of the God of 
Conscience, but the God of Revelation. Revelation meets the yearning of the heart for an 
Object to rest upon – plainly this prompting is more than merely that of the conscience. 
Callista replies that she cannot go beyond her nature – and she is Greek. Cyprian points to 
himself – he has changed and been transformed, and that by the power of the One he now 
loves. So too can Callista change. That is, nature can be fulfilled in Revelation. 
          The point here, though, is that Newman in this conversation indicates other 
elements in man’s nature that lead him to look out for a Revelation. The conscience, then, 
is not the only power in man preparing him for Revelation. This must be kept in mind in 
our discussion. Newman points to man’s natural aspiration for everlasting Love, a Love 
that will fill the longing of nature for a living, loveable and loving Object. 
Characteristically, Newman is not beginning with external nature, but with the moral 
nature of man.  
                                                 
725  Ibid., p. 123. 
726  Ibid., p. 124. 
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          As has been said, this aspiration for Love causes an expectation, a sense of 
likelihood and probability so great that such an Object must exist. It is a variant of 
Newman’s argument that “feelings” – the feeling of conscience, let us say – imply the 
real existence of an Object causing or answering them. Especially is this so when a 
Message comes purporting to be from this Object, a Message which will fulfil, if true, all 
the aspirations of the human heart.  
          This is not just the conscience which speaks, but the broad and total nature of man 
– his moral nature – longing for real love and support coming from an Object that 
provides it. Thus is Nature the voice of God in a wider sense than that special inner locale 
of Nature which is the conscience. The Self is discovered to be unable to satisfy the void 
experienced by the human heart, and therefore, granted the void, it is not unlikely that 
there is somewhere an Object that can satisfy it. Into this perplexity comes the 
announcement of a Revelation. So for all the stress which Newman gives to the 
Conscience as a way to God, he does not say that this is the only element in man’s nature 
which takes him to God.  
          Moreover, in this way to God from the need of his nature for enduring and total 
love, the external world also plays its part. St Cyprian is asked (in the same dialogue) by 
Callista, “What is your remedy, what your Object, what your Love, O Christian 
teacher?”727 At this point, Cyprian refers to the world and man’s love for it. “Every man 
is in that state which you confess of yourself. We have no love for Him who alone lasts. 
We love those things which do not last, but come to an end. Things being thus, He whom 
we ought to love has determined to win us back to him. With this object, He has come 
into his own world, in the form of one of us men.”728 A little later in his statement, 
speaking of this “one Lover of souls”, he compares him with the world. Love for him is 
“love of the Unchangeable. It satisfies, for He is inexhaustible. … why will  you not leave 
the creature for the Creator?”729  
          So the transitoriness and radical limitation of the external world has its part: it  
prompts dissatisfaction of the heart. The nature of man, already in relation with (and 
bondage to) the external world, turns from it in dissatisfaction to yearn for some other 
Object that will satisfy the the heart. The way to God does involve the essentially limited, 
                                                 
727 Ibid., p. 123. 
728 Ibid.  
729 Ibid., p. 124. 
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contingent and transitory character of created things. The subject passes through this way 
both because of his natural love for “those things that do not last” – a love destined for 
disillusionment – and because of a yearning “for Him who alone lasts”.730  
         This is not a merely intellectual path from the external world to God as the 
traditional Ways to God (as in, say, Paley) might suggest to some (including Newman, 
perhaps). It is a path from the world due to a longing for Love. It is more within the 
tradition of Augustine, and perhaps that school of scholasticism represented by Anselm, 
Bonaventure and Scotus. It is this search for Love which Newman is highlighting in the 
words of Cyprian. All this reminds us of Newman’s words on the conscience, in the midst 
of the world’s “changes” and “nothingness”, as described in his first sermon after his 
return from his 1832-1833 Mediterranean trip,731 a week after Keble’s Assize sermon. 
 
          Despite Aristo’s obtaining a special dispensation for her from the ultimate penalty 
of execution, Callista will not sign the declaration required. The time came, and Callista 
opened the gift given to her by Cyprian – it was a copy of the Gospel of St Luke. She 
read the whole volume, and could scarcely put it down. There follows a most important 
series of statements for our subject. “Here was He who spoke to her in her conscience;732 
whose Voice she heard, whose Person she was seeking for…. That Image sank deep into 
her; she felt it to be a reality.” She saw that there was a “higher beauty” than that which 
the natural world revealed, and a deeper peace. This was a new philosophy, but “the 
ruling sovereign thought of the whole was He who exemplified all this wonderful 
philosophy in Himself.” 733 
         This, then, is the connection between natural religion founded on the conscience, 
and revealed religion founded on authenticated witnesses of Scripture and the Church. 
The God of Revelation is recognized when good reasons and sufficient evidence come to 
light. This recognition is founded on the existing knowledge of God in the intimations 
and dictates of the conscience. The God of revelation is accepted and believed because 
there is a prior knowledge, acceptance and love of him from elements of man’s nature – 
of course, pre-eminently (though not exclusively) from the voice of conscience. The 
                                                 
730 Ibid., pp. 123-124. 
731 J. H. Newman, “The Immortality of the soul” Parochial and Plain Sermons. Vol. I, Sermon II. 
Westminster Inc.: Christian Classics Inc. 1966,  pp. 20-21. 
732 J. H. Newman, Callista: A Sketch of the Third Century,  p. 180. 
733 Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
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knowledge of and love for the God of conscience enables a recognition and loving 
acceptance of the God of Revelation, for the two are entirely in character.734 A full 
adherence to the word of the God of conscience, as in the case of Callista, will prepare 
the way for a full and total acceptance of the word of the God of revelation. Cyprian had 
been expressing the same thing to Juba, but Juba proudly resisted. Callista came readily 
to recognize the God of Revelation as the God she had come to know and love in her 
conscience, and gave her full assent to him. Her conscience sanctioned what she 
encountered in the Christian Revelation because it was recognized as fulfilling what she 
had already dimly perceived and expected from the testimonly of her conscience and her 
entire moral nature. It is what Newman had said in a sermon some twenty-five years 
before, that “obedience to conscience leads to obedience to the Gospel, which, instead of 
being something different altogether, is but the completion and perfection of that religion 
which natural religion teaches”.735 
         So it is that, in his Apologia (1864), Newman makes his well-known statements on 
the existence of God being the natural foundation of an acceptance of the Catholic 
religion, which is itself its logical and natural result. Various aspect of this were 
discussed in the previous chapter, but the point to be noticed here is that the conscience, 
implying and conveying the idea of God, leads on logically and naturally from there, as 
from its necessary foundation, to the assent to Revelation – understood as being the 
Catholic Faith. Thus does the conscience sanction Revelation and then act as its vigilant 
guardian.736 “I am a Catholic”, he writes, “by virtue of my believing in a God; and if I am 
asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it 
impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without 
believing also in the existence of Him who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging 
Being in my conscience”.737  
                                                 
734 As was noted before, it looks as if an habituation of the mind to moral truth, fostered by obedience to 
conscience, is what is involved.  Cf. Newman, J. H. Letters and Diaries. Vol II, pp. 254-5  July 20. 1830. 
735 J. H. Newman,  “Obedience to God the Way to Faith in Christ” (October 31,1830).   Parochial and 
Plain Sermons. Vol VIII, Sermon XIV. Westminster Md.: Christian Classics. 1968,  pp. 201-202. 
736 The sanctioning role of conscience in preparing for the assent to Revelation is described in various 
sections of this thesis, such as in 4.1.1, 4.3.3 (c), and 5.1. It is in view of its presence in Newman’s mature 
thought that it has been given a role in the account of the conversion of 1816 at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
737 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua. Chapter IV, Section 2, No.5. World’s Classics, p. 206. 
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            In the Grammar of Assent Newman writes that “Our great internal teacher of 
religion is … our Conscience.”738 Conscience suggests to us that God is our Ruler and 
especially our Judge.  Newman also provides suggestions on the role of the conscience 
(understood especially as the sense of guilt) in forming “Natural Religion” and in shaping 
the religions of “barbarism”, with their myths and rites.739 The point we are pursuing 
here, though, is that belief “in revealed truths depends on belief in natural”.740 So it is that 
“one of the most important effects of Natural Religion on the mind, in preparation for 
Revealed, is the anticipation which it creates, that a Revelation will be given. That earnest 
desire of it, which religious minds cherish, leads the way to the expectation of it. Those 
who know nothing of the wounds of the soul, are not led to deal with the question, or to 
consider its circumstances”.741 Newman parts company with Paley in his overall 
approach.742 It is the Illative Sense of a person, formed by habituation and a right moral 
ethos, led by need, desire, expectation and a consequent sense of antecedent probability, 
that prompts him, in the face of good reasons and sound evidence, to recognize, approve 
and sanction the God of Revelation, and give his firm assent.   
 
     4.1.4  (c)  Conscience “the aboriginal vicar of Christ” 
          In his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, the Conscience is famously declared to be “a 
messenger from Him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and 
teaches and rules us by His representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, 
a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and 
anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood throughout the Church could cease to 
be, in it the sacerdotal principle would remain and would have a sway”.743  
          The Pope’s authority, Newman writes, is based on that of the conscience in that, 
without the conscience, the voice of Christ which the Pope expresses when exercising his 
doctrinal authority would not be accepted. This assumes his long-standing point, that the 
                                                 
738 J. H. Newman,  A Grammar of Assent. Part II, Chapter.10.  Image Book edition, p. 304. 
739 This is investigated to a point in the Ph.D. thesis, entitled The Nature of God according to Conscience 
in the Thought of John Henry Newman, by Edward J. Tyler, presented to Charles Sturt University in 1996. 
740 J. H. Newman, A Grammar of Assent, p. 321. 
741 Ibid., p. 328. 
742 Ibid., p. 329. 
743 J. H. Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk.  Chapter 5: “Conscience”. In Conscience and Papacy,  
p. 63, in Conscience and Papacy (Letter to the Duke of Norfolk), edited with introduction and notes by  
S. L. Jaki.  Pinkney, Michigan, USA: Real View Books. 2002. 
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conscience recognizes in the voice of Scripture and Church (in the teaching of the Pope) 
the voice of the God already known. It involves the recognition of a Voice coming from 
above because it is broadly in character with the Voice already known naturally by the 
conscience. It must, though, be repeated that Newman is not meaning to say that it is only 
by means of the conscience that the Pope’s position and authority is recognized. Other 
powers of the mind and evidences are also at play, but the testimony of the conscience is 
essential.  
          But there is the deeper point expressed in the Letter. It is that Conscience is the 
“aboriginal Vicar of Christ” – suggesting that, from its first intimations, the conscience is 
oriented by nature to the assent to divine revelation, which is to say to the person and 
message of Christ as presented and represented by his Church. The natural conscience, 
sustained by grace, has not only a natural but, in the last analysis, a supernatural finality – 
and it has that from the beginning of its activity. It is designed and oriented by nature not 
just to a natural belief in God but to the assent in faith to Christ, in whom is the fullness 
of the godhead, as St Paul writes. Thus by nature does it have a supernatural finality, 
depending all along on the gift and presence of grace. This sense of God and recognition 
of Christ, though, presumes a suitably prepared mind and heart shaped by fidelity to the 
conscience, which is to say a certain moral ethos – which introduces our next section. 
 
4.2   Conscience and the moral ethos. 
 
The matter of ethos had been central to the Oxford Movement, and had a life-long 
importance to Newman in the question of assent to Revelation, although he did not 
always use the term. A mind would not judge its duty aright unless it was of a suitably 
prepared moral character. We must now consider the matter of ethos because both of the 
pivotal presence of the conscience in it, and its direct bearing, therefore, on attaining 
religious truth. The ethos of a person’s mind was critical for the assent to revealed truth.   
       In itself and in common parlance, the idea of “ethos” or, as Newman more 
commonly called it prior to 1827-1828, “temper” of mind, did not have a formally moral 
connotation. It was a common expression, and referred to the character of one’s mind.744 
                                                 
744 For instance, in January 1822 Newman’s father warned his eldest Evangelical son against the “temper” 
he was encouraging in himself: “take care …. You are encouraging a nervousness and morbid sensibility, 
and irritability, which may be very serious ... You are on dangerous ground. The temper you are 
encouraging may lead to something alarming. Weak minds are carried into superstition, and strong ones 
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Newman would require that one’s temper of mind be moral, formed largely by fidelity to 
a correct conscience, if revealed truth were to be correctly apprehended. 
 
     4.2.1   (a)     “Ethos”: Newman and Blanco White   
          Late in 1826 Blanco White arrived at Oriel. Fairly quickly Newman and he became 
friends.745 On 18 February 1827 Blanco White notes in his Diary that “Newman drank tea 
with me”.746 Without overplaying the point, early 1828 may be regarded as marking a 
new awakening in Newman and a recovery of a more trenchant insistence on the 
doctrinal character of revealed religion.747  At this very time (early in March) we notice 
the appearance of the expression “ethos” in Newman’s correspondence with Blanco 
White – and it is significant for what it reveals of Newman.   
          The circumstance was this. In February 1828 Blanco White suggested in a letter to 
Newman that, with Froude and Wilberforce, they start a kind of round-robbin 
correspondence on religious and moral subjects. Blanco White’s letter proposing to 
Newman a circle of correspondence on moral and religious subjects evoked a positive 
response from Newman,748 but one that was also significant in revealing fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                 
into infidelity” (J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 179, “Early Journals: Book II”, 1822, 
Sunday, January 6). The “temper” Newman’s father was referring to is a character of mind which would be 
expected to lead to certain judgments. Courses of action and opinions embraced were not just a matter of 
detached rational reflection. One’s “temper” of mind was critically important. 
745 The two ended at opposite poles. On March 6
th
, 1836, Blanco White recalled Newman. In a letter to 
Lord Holland from Liverpool where he lived now confirmed in his Unitarianism, he refers to the “Oxford 
persecution against Hampden” and its “impudent display of bigotry”. He writes of the “two men whom I 
loved for their talents and good-nature: Pusey, the Professor of Hebrew, and Newman, a Fellow of Oriel. 
The latter, in particular, was one of the most liberal, well-informed, and kind-hearted men I knew.” He “is 
now one of the most forward leaders of persecution. He is a man of great influence with the most reading 
young men at Oriel, all of which he has for the last four or five years gained over to bigotry and Toryism” 
(Life, Vol. II, pp. 198-199). In his Journal on April 27
th, 1836, he writes that Newman “has raised himself 
into a Protestant Pope” (ibid., p. 213), and three days later laments that “Among these persecutors I pity no 
one but Newman. Vaughan Thomas is a hardened politician; Pusey is a vain man; Newman’s deceiving 
pride is more deeply seated, and more difficult to be suspected by himself than the sources of the others’ 
practical error” (ibid., p. 233). On December 15th, 1837, writing to John Stuart Mill, he observes that 
“Pusey, in his better days, visited Germany, and made several acquaintances among the German Divines 
…. Newman is a real enthusiast; I do not believe that Pusey deserves that name, though I should be sorry to 
believe him a Hypocrite. But the Mysteries of Churchism are inscrutable. The Oxford Society of Saints 
have for some time been publishing a collection of Tracts called Tracts for the Times. Newman, Pusey, and 
Keble, the simple-hearted Poet, have been the chief contributors. The aim of the whole collection is to 
restore Popery, excluding the Pope.” (Life, Vol. II, p. 355).   Obviously, Newman is seen as the leader.  
746 Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, Vol. I, ed. J. H. Thom, p. 438. Also M. Murphy, Blanco White: 
Self-banished Spaniard. Martin Murphy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1989, p. 143. 
747 This new beginning followed his illness late in 1827, the death of his sister Mary in January 1828, and 
his resumption of a systematic reading of the Fathers. In March he would begin as Vicar of St Mary’s. 
748 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol II, pp. 59-60. (To Joseph Blanco White. March 1. 1828). 
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differences, though perhaps tacit, between the two friends.749 It involved our present 
subject: the question of a moral “ethos.”  Blanco White was more than twenty-five years 
older than Newman and his two friends Froude and Wilberforce, and carried with him a 
profound detestation of his early Catholic Faith and its priesthood. 
          In his letter to Newman, Blanco White distinguished orthodoxy in doctrine from 
arguments that supported doctrinal orthodoxy. He assured his young friend that he wished 
to have nothing to do with “the spirit of German rationalism,” and would be alarmed 
were he (inadvertently) to prove “a snare to any one of you.” He wished, he said, to 
explore the proofs of revealed truth.750 He thinks that “few men have any notion of the 
free variety of intellect which exists in mankind” – especially divines, who too often 
demand conformity to questionable proofs of unquestionable Christian truth.751  
           The drift of the letter suggests that Blanco White gives an emphasis to “intellect,” 
indeed to “the free variety of intellect.” It is also clear that he perceived in Newman a 
young man absolutely committed to the view that orthodoxy of doctrine is necessary for 
salvation.752 He seems anxious that Newman not see him as straying into “the spirit of 
German rationalism”. This alone suggests that Newman’s self-perceived and self-
confessed (by hindsight) “drift” towards Liberalism during the previous year was not 
much (if at all) noticed by Blanco White,753 who takes pains to show Newman that he is 
not questioning Christian truth. It looks as if he is a little apprehensive at the image of 
himself he may be projecting – and perhaps had already begun to project. He wanted, he 
                                                 
749 In like manner over the next 18 months there would be manifested serious, if to that point tacit, 
differences between Newman and his good friend (and one-time mentor), Richard Whately. These 
differences would become cemented by the time of Whately’s departure for Dublin as Archbishop. Blanco 
White and Richard Whately were good friends and associates – though falling out at length in doctrinal 
divergence. But they remained good friends 
750 One wonders whether Blanco White by that time had divined Newman’s own dissatisfaction with 
standard proofs from external nature, and his preference for proofs from conscience and the moral sense. 
751 M. Murphy,  Blanco White: Self-banished Spaniard.   New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
1989,  p. 144.   
752 In his Life (published posthumously in 1845), Blanco White would express the “evil” of “Orthodoxy” as 
being “the belief that right opinions on dogmatic theology are necessary to salvation”. Vol. I, p. 363. 
753 Several years later, Blanco White made observations about Newman, Pusey and Keble in a letter to 
John Stuart Mill (Dec. 15, 1837) – referred to in a previous footnote. The point here is that he refers to 
Pusey’s change from being once partial to the German Divines to his present Orthodoxy. So Pusey has 
changed – and Blanco White is a little ambivalent about him. He does “not believe that Pusey deserves” the 
name of enthusiast – “though I should be sorry to believe him a Hypocrite.” But we notice that there is no 
mention of this in Newman – that is, Newman emphatically “is a real enthusiast.” (The Life of the Rev. 
Joseph Blanco White, ed. J. H. Thom, Vol. II. London: John Chapman, 1845, p. 355).  
  Now, there is no mention here of Newman passing over from (say, the shadow of) liberalism to committed 
churchism, while there is mention of a change in Pusey. This suggests that Newman’s self-admitted lapse in 
about 1827 may have been hardly noticed by Blanco White, his close associate in Oriel College.  
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explained, to converse with his lively young friends on moral and religious matters in a 
way that would allow freedom of “intellect”, which is to say the routes and methods of 
reasoning to truth.  
          Newman’s response places the emphasis not on “intellect,” but elsewhere.754 There 
was something else more basic. Newman, just turned 27, “cordially” enters into the plan 
(though nothing seems to have come of it), as do Froude and Wilberforce. Then Newman 
gives his own thoughts, characteristically beginning with immediate areas of agreement. 
He has long been attracted to something like this. He recognizes that he needs the 
“stimulus of an object and proposed hearer” to enable him to write with satisfaction and 
result. This would be so all his life.  
          He agrees that there is a great variety in modes of thought and opinion – each looks 
at things with his “own eyes” and invests “the whole face of nature with colors of our 
own” (already suggesting Newman’s hesitation about abstract theoretical “reason” in the 
attainment of truth). Each mind “is actuated in that course (i.e., its own distinctive course) 
by ten thousand indescribable incommunicable feelings and imaginings.” This is a 
position Newman will emphatically develop – that the temper, character and steps of a 
person’s mind and not mere theoretical logic are decisive in the apprehension of reality 
and truth. Indeed, he is “tempted to say that on no single point do any two individuals 
agree”. What this means is that on “no single object do their minds view from the same 
spot and in the same light. And this will of course hold good in religious matters”.  
         Newman already has the beginnings of what will be his mature theory of 
knowledge. Each of us reasons to the truth, and holds the truth, in his own way – and not 
as a simple result of abstract logic. Further, the reasons of one may not be those of 
another in apprehending the truth. Some forty years later the Catholic Newman would be 
especially identified with an emphasis on freedom in matters of theological opinion, 
though not in declared dogma.  
          But, Newman states in passing, there are truths we should all hold as being 
necessary for salvation, though we hold them each in his own manner. So Newman is 
manifesting what Blanco White has come to fear elsewhere in his writings – an 
intransigence in doctrine, with its roots in his conversion of 1816. This “intolerance” 
involves the notion that the holding of certain “opinions” is necessary for salvation. 
Ominously, if this is necessary for salvation, the holding or not holding of them involves 
                                                 
754 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. II,  pp. 59-60 (1 March 1828). 
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a commendable or reprehensible decision. The holding of doctrines is a moral matter, 
involving choice.  
          Newman trusts that he will always be very slow to quarrel over differences of 
opinion – “for words are not feelings – nor is intellect ethos”. So we notice that Newman 
connects “opinion” with “words” and “intellect.” Terminology, preferred modes of 
expression (“words”), together with one’s preferred intellectual route (“intellect”) in the 
support and vindication of revealed truth, are peculiar to this or that person’s history and 
preference. Such matters – “words” and “intellect” – are indeed debatable and are matters 
of “opinion.”  
         But Newman has introduced a significant consideration. It is “feelings” and “ethos.” 
These ensure adherence to doctrinal truth which all must hold in order to be saved. The 
“feeling” is clearly the “moral feeling” (or moral attitude) that Newman had referred to in 
correspondence with his brother Charles a few years earlier, and to which reference will 
be made. It is the “right moral feeling” to which he refers in the very next sentence of this 
letter to Blanco White. It is the “feeling” or commitment to the moral life with the moral 
habits and character that this involves and produces.755 Newman shows in this sentence 
his serene appropriation of the term and notion of “ethos.” “Ethos” suddenly appears as 
being a normal part of his thought and converse. This “right moral feeling,” this “ethos,” 
is necessary for the appropriation of and adherence to right doctrine.   
          This obviously involves a moral life and the following of one’s conscience. But it 
is not merely this, as if it were a factor unrelated to the possession of the objective truth. 
That is, a right ethos is not, for instance, possessed by one who “follows his conscience” 
yet (as a result) refuses to accept divine Revelation. Such a person shows he does not 
have the right ethos needed for the assent to Revelation. So it includes certain convictions 
in the light of which the conscience chooses properly and dutifully. The term embraces 
one’s basic moral mind-set, including convictions which, when conscientiously adhered 
to as moral obligations, will guide one to the truth, keep one in the truth, and oppose the 
denial of the truth which all must hold. 
          The following of one’s conscience is an essential and dominant part of this, but it 
presumes right basic principles also, a correct spirit or habit of mind, and is a product of 
                                                 
755 Let us bear in mind this broad meaning of the term “feeling” when Newman explores the implications 
of the “feelings” involved in the conscience – they imply a “Governor & Judge”. The “feeling” of 
conscience is not a mere sensation as ordinarily understood. It denotes the whole experience involved in a 
perception. 
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them. Clearly, one such conviction is adherence to the dogmatic principle, which 
Newman indirectly emphasises in his note to Blanco White. It is this temper of the 
morally upright mind which supports and leads to one’s appropriation of moral and 
religious truth, both natural and revealed. All up, it seems that what is fundamental is 
virtue of a certain cast. 
          If the “ethos” and “right moral feeling” (in this sense) are in possession, the 
“words” (or preferred terminology) which one uses, and the “intellect” (or reasoning) at 
work will be acceptable matters of “opinion,” and open to legitimate discussion. It is, on 
the other hand, the “ethos” and the “right moral feeling” which ensures acceptance of the 
revealed truth which all must hold. Newman agrees with Blanco White on a legitimate 
liberty in how one expresses the truth (the “words”) and on the particular approach of the 
reason in defending or attaining the truth which all must hold (the “intellect”).  
          Newman allows this liberty provided one can assume in the person the “ethos” and 
“right moral feeling” which will take the mind of the person to revealed doctrine, and 
keep it in the truth. In any such discussion of the rational foundation of Christianity, 
Newman will assume the “ethos” which ensures his adherence to the doctrinal truth by 
which we are saved. Plainly, in “right moral feeling” and “ethos,” the conscience will 
have a most important place. The conscience, then, is deeply implicated in this matter of 
ethos. 
           This signal of Newman’s uncompromising hold to orthodox doctrine (stemming 
from his conversion of 1816) was a position for which Blanco White would have felt 
unease. He had secured Newman’s agreement with his distinction between orthodox 
Christian truth and the reasons which justify it, but had been subtly warned (with or 
without Newman formally meaning to do so, though I suspect it was intended) that any 
tampering with doctrine would certainly not do. Indeed, it would reveal moral decay and 
culpability. 
          Having said this, Newman immediately introduces a first topic for discussion – 
showing how much at the forefront of his thinking is “ethos.” There is a bad ethos, and it 
accounts for doctrinal error. We could regard this as a touchstone of the whole point, and 
trace it in our account of Newman’s position on ethos. “Let me then challenge W. or F. 
(i.e., Wilberforce or Froude) to give us some account of the connexion (how far) of 
speculative error with bad ethos - eg. in what is a consistent Socinian a worse man than 
an orthodox believer. I think him to be worse, but I wish my mind clear on the subject, 
211 
 
which it is not at present.” That is, to what extent does doctrinal error flow from a bad 
spirit of mind, from moral fault in the subject, from lack of virtue – which is to say, from 
a bad ethos? One’s moral ethos affects what one knows and thinks.     
          Newman is not suggesting that the truth of his fundamental point regarding ethos 
be discussed – he takes for granted that it is valid, and indicates that Wilberforce and 
Froude also take it for granted. He is asking that the prospective group determine to what 
extent (“how far”) moral “ethos” is the determining principle in leading the subject to 
truth and error. Specifically, he asks to what extent doctrinal error is due to moral fault. 
The conscience, then, is involved in the ethos that leads to religious truth, and in the ethos 
that leads to religious error. This is because the ethos in question is a moral ethos. 
Newman proposes his concrete case: for example, in what is the consistent Socinian a 
worse man than one who is orthodox? Newman assumes he is a worse man in that he is in 
doctrinal error, but in what does this consist? How is this so, and to what extent? These 
are indeed difficult questions. Blanco White himself would end his days as a Socinian, 
and would write that all along, without realizing it, he had been one – and for upright 
reasons.  
          Blanco White wanted a discussion of the reasons and terminology (what Newman 
called “words” and “intellect”) that may best lead to doctrinal truth. But Newman 
immediately countered with his proposal to discuss the relationship between ethos and 
doctrinal truth, and specifically between doctrinal error and bad ethos. Doctrinal error is 
due (somehow and to some extent) to a bad ethos of mind, heart and life, and manifests it. 
Newman is more interested in what he regards as more fundamental in the all-important 
matter of holding to revealed doctrine. The fundamental thing for right judgment and 
assent to revealed truth is not clear and logical reasoning, but virtue.  
         Ethos, then, is a particularly significant point in the appropriation of Revelation, and 
it involves fidelity to the conscience. It is the bad “moral feeling,” the bad “ethos,” moral 
decline and moral infidelity, which is shown in the acceptance of unorthodox doctrine, in 
adherence to it, and in its propagation. A bad ethos accounts for the heretic and his 
erroneous conscience far more than do mere reasons (or “intellect”).  One is revealed to 
be worse of a man for one’s doctrinal error.  
         So religious error is not merely intellectual – it is a profoundly moral matter. For 
Newman, one’s moral state shapes and constitutes one’s ethos and feeling – and this is 
what determines very largely what one thinks in matters moral and religious. For this, one 
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is responsible, for one is responsible for one’s moral state, which in turn is due, together 
with other factors, to one’s failure in fidelity to conscience. “Intellect” has a certain place 
in the attainment of religious truth, but the principal determinant is a good “ethos” or 
“right moral feeling.” Newman is firmly in the camp of those who oppose the 
Enlightenment understanding of religious knowledge.  
           This appears as an unquestioned position in Newman’s letter, suggesting that, 
whatever about his present use of the term “ethos,” the general position (expressed in the 
word “ethos”) has been his for some time. But while Newman has decided that moral 
“ethos” is more important than “intellect” in the appropriation of moral and religious 
truth, he is uncertain of various aspects of the subject.  
          It is also clear from the letter that Froude and Wilberforce (previously under the 
formative influence of Keble), had also come to a clear appreciation of the importance of 
“ethos”. But Newman was taking it further than they, for he immediately adds, “I doubt 
whether he or Wilberforce will think it safe to proceed to the lengths to which I expatiate. 
– For instance, it never occurs to me to measure the degree of a Socinian’s error by the 
deficiency of his creed under the accuracy of the Athanasian – yet this is a common 
practice.”  It never occurs to Newman to think this – suggesting a view held for quite 
some time. Further, it suggests that Froude and Wilberforce do not measure the 
significance of religious error by this criterion to the degree that Newman does.  
         Newman is saying that he never measures the Socinian’s error merely by comparing 
the details of his belief with the letter of the Athanasian Creed and leaving it at that – “yet 
this is a common practice.” He himself looks to a man’s failure in virtue to measure, 
evaluate, account for and appreciate the “error” prevailing in his mind. When it comes to 
the matter of a good or bad ethos and right or wrong moral feeling, Newman gives it a 
greater role in orthodoxy or heresy than is “common practice.” For Newman, the heretic 
is in a state of moral failure. He is in moral turpitude. According to Newman himself, he 
was ahead of Froude in the lengths to which he took this principle in accounting for 
dogmatic error.     
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4.2.1 (b)    Blanco White: Newman was the leader in “ethos”  
          Blanco White came to see the significance of Newman’s position on this, and 
gave to him the leadership in it. Eight years later, with the Oxford Movement well in 
progress, Blanco White was away from the Oxford scene and ending his days as a 
Unitarian in Liverpool, a self-confessed Socinian. He had been kept in touch with 
developments at Oxford through Hawkins and Baden Powell. He was not able to bear 
reading the Oxford Tracts. He explained to Hawkins (May 9, 1836) that “When people 
have advanced to that stage of mental disease in which the ultimate ground of argument is 
an act of the Will, it is most distressing to attempt anything like reasoning. Newman, I am 
convinced, is in that state, and I remember to have perceived the first symptoms when I 
was at Oxford. He had drawn into the same course the more lively mind of poor Froude, 
who seemed to me at times to laugh at the extravagance of the conclusions with which he 
found himself compelled by logical consistency...” 756  
          Blanco White understood this placing “the ultimate ground of argument in an act 
of the Will” as being at the heart of the Oxford Movement.757 Fundamentally, an act of 
the will (and not just “intellect”) was behind right and wrong religious “opinions”, and 
this act of the will, as Newman saw it, was due to your moral condition. Your being a 
good or bad person brings you to your choice of religious or moral opinion. This was the 
“ethos” that Newman stressed in his reply to him in March of 1828 – well before the 
formal beginning of the Movement. A few years later, with Newman, Keble, Froude, 
Wilberforce and later Pusey leading the charge, the Oxford Movement aimed at the 
restoration to the Anglican Church of Patristic doctrine and life. This required the 
restoration of the “ethos” of the Patristic Church as the only true support of doctrinal 
orthodoxy and freedom from dogmatic error. So it was virtue of the Patristic cast and 
spirit which ensured right judgment and knowledge. This understanding of religious 
knowledge, involving the Will, was at the heart of the theory driving the Movement.   
           Looking back, Blanco White makes Newman the leader in the idea, drawing “into 
the same course the more lively mind of poor Froude.” This accords with Newman’s 
description of the matter in his correspondence of 1828 with Blanco White, in which he 
                                                 
756 M. Murphy,  Blanco White: Self-banished Spaniard,  p. 177.  
757 In his letter to Dr Channing on October 9, 1839, Blanco White refers to the “Oxford Puseyites”, with 
whose leaders he has been “intimately acquainted”.  He writes that “Their plan is to stop all inquiry, and to 
believe because they like it. The leaders are still young, and as such possessed of an all-powerful Will.” 
(The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, ed. J. H. Thom, Vol III, p. 106). 
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doubts that Froude or Wilberforce “will think it safe to proceed to the lengths to which I 
expatiate.” Though “poor Froude” had “the more lively mind”, Newman was certainly 
leading the way. “Right moral feeling” – a good “ethos” – was necessary to adhere to the 
truth which must be held if one is to be saved. A “bad ethos” is the foundation of 
“speculative error” in moral and religious truth. But the extent to which this is so was not 
clear to Newman, though the fact was clear.758 
                                                 
758 Many years later, in 1845, Newman commented on Blanco White’s character after reading his 
posthumous Life (The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, written by himself, with portions of his 
Correspondence. Edited by John Hamilton Thom, in three volumes. London: John Chapman. 3 vols. 1845). 
In respect to Blanco’s final views as presented in his Life, Newman had this to say at the time: It was 
 “the most dismal possible work I ever saw. He dies a Pantheist, denying that there is an ultra-
mundane God, apparently denying a particular Providence, doubting, to say the least, the personal 
immortality of the soul, meditating from Marcus Antoninus, and considering that St Paul’s epistles 
are taken from the Stoic philosophy. As to Christianity he seems thoroughly to agree with Strauss 
and rejects the gospels as historical documents. Yet his Biographer actually calls him in his last 
moments a Confessor..” (J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. X, p. 639).  
Newman is referring to J. H. Thom’s remarks following Blanco White’s last entry on Saturday, February 6, 
1841, “Got up – ”. Thom writes that “To an excellent lady, who was impelled to urge the dangers of his 
Faith upon the dying Confessor, upon the man whose life had been a search for truth, and a martyrdom to 
what he had found, he dictated the following reply” (Life of Rev. J. Blanco White, Vol III, p. 308). 
   The dogmatic principle in Newman’s religion and “ethos” is manifest in his melancholic judgment on 
Blanco White. In respect to Blanco White’s character, Newman continues, he was sincere and honest. But 
he gave up one abode after another (Spain, Oxford, and then the Whately family in Dublin) “all for an idea 
of truth, or rather for liberty of thought.” Mixed up with his sincerity was “a morbid restlessness,...a 
readiness to take offence and to be disgusted, an unusual irritability, and a fear of not being independent, 
and other bad feelings” (Ibid). These “bad feelings”, with their moral significance, rendered him blind.  
      So then, the rejection of revealed truth was not just a simple matter of a failure to follow one’s 
conscience – whatever one’s conscience might dictate. A bad “ethos,” a wrong “moral feeling” could 
darken the judgment of one’s sincere conscience. This bad ethos was the result of a matrix of moral failures 
and erroneous starting points. It involved a set of principles from which the conscience was led to judge, in 
blind fashion, what it must do. Honesty and sincerity did not absolve from moral guilt. There was a 
blindness which involved a deeper moral failure and led in turn to its further deepening – and Blanco White 
became a case in point.  
        In his Life Blanco White presents his rejection of dogmatic religion as due to fidelity to his conscience 
and a dutiful search for the truth. To give but one instance, in The Life we read that “At this very time, 
nevertheless, and while I was most sincerely ready to expose my life for the sake of Christ’s Gospel – at 
that very time, my daily reading and reflections were constantly raising doubts on the theological doctrines 
of the Atonement and the Trinity – doubts, indeed, which after long and fierce struggles with myself gained 
a complete victory” (The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, Vol. I, London: John Chapman, 1845, p. 
323). So, for Blanco White, so-called “erroneous opinions” are not due to a “bad ethos”. They can be due to 
a sincere seeking after the truth and a decidedly moral life. It is a matter of sincerity and accuracy of 
“intellect.” The Unitarian minister John Hamilton Thom, the editor of Blanco White’s Life and who of 
course shared his denial of Christ’s divinity, had the highest regard for his moral character. In the 
Introduction to the first volume of Blanco White’s Life, Thom writes that “Every page of these Memoirs … 
show … that Honesty, not speculativeness, enforced each change, - that he never stepped off any old 
ground of Faith, until he could no longer stand upon it without moral culpability..” (The Life of the Rev. 
Joseph Blanco White, Vol. I, Introduction, pp. x-xi). As observed above, Newman commented that “his 
Biographer actually calls him in his last moments a Confessor”.  
        Newman did not question Blanco White’s honesty, sincerity and intelligence – and this sincerity is 
clear in White’s autobiographical Life (eg., Vol. I, pp. 359-360). But he did see him as engulfed in a tragic 
blindness brought on by moral defects. His moral failure led to this condition and incapacitated him for the 
perception of and assent to religious and dogmatic truth. As a Catholic six years later, Newman returned to 
Blanco White in greater detail in his Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics (1851). He pronounced 
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4.2.2    “Ethos” and the Oxford Movement 
With the letter of reply to Blanco White in March of 1828 we have an explicit appearance 
of the term “ethos” in the thinking of the young Newman – then having just completed 
his 27th year – as well as in the thinking of Wilberforce and Froude. It is to be 
remembered that this is some six months before Newman’s first significant involvement 
with Keeble.  “Ethos” is a shared concept among the three tutors who would be leaders of 
the Movement. Blanco White, later a firm opponent of the Oxford Movement, came to 
recognize Newman’s position on ethos as basic to the Movement, as common to its 
leaders, and most especially as characteristic of its foremost personality,759 Newman 
himself.  
           What is involved here is a certain theory of religious knowledge, one which gives 
to the (moral) will a decisive role in right judgment.  Judgment does not depend on mere 
Reason. Nor is the mere imperative of the conscience sufficient as a guide to truth – for 
the “law of conscience” as perceived and judged by the bad man is no correct guide.  
This, then, is Newman’s position during the important year, 1828, begun with his 
correspondence with Blanco White and including his later article on Poetry, in which a 
moral character equips the poet to write good poetry, written some nine months later. It 
was in August of this year that Newman drew near to Keble. The future leaders were 
coming together and the idea of ethos was a common thought among them.  
          We must now discuss the origin of Newman’s idea of the moral ethos, in which the 
action of the conscience was pivotal – and, conversely, with ethos itself being pivotal for 
the right functioning of conscience. Our topic is the historical development of Newman’s 
idea. 
     4.2.2   (a)     Keble, “ethos” and Froude 
          Let us commence with the important discussion pursued by James Pereiro on the 
origins in Keble (and Froude) of the Oxford Movement’s notion of ethos and its place in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the same judgment – but with the further observation that Blanco White also suffered from “some radical 
defect of mind…(he) never knew what Catholicism had to give” (Lecture 1, pp. 18-19.).  This observation 
of some “radical defect” of mind in Blanco White suggests that a good ethos involved more than a mere 
perceived fidelity to one’s conscience – which was, though, essential.  
759 Blanco White certainly regarded Newman as the foremost person of the Oxford Movement – which  he 
abhorred because of its championing of orthodox dogmatic religion. In his Letter to Rev. J. H. Thom 
(composed August 8 to August 21, 1839) he writes (with admiration of elements of Newman’s character) 
that Newman became “one of the leading persecutors of Dr. Hampdon, and the most active and influential 
member of that association, called the Puseyite party..” (Life of the Rev. J. Blanco White, Vol. III, p. 131).  
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religious knowledge.760 Pereiro has seen the critical importance of “ethos” at the heart of 
the Oxford Movement, and has investigated its origins and development – his work is 
currently the best general introduction to it. Of particular value is his attention to the 
letters of Samuel Francis Wood to Manning, which are among the Manning papers in the 
Bodleian Library and in the Borthwick Institute, York. Of special place in Pereiro’s 
analysis is Wood’s manuscript, entitled “Revival of Primitive Doctrine”,761 written in 
1840 and describing the beginnings and history of the Oxford Movement to that year.  It 
was written at the request of Newman and Pusey, and when finished it won Newman’s 
approval.   
           Pereiro’s study of ‘ethos’ and the Oxford Movement draws heavily on Wood’s 
account. Wood himself never uses the term, and there was never a systematic expression 
by the Oxford men of their theory of ethos. From Wood’s 
survey, Pereiro writes, it is obvious that the Tractarians saw 
the Oxford revival as arising from a new “ethos,” which is to 
say a certain moral character of mind and feeling of which 
Catholic doctrines were the proper expression. This they 
identified, by the time the Movement was under way, with the 
ethos of the Patristic Church — it was the possession of this 
ethos of the Catholic Church of the Patristic age which would 
ensure for the Established Church a lasting adherence to 
Creed and to Primitive Doctrine.762 Our question here is, of course, what were the origins 
of the idea of ethos in the mind of Newman himself? – for back in early 1828 he certainly 
had the idea.  
          In understanding the ethos of the Oxford Movement we must start, Pereiro lets us 
know, with Keble.763 It “was Joseph Butler …. who had played the determining role in 
the formation of Keble’s concept of ethos, and ethos was the principle propelling the 
                                                 
760 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement: At the Heart of Tractarianism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 2008. 
761 Borthwick Institute, Box A2 42. 3. 
762 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement,  p. 234 
763 John Keble (1792 – 1866), churchman and poet, was a main leader of the Oxford Movement. Keble 
College, Oxford, was named after him. Author of The Christian Year, in 1846 he published a book of 
poems, Lyra Innocentium. Other works were a Life of Wilson, Bishop of Sodor and Man, and a 3 volume 
edition of the Works of Hooker. After his death there appeared Letters of Spiritual Counsel, and 12 volumes 
of Parish Sermons. 
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Movement and giving it direction”.764  The idea of ethos, Pereiro writes,765 “had first 
taken shape in Keble’s mind; it had been transformed and reshaped in the mutual dealings 
of Keble with his students, particularly with Froude”, and then shared among others. So 
Keble, formed by Butler, is the principal and first source of the notion of the moral ethos 
among the Movement men. “This focus on ethos by the Tractarians,” Pereiro states again, 
“owes much to Keble and to those directly influenced by him”.766  
          How, then, did all this get going? Pereiro writes that Wood (in his “Revival of 
Primitive Doctrine”) saw the roots of the Movement being planted in Oxford many years 
before 1833, as well as in the reading parties arranged by Keble at Southrop during the 
long vacations from 1823.767 At these reading parties, Keble “imbued his students – 
Froude, Wilberforce and Williams – with his ideas: a new way of approaching and 
understanding Aristotle and Butler, and this was later to inform and define the intellectual 
and religious line followed by the Tractarians. He had also established a new form of 
relationship between dons and undergraduates. The young Oriel tutors would make it 
their own”.768 
         Yet, Pereiro writes, as time went on nobody “seemed to feel inclined to claim the 
paternity of this common concept to which many had contributed .… Newman’s stature 
seems to have stolen the limelight from the contributions others made to the ideas of the 
Oxford Movement or to his own.”769 So Keble’s originating role in the central matter of 
ethos was unacknowledged. It is indeed true that Newman himself never acknowledges, 
as he readily does in relation to certain others of his views (such as the “Sacramental 
system” and probability),770  that it was from Keble that he learnt the idea of ethos. 
          How does Pereiro describe Keble’s thinking on “ethos” – for this question is 
crucial if we are to understand Keble as the fount of this notion in the thought of the 
Movement men.  Keble used the term ethos (in his early Lectures on Poetry, started in 
1831) to refer to a stable disposition or character which was the result of a lasting search 
for virtue.771 So commitment to virtue of character was at the heart of a proper ethos. This 
                                                 
764 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, p. 80. 
765 Ibid., p. 83. 
766 Ibid., p. 85 
767 Ibid., p. 80 
768 Ibid. 
769 Ibid.,  p. 83. 
770 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 19. 
771 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, p. 95. 
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summary statement appears, on the face of it, to make a right ethos the result simply of a 
“lasting search for virtue” – although Pereiro does say later that “the use of the term ethos 
always demands the presence of a context to determine its exact nature and direction”.772 
The point here, though, is that this search for virtue, involving fidelity to the conscience 
and resulting in a right ethos, was critical for the attainment of truth. Keble’s early if brief 
work as Tutor was marked by this view. A right ethos, the result of “a lasting search for 
virtue”, was needed for right knowledge. 
          That is to say, Keble was firmly convinced “that the search for truth could not be 
separated from the pursuit of goodness. Doing otherwise would lead to intellectual 
pride”773 – and pride inclines the mind towards error. Thus the stress on the pastoral role 
of the Tutor: the Tutor had to instil a moral ethos if right knowledge – especially moral 
and religious – was to be acquired. This was not the Enlightenment idea of knowledge 
which had it that reason reached truth and could take a person to virtue. Reason was pre-
eminent. 
          Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was, Wood narrates, basic in Keble’s system, and 
he made use of it in his instruction in morals and religion – and Williams, Froude and 
Wilberforce had all learnt this perspective on the Ethics in their reading gatherings with 
Keble at Southrop in 1823. Wilberforce and Froude went on to use the Ethics in similar 
fashion as tutors with Newman.774 Wood asserted that the three tutors (Newman, Froude 
and Robert Wilberforce) made use of the Ethics (with Keble as their inspiration) to stress 
this moral foundation of a right education, and this was a relatively new use of the Ethics 
at Oxford, complemented by Butler’s Analogy and his Fifteen Sermons.   
          By the early 1830s Butler’s Analogy of Religion was taken to be the most 
authoritative modern text complementing Aristotle’s Ethics, and it too, the Analogy, 
stressed that virtue facilitates a correct judgment about what is right and wrong action in 
particular circumstances. The two authors agreed on the importance of formation of 
moral habits – Newman being especially interested in the effect of habits on the 
formation of opinion775 –  because habits are something we can actually do in order to 
have the mind to think correctly.  
                                                 
772 Ibid., p. 104. 
773 Ibid., p. 86. 
774 Ibid., p. 87. 
775 Ibid., p. 90. 
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         Pereiro explains that, in the question of how man attains the truth when this 
involves “a maze of probable arguments”, 776 Butler started with the Aristotelian notion 
of phronesis. Practical wisdom (i.e., what one is to do) requires777 the presence of 
virtue.778  Butler affirmed with Aristotle that virtue strengthens the will in its search for 
the good, but he applied this idea also to intellectual matters, and in particular to the 
evidence of Christian revelation which was the interest of his work. Butler, arguing 
against unbelief and rationalist deism, stressed that probability is the guide of life – which 
is to say, the guide of the conscience. The evidences are necessarily probable ones, and it 
is the moral temper of a person’s mind which will assist and guide his judgment on the 
meaning of these probabilities.779 Virtue is a reliable guide in doubt, and moral 
imperfection will affect a person’s discernment of the evidence of a divine revelation. 
Such is Pereiro’s account of Aristotle and Butler, and I shall not divert into a discussion 
of this. 
          Pereiro tells us that Keble (in his sermons of the early 1820s) wrote for those who 
accepted divine revelation. He took Butler’s approach for evidences and applied it to 
maintaining the orthodox mind as against the heretical mind, conformity in doctrine as 
against doctrinal error. In this, he made use of what he saw as the testimony of Scripture 
itself.780 So it was that Keble was convinced that moral qualities were of much greater 
importance than intellectual ones for a religiously orthodox judgment. The one with a 
devout and sober spirit is more likely to be right, and more worthy of being followed in 
disputed interpretations of God’s works and ways. This, Keble believed, was a legitimate 
extension (following the lead of Butler) of Aristotle’s phronesis for knowing what to do.  
          Man, then, attains religious truth on but probable arguments, and moral rectitude is 
the light guiding man to the truth from this complex of probabilities. Indeed, moral 
qualities are of much greater importance than intellectual ones when reasoning to and 
analysing the truth of religious propositions. The moral sense can correct errors of the 
intellect in matters of revealed truth.781 Moral rectitude guides man to truth through the 
maze of possible answers.782 In his Lectures on Poetry (started in 1832), Keble described 
                                                 
776 Ibid., p. 91 
777 Ibid. 
778 Without intending to delay on the point, there is also the question of Aristotle’s notion of virtue. 
779 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement,  p. 92 
780 Ibid., p. 94. 
781 Ibid. 
782 Ibid., p. 95. 
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ethos as a stable moral disposition – not just a passing impulse but the result of a lifetime 
searching after virtue”.783 
             Because of his reading of Keble’s early writings and especially his sermons of 
the early 1820’s, Pereiro is able to tell us that Keble found plenty of confirmation for his 
view in Scripture 784 – which stands to reason because it is plainly there in Scripture for 
all to see.785 The point here, though, is that orthodox faith was associated with, and 
indeed the product of, a sound moral life. This seems to have been, at this stage, the 
essence of Keble’s idea of ethos, understanding it as that moral habit or temper of mind 
which disposed the person for the recognition of and assent to revealed truth. “A person 
experienced in the life of virtue and desirous to do good would have a sort of instinct for 
truth, making him or her more able to detect the bent of a particular doctrine”.786 Froude 
took up Keble’s great point about ethos, developing the link between religious opinions 
and a certain temper of mind or character in his notes of 1827.787  
          Keble insisted that tutoring be understood as a pastoral care (with its stress on 
moral formation as the foundation) – and, Pereiro tells us, “Froude, Newman and Robert 
Wilberforce took up his mantel in the university”.788 He writes that the “basis of their 
concept of the tutorial system was Keble’s firm conviction” 789 as just outlined. He seems 
to say that Newman himself gained it from Keble – but then he acknowledges in a 
footnote that Newman himself had had this notion of tutoring before his contact with 
Froude and Keble.790 He allows that others in the university had this idea too.791  I have 
to observe that from the first as a Tutor Newman appears just as intent on it as Keble had 
been, and this may have derived from the very early and formative influence on him of 
his own classics master, the Evangelical Walter Mayers. Not long after he began as an 
Oriel Tutor in 1826, he contemplated the possibility of resigning if he could not make of 
                                                 
783 Ibid 
784 Ibid., p. 94. 
785 For instance, in John 3: 18-20: “he who does not believe is condemned already, because he has not 
believed in the name of the only Son of God. And this is the judgment, that the light has come into the 
world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. For every one who does evil 
hates the light, and does not come to the light..”  Again, in John 8: 43.47: “Why do you not understand 
what I say? It is because you cannot bear to hear my word … He who is of God hears the words of God; the 
reason why you do not hear them is that you are not of God.” 
786 J. Pereiro ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement,  p. 94. 
787 Ibid.,  p. 99 
788 Ibid.,  p. 86 
789 Ibid.  
790 Ibid.,  p. 86,  footnote 8. 
791 Ibid.,  p. 86 
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his tutoring a pastoral charge.792 This was well before any influence on Newman of Keble 
or Froude. 
 
     4.2.2   (b)     Keble, “ethos” and Newman  
          But then something new is suggested in Pereiro’s illuminating account, and it 
bears directly on our subject. Having explored Froude’s further refinement of Keble’s 
idea of ethos,793 he suddenly informs us that “Newman continued building on the 
foundations laid by his friends, and acknowledged the influence that Butler had had on 
him, through the medium of Keble’s mind. Froude had also played an important role in 
the formation of Newman’s ideas about ethos. As Newman put it in correspondence in 
1828, he relied on Froude’s authority ‘for lowering the intellectual powers into 
handmaids of our moral nature’” (my italics).794 So this theory of the foundations of right 
moral and religious judgment were “laid by his friends”, and “Newman continued 
building on” this.  
          With respect to “the influence that Butler had had on him, through the medium of 
Keble’s mind”, Pereiro refers us to the Apologia.795 But that Apologia reference to the 
influence of Butler and Keble refers to their influence on him in the two matters of 
sacramentality and probability – not (if Pereiro means to suggest it), to the matter of 
ethos. In his same footnote (no. 72) Pereiro refers us to Newman’s Diary which states that 
Newman had begun to read Butler in June 1825. It needs to be said in passing that 
Newman had already been reading Butler at least by 1823 – as he states in the 
Apologia.796  
                                                 
792 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol I, p. 286, Footnote 4. Newman quotes from  Autobiographical 
Writings. p. 209: Sunday May 7, 1826:  “I have now been engaged in the Oriel Tuition four weeks. ....There 
is much too in the system which I think wrong. I hardly acquiesce in the general reception of the 
Sacrament, which is expected, or even in the practice of having evening chapel. I think the Tutors see too 
little of the men, and that there is not enough direct religious instruction. It is my wish to consider myself as 
the minister of Christ. May I most seriously reflect, that, unless I find that opportunities occur of doing 
spiritual good to those over whom I am placed, it will become a grave question, whether I ought to continue 
in the Tuition.” 
793 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement,  pp. 99-102. 
794 Ibid., p. 102. 
795 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, pp. 18-20. 
796 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 10: “It was at about this date, I suppose, that I began reading 
Bishop Butler’s Analogy” – that is, “about the year 1823”, his first year as a full Fellow of Oriel. This is 
confirmed in Newman’s Autobiographical Writings, p. 192 (“Early Journals: Book II”, Saturday August 9, 
1823), where his brother Charles states in passing that Newman had recommended Butler’s Analogy to him 
(“which you recommended to me”). Charles said that he did not find in the Analogy a confirmation of the 
doctrine of eternal punishment and on the natural depravity of man in sin.  
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          “Froude had also played an important role in the formation of Newman’s ideas 
about ethos”, Pereiro declares in passing.797 Then, proceeding on with a discussion of 
Newman’s position on ethos subsequent to 1828,798 Pereiro implies, if not explicitly 
states, that Newman’s appropriation and use of the idea of ethos is to be understood as 
due mainly to the influence of Froude who acted as the conduit of Keble – Keble being 
the main conduit of Butler on this matter of ethos799 – and it is only “ethos” that we are 
discussing here.”800  
          It ought be observed in passing – as was mentioned above – that Newman was 
always ready to acknowledge his intellectual debts. As just stated, he acknowledged the 
influence of Butler and Keble in two areas: probability and the sacramentality of the 
world. But nowhere does he acknowledge his indebtedness to Keble for the idea of ethos 
as such. As has been observed, Pereiro notes that “nobody seemed to feel inclined to 
claim the paternity of this common concept to which many had contributed”.801 This, I 
suggest, is because no one person in the Movement circle could claim to be the father of 
the idea.  
         The most contentious point about “ethos,” and the litmus test of its pivotal 
character, is not merely that a moral disposition disposes one for the acquisition of the 
truth, but the assertion that, conversely, unbelief is at root due to a particular ethos, one 
formed by moral infidelity. In such an ethos, there has been (perhaps a history of) failure 
in the conscience. Just as the man with the right moral ethos will be led by his moral cast 
of mind (which includes his dispositions, interests and expectations) to perceive the truth, 
so a man of moral failure will be led by his bad moral ethos to reject it and embrace 
religious error. Heretical opinion, then, is morally perverse. The man who rejects 
orthodox doctrine is revealed by his “opinion” to be a worse man for it. The action of the 
conscience, then, is critical for the perception of and assent to religious truth. As we have 
                                                 
797 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement,  p. 102. 
798 Ibid., pp. 102-110. 
799 Though Pereiro states (on p. 105, quoting a letter in 1840 from Newman to his brother Francis) that the 
topic of ethos “was an old one” with Newman, he still gives the impression that it derived from Keble. For 
Pereiro only takes us back to Newman’s reference to ethos in his March 1828 correspondence with Blanco 
White. 
800 It could certainly be argued that Keble was the main initial conduit of Butler in Newman’s renewed 
appreciation of probability as the guide of life and of the sacramental dimension of reality – but here we 
are talking of a moral ethos (by whatever term it was used) as a critical factor in right religious knowledge. 
801 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, p. 83. 
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seen, by March 1828 Newman was of this view, but did not know how far it could be 
taken.  
 
     4.2.2 (c)      “Ethos” and Oxford  (Van Mildert and Blanco White)  
          If we are to determine the origins of Newman’s notion of ethos, it is helpful to 
consider the general culture of ideas on this point, at least at Oxford. Pereiro, referring us 
to Wood, states that “the Oxford Movement, within the general revival, possessed a deep 
originality.” For instance, “the source of the differences between Tractarians and High 
Churchmen – in respect of Antiquity, Reformers etc, – originated in the Tractarian theory 
of religious knowledge underlying their constant references to ethos.” – a concept that 
“had first taken shape in Keble’s mind”.802 This would seem to suggest that it was the 
Tractarians who suddenly and alone brought forward, as “the source of the differences”, 
the idea of ethos. Perhaps Pereiro means to refer to the idea of a Patristic ethos as 
essential for the Established Church. In fact, the “theory of religious knowledge 
underlying the idea of ethos” was much more widely held than Periero emphasises. Then 
there is the further matter: Newman’s own position on this prior to his entry as Tutor at 
Oriel.  
             In order to illustrate the first point (the culture of ideas on ethos or temper of 
mind – taking Oxford as a test case), let us consider two contrasting writers as examples 
of this matter of the connection of virtue with truth. The works of the first were well 
known in the University during Newman’s early years at Oxford as an undergraduate. 
They have little connection with Keble. I refer firstly to William Van Mildert, loosely 
connected with the High Church party, who exemplifies the notion that one’s moral 
temper of mind largely accounts for right and wrong opinions and belief. Then there is 
Joseph Blanco White who illustrates opposition to this view. He was a typical man of the 
Enlightenment and soon to be Newman’s friend at Oriel prior to the start of the Oxford 
Movement.  
 
          Matriculating for Trinity College Oxford on 4 December 1816, Newman went into 
residence there in June the following year. William Van Mildert (1765-1836) was the 
Regius Professor of Divinity for nearly two years following the young Newman’s arrival 
                                                 
802 Ibid. 
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at Trinity. He was appointed to this position in 1813 and left it in 1819 on his 
appointment as Bishop of Llandaff. He must have been well known to Newman by name. 
Newman mentions his appointment to Llandaff in his letter to his mother of April 28 of 
1819.803  
         Van Mildert’s Boyle Lectures (1802 to 1805) and his Bampton Lectures (1814, 
published 1815) were well known.804 Newman notes in his diary on 22 July 1825 that he 
“began to run thro’ Van Mildert’s Boyle Lectures.” The next day he mentions that he had 
“finished running thro’ Van Mildert”.805 He was obviously 
glancing quickly over this work of two volumes with which he 
was entirely familiar. Regarding Van Mildert’s Bampton 
Lectures, in his Reminiscences Thomas Mozley (Newman’s 
brother-in-law) recalls that “long before the earliest date that 
could be ascribed for a ‘movement,’ … Newman held Van 
Mildert in much esteem, and quoted his Bampton Lectures”.806 
Mozley earlier on that page states that Newman “put into the 
hands of his young friends the books that had done his own 
soul good”.807  
          Van Mildert’s Boyle Lectures had Infidelity for their subject. There is no 
suggestion in his volumes that unbelief is the fruit of unclouded and mere intellectual 
reflection. It has its roots in a perverse frame of mind and disposition. The first volume 
attempts a survey of the rise and progress of unbelief. It shows “the perverseness of both 
Jews and Gentiles in their rejection of the Gospel, their efforts to overthrow it”,808 and 
                                                 
803 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol I, p. 65. (“Van Mildert is to be bishop of Llandaff…”) 
804 E. Varley writes that “Van Mildert's theological writings (were) influential in their day”.  E. A. Varley,  
(Ph.D. thesis) A study of William Van Mildert, Bishop of Durham, and the high church movement of the 
early nineteenth century, (Introduction, p. ii). Durham theses, Durham University. 1985.  
Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6840/  (Internet access 3 February, 2014). 
     Years later on January 8, 1864, Newman wrote to Alexander Macmillan giving his initial and indignant 
response to Kingsley’s charge of duplicity in his writings. In the course of illustrating to Macmillan the 
outrage of using an individual’s name unjustly, he refers to Bishop Van Mildert’s Bampton Lectures – 
incidentally showing that he regarded Van Mildert as an author still widely known in the Anglican 
Communion, and perhaps still read.  J. H. Newman.  Letters and Diaries, Vol. XXI, p. 14.  
805 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 245. 
806 Rev. T. Mozley,  Reminiscences chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement. Vol. 1, p. 318 
London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1882. 
807 Ibid. 
808 W. Van Mildert, An Historical View of the Rise and Progress of Infidelity, with a Reputation of Its 
Principles and Reasonings: In a Series of Sermons Preached for the Lecture Founded by the Hon. Robert 
Boyle, in the Parish Church of St. Mary Le Bow, London, from the Year 1802 to 1805 Vol 1. Sermon I, p. 
19. 
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passes on then to the Middle Ages and the modern period. In this historical part he 
presents “sufficient proofs of a wilful apostasy, on the part of unbelievers, from the 
known Will of God, and of a presumptuous opposition to his authority”.809 He declares 
that in the second volume 810 he will enter upon “a general vindication of the grounds and 
principles of the Christian Faith” and aims “to shew the spirit of perverseness by which 
they are generally dictated”.811  That is to say, infidelity is the fruit of a morally bad 
disposition of mind – a bad ethos, in other words.  As with the first volume, so in his 
second he declares that he intends to set forth the “true Origin of Infidelity, and the 
perversity and folly of Unbelievers” who are, as St Paul describes them, “deceivers and 
being deceived”.812 Revealed truth is so congenial with the mind and heart of man that 
the loss or renunciation of this truth “argues an unpardonable degree of neglect or 
depravity”.813  
          The general lines of this argument are present also in Van Mildert’s Bampton 
Lectures of 1814.814 He states that he plans “to consider, in the first place, the moral 
qualifications necessary for a right apprehension of the Sacred Word.”815  The Scriptures 
teach, he writes, that unbelief, heresy and schism derive from human perverseness and 
from the action of Satan816 who works on man’s proneness to sin.817 Our Lord states that 
if any man do the will of God he will know his doctrine.818 What all this implies is that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Vols I and II of the Boyle Lectures are Volumes II and III of The Theological Works of William Van 
Mildert in Six Volumes,  Oxford: For John Henry Parker. 1838.   
Internet archive, accessed on 18 September, 1013:  http://www.classicapologetics.com/u/VanWorks2.pdf    
809 Ibid. (Boyle Lectures), Vol. I, p. 21 
810 W. Van Mildert,  An Historical View of the Rise and Progress of Infidelity    Volume  II  
      Internet archive accessed 22 September 2013:  http://www.classicapologetics.com/u/VanWorks3.pdf 
811 W. Van Mildert,  An Historical View of the Rise and Progress of Infidelity. Volume I, p. 20. 
812 W. Van Mildert,   An Historical View of the Rise and Progress of Infidelity. Volume II, p. 27. 
813 Ibid., p. 47. 
814 W. Van Mildert, (1814). An Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture-Interpretation, in Eight 
Sermons preached before The University of Oxford in the year MDCCCXIV.  (The Bampton Lectures).   
2
nd
 edition.  Oxford at the University Press. 1815.     Internet archive accessed on December 10, 2013: 
http://books.google.com/books?id=FJgPAAAAIAAJ&dq=Van+Mildert+Bampton+Lectures+An+enquiry&
printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=FPKRhmGGmW&sig=NG6iCpJqcHHYU6LvPpeN67_uUu0&hl=en
&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result          
815 Ibid., p. 22. 
816 Ibid., p. 29 
817 Basil Willey writes: “Van Mildert, in his Bampton Lectures (1814), said that acceptance of any biblical 
‘criticism’ indicated moral defectiveness, unsoundness of faith, and disloyalty to the Church.”   Nineteenth-
Century Studies: Coleridge to Matthew Arnold.  Penguin Books in association with Chatto & Windus. 1964 
(first published 1949), p. 47. So, for Van Mildert the acceptance of biblical “criticism” was morally 
perverse.  
818 W. Van Mildert, (1814).  An Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture-Interpretation, p. 31. 
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correct moral disposition prepares a man for true religious knowledge and suggests that 
without this, a man will not attain religious knowledge.819  
          All up, there is not a trace of rationalism in Van Mildert and so his works may have 
commended themselves to the young Evangelical Newman. Had Newman read Van 
Mildert’s work during his undergraduate years – which, I propose, is probable – he would 
have been confirmed in the notion that doctrinal and religious error is morally perverse. It 
involves a failure in virtue and is not a mere intellectual conclusion. The state of the will 
is implicated in one’s intellectual position and beliefs. No philosophical argument that 
unbelief involves moral perversity is presented by Van Mildert. It is simply assumed and 
repeated almost constantly, indicating it to be widely held. Newman would also have 
been confirmed in his Evangelical view of the moral perversity (and not just the errors) of 
the Romish Church.  
          Newman himself affirmed that in controversy this accusation of moral deficiency 
may look to an opponent like prejudice or pride. On 3 March 1825 he writes to his 
brother Charles that “The internal evidence depends a great deal on moral feeling; so that 
if we did not agree, we might accuse each other of prejudice or pride”.820 Despite this 
possible appearance of prejudice, (in 1825) Newman is clear to his brother Charles. The 
rejection of Christianity arises from “a fault of the heart, not of the intellect”.821  It 
springs from a sinful “dislike of the contents of Scripture” which “is at the bottom of 
unbelief”. The arguments pressed by the objector are really “an afterthought” to this 
dislike. At root unbelief comes “from pride or from sensuality”.822 Francis McGrath 
writes that Newman’s private theological papers between 1821 and 1823 show that he 
understood the keystone of revealed truth to be the fact and enormity of sin.823 Well, in a 
different sense, Newman sees sin as the keystone also of unbelief.  
          This view is in full harmony with the writings of Van Mildert, a public man of 
great prominence in the University, broadly connected with the High Church element in 
the Established Church. He had little connection with Keble personally.824 Keble’s 
                                                 
819 Ibid., p. 33 
820 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Volume I,  p. 214 
821 Ibid., p. 219. (To Charles Robert Newman, March 24, 1825).  
822 Ibid.  
823 F. McGrath, John Henry Newman: Universal Revelation. Kent: Burns & Oates Ltd. 1997, p. 26 ff. 
824 Van Mildert looked to Daniel Waterland (1683-1740) – and so steeped was he in Waterland that he 
edited and published a ten-volume edition of his works in 1823 at Oxford (the last being mainly 
Waterland’s letters).  
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conviction that the intellectual apprehension of truth was deeply dependent on the moral 
life was common to many others. It was “in the air” that Newman breathed.    
 
           However, though Van Mildert’s view was common enough, it was certainly not 
the only view on assent to Revealed Truth in the University of these years. There were 
those who insisted that its rejection need not be due to moral perversity, which is to say to 
a bad ethos. Mention was made of Newman’s rapid review of Van Mildert’s Boyle 
Lectures on 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 July 1825. Well, in this very month of July, Newman also read 
Joseph Blanco White’s book Practical and Internal Evidence against 
Catholicism,825 published a some months prior to this date, and 
dedicated precisely to Edward Coppleston (1776 – 1849), Provost of 
Oriel – of which College Newman was a young Fellow. This book 
presents a very different view from that of Van Mildert. The point 
being made here is that ethos was an issue for very many.            
          Blanco White (immigrant from Spain many years before, and 
ex-Catholic priest who detested the Catholic Church) is significant for the current of ideas 
that would grow in Oriel College. In his Life of Pusey Liddon declares that “Of Blanco 
White’s positive influence it is not too much to say that he is the real founder of the 
modern Latitudinarian school in the English Church. Whately826 and Hampden were in 
                                                                                                                                                 
        Keble looked to Richard Hooker (1554-1600), a 3 volume edition of whose works he produced – 
entitled, The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine, Mr. Richard Hooker (3
rd
 ed. printed by Oxford 
University Press, 1845). Volume I includes Keble’s introductory material, Isaac Walton’s biography of 
Hooker, and Books I to IV of Ecclesiastical Polity; Volume II includes Book V of Ecclesiastical Polity; 
and Volume III includes Books VI to VIII of Ecclesiastical Polity as well as Hooker’s sermons and 
disputations. Keble’s critical material is included throughout all three volumes. Hooker emphasised 
Scripture, reason and tradition. 
     However, the year after Keble’s death Newman said in private correspondence to Pusey that Jewel came 
to have a significant and even higher influence on Keble than had Hooker. Newman wrote: “Keble was 
especially a disciple of Hooker. According to  my own idea, it was Jewel, as forced upon Keble's attention 
by Froude, whose writings first opened Keble's eyes to the unsatisfactory doctrine of the Reformers as such, 
in contradistinction to the high Anglican school; and from that time Keble took a much higher line of 
theology, and hardly recollected himself what he held before, as is the case with men who have originally 
taken what they received,  without question, and have not precisely examined into its meaning,  coherence, 
and grounds.” (J. H. Newman. Letters and Diaries, Vol. XXIII, p. 44.  To E. B. Pusey. January 31. 1867) 
825 J. B. White, Practical and Internal Evidence against Catholicism with occasional strictures on Mr. 
Butler’s Book of the Roman Catholic Church: in six letters, addressed to the impartial among the Roman 
Catholics of Great Britain and Ireland.   London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street. 1825. 
  First American edition.  Georgetown, D.C. Printed and Published by James C. Dunn. 1826. 
  Internet Archive on September 18, 2013:    http://www.archive.org/stream/practicalinterna00whit 
         (Blanco White:  born José María Blanco Crespo on11 July 1775, died 20 May 1841) 
826 Richard Whatley’s The Errors of Romanism Traced to their Origin in Human Nature (London: B. 
Fellowes, Ludgate Street. 1830), was dedicated to the Rev. Joseph Blanco White. Whately states in his 
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different senses his pupils; Arnold and even Hawkins felt his positive influence, though 
less directly”.827  At least we can say that Blanco White was a significant if brief catalyst 
of the liberalism which, together with its antagonist the Oxford Movement, arose out of 
the Common Room of Oriel. He is worthy of attention. On his admission to Oriel late in 
1826 he quickly became an intimate of Newman’s and in due course warned Newman 
against the dogmatic drift of his opinions. He ended by being utterly appalled by them, 
and in consequence cut off converse with his young friend whom he had (and still 
secretly) admired.828  
          Blanco White published major attacks on Catholicism in 1825 and 1826.829 His 
most significant was the work just mentioned, his Practical and Internal Evidence 
                                                                                                                                                 
five-page dedication that he is indebted to Blanco White for such an insight into the Church of Rome as he 
could never have gained. Due to Blanco White, he had been able to see that its system amounted to the kind 
of religion that natural man is inclined to frame for himself. It exemplified the Religion of Nature. He states 
that Blanco White’s judgment was particularly valuable as he could be regarded as an eminent Roman 
Catholic divine and at the same time more eminently Protestant than most members of “our Church.”  
827 H. P. Liddon D.D., Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey.  London: Longmans. 1894, Vol. I, Ch. XVI, 1836. 
Internet archive on December 20, 2013:  http://anglicanhistory.org/pusey/liddon/1.16.html. 
Liddon has this to say of Blanco White (in the same paragraph of Vol I, Ch. XVI, as the sentence above):  
“Many years before, he became a professed Socinian his eager, remorseless, unappeasable 
dialectic was gnawing away at all that was fundamental in the Christian creed and life. To minds 
with a bias towards a meagre creed and an easy theory of living, he was a welcome teacher. 
Whately and Hampden sat at his feet, as he laid down his theories on subjects of which they knew 
nothing, or pointed out supposed corruptions of Christianity, Primitive, Anglican, and even 
Protestant, no less than Roman, with the confidence that among his hearers no one could answer 
him. Whately, indeed, was a nimble dialectician, but Blanco White's was a much more powerful 
mind than Whately's; and while Whately was entirely ignorant of any serious theological 
literature, and too scornful to make himself acquainted with it, Blanco White brought a vast mass 
of knowledge which may have silenced rather than interested him, and which he never 
assimilated. His influence on Whately was to sharpen the logician's anti-Church logic: his 
influence on Hampden was to provide a receptive student with new and ample material. The 
literature of Scholasticism, of which nobody in Britain, except one or two metaphysicians, knew 
anything, was to Blanco White perfectly familiar ground; and Blanco White not only directed 
Hampden's attention to this new field of reading, but furnished him with the bias with which he 
was to read it. It is within the truth to say that but for Blanco White's visit to Oxford, Hampden's 
Bampton Lectures could never have been written.”   
828 We see the mixture of great admiration and regret in Blanco White’s references to Newman in his 
posthumously published Life. For instance, in his Letter to the Rev. John Hamilton Thom, composed 
between August 8 and 21, 1839, he has this to say of Newman and the deleterious effects of Orthodoxy 
upon him: “… my heart feels a pang at the recollection of the affectionate and mutual friendship between 
that excellent man and myself; a friendship which his principles of Orthodoxy could not allow to continue 
in regard to one, whom he now regards as inevitably doomed to eternal perdition. Such is the venomous 
character of Orthodoxy. What mischief must it create in abad heart and narrow mind, when it can work so 
effectually for evil, in one of the most benevolent bosoms, and one of the ablest minds – in the amiable, the 
intellectual, the refined John Henry Newman!...” (Life of Joseph Blanco White, Vol III, pp. 131-132). 
829 For instance, we read in his posthumous Life, Vol. I (p. 420), that Blanco White “Finished the Poor 
Man’s Preservative against Popery, which was begun on the 27th of July”, on August 20th, 1825.  
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against Catholicism.830 Writing to congratulate Blanco White (on July 20, 1825), on the 
publication of this work (Evidence against Catholicism), Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
commended the “manliness” with which he had opposed “that current illiberal dogma 
that infidelity always arises from vice or corrupt affections”.831 The point being noticed 
here, though, is that according to Coleridge, this “illiberal” view (which was Keble’s too) 
was “current” and it was a “dogma” – indicating its spread and its firm acceptance. This 
“dogma” was that infidelity “always” (that is, broadly speaking) arises from vice, or as 
the Keble-Newman circle would say later, from a bad ethos. These remarks of Coleridge 
alone provide a context for Van Mildert’s firm position on the moral roots of religious 
error. Coleridge would not have heard of Newman at this point, but he may well have 
been aware of Van Mildert’s Boyle and Bampton Lectures which had been for some 
years in print. For Coleridge, they would clearly have represented the “current illiberal 
dogma” which he attacks. It is evident from the text of the book that Blanco White 
expressly means to refute this “illiberal dogma” – and this very apparent aim of the work 
perhaps occasioned Coleridge’s commendatory remarks to the author, his friend. It 
appears that Blanco White also regards it as a view which for his own credibility he must 
take seriously when admitting to and recounting, in the book, his past unbelief.832  
          We also notice from his Dedication to Edward Coppleston that Coppleston too 
holds it “wrong” to suppress religious error by force, “or to propagate religious truth by 
degrading and branding those who do not think with us”. This intolerance towards certain 
                                                 
830 This work won high praise from such persons as Robert Southey and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
Coleridge was anxious to make Blanco White’s acquaintance. They met at Highgate on July 14th.  
831 Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, written by himself, with portions of his Correspondence.   J. H. 
Thom editor, London: J. Chapman. 3 Volumes. 1845.  Vol. I, p. 419.  In this very letter to Blanco White, S. 
T. Coleridge shows that he was firmly of the opinion that internal dispositions are a necessary component 
of intellectual apprehension. He writes that “an infallibility wholly objective, and without any 
correspondent subjective, (call it grace, spiritual experience, or what you will,) is an absurdity..” (p. 419). 
       Coleridge did certainly allow (elsewhere) that a good heart will normally beget a belief in God and his 
judgment. He writes in his Biographia Literaria  that “The belief of a God and a future state, (if a passive 
acquiescence may be flattered with the name of belief,) does not indeed always beget a good heart; but a 
good heart so naturally begets the belief, that the very few exceptions must be regarded as strange 
anomalies from strange and unfortunate circumstances”.  S.T. Coleridge, 1817. Biographia Literaria. Ch. 
10, no. 136. Ed. with his aesthetical essays by J. Shawcross. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1907.    
Internet archive on September 16, 2013:  
http://archive.org/stream/cu31924102776196/cu31924102776196_djvu.txt)    
      This shows that Coleridge too connects virtue with right belief (in God), but his letter to Blanco White 
also shows that he is opposed to the further step, that “infidelity always arises from vice or corrupt 
affections”. 
832 Blanco White’s book was a response, in large measure, to Charles Butler’s The Book of the Roman-
Catholic Church: In a Series of Letters Addressed to Robt. Southey, Esq., LL.D., on His "Book of the 
Church". London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street. 1825. 
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opinions includes the practice of “degrading and branding”. That is, it is wrong to think 
error to be morally perverse. Blanco White adds that “I have suffered too much from 
religious despotism, not fully and cordially to hold the same doctrine”. Coppleston, 
Provost of Oriel, clearly opposed the notion that religious error was due to a morally bad 
ethos. Not long after, it was he who formally proposed that Blanco be awarded the 
University diploma.           
          Blanco White’s Practical and Internal Evidence against Catholicism is an 
important indicator of ideas at Oxford, inasmuch as, like Van Mildert’s volumes, it was 
well received by many in the University for its attack on popery and doctrinal intolerance. 
It was largely because of this book that Blanco was awarded his diploma by the 
University in April 1826.833 He was then welcomed into Oriel with its Common Room, 
and in his writings and opinions proceeded to contribute to the culture of the University 
and of the influential Oriel College. We might say that he contributed towards the 
disassociation of “right” belief from the moral life (or good ethos), and of heresy from 
moral perversity (or bad ethos). 
          In the first Letter of his book, Blanco White plainly intends, by presenting the facts 
of his own case, to refute the view that “immorality and levity are always the source of 
unbelief”.834 The facts of his own case, as narrated by him, were as follows. His parental 
upbringing in Spain was deeply religious and at the age of fourteen “all the seeds of 
devotion” arose in him “spontaneously.” He received regular spiritual direction from 
Oratorian priests,835 and after ordination to the Catholic priesthood devoted himself with 
success to the study of religion. He writes that his “rejection of Christianity took place at 
a period when my conscience could not reproach me with any open breach of duty”.836 
So precisely at the time of his apostasy, he states, his conscience was very clear. Further, 
                                                 
833 On April 19, 1826, Blanco White received a letter from Dr Coplestone telling him that the University 
was about to give him a Diploma of Master of Arts. This occurred on April 28
th
. On October 8
th
 he wore his 
Master’s gown for the first time, and on October 17th his name was entered at Oriel. On February 12th, 
1827, he walked with Dr Whately, and on the 18
th
 he drank tea with Newman. Towards the end of the year, 
November 28
th
, 1827 he received a letter from S. T. Coleridge who, in the course of it, entreated him to 
resume his correspondence with him. (The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, Vol. I, pp. 431-443). Just 
short of nine years later (January 27, 1835) he wrote to the Provost of Oriel asking that, in view of his Anti-
Trinitarianism and his adherence to Unitarianism, his name be taken off the Oriel College books (The Life 
of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, ed. J. H. Thom, 1845, Vol. II, pp. 88-89). 
834 J. B. White, Practical and Internal Evidence against Catholicism,  p. 18. 
835 Ibid., p. 5.  
836 Ibid., p. 6.  
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he strove to resist with “irresistible strength” the “involuntary doubts” that haunted 
him.837 He read, studied, preached and had even published (a sermon) on infidelity.  
          Yet despite his irreproachable conscience, a year later he was bordering on 
atheism. Had it not been for the fact that the history of his own mind was the same – so 
he claimed – as that of a “great portion of the Spanish clergy”, he “would submit to the 
humbling conviction,838 that either weakness of judgment or fickleness of character, had 
been the only source of my errors.” The crux of Blanco’s argument is that his “errors” 
were “the spontaneous suggestion” of his principled intellect despite a background 
entirely favourable to religion. His infidelity issued from an irresistible perception of the 
fundamental fallacy underpinning the entire Catholic religion, a perception shared – he 
claimed – by clerical peers of similar situation and attainments.  Implicitly Blanco White 
is saying that in following the unavoidable logic of the case he was acting according to 
his conscience. That is to say, it was precisely his moral integrity that led him into 
“unbelief.” It had nothing to do with a “bad ethos”, or lack of virtue. This, incidentally, 
reminds us that Newman’s insistence on the pre-eminence of “fidelity to conscience” in 
forming a right ethos is not meant in just any sense. 
          In the Letter (of Blanco White’s book) we are given more information about the 
fallacy he believed he had discovered in Catholicism. Prior to his rejection of the 
Christian faith, he had grounded his faith on the infallibility of the Church – and “no 
Roman Catholic pretends to a better foundation.” His “first doubts” concerned precisely 
this tenet and what he took to be its foundation. “I believed the infallibility of the church 
because the Scripture said she was infallible; while I had no better proof that the Scripture 
said so, than the assertion of the church, that she could not mistake the Scripture”.839 This 
vicious circle, as Blanco White perceived it, was the flimsy basis of the religious 
authority of the Catholic Church. White is saying that his rejection of Catholicism and 
passing over to unbelief – which at this point bordered on atheism – was due simply to 
his rational perception of the illogicality of the Catholic position. It had nothing whatever 
to do with moral failure – actually, quite to the contrary. He was acting on nothing other 
than his perception of the truth of the matter. Indirectly, we might say that he was 
                                                 
837 Ibid., p. 7. 
838 Ibid., p. 8. 
839 Ibid., p. 21. 
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proposing his “infidelity” as due to his own good ethos, which is to say to his following 
his conscience. 
          This in fact is the thesis presented in most of Blanco White’s autobiographical 
accounts and especially his 3-volume posthumous Life edited by Thom.840 It is his dutiful 
search for the truth that leads him into, then back out of, and once again into a final 
rejection of the body of Christian dogma.841 He ended his life in formal rejection of 
orthodox Christian doctrine, protesting all the while that he was following the call of 
truth.842 So then, here we have a viewpoint that contradicts Newman’s position – and that 
of many others843 — that positive unbelief is (generally) due to moral fault, which is to 
say a bad ethos.844 The point being made here, though, is that the matter of ethos was 
entertained, accepted and contested more widely than, and prior to, the Oxford 
Movement. If we were to ask, what was the origin of Newman’s idea of the pre-eminent 
                                                 
840 John Hamilton Thom, editor.  Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, written by himself, with portions of 
his Correspondence.  London: J. Chapman. 1845.  3 Vols.  
841 Blanco White, in Vol. I of his Life gives ample evidence of his profession that a sincere following of his 
conscience led finally to his formal rejection of orthodox Christianity. For instance, having quoted a long 
entry in his own Journal of December 21
st, 1818, in which he states that “I cannot persuade myself that he 
(i.e. Jesus) could be God, properly so called” (p. 356) nor that “Christ is God and Man” (p. 357), he writes 
in March, 1835, that “I feel delighted and grateful that I possess a proof so perfectly satisfactory, of my 
earnestness and sincerity in the examination of these religious subjects” (p. 359)… “Thus it is that I find 
myself as settled an Unitarian as if, since the end of 1818 to the present moment, I had read nothing but 
Unitarian works. My Unitarianism is the result of my own thoughts, in the study of the New Testament” (p. 
360). The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, ed. J. H. Thom, 3 vols., Vol. I. 1845. 
842 On December 22, 1834, Blanco White wrote in his Journal that “I yesterday wrote a letter, declaring 
that my views in regard to the Scripture Doctrine respecting our Saviour, have gradually become Unitarian” 
(Life, vol II, p. 61). On December 29 he writes that “I wish openly to separate myself from the Church of 
England” (ibid., p. 65), and that “I hereby solemnly declare that after a very long consideration and study of 
the subject, I am convinced that he Doctrine of the Trinity is not true: that, at all times, it must have been 
injurious to the Spirit of Christianity” (ibid., p. 67). On January 2, 1835, he wrote to his Dublin host, 
Archbishop Whately, declaring that he was “a decided Anti-Trinitarian” (ibdi., p. 71), that he intended to 
publish this fact, and that in consequence within days he would leave Whately’s residence for Liverpool. A 
week later he arrived there at his friend Zuueta’s house (ibid., p. 78), soon at home with the Unitarian 
community, all the while professing his dutiful adherence to the Truth. (Life, Vol. II, pp. 80-100). On 
March 3, 1835 he writes in his Journal that “I have followed TRUTH whithersoever (according to my 
conscience) it has led me” (Life, Vol. II, p. 105). 
     If anything shows that Newman’s position on virtue (and the following of conscience) being necessary 
to attain religious truth cannot be reduced to a mere “following of one’s conscience”, it is his response 
when finishing Blanco White’s posthumous Life in 1845. He regarded it as tragically dismal. Plainly, for 
Newman more was required in a correct moral ethos than the mere “following of one’s conscience”.  
843 To the end, Blanco White potests this position. In a letter to Dr Channing on October 9, 1839, he states 
that “I cannot find in myself any spirit of dogmatism, though I feel great practical security. That I may be 
wrong, is exceedingly probable; that I am criminally wrong, I cannot believe: my conscience assures me 
that I am not.” (Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, ed. J. H. Thom, Vol III, 1845, p. 105). 
844 Having made known his Unitarianism, in a letter of March 11
th
, 1835 to a correspondent, Blanco White 
declares that “At all periods of my rational existence, even when feeling, rather than conviction, had made 
me lapse into the theological habits of my youth, I have fearlessly asserted, what I knew from experience, 
that unbelief is not necessarily the result of depravity, much less can dissent from certain theological views 
be referred to as moral faults” (The Life of Blanco Joseph White, Vol. II, pp. 108-109). 
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role of the moral ethos (and conscience) in accounting for a person’s apprehension of 
religious truth and Revelation, we cannot look simply to Keble (via Froude). Taking 
Oxford alone as an example, we can see it was current. As has been said, it was “in the 
air”.845 
 
4.2.3.   Ethos and Newman, before Froude and Keble.  
The question of the currency of the idea of ethos, as extending well beyond Keble, is one 
matter. But inasmuch as the subject of this investigation is the history of the idea of the 
conscience in Newman’s life and thought, we must now consider the rise in Newman 
himself of the essential elements of the notion of a moral ethos and its connection with 
the knowledge of religious truth, for manifestly the conscience is critical in the formation 
of a moral ethos. A pivotal aspect of the matter is this, that a good moral ethos is not just 
necessary in order to assent to the truth, but also that doctrinal error is generally due to, 
and reveals, a bad or unsatisfactory moral ethos. This was Keble’s theory, and it was the 
view of others too – such as Van Mildert of the High Church party. But what of 
Newman? 
          James Pereiro seems to conclude to Newman’s dependence for the idea of ethos on 
Froude and Keble because of Newman’s passing remark in his letter to Blanco White of 
March, 1828. That was that he had “Froude’s authority for lowering the intellectual 
powers into handmaids of our moral nature.”846 But he offers no discussion of Newman’s 
position on the connection of a moral temper of mind with right knowledge prior to 1828, 
the year beginning his serious intimacy with Keble and his protegés, now tutors with 
Newman. But this analysis is surely necessary if we are to interpret properly that passing 
                                                 
845 The idea that virtue is needed for right religious knowledge appeared even in overseas publications, as 
W. G. Ward, who later argued for this point, showed. In the first of his series of articles in the British Critic 
(October 1841), William George Ward cited several passages from the German Catholic theologian Johann 
Adam Moehler’s book “On the Unity of the Church or the Principle of Catholicism” (Die Einheit in der 
Kirche oder das Princip des Katholicismus, 1825). They supported his point (against Dr Arnold) that 
religious understanding depends on a virtuous and obedient life (W. G. Ward, October 1841 – book review: 
Art. II. – Christian Life, its Course, its Hindrances, and its Helps, Sermons preached mostly in the Chapel 
of Rugby School. By Thomas Arnold, D.D. Head Master of Rugby School, and late Fellow of Oriel 
College, Oxford, London: Fellowes.) Citations from Moehler are given by Ward on pp. 328-330.   
846 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol II, p. 60. To Joseph Blanco White. Oriel College. March 1, 
1828. 
     Pereiro writes that (apart from Keble), “Froude had also played an important role in the formation of 
Newman’s ideas about ethos. As he put it in 1828, he relied on Froude’s authority ‘for lowering the 
intellectual powers into handmaids of our moral nature.’” (‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, pp. 102-103). 
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and somewhat incidental statement. Pereiro also cites847 support from Vincent Blehl who 
“reckoned that Froude had introduced Newman to a concept of ethos unknown to 
him”.848 Stephen Thomas could also be mentioned as being in support of this view.849  It 
must be said that even apart from the question of Pereiro’s interpretation of this particular 
remark by Newman, a discussion of the development in Newman of the idea of the 
necessity of a moral temper of mind for truth is obviously necessary as part of any study 
of Newman’s developing idea of the conscience. That is to say, this part of our historical 
investigation would be necessary even if Newman had made no reference to Froude’s 
“authority” in his note to Blanco White. 
 
     4.2.3.    (a)     The Evangelical Newman and “ethos”  (1818-1825)   
          There was no significant change of religious opinions during Newman’s 
undergraduate years at Trinity – a period which he looked back on with happiness late in 
life. He was firmly Evangelical and enjoying the continuing friendship and influence of 
his original mentor, Walter Mayers. In respect to the connection of practice (and, 
implicitly, of character) with right belief, we do notice that Newman writes in his Journal 
in October 1819 – during his time at Trinity – that “As a man’s faith, so is his 
practice”.850 This is recorded as being a Scripture teaching.851 Eight years later in his 
“Occasional thoughts” of 1827, Froude would note the connection of moral character 
                                                 
847 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, footnote 73, p. 103. 
848 V. Blehl,  Pilgrim Journey: John Henry Newman, 1801-1845  London: Burns & Oates.  2001, p. 179. 
849 S. Thomas, Newman and Heresy: the Anglican Years.  Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 1991. On p. 25 Thomas writes (my emphasis in italics and at times in bold):  “The final reference to 
John Keble points to the probable ultimate source of Newman’s connection between the capacity to 
receive revealed truth with full assent, and moral character or ethos. Although he had already, simply and 
briefly in his 1819 Journal, made this connection, Keble’s characteristic exaltation of ethos over intellect 
would have reinforced it, providing a powerful means of explaining the presence of heterodoxy... 
        Keble’s ardent disciple… Hurrell Froude..... had in July 1827, written “On the Connection between a 
Right Faith and Right Practice; on the Ethos of Heresy”. In four closely argued pages, Froude achieves a 
level of systematic speculation upon the nature of heresy, which Newman had not yet attained. Froude’s 
argument is directed against the idea that two distinct principles of causality, that is, right faith and right 
practice, operate in relation to salvation. Rather, the two must be connected, since it is possible to be as 
responsible for one’s beliefs as for one’s actions. Froude advances his argument in three stages.... (p. 25) 
..... … There is for Froude, then, an ethos of heresy. The common atmosphere between Froude and 
Newman is clear: both identify intellectual with moral soundness, and it is likely that Froude influenced 
Newman in this instance - at least in conversation, if he had not by this time read the passage in Froude’s 
“Occasional Thoughts” (p. 26) ... 
850  J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p. 162 (Early Journals: Book I).  
851 This point, though, is made primarily to show the importance of holding to the content of the Faith. If 
one fails in the holding of the faith, this will affect one’s practice.  
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with faith.852 It indicates in the young Newman, still a teenager, an interest in the 
connection between the faith and the way one chooses to live – or the content of the faith 
and a moral character. Probably, though, Newman’s appreciation of the idea of ethos 
(without the word necessarily being used) received a significant impetus from reading 
associated with his conversion of 1816 (and early 1817). 853 
 
          Of interest to our topic is Newman’s earliest published position, as contained in his 
letter to the Christian Observer of May 1821. This was an Anglican Evangelical 
periodical, founded in 1802 in response to the Dissenters’ Leeds Mercury. Newman was a 
20-year-old recent graduate. This was, of course, prior to the 1823 reading parties 
elsewhere of the High Anglican Keble with his protegés – Newman’s three future 
companion Tutors. It is also at the time of Keble’s sermons of the early 1820s,854 in 
which Scripture is used to support his point about moral rectitude enabling right religious 
knowledge. Newman was writing as a young Anglican Evangelical, and in an Anglican 
Evangelical organ.  
          Newman’s concern in his letter is with the rejection of “the truths of the Bible”.855 
Rather than present an argument providing evidences for the truth of those doctrines, the 
                                                 
852 R. H. Froude, Remains of the late Reverend Richard Hurrell Froude, M.A. fellow of Oriel College, 
Oxford. in two volumes. London: printed for J.G. & F. Rivington, St Paul's Church yard, and Waterloo 
Place, Pall Mall. 1838. Vol I.  (July 16, 1827) “On the connection between a right faith and right  practice; 
on the ethos of heresy”. Froude asks, “Is there or is there not, the same probability that a man who is 
morally good, will have a right faith?”  p. 114.   
853 As said, I think we may place an exposure to Newman of the idea that infidelity and heresy is connected 
to an immoral character in the year of his conversion, 1816. We read in the Apologia of “two other works, 
which produced a deep impression on me in the same Autumn of 1816 … I read Joseph Milner’s Church 
History …” (p. 7). Now we cannot but help noticing Milner’s verdict on Arius’s dramatic death (and his 
career was all about heresy). The young Newman would have pondered on it. Milner’s judgment is,  
“That the danger of the Church from heresy was particularly great at this time, will be equally 
admitted by all who believe that the Trinitarian doctrine includes within it whatever is most 
precious and interesting in the Gospel: that here on one side an appeal was made to God in his own 
appointed way, in faith, prayer, patience, and sincerity; while the other side dealt in falsehood, 
artifice, ambition and worldly policy, is evident from the narrative. …. Certain it is, that the fear of 
God rested with the Trinitarians, though it was at too low an ebb among all parties. Among these, 
however, nothing like such wickedness appears; while the Arians evidently seem to have been 
given up to the greatest villainies and profligacy” (my italics, for emphasis). 
J. Milner, The History of the Church of Christ Volume 2 (publ. 1795), chapter III (at end of chapter III). 
January 10, 2014: http://www.biblestudytools.com/history/milner-history-of-the-church-of-christ-vol-2/ 
854 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, p. 94.  Pereiro discusses these sermons which he has 
studied. 
855 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. 1, p.102-105.  May 1821 (to the Christian Observer): 
Part of Newman’s Letter to the Editor of the Christian Observer (May 1821) is the following:  
(regarding) “Mathematical studies ... no science perhaps is more adapted to confirm our belief in 
the truth of Christianity than that of mathematics, when cultivated with a proper disposition of 
mind. It is calculated to humble us, ...  If persons would but consider this analogy, if they would 
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young man, just out of his teens, chooses to comment on the “proper disposition of mind” 
– the “temper” of mind – which favours their reception or rejection. This is his interest – 
as it was to be in his correspondence with Blanco White seven years later. Mathematical 
science, he writes, “when cultivated with a proper disposition of mind” is especially 
adapted to “confirm our belief in the truth of Christianity”.856  Such study “is calculated to 
humble us”. If persons who reject the truths of the Bible would but approach revealed 
religion with the same humble impartiality with which they should approach science, 
“there would be but few objectors to the truths of the Bible.” So a humble impartiality of 
mind is needed for the acceptance of revealed truth – the critical need is “a proper 
disposition of mind” (my italics).  
          Newman does not fault unbelievers in their intelligence or logic. Rather, they are 
prejudiced, and this involves attitudes to truth and to duty. They “fear lest the Gospel 
should be true,” they “are not inclined to spiritual duties.” Indeed, they “hate the light” – 
the young Evangelical is manifesting his biblical reading and Evangelical convictions 
(John 3: 18-21). Unbelief arises from a dislike of the Gospel and a disinclination to 
spiritual obligations. That is, as we might interpret him, such persons are not virtuous. In 
this, his first public declaration on belief and unbelief, Newman sees the root of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
but apply something of the same temper and calm judgment to religion which they do not refuse to 
science, there would be but few objectors to the truths of the Bible. But their passions are brought 
into play: they fear lest the Gospel should be true; they hate the light, their heart is not inclined to 
spiritual duties and therefore they approach the examination of the Scriptures with prejudice; they 
decide superficially and turn away in disgust. The conclusions of Newton are implicitly believed, 
because the arguments which prove their truth are sound. The nature of those conclusions makes 
no difference in our belief; we acknowledge them whatever they may turn out to be; be they 
difficult, mysterious, incomprehensible, seemingly contradictory, it matters not: they are proved. ... 
What would be said to that man, who, instead of sifting the proofs on which these propositions are 
built, and beginning with the demolition of the premises, should commence with asserting the 
falsity of the conclusion from some a priori conception of his own fancy, and then proceed, by the 
help of this assumption of error in the conclusion, to overthrow the reasonings on which it is 
founded? Yet this thing is done daily with the Bible. Men begin at the wrong end of the scale of 
reasoning; and having refuted, as they conceive, a doctrine by arguments resting on the basis of 
pre-conceived ideas, they proceed up the ladder, and arrive at once at the portentous determination, 
that all the proofs which have been advanced in support of that doctrine, and the book which 
contains an avowal of that doctrine, must be erroneous. It is in this spirit that they lay down the 
unphilosophical axiom, ‘a true religion can have no mysteries;’ and then infer either that 
Christianity is not a true religion, because it contains mysteries - or that it contains no mysteries, 
because it is a true religion. Nothing can be more illogical, more unworthy of a person of science 
than such conclusions; but where the passions of men are roused, and their interests concerned, 
little regard is paid to consistency or impartiality….”      
Months later, Newman’s father said to his son, warning him against the temper of mind he was cultivationg 
in himself and predicting change in opinion, “I know you write for the Christian Observer. My opinion of 
the Christian Observer is this, that it is a humbug. You must use exertions. That letter was more like the 
composition of an old man, that of a youth just entering life with energy and aspirations.”  
J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 179 (Sunday January 6, 1822). 
856 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 102.   
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matter as lying in, without using the expression, an ethos or moral temper of mind – and 
fidelity and impartial commitment to duty is a prominent component of it. Newman’s 
firm assurance of this, as expressed in his letter of May 1821 (a time when, he later said, 
he was very much part of the Evangelical community),857 suggests that his view is 
derived from his Evangelical influences following his conversion. Of course, these 
“Evangelical influences” must be understood broadly. Just as the Evangelical Milner was 
open to the thought of the un-Evangelical Butler,858 so too Newman would have been 
open to certain non-Evangelical influences. His letter of 1821 expresses thought which 
looks similar to that expressed in both Volumes, and especially in Volume II, of Van 
Mildert’s Boyle Lectures. It is not unlikely that Newman had been reading Van Mildert 
while an undergraduate at Trinity. 
          Certainly, the standard Evangelical concern was primarily for the state of the heart, 
rather than the accomplishments and abilities of the reason. When the young Newman 
fell under the influence of Mayers, his mentor urged on him Doddridge’s The Rise and 
Progress of Religion in the Soul. He read assiduously William Beveridge’s Private 
Thoughts. Both these works instilled the thought that one must be spiritually minded. The 
earnest Christian governs his mind and thoughts, and forms a proper and moral habit of 
mind. The will has a power to control thoughts and beliefs, and it should be used for this 
very moral purpose.  
          This is evident in John Newton, too. Apart from his Authentic Narrative which 
chronicles the rise in him of a sensitive conscience and its leading him to an apprehension 
of and assent to the Christian faith, Newton’s other famous work was his Cardiphonia, 
or, The Utterance of the Heart.859 The very title of the work illustrates this emphasis. 
Belief involves utterances of the heart. It warns that a “moonlight head-knowledge, 
derived from a system of sentiments, …. is, in my judgment, a poor thing.” Rather, “The 
gospel addresses both head and heart.”860 The state of the heart and the consequent 
temper of mind is decisive in the acceptance of divine revelation. In his chapter, “Eight 
                                                 
857 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. XXX, pp. 180, To George T. Edwards  Birmingham  Febr 8. 
1883. 
858 As in Milner’s attack on Hume, using Butler’s ideas on the Conscience (in his Gibbon’s Account of 
Christianity) 
859 Rev. J. Newton, Cardiphonia or, The Utterance of the Heart in the Course of a Real Correspondence   
Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.  (Undated.  Advertisement 1780).           
Internet archive on September 18, 2013:      
http://archive.org/stream/cardiphoniaorutt00newtuoft#page/148/mode/2up 
860 Ibid., Letter III to Mrs –, p. 290. 
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Letters to the Reverend Mr. S –” (probably addressed to the Rev. Thomas Scott, 
Newton’s convert and the young Newman’s greatly admired author), Newton writes that 
“true religion is not a science of the head, so much as an inward and heart-felt 
perception”.861  Again, “It is not through defect of understanding, but a want of simplicity 
and humility, that so many stumble like the blind at noon-day, and can see nothing of 
those great truths which are written in the Gospel as with a sun-beam”.862  
          In his Gibbon’s Account of Christianity Considered, Together with some strictures 
on Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1781), the Evangelical Joseph 
Milner makes it clear that what is needed was spiritual understanding. He writes that 
“following the rational scent of Mr. Locke, who first unhappily gave Reason leave to 
intrude herself into the secrets of Christianity, (he, Hume) keeps her in full employ, till he 
has demolished all, both natural and revealed religion”.863 Evangelical writers such as 
Newton, Scott, Beveridge, Milner and others had an implicit theory of religious 
knowledge, and it involved the influence of the state of the heart and a moral life.864  
Plainly, this was derived from Scripture. 
          We see this general theory of religious knowledge also in Newman’s personal 
correspondence. Newman was soon to have the anxiety of seeing his brother Charles, a 
                                                 
861 Ibid., To Rev. Mr. S – Letter 1, p. 149. 
862 Ibid., Letter 2, p. 152. 
863 J. Milner, Gibbon’s Account of Christianity considered: Together with some Strictures on Hume’s 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.  York: Printed by A. Ward; and sold by G. Robinson ... and T. 
Cadell ... London; J. Merrill, in Cambridge; J. Fletcher, in Oxford; W. Tesseyman, in York; T. Browne, in 
Hull; and J. Binns, in Leeds. 1781, p. 199.    Internet Archive, on September 20, 2013: 
http://archive.org/stream/gibbonsaccountof00miln#page/n5/mode/2up 
   During 1818 (Newman’s first full year at Trinity – when he won his 9-year scholarship) Newman read 
some of Gibbon. In view of his early love for Milner (Apologia, p. 7) one wonders whether he also read 
Milner’s critique of Gibbon and Hume in Gibbon’s Account of Christianity Considered. If so, it would have 
introduced to him Butler’s thought on the Conscience, which the Evangelical Milner draws on for his 
critiques of these authors.  
864 Richard Marius writes of Luther’s view of the right understanding of Holy Scripture:  
“So Luther could explain easily enough why so many people disagreed with him so profoundly on 
what Scripture meant. False interpreters, he thought, did not possess the Word of God. And 
without the Word, they must be on the side of the devil. … If people did not understand Scripture, 
it was because they did not possess the Word; and without the Word they must be the agents of 
Satan, no matter how innocent they might appear.”  (Luther: A Biography. 1974, p. 107).      
If Richard Marius is right, then Luther thought that moral dispositions were deeply connected with the 
apprehension of truth. In writing of the Oxford Movement’s view of the ethos of the Reformers, Pereiro 
tells us that in “the religious polemics of the sixteenth century both Catholic and Protestant controversialists 
argued along similar lines: holy lives and holy doctrine went together, as did moral and theological 
corruption” (J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, p. 189, footnote 11 – referring to H. Parish). 
    That was Luther. Luther’s lay English opponent, Thomas More, had a similar conviction. It seems that 
More’s high regard for Bishop John Fisher’s indubitable personal holiness was a chief reason for his taking 
to heart Fisher’s arguments on the strict primacy of the Bishop of Rome. (“Introduction” to Saint John 
Fisher’s The Defence of the Priesthood, by Stanley Jaki, p. xvii. Real View Books, Fraser, Michigan, 1996) 
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year his junior, gradually abandoning Christianity. Charles was destined never to make 
his way in life – as his father predicted. As has been referred to previously, on Saturday 
August 9, 1823 865 Newman noted a long discussion (“from Turnham Green to 
Knightsbridge”) which he had with Charles on points of his unbelief. Two doctrines that 
Charles questioned were the doctrine of Hell and the sinful condition of man – which is 
to say, the very reality of “sin.” These, of course, were pivotal Evangelical doctrines, and 
Newman would think long on each in future years,866 for they commonly constituted an 
obstacle to the acceptance of the Christian faith. Charles criticizes Newton and Scott, 
which suggests that both these Evangelical authors had been spoken of by his older 
brother with respect. Charles also appealed to Butler’s Analogy for support on a point – a 
book, Charles reminded Newman, “which you recommended me”.  
          Newman records three things that he stressed with his brother on this occasion. 
Before anyone could judge of the Scripture doctrines (which is to say, before one can 
attain religious truth) he had “to read the Bible constantly and attentively, to pray for 
grace to understand it incessantly, and to strive to live up to the dictates of conscience and 
what the mind acknowledges to be right”.867 Let us immediately notice that these 
requirements for the acceptance of Revelation (“the Scripture doctrines”) are not 
reducible simply to following “the dictates of the conscience”. As a matter of fact fidelity 
to the conscience comes third in the list, suggesting that the first two are a kind of 
foundation or at least context for an indispensable fidelity to the conscience. Those two 
are the readiness to study the Bible assiduously, and a resolve to pray for divine aid in the 
understanding of it.868 So the temper of mind required of one to judge Scripture doctrines 
aright required, but was more than mere fidelity to “the dictates of the conscience”.  This 
stands to reason, for one could be pursuing the dictates of a profoundly mistaken 
conscience, one that had no interest in reading “the Bible constantly and attentively” – 
                                                 
865 J. H. Newman, J. H. Autobiographical Writings,  pp. 192-193. 
866 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. XXIX, p. 296,  To E. B. Pusey,  The Oratory  Aug.4. 1880 
867 Ibid., p. 193. 
868 This was in 1823 – when Newman was firmly Evangelical still. That is to say, the ethos behind his own 
understanding of revealed truth was at this point an Evangelical protestant one. The context of the upright 
conscience was the Bible – with a dogmatic framework, but with little store placed on the Church. He was a 
man of Scripture and Creed, but not yet a church man. Within his commitment to dogmatic truth there were 
the seeds of a future Catholic ethos, but this was yet to emerge. 
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indeed one that was hostile to it. A certain ethos was required, a matrix of basic principles 
within which the dutiful conscience operated.869 
          Certain basic philosophical assumptions were also involved – all making up the 
ethos that is necessary. In his letter to Charles of 12 December that same year, 1823,870 
Newman refers back to their conversation of August 9, and insists that as in other 
disciplines, the critical issue in religion is the readiness to acknowledge and accept 
objective truth as a point of duty. It will not do to allow that one opinion is as good as 
another, though they be even contradictory. “We find one man of one opinion in religion, 
another of another,” he writes. “Contradictions can no more be true in religion” he 
continues, “than in astronomy or chemistry.” That is to say, objective truth is a fact, and 
its acceptance is a duty. Truth is not morally neutral, as if a mere intellectual preference. 
The temper or basic position of a person’s mind must be such as to have accepted this. 
          Importantly, there is a connection between holding the faith and moral excellence. 
He writes: “he who holdeth not ‘the faith,’ (I am not now determining what that faith is) 
such a one is said to be incapable of true moral excellence, and so exposed to the 
displeasure of God”.871  Newman’s primary source for this dictum that unbelief negates 
moral goodness would have been the doctrine of Scripture (for such a one “is said” to be 
incapable).872 Newman continues that this moral fault will show itself in a failure to be 
                                                 
869 Decades later Newman referred to the idea of “ethos” held by him and his friends when at Oxford. 
Writing to Sister Mary Gabriel du Boulay from the Oratory on January 2, 1870, Newman had this to say:  
(There is a need for) “what I call levelling up. If we are to convert souls savingly they must have the due 
preparation of heart, and if England is to be converted, there must be a great move of the national mind to a 
better sort of religious sentiment. Wesleyans, Anglicans, Congregationalists, Unitarians, must be raised to 
one and the same (what we used to call at Oxford) 'ethos'. That is the same moral and intellectual state of 
mind to bring them to this is 'levelling up'.” (Letters and Diaries, Vol. 25, p. 3). Obviously Newman was 
not implying that the lack of a common and necessary “ethos” was due simply to a failure in the following 
of their consciences on the part of “Wesleyans, Anglicans, Congregationalists, Unitarians”. 
870 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries.  Vol. I, p. 169. 
871 Ibid., p. 170. 
872 An obvious reference in Scripture, one may suppose, would be Mark 16:16: “He who believes and is 
baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned.” This judgment of God on 
deliberate unbelief presumes that this deliberate unbelief is morally culpable and indicative of serious moral 
fault. There is, then, a connection between moral character and religious opinion. Another reference in 
Scripture, among many, is that which we notice at the end of the Acts of the Apostles, when Paul 
pronounces on those who did not believe, quoting Isaiah: “The Holy Spirit spoke the truth to your 
forefathers when he said through Isaiah the prophet: ‘Go to this people and say, ‘You will be ever hearing 
but never understanding; you will be ever seeing but never perceiving.’ For this people’s heart has become 
calloused; they hardly hear with their ears, and they have closed their eyes. Otherwise they might see with 
their eyes, hear with their ears, understand with their hearts and turn, and I would heal them.’” (Acts of the 
Apostles 28: 25-27). Again, St Paul, writing to the Ephesians, has this to say of the “Gentiles”: “They are 
darkened in their understanding and separated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them 
due to the hardening of their hearts” (Ephesians 4: 18). (My italics). We read in 1 Kings 3: 9 Solomon’s 
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conscientious in seeking the truth of the matter. The “conscience” must be roused to its 
duty by the thought of the consequences: “the first point then to press upon the 
conscience is that we are playing with edged tools, if instead of endeavouring 
perseveringly to ascertain what the truth is, we consider the subject carelessly, 
capriciously, or with indifference.” Furthermore, this failure to be conscientious in 
ascertaining the truth is common: “Now it will be found, I presume, even on a slight 
examination, that the generality of men have not made up their religious views in this 
sincere spirit...” 873  
          All up, the young Newman (this is 1823) goes beyond the position that fidelity to 
the conscience – in other words a moral life – is necessary for the attainment of religious 
truth. He is also saying that unbelief involves moral failure and the lack of a moral temper 
of mind.  
          But it is not a simple matter. Newman does not formally claim that a good person 
will necessarily attain the truth (which tended to be a Protestant assumption). Further, on 
August 9, 1824 – just several weeks ordained a deacon – Newman writes to his father that 
“a good dissenter is of course incomparably better than a bad Churchman – but a good 
Churchman I think better than a good dissenter.”874 This would imply that, as Newman 
then sees the matter, other things being equal, the good Churchman is to be presumed a 
man of a better moral character and ethos than the good dissenter. He assents to the fuller 
revealed truth that is included in Church principles, while the Dissenter rejects this fuller 
truth, however sincerely. This particular view, of course, would gain in him a much more 
balanced sophistication in the years ahead.  
         James Pereiro suggests that Newman’s remark in his letter to Blanco White on 1 
March, 1828 875 (that he relied on Froude’s authority “for lowering the intellectual 
powers into handmaids of our moral nature”) indicates that he depended on Froude for 
                                                                                                                                                 
prayer: “Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern between 
good and bad”. What is needed is an understanding heart. It is the heart that understands. 
       Newman, as part of his stress on moral character, stresses obedience in moral action for a person to 
attain moral and religious truth. This is not especially original. We notice it in No. 89 of The Catechism of 
the Catholic Church  (1994, 1997), in the section “The Interpretation of the Heritage of Faith” (I, ch. II, 
Art. II, Sect 3). The text states that “Dogmas are lights along the path of faith; they illuminate it and make it 
secure. Conversely, if our life is upright, our intellect and heart will be open to welcome the light shed by 
the dogmas of faith”. It then refers the reader to John 8: 31 (“If you continue in my word, you are truly my 
disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free”).  (My italics). 
873 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries.  Vol. I, p. 170. 
874 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries.  Vol.1, p. 184. 
875 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries.  Vol. II,  p. 60. 
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this idea.876  But Newman’s letter of 1821, his dealings with Charles in 1823, and his 
letter to his father in August of 1824 – his Evangelical period – show that he had the 
elements of this idea well before his meeting with Froude, let alone his later friendship 
with Keble. It is much more likely that Newman’s incidental remark to Blanco White on 
his relying on “Froude’s authority” was a kind of jesting way of pointing to support for 
his own view. He brings forward Froude’s “authority” as being in full agreement with the 
general idea he has just insisted on, while then going on to stress that he himself took it 
further than his companions.  
         In his discussions with his brother in 1823, Newman also distinguishes between 
internal and external evidence of revealed truth. Each involves different criteria of truth. 
The criteria for external evidences are not peculiar to religion. They are criteria normal to 
human reason and the rules of general argument. Newman would go on to examine this 
point in the years ahead, and, in the line of Butler, to develop his theory that in matters of 
fact it is not mere demonstration but a sense of powerful probability which brings the 
mind to certitude. However, what Newman insists on at this early stage is the place of 
“moral feeling” in the matter of internal evidence.  
          The point is kept up. On March 3, 1825, he writes to his brother Charles that while 
external evidences are judged by “the obvious and general canons” by which we judge 
the truth of everything – which is to say, “purely logical principles” – the “internal 
evidence depends a great deal on moral feeling; so that if we did not agree, we might 
accuse each other of prejudice or pride”.877 He is speaking of a moral ethos. Three weeks 
after this letter, he drives the point hard against his brother. “I consider the rejection of 
Christianity to arise from a fault of the heart, not of the intellect; that unbelief arises, not 
from mere error of reasoning, but either from pride or from sensuality….. A dislike of the 
contents of Scripture is at the bottom of unbelief.” That is, since the contents (i.e., the 
doctrine itself) must be rejected (because of this prideful or sensual dislike), the 
evidences for it must in some way be rejected. The unbeliever is not impartial in the 
temper of his mind, and this is because of his dislike. He dislikes – indeed, he hates – 
what he sees. There is “at the bottom that secret antipathy for the doctrines of 
                                                 
876 J. Pereiro, Ethos and the Oxford Movement, p. 102. 
877  J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 214. 
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Christianity, which is quite out of the reach of argument”.878 This is the point he made in 
his letter nearly four years earlier, in May, 1821. 
          And so Newman does not expect “so much to show Christianity true, as to prove it 
rational, nor to prove infidelity false, so much as irrational”.879 We can also see here the 
beginnings of Newman’s grappling with the notion of what it is to be rational and 
reasonable. It was impossible to show that Christianity was true, if a false notion of 
rationality held the field, and if there were to be lacking a truly moral life disposing the 
mind for the acceptance of the truth. Here Newman is stressing the pivotal effect of a 
person’s state of mind and heart, which includes his possession of the right fundamental 
starting points and a moral readiness to follow his conscience.  
          In fact, there was a further consideration, Newman told his brother the following 
month. It indicated that his moral state disqualified him from attaining the truth of the 
matter. On April 14 (1825) he wrote that “one proof” of his brother being “under the 
influence of pride” was his assumption that the “unassisted reason is competent to 
discover moral and religious truth.”880 This was one of the assumptions which were 
inimical to attaining the truth, and the roots of this assumption were moral.881 Charles had 
thought in this fashion for some time, Newman pointed out – which would have meant 
that he “never entered into the spirit of Christianity”.882 He never had its ethos – so he 
could not grasp its truth. 
          Newman is stressing a temper of mind that involved certain assumptions and 
moral attitudes which lie at the origin of the rejection of revelation. Its roots are moral, 
but we ought note, as already said, that this is more than a matter simply of following or 
not following one’s “conscience”. One may be following one’s conscience as one thinks 
one sees it, but one’s vision and judgment may be blinded because of a deeper moral 
failure and vice – manifested in dislike of revealed doctrine. On July 26 of the same year 
– in answer to a letter from Charles a week earlier, Newman repeats this point. Charles is 
labouring under a prejudice originating in dislike: “I have stated what I consider a fact; 
that your doubts of the truth of Christianity originated in a dislike of its doctrines. I 
                                                 
878 Ibid., p. 219.  (To Charles Robert Newman,  March 24
th
. 1825). 
879 Ibid. 
880 Ibid., pp. 227-228. 
881 It may be noted that in his three-volume Life, consisting of diaries, letters and observations, Blanco 
White (who ended his life in total rejection of orthodox Christian doctrine and in Socinianism), constantly 
places emphasis on, and exalts, Reason. The grand instrument of attaining religious truth is Reason. 
882 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 228. 
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wished therefore to draw near and put my finger on the seat of the disease”.883 All of 
these things Newman was saying well before any acquaintance with Froude.884 
 
     4.2.3.    (b)    Newman in transition to High Church (1825-1826) 
           By the time of his ordination to the Anglican priesthood, Newman was 
abandoning the key Evangelical doctrine on regeneration by conversion. But his basic 
idea of the moral ethos in religious assent continued. On May 29 (1825) Newman, having 
completed nearly a year as deacon in active ministry, was ordained to the Anglican 
priesthood in Christ Church chapel by the Bishop of Oxford. The issue of the connection 
between the good conscience as a principal component of a right ethos of mind for the 
attainment of religious truth, continues in his sermons. Be it noted that we are pursuing 
the early history Newman’s notion of ethos, not merely to comment on Pereiro’s thesis on 
the origin in Keble of Newman’s idea of ethos, but to track the history of Newman’s idea 
of the conscience and its place in religious belief.  
          Two weeks after his ordination on May 29 he preached his sermon on “Secret 
Faults”.885   
“Now (I repeat),” he writes, “unless we have some just idea of our hearts and of 
sin, we can have no right idea of a Moral Governor, a Saviour or a Sanctifier, that 
is, in professing to believe in them, we shall be using words without attaching 
distinct meaning to them. Thus self-knowledge is at the root of all real religious 
knowledge; and it is in vain, - worse than vain, - it is a deceit and a mischief, to 
think to understand the Christian doctrines as a matter of course, merely by being 
taught by books, or by attending sermons, or by any outward means, however 
excellent, taken by themselves. For it is in proportion as we search our hearts and 
understand our own nature, that we understand what is meant by an Infinite 
Governor and Judge; in proportion as we comprehend the nature of disobedience 
                                                 
883 Ibid., p. 246.  To Charles Robert Newman  July 26. 1825. 
884 Although not precisely on this point, in one of his unpublished sermons a few months later, Newman 
speaks at length of the “feelings” or state of heart associated with faith and as evidenced in the saints of the 
Old Testament. It is Sermon 72, no.110   S.4. - On the feelings produced in common by all revelation. -    St 
Clements   S.M. Oct 16 – 1825       Hebr.: xi,6. ... Without faith it is impossible to please Him - for he that 
cometh to God, must believe that He is and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.        
     I provide a copy of the manuscript of this sermon of Newman’s in the Appendix, Sermon 9.  
     This sermon is also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol V. ed. F. McGrath, pp. 326-333.  
885 J. H. Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons. Vol I. Sermon 4 (June 12, 1825). Westminster Md: 
Christian Classics Inc. 1966.  
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and our actual sinfulness, that we feel what is the blessing of the removal of sin, 
redemption, pardon, sanctification, which otherwise are mere words”.886  
Newman continues: “God speaks to us primarily in our hearts. Self-knowledge is the 
key to the precepts and doctrines of Scripture...” So a sense of sin, obviously involving 
the action of the accusing conscience, is needed to “understand what is meant by an 
Infinite Governor and Judge.” 
          Apart from the sense of personal sin, Newman also places special stress on fidelity 
to the conscience as the element that shapes the mind for a due assent to revealed truth. 
The mind must be properly prepared for the reasoning that is involved and for the assent 
that will be made. For this there is needed a conscience that is striving to be obedient to 
God’s law: “Obedience to God's commandments, which implies knowledge of sin and of 
holiness, and the desire and endeavour to please Him, this is the only practical interpreter 
of Scripture doctrine. Without self-knowledge you have no root in yourselves 
personally”.887  Newman is insisting emphatically on the state of the heart, the temper of 
mind, the moral character, which includes the matrix of assumptions within which the 
conscience functions, together with the fidelity or otherwise of the conscience itself – in 
other words, the moral ethos of one’s mind and heart. 888  
          A week later he preached his Sermon on “Conscience, its use etc”889 – and the 
basic idea of fidelity to the conscience and a right ethos shaping one’s knowledge 
continues to feature. He writes that “the knowlg & doing our duty, seem to be quite 
separate & it is often tht. that we can know our duty without doing it - this however is not 
(quite) the case - for the more we do our duty, the clearer we shall know our duty - a man 
can hardly know his duty unless he does it - for doing his duty is the way to know more 
& more of it.” 890   
        So then, it is by acting dutifully that one comes to know one’s duty.   
“The more we strive to act up to our conscience, the more will conscience be 
enlightened to understand what is rt & wrong - a good man is always aiming to 
                                                 
886 Ibid., “Secret Faults” (June 12, 1825), p. 42. 
887 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
888 For more on the conscience as discernment, rooted in experience and virtue, W. E. Conn can be 
usefully read in  “Newman on Conscience” in Newman Studies Journal, Vol. 6, no. 2, 2009,  pp. 15-26. 
889 J. H. Newman, “Conscience, its use etc” 19 June, 1825   Sermon 58, no. 85 (B.3.4) St Clements.   
 (A copy of this sermon’s manuscript is provided in sermon 4 of the Appendix)  
 Also published in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V. 
890 Ibid., Manuscript of the sermon, p. 8 (copy in the Appendix, Sermon 4). 
Also published in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol V, p. 238.  
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do what is holy & righteous, and the more he strives, the more is his conscience 
enlarged - thus as his conduct rises nearer & nearer to heaven, his sense of duty 
& his conscience mount higher & higher with it”.891  
          One’s moral state, forged and manifested by one’s right actions – itself the result 
of fidelity to the conscience – disposes and equips a person for a correct judgment and 
knowledge. The word ethos is not used, but the idea is present here.  On August 28 
(1825) in his sermon, “On Sins against Conscience”,892 Newman states that it is an error 
to suppose that “a good conscience” is “not necessary for arriving at religious truth.” So a 
good conscience is not just necessary to know one’s duty. It is needed for a knowledge of 
religious truth. Purity of heart “is necessary for a correct judgment.” An “habitually 
irreligious man will not enter into the meaning of the word of God.” The “habitually 
irreligious man,” we may also note, is not merely the man who fails to follow his 
conscience, whatever be its principles. He is also one who possesses a set of assumptions 
and beliefs which are absolutely inimical to Revelation. He lacks, Newman would say a 
few years later, the necessary “ethos” of mind. The right ethos involves an habituation of 
mind with moral and religious truth and it is this that is decisive, rather than mere logical 
reasoning.  
          The “good conscience” is a dominant element in this temper or habit of mind, and 
Newman’s source for this is Scripture:  
“Thus St Paul speaks of some who having wilfully sinned, wandered from the 
true doctrines of Scripture - 'who', he says, 'having put away a good conscience, 
concerning faith have made shipwreck' 1 Tim.1.” “Let them recollect” he 
continues, “our Savior's words - 'Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall SEE 
God' <Matt.5”, “and it is from a neglect of this principle that the conscience of so 
many is dark and erring. They do not strive to obey it, and therefore it is a blind 
guide - The more implicitly we follow its suggestions, the more likely is it to 
suggest aright”.893  
                                                 
891 Ibid., Manuscript of the sermon, pp. 8-9 (copy in the Appendix, sermon 4). 
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol V, p. 238.    
892 J. H. Newman, Sermon 10, “On sins against conscience - ” 2 Cor i,12....Our rejoicing is this, the 
testimony of our conscience”  (St Clements – Sunday Morning - August 28, 1825). Preached again in 1826, 
1827 (twice), 1828 (twice), 1831, 1835, 1838, 1841 (twice), and finally at Littlemore, August 13. 1843.   
In V. F. Blehl SJ, ed.  John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843  Volume II,  Sermon 42  no.101.   
Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford. 1993, p. 312.   
893 J. H. Newman,   Sermon 10. “On sins against conscience - ” 2 Cor i, 12.  
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          The indications are that it is especially Evangelical influences and Holy Scripture 
which have brought home to Newman the necessity of a moral character and ethos 
(without the term “ethos” being used) in the attainment of religious truth.894  
          A few weeks later, in his sermon of September 18 (1825), Newman applies his 
point about dislike for the truth and following one’s conscience more fully to “the 
heathen”. Their state of desolation “was the consequence of sin - they did not follow 
conscience & seek the Lord in humility & prayer, and therefore did not find him - Thus 
their mistakes arose ultimately fr dislike of the truth”.895  Newman is now applying to 
natural religion the point he had made back in 1821 about revealed religion, and we shall 
notice this again later. His observation is made as if in passing (“nor must we forget...”), 
which is to say as if scarcely to be questioned.  
          While Newman is drawing primarily on Scripture and his knowledge of the 
classics, we do notice that he is reading more widely on pagan religion, for a few weeks 
later on 8 October, 1825, he tells his mother that he is “reading Davison on Primitive 
Sacrifice”.896  He writes on December 4, 1825 (Sermon 9 - on natural religion), that the 
reason “why the heathen world has never drawn those practical truths from a survey of 
life and nature, which are so evidently contained in them - why with the same heavens 
and earth, the same state of being and the same course of human affairs, even their wisest 
men were so ignorant in the first principles of religion as on a late occasion I 
endeavoured to describe. - Now sin was the cause of their ignorance”.897  
          But this is not to be thought of as applying to the heathen alone, for “we ourselves, 
being of the same evil and corrupt nature with them, and differing from them only as 
grace has made us to differ <vid. 1 Cor.4> we too most assuredly stand in danger of 
losing not only our knowledge of God, but even much more our perception of the gospel 
                                                                                                                                                 
V. F. Blehl ed., John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843,  Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1993.  p. 
313.  
894 This is not to exclude other influences – such as a reading of Van Mildert’s Boyle and Bampton 
lectures. 
895 J. H. Newman, Sermon 69, no. 106 – “state of the heathen world an evidence of the need of a 
revelation”.-  Jeremiah ii,19  Thine own wickedness shall correct thee, & thy backslidings shall reprove 
thee - know therefore & see, that it is an evil thing and bitter, that thou hast forsaken the Lord thy God, & 
that My fear is not in thee, saith the Lord God of hosts.   St Clements S.M.  September 18. 1825        
Manuscript sermon, p. 15 – in the addition to the left side of p. 15 in the MS  (Appendix, sermon 7). 
Also in  John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 310    
896  J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. I, p. 262.  To Mrs Newman. 
897 V. F. Blehl SJ, John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843,  Vol. II,  p. 379   (Sermon 50, no.119). 
Sermon 9.  - on natural religion –   Rom I, 20: ..... the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the 
world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and godhead -     
St Clements.  Sunday Morning Dec. 4, 1825.  
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and our understanding of the mystery of Christian salvation, if we do not keep our hearts 
with all diligence and pray for grace to purify them from the love of sin”.898  (italics 
mine). 
          As has been pointed out, for all Newman’s distinctive stress on “fidelity to the 
conscience” in acquiring the temper of mind that accepts the truth, nevertheless, this 
cannot be understood in just any sense. For instance, there must be a love for and 
attention to the message of Scripture. In his letter of 1823 to his brother Charles, Newman 
had listed the assiduous reading of Scripture (together with and as included in fidelity to 
the Conscience) as necessary for the attainment of religious truth. Familiarity with 
Scripture is part of the ethos of mind that is needed. In a letter to Simon Lloyd Pope on 
February 18, 1824, Newman observes that the continued and searching study of Scripture 
“gives us that ‘inward witness’ it so often describes, which is after all the great evidence 
for its divine origin”.899 
          On March 27, 1825, Newman preached his sermon on the “inward witness” to 
revelation. There is a witness interior to the believing subject which supports the 
testimony of Scripture and that is the consciousness of oneself as having improved as a 
result of faith and obedience. Obedience implies, we may add, the dutiful action of 
conscience. From personal experience he knows that his heart is incurably diseased, but 
now he sees “holiness and peace produced in his soul” due to his faith and obedience.900 
This is a “powerful argument for the truth of the divine testimony”.901 Significantly, 
Newman writes that for the average Christian this constitutes a more convincing 
testimony than the external evidences.902  So the man of good conscience – with a moral 
ethos – and who knows and obeys the Scriptures can confirm the truth of Scripture 
doctrine because he sees evidence of its promise fulfilled in his life.  
                                                 
898 J. H. Newman ,  “- on natural religion”, (No.119, Sermon 9).   
V. F. Blehl ed., John Henry Newman: Sermons 1824-1843.  1993.  Volume II, Sermon 50, p. 380.      
899 J. H.  Newman, Letters and Diaries.  Vol. I, p. 171 (To Simon Lloyd Pope. Oriel College. Feb 18. 
1824). 
900 J. H.  1 John v.10 He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself.  (Faith connected 
with, and confirmed by the inward witness),  (No. 67, Sermon 51).     St Clements S.M.  March 27. 1825   
Manuscript sermon, p. 12.  (copy of MS in Birmingham Oratory archives – third sermon in the Appendix). 
Also in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 200      
901  Ibid. Manuscript sermon, p. 16  (third sermon, Appendix).  
Also John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 200.    
902  Ibid. Manuscript sermon, pp. 27-28.  (third sermon, Appendix). 
Also in  John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V, p. 205.   
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          On December 18, 1825, Newman preached again on this “inward witness” to the 
truth of the Gospel.903  By “obeying the commands of Scripture we learn that these 
commands really come from God; by trying we make proof; by doing we come to 
know”.904 That is to say, “by doing we come to know”.905 This is “a very real and 
substantial argument, an intimate token, of the truth of the Gospel”.906  The good 
conscience serves to assure the subject that the divine testimony is true.907 
          All this is to say that a certain moral state, with its consequent moral character and 
temper of mind, is needed to attain religious truth and to have the conviction of its truth 
confirmed. It is not just a matter of mere reasoning. It requires virtue of a certain cast.  
 
          Early in 1826, Newman took up his position as tutor at Oriel. Newman’s first 
University Sermon of July 2, 1826, was entitled “The Philosophical Temper, First 
Enjoined by the Gospel,”908 and, for our purposes here, it is more significant than might 
at first be supposed. The “Philosophical Temper” Newman refers to in the sermon is the 
disposition of mind that is open to intellectual and educational advances, especially 
philosophical and scientific. Newman connects that “moral character”, which the Jewish 
and Christian religions hold up “as the excellence and perfection of human nature”, with 
the temper of mind that is conducive to philosophical and scientific advances.  
         He writes that “some of those habits of mind” which the Bible represents “as alone 
pleasing in the sight of God” are the “very habits which are necessary for success in 
scientific investigation” (no.7). They make up the “character” of “the virtuous man” as 
presented in Scripture, an “original character,” only “scattered traces” of which are found 
in “authors unacquainted with the Bible.” This character of the virtuous man is 
distinguished by obedience to duty and holiness.  
          We notice that, in the sermon, the theory that a moral character of mind is necessary 
(to a point) for the attainment of scientific knowledge is not presented as something new, 
which is to say a novel thesis peculiar to himself  – it is assumed that non-believing 
                                                 
903 J. H. Newman, “Inward Witness to the Truth of the Gospel” (December 18, 1825).   Parochial and 
Plain Sermons. Vol. VIII, Sermon VIII.    Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1968,  pp. 110-123.   
904 Ibid., pp. 112-113. 
905 Ibid., p. 113. 
906 Ibid., p. 112. 
907 Ibid., p. 120. 
908 J. H. Newman, “The Philosophical Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel” (Preached July 2, 1826. Act 
Sunday). Sermon I in Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford between AD 1826 and 
1843.  Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1966.  
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scientists themselves broadly accept this. This itself shows that the basic idea of a moral 
ethos for right knowledge was generally held. What scientists have forgotten, in their 
accusations that Christianity is inimical to scientific advances, is that the moral character 
presented by the Christian Revelation and unique to it is exceptionally conducive to the 
advance of knowledge. This is precisely because it is superlatively moral. 
           It is to be noticed once again that Newman does not say that it is simply the one 
who “follows his conscience” who will discover the truth – as if independent of other basic 
elements of the moral character. A right temper of mind includes this but is not to be 
reduced to it. One must be “earnest in seeking the truth”. This “is an indispensable 
requisite for finding it” (no.8). There must be “modesty, patience, and caution,” – 
“dispositions of mind quite as requisite”; a “humble and reverential spirit of learners and 
disciples” is needed (no.9); a “tedious discipline,” and being moderate, dispassionate and 
cautious, fair in discussion, patient. All these constitute “the only temper” which will 
interpret nature properly. It is “a temper little known to the heathen world,” yet it “is the 
very temper which Christianity sets forth as the perfection of our moral character” (no.10).  
         Scripture “was, in matter of fact, the first to describe and inculcate that single-
minded, modest, cautious, and generous spirit, which was, after a long time, found so 
necessary for success in the prosecution of philosophical researches” (no.12). So “a true 
philosophical temper” is “allied to that which the Scriptures inculcate as the temper of a 
Christian”. The “Christian spirit is admirably fitted to produce the tone of thought and 
inquiry which leads to the discovery of truth”, even though “a slighter and less profound 
humility will do the same” (no.13). 
        Newman is not saying that one must be a Christian in order to have the temper of 
mind necessary for the attainment of scientific truth. The Christian moral character 
includes, but is greater than, the moral character needed for the philosophical temper. This 
is especially because, he explains in the Sermon, Christianity adds to the moral qualities 
favouring the philosophical spirit the awareness of personal sin and a moral fall – this is a 
doctrine that is the basis of the Christian system (no. 13). As a matter of fact, this 
acknowledgment of sin revolts many, and sets them on a course which can separate the 
philosophical school from the Christian Church (no. 15).  
          We may note, in view of our next chapter, that Newman ends his discussion with 
the consideration that the very fact that Christianity came from uneducated Apostles, and 
proved to be so valuable for the “best canons … for scientific investigation,” adds to the 
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“strength of those accumulated probabilities, which on other grounds are so 
overpowering,” showing that “they were moved by the inspiration of God Himself” 
(no.16). Newman is already very much in possession of the idea of the persuasive force of 
“accumulated probabilities”. But to recognize this likelihood, a right moral ethos is needed. 
 
     4.2.3.    (c)      “Ethos”:   Newman, Keble and Froude 
          What, then, can we say about Newman’s acquisition of the idea of what came to 
be called the moral ethos, formed by the conscience, and its necessity for religious 
knowledge? Newman gained his basic ideas on the moral element requisite for right 
judgment early on and within an Evangelical environment – though not simply from 
Evangelical reading, for it is manifest even in Van Mildert. He had it, in certain elements, 
even prior to this. But it must also be said that it was a view widely held as being 
Scriptural, and was opposed by those within the Enlightenment tradition of “Reason”.   
          As further evidence of its currency, we may note remarks made by Edward Pusey. 
In correspondence during 1839 with his German Protestant friend Friedrich Tholock (a 
friendship begun in 1825), Edward Pusey stated that the Tractarians accepted, firstly, the 
following: “Whatever is Catholic is true; the test of Catholicity being the ‘quod semper, 
quod ubique, quod ab omnibus’”.909 Secondly, they held that it is a person’s duty to 
accept the Nicene Creed on the authority of the Church, and not because he happens to 
agree with its articles on the basis of its agreement with Scripture.  
          Significantly for our purposes here, Pusey writes that “The Ultra-Protestant 
believes ‘the good man,’ the individual, to be infallibly ‘guided into all truth;’ we, the 
Church Universal”.910 We notice that in this observation, the “Ultra-Protestant” also held 
to the idea of moral ethos. It is the good man, accepting and interpreting Scripture, who is 
guided into all truth. That is to say, his moral ethos or temper of mind (with the aid of the 
Holy Spirit, presumably) will “infallibly” guide his religious judgment to the truth, and 
enable it.  Indirectly, Pusey’s remark illustrates that this notion was and had been widely 
held by many convinced Christians, including those on the opposite spectrum from 
                                                 
909 For Pusey, catholicity, or universality, could only have been present in the Patristic Church which was 
as yet undivided. Froude, who had died a few years before this comment by Pusey, saw the Catholic ethos 
as not just present in the Patristic Church, but as in, say, the Medieval theocratic Church (Apologia, pp. 24-
26). For Froude, its unambiguous Catholic ethos was the special attraction of the Medieval Church. 
910 H. P. Liddon DD, Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey.  London: Longmans. 1894. Vol. 2,  p. 158.  
Quoted in J. Pereiro ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, pp. 31-32, and footnote 117.  
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himself. Very many held to ethos, but the Puseyites held to the Patristic (that is, the 
Universal Church) ethos. 
          On his conversion of 1816, Newman did not become an “Ultra-Protestant” because 
he took dogma and Creed as the criterion of the true teaching of Scripture, and so, though 
Calvinist in doctrine at this point, he had the remote beginnings of the Tractarian ethos. 
Church principles, of course, were still to come. But the point here is that, together with 
others of different traditions (such as the “Ultra-Protestant”), he did accept the necessity 
of a moral ethos in religious knowledge, which Pereiro says was at the heart of the 
Oxford Movement. Pereiro himself notices that Daniel Wilson (the prominent 
Evangelical who would be absolutely opposed to Tractarianism) affirmed, back in 1810, 
that it was generally acknowledged that the affections (i.e., good and bad feelings) 
influenced understanding, and he based this on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and on 
John 7: 16-17.911  
          Pereiro, of course, does not claim that Keble was the absolute originator of the 
idea of ethos in the sense of not allowing for its presence in other circles, and he cites its 
presence in other contexts.912 But he does strongly imply that Keble was the father of the 
idea among the Oxford Movement men and that, importantly, Newman gained the idea of 
ethos from Froude and (so from) Keble. Newman built “on the foundation laid by his 
friends, and acknowledged the influence that Butler had had on him, through the medium 
of Keble’s mind”.913 What we are doing here is showing that Newman was possessed of 
the basic idea of the moral ethos (involving fidelity to the conscience) well before his 
contact with Keble’s circle. It had its own history in his thought, and it is this history 
which is our subject. Furthermore, it was “in the air,” as it were, which is to say in 
possession by many well beyond Keble’s circle.914 
                                                 
911 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, p. 93. 
912 For example, Pereiro mentions Daniel Wilson’s observation on this in his sermon of 1810 (‘Ethos’ and 
the Oxford Movement, p. 93). 
913 Ibid., p. 102.        
      In relation to the influence of Butler on Newman – “through the medium of Keble” – Pereiro refers the 
reader to the Apologia, pp. 18-20. But this reference in the Apologia to the influence of Butler through the 
medium of Keble is not in relation to ethos, but in relation to the idea of the Sacramental system of the 
visible world and to Probability as the guide of life (Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 19).  
914 Indirect evidence of the general currency of the term and the notion of “ethos” is given in a passing 
remark by William George Ward in his review of William Goode’s The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice, 
published in the British Critic and Theological Review of July 1842. He writes that “The period then of the 
four first councils seems, speaking generally, to  have been chiefly employed (as regards speculation) in 
deepening, perfecting and systematizing the ideas conveyed by the Apostles’ Creed on the Trinity and 
Incarnation. The principles meanwhile, or (to use a hackneyed word) ήΘοϛ, with which the Church started, 
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          Newman’s theological position on the pivotal doctrine of regeneration changed 
during 1825 from the (Evangelical) denial of the necessity of Baptism to the normal 
(High) Church insistence on it – because of his basic dogmatic ethos. Together with this, 
he embraced the Caroline divines during that and the following year. With all this, his 
understanding of the requisite moral temper or ethos advanced. Newman always thought 
(after his Evangelical conversion) that a right reason required the quest for virtue. But 
with a changing theology, his notion of the theological context of a virtuous life changed. 
That is to say, his position evolved from requiring the moral temper of the man of 
Scripture and Creed in order for revealed truth to be attained, to requiring the moral 
temper of the Churchman – which is to say, of the one who thought with the Church. It 
was this moral ethos, the ethos of the Church (as understood by, say, the Carolines) that 
took a man to the Truth. This meant the Church of the Fathers as interpreted by the 
Carolines such as Hooker and Andrewes. 
          As Newman took up once again his earnest study of the Fathers, a love for whom 
had begun with his youthful reading of the Evangelical Milner’s History915 (well before 
Froude began any such study), there grew also his more intense association with Froude 
and Wilberforce and then with Keble. This involved a further impulse to identify, with 
his new friends, the necessary moral ethos with the ethos of the Patristic Church.916 It 
was the conscience of the man who thought as did the Patristic Church which would lead 
him to and preserve him in revealed truth.  
                                                                                                                                                 
were propagated onwards and maintained ever fresh and living within her, by this chief means … the great 
ritual and ceremonial system … joined of course to the traditional and continuous maintenance of the 
general outline of the Creed.” (W. G. Ward, “Art. II. – The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice .. By William 
Goode. London: Hatchard and Son, Picadilly.”  British Critic, July 1842, p. 102).  That W. G. Ward refers 
to ήΘοϛ as a “hackneyed word” indicates that it was commonly and widely used. 
     The effect of one’s morality on one’s belief has been widely held. To give but one example, in his 1907 
re-issue of Henry VIII’s highly successful Defence of the Seven Sacraments (in 1521, for which Henry was 
granted the title ‘Fidei Defensor’ by Pope Leo X), the editor (Fr Louis Donovan) writes the following in his 
“Forward”:  “The first reason for reprinting this work is a moral one – namely that the readers may see, 
from so illustrious an example, that loss of faith comes from loss of morals” (my italics).   
L. O’Donovan, “Forward” Assertio Septem Sacramentorum or Defence of the Seven Sacraments by Henry 
VIII., King of England. Re-edited, with an Introduction by Rev. Louis O’Donovan, STL, preceded by a 
preface by James Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore. New York: Benzinger Bros., 1907, p. 16. 
915 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 7.   
916 In his last major publication, the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk (1875), Newman had this to say: 
     “The Tracts for the Times were founded on a deadly antagonism to what in these last centuries has been 
called Erastianism or Cæsarism. Their writers considered the Church to be a divine creation, “not of men, 
neither by man, but by Jesus Christ,” the Ark of Salvation, the Oracle of Truth, the Bride of Christ, with a 
message to all men everywhere, and a claim on their love and obedience; and, in relation to the civil power, 
the object of that promise of the Jewish prophets…. No Ultramontane (so called) could go beyond those 
writers in the account which they gave of her from the Prophets, and that high notion is recorded beyond 
mistake in a thousand passages of their writings.” (no. 2, “The Ancient Church”). 
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          The distinctive thing about the Oxford Movement was not simply the idea that a 
moral ethos was necessary for religious knowledge. It was, rather, its requirement that 
this moral ethos be that of the Patristic (and undivided) Church, together with an 
insistence that a right moral ethos was of maximum importance for attaining and 
remaining in the Truth.917  In respect to the former, present in Newman from his 
conversion was the seed of a Catholic ethos. His conscience was embedded in the 
beginnings of a Catholic mind, though he was immersed in the Evangelical set. He 
possessed a set of assumptions (especially that revealed religion was not merely 
Scriptural but essentially dogmatic and creedal), which set him on the road of a growing 
Catholic ethos. This moral temper of mind passed from Evangelical to Caroline to 
Tractarian or Patristic. It then passed on to the ethos of Roman Catholicism – which he 
came to identify with the Patristic. In all these phases Newman saw the same basic 
principles unfolding – the only absolutely radical change having occurred at his 
conversion of 1816. Even here, there had been a preparation of mind in his early 
childhood – as the first three pages of the Apologia suggest.  
         At the heart of the acquisition of this ethos, and at the heart of the very idea of it, 
was the following of one’s conscience. Conversely, Newman believed that adherence to 
heresy betrayed moral failure. But it must be repeated that it was not simply a matter of 
“fidelity to conscience”, as baldly stated. Frank Newman had this readiness to “follow his 
conscience”, and ended up a Unitarian right outside Christian orthodoxy. Likewise, 
Joseph Blanco White constantly protested his own “fidelity to conscience” and passed 
from Catholicism into atheism, then to Anglicanism, then finally to Unitarianism which 
involved the denial of cardinal tenets of the Christian religion.918 
                                                 
917 This insistence on the critical importance of a right moral ethos was never meant, in Newman’s thought 
and practice, to replace or diminish the concentrated exercise of reason, properly understood. Newman’s 
entire course of writings as an Anglican and as a Catholic shows his exercise of reason on objective 
evidence (such as, say, in his Development of Christian Doctrine, 1845). But it all presumes a right moral 
ethos, or virtue of a certain cast – i.e., the ethos commonly seen in the Patristic Church and its Fathers and 
saints. Nor was the ethos of the Patristic Chuch understood as confined to the Patristic Church. Rather, it 
was most evident there, in the undivided and Catholic Church of the Fathers. Hurrell Froude was much 
more enamoured of the ethos of the mediaeval Church, as more trenchantly Catholic vis-à-vis the state. 
918 Another whom Newman himself firmly recognized as morally upright was Dr Thomas Arnold who was 
firmly in the Broad Church camp, and whom all recognized as antagonistic to Newman’s position on 
religious truth. The idea of a correct and necessary moral ethos has to be understood with careful nuance.  
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          Newman’s intimacy with Keble commenced in the second half of 1828.919 He says 
of Hurrell Froude920 that “I knew him first in 1826,921 and was in the closest and most 
affectionate friendship with him from about 1829 till his death in 1836.”922 Despite initial 
mutual admiration, they moved towards one another but slowly. In respect to Froude’s 
bent of mind, Newman writes that “He was powerfully drawn to the Medieval Church, 
but not to the Primitive.” He continues, “He set no sufficient value on the writings of the 
Fathers, of the detail or development of doctrine, on the definite traditions of the Church 
viewed in their matter, on the teaching of the Ecumenical Councils, or on the 
                                                 
919  This is to be noticed in Newman’s letter to Keble when the the election of the new Provost of Oriel 
College was coming up. In that letter we read of Newman’s limited contacts with Keble prior to this letter.  
Newman writes in that letter: “... I have been silent because I did not conceive you knew or 
understood me well enough to be interested in hearing more than the fact, anyhow conveyed, which 
way my opinion lay in the question of the Provostship between you and Hawkins. ...... this is the 
first time I have had an opportunity of expressing any feeling towards you at all, and that 
consequently it would have been acting more kindly had I spoken to you rather than about you.... 
    I have lived more with Hawkins than with any other Fellow - and have thus had opportunities for 
understanding him more than others. His general views so agree with my own, his practical notions, 
religious opinions, and habits of thinking, that I feel vividly and powerfully the advantages the 
College would gain when governed by one who pursuing ends to which I cordially approve would 
bring to the work powers of mind to which I have long looked up with great admiration. Whereas I 
have had but few opportunities of the pleasure and advantage of your society - and I rather suspect, 
though I may be mistaken, that did I know you better I should find you did not approve opinions 
objects and measures to which my own turn of mind has led me to assent. I allude, for instance, to 
the mode of governing a College (footnote: with sternness), the desirableness of certain reforms in 
the University at large, their practicability, the measures to be adopted with reference to them, - etc. 
..... I have said enough perhaps to relieve you from any uneasy feelings as regards myself - the deep 
feelings of love I bear towards you these I shall keep to myself.”  (italics for emphasis are mine) 
(footnote: ‘I knew Hawkins and he had taken me up, while Keble had fought shy of me.’ Letter of 9 
April 1866 to Henry James Coleridge).  J. H. Newman. Letters and Diaries Vol. II,  p. 44. To John 
Keble  Marine Square, Brighton Dec 19. 1827.    
Newman’s attitude to and relations with both Keble and Hawkins were soon to change. In the Apologia, 
Newman writes that “Hurrell Froude brought us together about 1828” (World’s Classics ed., p. 18). We 
read the following in his Diary of Thursday 14 August 1828:  “Went off to Keble (Fairford) (this was the 
first symptom of our growing intimacy. old Mr Keble was then alive - and Keble was at his house.) Friday 
15 August   letter from Froude   dined with Keble at Mr Beach’s. (Letters and Diaries, Vol. II, p. 88). 
920 Richard Hurrell Froude (1803–1836) Anglican clergyman, Fellow of Oriel, and with Keble and 
Newman an early leader of the Oxford Movement. He collaborated with Newman on the Lyra Apostolica.  
He spent the winter of 1832–33 travelling with his father and Newman for the sake of his health, and 
contributed on his return to the Oxford Movement. Soon, though, he left England again to assist his 
doomed medical condition, acting as mathematical tutor at Codrington College in the Barbados. He 
returned to England in 1835 and died from tuberculosis the following year. After his death Newman and 
other friends edited the notorious Remains, a collection of Froude's letters and journals. By 1829, he and 
Newman were very close. 
921 There is a sense in which Newman viewed the Oxford Movement party as originating in 1826 in Oriel. 
In the Apologia, writing of “Mr. Oakeley”, he says that he “both in political and ecclesiastical views, would 
have been of one spirit with the Oriel party of 1826-1833. But he had entered late into the Movement; ...” 
(Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 170).  
922 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 24. 
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controversies out of which they arose”.923 We must not overstate Froude’s influence on 
Newman in the matter even of the Patristic ethos.  
         Then there is the question of the pastoral function of the Tutor. One could gain the 
impression from Pereiro, unless one reads him very carefully, that the pastoral dimension 
of the tutorial office, as understood by Newman and his two fellow Tutors (stressing the 
moral element in gaining right knowledge), mainly stemmed from Keble’s idea of 
ethos.924 He tells us that “Although Keble soon retired from Oxford to a pastoral ministry 
in rural parishes, Froude, Newman, and Robert Wilberforce took up his mantel in the 
university”925 (my italics). Froude did take up this “mantel” from Keble, but Newman 
had already this view of things – and this, we notice, is then allowed by Pereiro in a 
footnote.926  This pastoral commitment as Tutor was in Newman’s practice well prior to 
his special relations with Froude.927 Newman’s conviction of the necessity of moral 
formation for religious and moral understanding was already very strong.928 It surely had 
its origins in the example of the Evangelical-Calvinist Mayers, his school classics’ master 
who converted him, and in Mayers’ long friendship with him for more than a decade 
after, up to his death in 1828.929 Mayers was a true pastor-teacher, making converts 
                                                 
923 Ibid., p. 25. 
924 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement, pp. 85-86. 
925 Ibid., p. 86. 
926 Ibid., p. 86, footnote 8.  Pereiro also allows that “at the time, tutors in other colleges acted on a similar 
interpretation of the university statutes” (on the Tutorial office) – p. 86. 
927 Newman moved into Oriel on March 21 (1826) to begin as Tutor. But six or seven weeks later, and a 
little more than but a month after the election of Froude and Wilberforce as Fellows of Oriel, Newman was 
writing the following:  “I have now been engaged in the Oriel Tuition four weeks. ....There is much too in 
the system which I think wrong. I hardly acquiesce in the general reception of the Sacrament, which is 
expected, or even in the practice of having evening chapel. I think the Tutors see too little of the men, and 
that there is not enough direct religious instruction. It is my wish to consider myself as the minister of 
Christ. May I most seriously reflect, that, unless I find that opportunities occur of doing spiritual good to 
those over whom I am placed, it will become a grave question, whether I ought to continue in the Tuition.” 
(J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries Vol 1, p. 286. Autobiographical Writings, p. 209: Sunday May 7, 
1826).   
928 This is very plain in Newman’s account of his idea of the office of Tutor in his “Autobiographical 
Memoir: IV” (Autobiographical Writings, p. 91). It is there noted that “thus, strangely enough, Mr 
Newman, at the very moment of his friend Dr Hawkins’s entering upon the Provostship, became conscious 
for the first time of his own congeniality of mind with Keble, of which neither Mr Keble nor  he had had 
hitherto any suspicion”.  
929  On the death of Walter Mayers in Feb. 1828, Newman wrote to Richard Greaves the following words:  
“Assure Mrs Mayers that,.....Whatever religious feeling I have within me, to his kind instructions 
when I was at school I am especially indebted for it - and it may (I think) be safely said, that had it 
not been for my intimacy with him, I should not have possessed the comfort of that knowledge of 
God which (poor as it is) enabled me to go through the dangerous season of my Undergraduate 
residence here without wounding my conscience my any gross or scandalous sin - And when I think 
of the affection he always showed me,...I feel my heart quite [brea]k within me at the loss of him”   
(J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. II, p. 58, To R. Greaves  Oriel College. Febr 27. 1828) 
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among his pupils – as we learn from the introduction to his posthumously published 
collection of sermons. Newman’s first sermon was given at Mayers’ parish, and it was he 
who preached at Mayers’ funeral.  
         As an Oriel Tutor with a high idea of his pastoral vocation, Newman may also have 
begun to use Aristotle’s texts for their religious and moral value. With the growing 
friendship with his fellow Tutors, especially Froude, Aristotle’s Ethics and the notion of 
“ethos” as held by Froude (and Keble) came then to be vigorously used by him as entirely 
in accord with his long-standing convictions. Newman may have quickly invested the 
term “ethos” with the strong stress he himself had long given to the moral element needed 
for religious knowledge.  
          As has been pointed out, Newman’s reference to Froude’s “authority” for 
“lowering the intellectual powers into handmaids of our moral nature”, cited by Pereiro, 
need not be understood as meaning that Newman gained the idea of moral ethos from 
Froude. It was surely but a way of expressing the support he had from Froude, his friend 
whom he (and certain others) greatly admired. For as we have seen, he had the idea well 
before – its roots plainly lay in Scripture. It is probably because of this Scriptureal 
connection that Keble himself, as well as Butler and others, proceeded to make use of 
Aristotle as they did. 
          What Froude may have done, due to Keble’s formation of him, was, because of his 
stress on Apostolic Succession, to have nudged Newman more towards seeing in the 
Church of the Fathers the embodiment of the special moral ethos which ensured the right 
interpretation of Scripture and a correct understanding of the Creed, the Church and its 
life. Newman was resuming his study of the Fathers. In a letter to Keble of November 21, 
1844 he writes, “When I was first taught the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration by 
Hawkins on my getting into Oriel, of ‘the Church’ by Whately in 1825, and of Apostolic 
Succession by Hurrell seven years later in 1829 (after James on ‘Episcopacy’ in 1823), I 
began to profess them and commit myself by definite acts to the profession, with far less 
of intellectual conviction and feeling of certainty than I now have of Papal Supremacy 
and Catholic communion.”930      
          In the matter of Apostolic Succession, we read in the Apologia that “William 
James, then Fellow of Oriel; who, about the year 1823, taught me the doctrine of 
Apostolic Succession … I recollect being somewhat impatient on the subject at the 
                                                 
930 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol X, p. 425. 
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time”.931 His own ethos then was Evangelical. So Froude introduced Apostolic 
Succession to Newman not for the first time, but at a time when he was more open to it. 
Hurrell Froude was a principal instrument in bringing home to Newman, now disposed 
for it because of his shift in theological position, the centrality of Apostolic Succession in 
the life and doctrine of the Church – and this doctrine was early stated to be central to the 
Movement. It is the prominent point in Newman’s first Tract.932 The decisive influence of 
Froude, we learn, lay there rather than in relation to the Patristic Church, as such, being 
the yardstick of Christian thought and ethos. As a matter of fact, Newman wrote that “I 
do not know when I first learnt to consider that Antiquity was the true exponent of the 
doctrines of Christianity and the basis of the Church of England; but I take it for granted 
that the works of Bishop Bull,933 which at this time I read, were my chief introduction to 
this principle”.934 
          As the Apologia makes clear, Newman had an affection for the Fathers that 
predated his acquaintance with Froude, stemming from his adolescent reading of Joseph 
Milner’s Church History.935 It may therefore have predated Froude’s own limited love for 
the Fathers (such as it was). Froude’s love for the Patristic Fathers never at all equalled 
Newman’s – indeed, Froude came to be “powerfully drawn to the Medieval Church, but 
not to the Primitive”, as the Apologia tells us.936  
          In the Church of the Fathers there was the universal presence of the matrix of 
Catholic belief and life. It was seen by the Tractarians as the Undivided Catholic Church. 
                                                 
931 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 10. 
932 In Tract No. I (9 Sept. 1833), Newman asked, "on what must Christ’s Ministers depend?" He answered 
that "the real ground on which our authority is built [is] our apostolic descent. We have been born, not of 
blood, not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. The Lord Jesus Christ gave his spirit 
to the Apostles; they in turn laid their hands on those who should succeed them: and these again on others; 
and so the sacred gift has been handed down to our present bishops, who have appointed us as their 
assistants ... ” (Tract no. 1 (Ad Clerum) Thoughts on the Ministerial Commission, Respectfully Addressed to 
the Clergy, London: Printed for J. G. F. & J. Rivington. 6
th
 ed., 1840, p. 2).   
(Also in Tract One: Thoughts on the Ministerial Commission respectfully addressed to the clergy, by John 
Henry Newman; with an introduction by Alan Stephenson. Didcot, Oxfordshire: Rocket Press. 1985. P. 15.) 
933 Bishop George Bull (1634–1710) English theologian and Bishop of St David's, wrote four major 
theological treatises in Latin, one on justification and three on the Trinity. These works have been 
translated into English at various times. A translation of the Harmonia Apostolica was made in 1801. The 
Harmonia, Examen Censurae, Defensio, and Judicium formed part of the Library of Anglo-Catholic 
Theology published at Oxford 1842-55. The Opinion of the Catholic Church, a translation of the Judicium, 
was published with a memoir of Bull's life in 1825, and a full edition of all the works of Bull (including the 
Sermons and Nelson's Life) in seven volumesin 1827. He has a high place among Anglican theologians, and 
as a defender of the doctrine of the Trinity was regarded well by Catholic controversialists on the 
Continent. 
934 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 27. 
935 Ibid., p. 7. 
936 Ibid., p. 25. 
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It had the ethos needed to hold and retain right belief and orientate the upright man of 
conscience to Christian truth and holiness. It exemplified the man of virtue of a certain 
cast. It thus became the exact and enduring exemplification of the special “ethos,” the 
temper of mind, the “right moral feeling,” the “good feeling” which Newman insisted on 
as necessary for the attainment of the truth, and in particular for assent to Revealed Truth. 
This development was not due to Froude – it was the result of prior influences, and 
fundamentally, it seems, because of the dogmatic principle in Newman’s Evangelicalism 
from the beginning. Newman’s own dogmatic “ethos” led him progressively out of 
Evangelicalism to, as Pusey began to perceive early in 1826, his being “quite High 
Church.” As has been mentioned in a previous chapter, after one sermon preached a little 
before Froude’s arrival in 1826, Samuel Wilberforce went away wondering at Newman’s 
High Church opinions.937  
          Early in 1828 Newman began his renewed pursuit of the Fathers, which had been 
an old and early love.938  There is no evidence that Froude had begun such an intensive 
study of the Fathers as Newman had. Newman was ripe for the formal use of the term 
“ethos” and for a special stress on the “ethos” of the Primitive Church. In the matter of 
the moral element in right judgment, Froude and Wilberforce may have nudged Newman 
towards a greater realization of the religious use that was possible of Aristotle’s texts 
which they were teaching. Because of Froude’s awareness of Apostolic Succession 
(which involved the direct descent of Orders from the Apostolic and Patristic Church), he 
also may have nudged Newman (now enamoured of the Fathers and the Carolines) 
towards a more formal identification of the “good ethos” with the “ethos” of the Patristic 
Church. This made “ethos” very concrete, identifiable and historical. 
          Wood, Pereiro points out, considered that Froude played a defining role in the 
Movement’s ethos. I suggest that this was not due to an earlier conviction than in 
                                                 
937 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXX, p. 180. “I grew so high church that Samuel Wilberforce 
who in 1826 heard me preach at St Clement’s, went away wondering”. 
938 1828 was a particularly significant year in Newman’s development. His earnest study of the Fathers 
gained momentum. His friendship with Froude and Keble cemented. His High Church and Caroline 
sympathies greatly consolidated and he put behind him the shadow of liberalism. By early in 1829 when the 
contest over Sir Robert Peel had begun, his sympathies were decided. It was a surprise to Blanco White 
who writes, recalling the “No-Popery Party” which opposed Peel because of his favouring Catholic 
Emancipation, that “In this party I found, to my great surprise, my dear friend Mr. Newman, of Oriel. As he 
had been one of the annual Petitioners to Parliament for Catholic Emancipation, his sudden union with the 
most violent bigots was inexplicable to me. That change was the first manifestation of the mental 
revolution, which has subsequently made him one of the leading persecutors of Dr. Hampden, and the most 
active and influential member of … the Puseyite party”. (Life of Rev. J. B. White, Vol III, p. 131). 
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Newman of the general role of a moral ethos in religious knowledge, but to his earlier 
unambiguous identification of the right moral ethos with the Catholic ethos, which 
embraced Apostolic Succession and other Catholic positions. In large part this was due to 
Keble, but not entirely. For what was especially distinctive of Froude was his early and 
brilliant instinct for the Catholic ethos.  Because of this exceptional instinct he was ahead 
of both Newman and Keble in his earlier stress on Catholic features, whether Patristic or 
Medieval – and this included Apostolic Succession. Because of this instinct he had a 
“hatred of the Reformers”, pressuring both Newman and Keble against them and in the 
direction of Catholic life and devotions. As said, he was enamoured of the Medieval 
Church.939  He had a Catholic instinct with its own ethos prior to Newman and Keble. But 
Newman was more thoroughgoing in a theological sense, and he certainly possessed the 
general notion of moral ethos as early as had Froude. He may have had it earlier. 
          Newman, as Blanco White shrewdly perceived, drew Froude after him in the 
lengths to which he took this critical element (the role of the will) in the new revival. 
Truth to tell, it may have had a deeper hold on Newman than even on Keble, perhaps 
because of a more dominant place of the conscience in Newman’s general view and in his 
emerging philosophy of religious belief. Newman’s rapid leadership in this idea suggests 
that ethos had been a deeper conviction in him in certain respects than in his companions. 
It accounts for what Pereiro notices in his work, that while ethos became decisive for 
Newman in his account of the development of Christian doctrine and in his own 
conversion to Rome (for he discovered that the ethos of the Patristic – universal – Church 
was found only in the Church of Rome), probability and therefore a species of necessary 
doubt remained more characteristic of Keble, holding him back from following 
Newman.940 All this is to say that from very early, Newman had perceived the importance 
of “right moral feeling” or, as he came to call it, “ethos,” in attaining the truth.  The idea 
of moral ethos in Newman’s mind – at least in its essence  – did not have, as Pereiro at 
least suggests, “its origins in Keble’s mind”.941 Newman already long had the notion that 
at the root of the correct perception of truth was the presence of virtue.   
 
                                                 
939 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, pp. 24-26 – Froude had “no turn for theology as such”. His 
difficulties were “the contrariety between theory and fact” – he was “smitten with the love of the 
Theocratic Church; he went abroad and was shocked by the degeneracy which he thought he saw in the 
Catholics of Italy.”  
940 J. Pereiro, ‘Ethos’ and the Oxford Movement,  pp. 224-225. 
941 Ibid., p. 233. 
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4.2.4.    Ethos: Newman during and beyond the Oxford Movement. 
At the dawn of the Movement, Newman’s position on the necessary ethos was very clear. 
As he writes in October 1830, “obedience to conscience leads to obedience to the 
Gospel”942… and “obedience to God is the way to know and believe in Christ”.943  
Conversely, Newman had said a couple of weeks earlier that “Those who reject revealed 
truth wilfully, are such as do not love moral and religious truth. It is bad men, proud men, 
men of hard hearts, and unhumbled tempers, and immoral lives, these are they who reject 
the Gospel”.944  Let us note, of course, that Newman is speaking of “those who reject 
revealed truth wilfully” (italics mine). The apprehension of moral and religious truth 
requires, as Newman writes in a letter to Samuel Rickards, an habituation of mind, which 
is more important than acuteness of reason: “As moral truth is discovered, not by 
reasoning, but by habituation, so it is recommended not by books, but by oral 
instruction.”945           
                                                 
942 J. H. Newman, “Obedience to God the Way to Faith in Christ” (October 31, 1830).   Parochial and 
Plain Sermons. Vol VIII. Sermon XIV.  Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1968,  pp. 201-202. 
943 Ibid., p. 204. 
944 J. H. Newman,  “Truth hidden when not sought after”. October 17, 1830.  Parochial and Plain 
Sermons. Vol. VIII, Sermon XIII. Westminster, Md: Christian Classics Inc. 1968,  pp. 189-190. 
945 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol II, pp. 254-255, (July 20. 1830).  This habituation of mnd 
would seem to be a sympathy and openness of mind with the truth in question, forged by moral fidelity.   
        It is to be noted that Newman does not mean to say that simply because a person is of a moral and 
obedient mind he will not be mistaken as to revealed truth. We cannot follow him in all of this, but he 
insists that it is not the individual good man alone who has the entirety of moral and intellectual qualities 
necessary for this, let alone that he may be confident in attaining revealed truth. Rather, it is the whole 
Church which is possessed of adequate qualities (with the aid of the Holy Spirit whose Temple the Church 
is) for the attainment of revealed truth. This is an important reason for the individual believer thinking with 
the entire Church, being immersed in her life and looking to her for guidance on doctrine. In this way, the 
good man shares in the ethos of the Universal Church which ensures his possession of the Truth. 
Newman’s theory of religious knowledge thus had a place in his insistence on role of the whole Church for 
the individual’s possession of revealed truth. In his Prophetical Office (1837) he writes:  
“I repeat it; while Scripture is written by inspired men, with one and one only view of doctrine in their 
hearts and thoughts …. I would not deny as an abstract proposition that a Christian may gain the 
whole truth of the Scriptures, but would maintain that the chances are very seriously against a given 
individual. I would not deny, but rather maintain, that a religious, wise and intellectually gifted man 
will succeed: but who answers to this description but the collective Church? There, indeed, such 
qualifications might be supposed to exist; what is wanting in one member being supplied  by another, 
and the contrary errors of individuals eliminated  by their combination. The Church truly may be said 
almost infallibly to interpret Scripture ….. The Church Catholic, the true prophet of God, alone is able 
to tell the dream and its interpretation.”   
(J. H. Newman, Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church, Viewed Relatively to Romanism 
and Popular Protestantism. Lecture 6. “On the Abuse of Private Judgment”, no. 2. London: J. G. & 
F. Rivington & J. H. Parker, Oxford. 2
nd
 edition. 1838, pp. 192-193. (1
st
 edition published in 1837).   
Internet access on 4 February 2014:     
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=jFsJAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA192&lpg=PA192&dq&source=bl&ots=Uq
WWKe1TUJ&sig=uarZZzG7tgwPaxVhtsCdv45tz3Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=0r7VU8fsG5D98QWc1ILYAQ&
ved=0CCMQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false 
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          As we shall see in the next section (4.3), one of Newman’s major preoccupations in 
the combat with liberalism in religion was to expose the sophistries in the popular idea of 
“Reason”, for it was “Reason” thus understood that had usurped the place of wisdom and 
moral perception.  The moral ethos, with a pivotal involvement of the conscience, has an 
essential place in his discussion and account of right Faith. In his University Sermon 
“The Usurpations of Reason”, preached on December 11, 1831,946  Newman states that it 
is not “reason” (as popularly understood) which justifies divine wisdom (or, we might 
say, Revealed Truth), but the “children” of divine wisdom – which is to say, those 
already under her teaching947 and with a character of mind formed by her. Newman 
writes that “what is commonly called Reason” is, in religious subjects (intended to  be) 
“but the instrument at best, in the hands of the legitimate judge, spiritual discernment” 
(no.2). (my italics).  
          The “Reason” or “intellect” which Newman is combating is “secular Reason, or 
Reason, as informed by a secular spirit, or starting from secular principles, as, for 
instance, utilitarian, or political, or epicurean, or forensic”.948 Its “secular principles” 
(which exclude God) obviously contribute to and are encouraged by an ethos utterly at 
variance with the ethos that Newman requires. It is the “Reason” exercised and appealed 
to by such as Hume and Payne. This form of “Reason,” in which “Reason is the 
aggressor,” usurps the position of “judge of those truths which are subjected to another 
part of our nature, the moral sense.”949  It is again to be remembered that more is needed 
than a bald fidelity to the imperative of the conscience – for the conscience itself must not 
be founded on “secular principles”, which is to say principles that exclude God. 
          To this Newman added, in later life, the following footnote by way of explanation: 
“[By “aggressive Reason” is meant the mind reasoning unduly, that is, on assumptions 
foreign and injurious to religion and morals.]”950  These are assumptions “informed by a 
secular spirit, or starting from secular principles”.951 So these “assumptions” (or “secular 
principles”) are the basis of the ethos that is injurious to religion. It is not to “Reason” 
possessing such an ethos as this, that questions of Christian life and doctrine are 
                                                 
946 J. H. Newman, “The Usurpations of Reason”. Sermon IV in Fifteen Sermons preached before the 
University of Oxford  between 1826 and 1843.  Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1966. 
947 Ibid., no.1, p. 55. 
948 Ibid., no. 4, footnote 4,  p. 57. 
949 J. H. Newman, “The Usurpations of Reason”,  no. 6, p. 59. 
950 Ibid., no. 6, footnote 7,  p. 59. 
951 Ibid., no. 4, footnote 4,  p. 57. 
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“addressed”, but, “properly speaking, “to the cultivated moral perception, or, what is 
sometimes improperly termed, “feeling” (no.6). So it is the “cultivated moral perception” 
or moral “feeling” which apprehends Revelation – which is to say the mind suffused with 
a cultivated moral temper or character of a certain cast. The “powers of the intellect …. 
do not necessarily lead us in the direction of our moral instincts, or confirm them” (no.7). 
Newman is highlighting the “instinctive power of an educated conscience” which – “by 
an implicit act of reasoning” – is able to “detect moral truth wherever it lies hid” (no.13). 
Newman is speaking of the power not just of “conscience” but of “an educated 
conscience”.   
         The presence and necessity of a moral ethos continues to show itself in Newman’s 
thoughts on a right faith.  At the height of the Oxford Movement (1839), the safeguard of 
faith is “a right state of heart. This it is that gives it birth; it also disciplines it”.952  Again, 
“Right Faith is the faith of a right mind. Faith is an intellectual act; right Faith is an 
intellectual act, done in a certain moral disposition. Faith is an act of Reason, viz. a 
reasoning upon presumptions; right Faith is a reasoning upon holy, devout, and 
enlightened presumptions. Faith ventures and hazards; right Faith ventures and hazards 
deliberately, seriously, soberly, piously, and humbly, counting the cost and delighting in 
the sacrifice”.953 So there is reasoning, but on the basis of right moral prepossessions.  
        Newman pointed to the method of St Paul who “appealed to that whole body of 
opinion, affection, and desire, which made up, in each man, his moral self; which … set 
him forward steadily in one direction, - which, if it was what it should be, would respond 
to the Apostle’s doctrine...” It is a man’s moral self, then, which is the source of the 
necessary “presumptions” upon which Faith reasons. That is to say, the Apostle taught 
men “that His representative was in their hearts; that he already dwelt in them as a 
lawgiver and a judge, by a sense of right and a conscience of sin; and that what he 
himself was then bringing them fulfilled what was thus begun in them by nature, by 
tokens so like the truth, as to constrain all who loved God under the Religion of Nature to 
believe in Him as revealed in the Gospel”.954  Where there is not this natural foundation 
of a right moral condition, knowledge of the true doctrine of the Gospel will not take 
root.  
                                                 
952 J. H. Newman, “Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstitions”. Fifteen Sermons preached before 
the University of Oxford .  Sermon XII, no. 16.  May 21, 1839. Christian Classics Inc. 1966, p. 234. 
953 Ibid., p. 239. 
954 Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
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         In his article on the Anglo-American Church (October 1839) for The British 
Critic,955 Newman applies the point to the Unitarianism of the American Church. He 
writes that “a trading country is the habitat of Socinianism”956 – meaning that wealth 
disposes a person to be allured to a religion needing no Saviour from sin. “Not to the 
poor, the forlorn, the dejected, can the Unitarian doctrine be alluring, but to those who are 
rich and have need of nothing”.957  
         On December 22, 1844, he writes to Mrs John 
Mozley from Littlemore, “I do not wonder at any 
one’s first impression being, when he hears of the 
change of religion of another, that he is influenced by 
some wrong motive. It is the necessary consequence 
of his thinking himself right .... A person’s feeling 
naturally is, that there must be some thing wrong at 
bottom ....” 958 Newman is saying that it is natural to 
assume that one’s ethos in large measure accounts for 
one’s opinions. By the time of Newman’s entry into 
the Church of Rome, the point was settled in his 
mind. The conscience had an intimate and dominant connection with ethos, and a right 
ethos determined the capacity of the subject to know and assent to revealed truth, and to 
distinguish orthodoxy from heresy.  
          It also led to self-doubts. For some time before his conversion to the Church of 
Rome in 1845 he was convinced intellectually of the truth of (Roman) Catholicism. But 
he did not yet assent because he was alive to the possibility that his conviction may have 
been due to (and a punishment for) moral fault and sin on his part – and therefore, 
because of this, possibly mistaken. He prayed for light to be led, and it was only after 
considerable delay that he was absolutely sure that his conviction was due to his having 
attained the truth. So he assented, and with this, never again did he doubt that he had 
attained the truth in his decision. What this means is that Newman saw virtue as the 
fundamental requirement for right moral and religious knowledge. Virtue empowered the 
                                                 
955 J. H. Newman,  “The Anglo-American Church”. October,1839 for the British Critic. Essay VIII, of 
Essays Critical and Historical, new ed. Vol I.  Longmans, Green, and Co.  London 1897.  New impr. 1914. 
956 Ibid., p. 347. 
957 Ibid.  
958 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. X, p. 467. 
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conscience to judge aright, and the conscience in turn, judging aright, forged the increase 
of virtue. However, as has been said before, one cannot say that Newman based all on 
“the dictate of conscience” – the imperative of a perceived duty – as if this perception of 
an imperative alone was the ultimate ground of right knowledge and a right assent.959 
          Newman’s views on the moral ethos remained throughout his life. His last major 
book was his Grammar of Assent (1870). With it just completed, he wrote to Sister Mary 
Gabrile du Boulay. He writes that “if we are to convert souls savingly they must have the 
due preparation of heart, and if England is to be converted, there must be a great move of 
the national mind to a better sort of religious sentiment. Wesleyans, Anglicans, 
Congregationalists, Unitarians, must be raised to the one and same (what we used to call 
at Oxford) ‘ethos’. That is the same moral and intellectual state of mind. To bring them to 
this, is ‘levelling up’…..” 960 
          The Grammar of Assent was Newman’s master work on assent to religious truth.  
If one thing is plain in this work it is the point that a moral life, a life and mind faithful to 
the conscience, is a prerequisite for the power to attain religious truth.961 We do not 
determine our assent merely by logic but by an act of the living mind which has been 
formed by moral and religious living. It is the moral mind thus possessing a good ethos 
that is able, with its assumptions and expectations, and marshalling reasons and evidence 
adequately, to judge correctly the meaning of converging probabilities inherent in the 
evidence and reasons before it.962 
                                                 
959 The view of ethos developed among the Oxford men during the Movement years. In his extensive 1842 
critique of William Goode’s book, The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice, William George Ward 
(Newman’s most prominent disciple at that point) sees the correct Catholic ethos as the “Church spirit” 
which “is, as it were, the atmosphere through which” one looks. It is “the spirit thus cherished within the 
Church” – “or we may say, the Spirit Who dwells within the Church” (footnote).  
W. G. Ward, “Art. II. – The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice… By William Goode. Picadilly: Hatchard 
and Son”. British Critic, and Quarterly Theological Review, Vol. XXXII (July 1842), p. 102. 
960 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXV, pp. 3-4. 
961 This point was picked up early in his career by the great 20
th
 century philosopher and theologian, 
Bernard Lonergan – showing the influence of Newman in the realm of the philosophy of religion. The 
young Lonergan, after reading the Grammar some five times at Heythrop, wrote a 30, 000 word essay on 
Newman when he began studies in Rome in 1933. What might be fragments of his lost essay on Assent are 
in the Lonergan archives in the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. In these fragments there are several 
references to Newman, among which is this observation on the Grammar of Assent (p. 36):  “The essential 
morality of assent is the supreme contention of the Grammar of Assent. Assent is moral in its prerequisite 
of moral living, in its appeal to men of good will, in the seriousness with which it is to be regarded, in its 
reaction upon our views of what right morality is, in its being an actus humanus” (my italics). 
Internet 12 January, 2014:  http://lonergan.org/online_books/Liddy/chapter_two_john_henry_newman.htm 
962 Newman would not have claimed that one with a right moral ethos will therefore necessarily attain a 
full and right understanding of a religious issue. Presumably Newman would have remembered that she 
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         But this leads directly on to the matter of appropriate reasoning to the assent of faith 
– and to the role of the conscience in the reasoning process.  
 
4.3.    Conscience and Reasoning to Belief in Revelation. 
 
4.3.1.  Introduction           
We have explored the knowledge of God implicit in the basic sense of moral obligation. 
This sense of duty is, we might say, the soul of the practical judgments of conscience 
which involve reasoning in some form – such as the decision to embrace a particular 
faith. While all have a basic sense of moral obligation (and so implicitly the capacity to 
sense a Lawgiver and Judge), the practical judgments of conscience vary without number 
and are often in contradiction. In what way is the sense of God implicit in the practical 
judgment of conscience, which of course involves forms of reasoning?  In the judgment 
that a particular faith is the true one and to be embraced, for example, is there an implicit 
sense of the voice of God? To discuss this matter, we must take up a major question 
preoccupying Newman in his Catholic years. It was antecedent probability and the 
possibility of absolute certitude. The matter is intricate, and if we are to get at Newman’s 
thinking on conscience in this, we must take time off, as it were, to set out the issues 
associated with antecedent probability. 
          On November 26, 1872 (with the Grammar of Assent behind him), Newman 
replied to J.J. Willis Nevins’ question concerning the assent to the Catholic Faith. It 
“involves a conviction … which is sufficient for assent, or rather, which makes assent a 
duty. This I rejoice to think is your case”.963 So for conversion to the Catholic Faith, 
which he regarded as revealed truth, one must reach a conviction which makes assent a 
duty. We are speaking of a conviction involving a practical judgment of the conscience to 
assent. The “conviction” is “sufficient for assent” – implying that it does not subdue and 
force the intellect in the way a strict demonstration may. There is an implicit allusion here 
to probability. Further, the conviction (based on a probability) thus attained makes assent 
a duty – and being a duty, the conscience is involved. So the duty perceived by the 
conscience arises from probable grounds. Further, assent appears to be a distinct step 
                                                                                                                                                 
whom  the Angel Gabriel addressed as “full of grace” (Luke 1: 29) “did not understand” the reply that the 
boy Jesus gave her when she and Joseph found him in the Temple after three days’ search (Luke 2: 51).  
963 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXVI, p. 208. 
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from the conviction that it is a duty. Assent is not to be identified with the inference 
(based on probability), then. The issue here is religious certitude. How, then, is the 
conscience related to the certitude which should lead to assent?  
          It ought also be stated that Newman (as a Catholic) never understood the 
supremacy of the conscience (highlighted by Butler in his Fifteen Sermons) as a 
supremacy of the thinking subject, let alone his supremacy over revealed doctrine as 
enunciated by the Church. On June 22, 1881, Newman wrote to E.S. Purcell, declaring 
that “I would observe that, as regards doctrine, the ‘supremacy of conscience’ is not an 
adequate account of what I should consider safe to say on the subject”.964  One’s 
conscience is not supreme over doctrine. Rather, what is supreme is the objective 
(revealed) truth – i.e., the doctrine – apprehended by the conscience. Newman is reacting 
against the notion that because I conscientiously judge something to be so, my personal 
judgment is the supreme thing. The “supremacy of conscience” means, for Newman, the 
supremacy of the law of conscience – which is the supremacy of the truth (of, say, the 
moral law) apprehended by the conscience.  
           At the outset of this section on conscience and reasoning to religious certitude and 
assent, let us clarify a couple of terms to be used in this section. By “a certainty,” I 
usually refer to the objective truth, expressed, say, in a proposition. I usually use the term 
“certitude” to refer to one’s personal state of mind.  For example, I am in a state of 
personal “certitude” as to the objective “certainty” that God exists.  The word “certain” 
can apply to the objective truth, or to my state of certitude. That God exists, is “certain” – 
which is to say that it is a “certainty.”  I am also “certain” of it, which is to say that I am 
in a state of “certitude” about it.  
          Newman, in his Grammar of Assent, writes that “Certitude is a natural and normal 
state of mind”.965 He writes that “Certitude is a mental state: certainty is a quality of 
propositions …. Certitude is …an active recognition of propositions as true, such as it is 
the duty (my emphasis) of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason, 
and, when reason forbids, to withhold” 966 – indicating in this sentence, incidentally, the 
place of conscience and reason in certitude. He writes that “the very idea of Christianity 
…. is a definite message from God to man .. and to be received as …absolutely certain 
                                                 
964 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXIX, p. 388.   To Edmund Sheridan Purcell. 22 June 1881. 
965 J. H. Newman,  A Grammar of Assent. Part II, ch. 6, 2 (3), p. 172. 
966 Ibid., Part II, ch.  9 The Illative Sense, p. 271. 
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knowledge, certain in a sense in which nothing else can be certain, because it comes from 
him”.967  
          In this context, Newman as a Catholic would say that Christianity is objectively 
“certain,” which is to say, a true “certainty”, and it involves absolute “certitude” in the 
believer. In the Apologia, he writes of Butler’s doctrine that its danger “in the case of 
many minds, is, its tendency in them to destroy absolute certainty, leading them to 
consider every conclusion as doubtful, and resolving truth into an opinion”.968 Obviously, 
if conscience (as a practical judgment) is said to echo the voice of God, the matter of 
certitude is most important. 
 
4.3.2.     Newman and Antecedent Probability: the Anglican years 
As we saw in the previous section of this chapter, by the time of Newman’s entry into the 
Catholic Church his position on the pivotal role of a person’s moral disposition and 
temper of mind in reasoning to religious truth – which is to say, the good ethos – was 
established. This was not the case with question of the kind of reasoning this involved – 
which is to say, the recognition and importance of probability in reasoning to the truth. 
The question of “reason” had been a principal intellectual preoccupation during his 
Anglican years because “reason” was thought to show that Faith is unreasonable. It was 
one thing for Newman to determine the kind of reasoning ordinarily involved in reaching 
a conviction as to religious truth. It was another to show that this justified certitude (that 
is, the certitude of faith) – and it was precisely this that had long been the issue. 
          In the Enlightenment tradition, it was “Reason” (understood as a formal proof 
showing commensurate evidence) which alone produces an absolute certitude.969 That is 
                                                 
967 Ibid., Part II, ch. 10,  p. 302 
968 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 19. 
969 While Newman, in the line and spirit of Butler, strove to clarify the true understanding of “Reason” and 
to distinguish it from mere formal “demonstration” (bereft, as well, of a right moral ethos), he never 
disparaged Reason properly understood. Its formal use is one of the glories of Western civilization.  
       Sir R. W. Livingstone has this to say in his discussion of Socrates and Greek innovation in thought. 
“Socrates … has had a deeper influence on western civilization than any one except Jesus Christ.” Socrates 
is one of those cases in which “mankind makes a step forward and finds itself in a new world …. a new 
outlook, a new attitude to life, in which possibilities of endless development are contained”. Livingstone 
writes that such steps in history as these are “ the birth of Jesus Christ and those centuries between 600 and 
400 B.C. when Greece brought forth the Spirit of Reason, - the desire to see things as they are, or, as 
Socrates expressed it in words equally simple and profound, to follow the argument where it leads. The 
appearance of this spirit is one of the greatest events in history, and the world has never been the same 
since its epiphany …. Reason was incarnate in Socrates and can be seen in him in its purest and simplest 
form.” Sir R. W. Livingstone, Portrait of Socrates being the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Plato in an 
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to say, it is only strict evidential proof which makes absolute certitude ethical. The 
conscience perceives a duty to require this, and nothing less. A position (if it is to be 
perceived as certain) must be strictly commensurate with the reasons supporting it, and 
these reasons must be producible and subject to examination. There had to be sufficient 
“evidence” for your position, if your position was to be moral. You must strictly “prove” 
that Christ existed, that he is God, that he redeemed the world, that he died on the cross 
and rose from the dead, that he founded his Church – if you are to assent to these 
purported truths as certainties. If it is not thus “proved” with evidence commensurate 
with the conclusion it cannot reasonably (and ethically) command an assent involving 
certitude, for it is at most no more than a likelihood, a probability. Therefore it cannot be 
regarded as a certainty.  
          The Anglican Newman denied this requirement of formal commensurate evidence 
for normal certitudes. In Butler’s tradition, he proposed instead that “probability” is the 
guide for life’s assents. It must also be remembered that when Butler declares that 
probability is the guide of life, this must not be misunderstood. Conscience is the 
supreme guide of life,970 but it sees the duty to assent not as grounded in strict evidential 
proof, but in probability. Newman was not in any way meaning to disregard the 
importance of evidence and good grounds,971 but he insisted with Butler and Keble that it 
is but probabilities that constitute good and adequate grounds for the assents of life. 
Conscience is guided by the probable – not by “Reason,” as this was understood. Well, 
doubtless this was so in ordinary life, but it still contained a philosophical problem: how 
is the absolute “certitude” that something is a true “certainty” justified, if the reasons for 
                                                                                                                                                 
English Translation with Introduction and Notes. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 1
st
 ed. 1938, this edition 
1966. Preface, pp. v-vi.   
      In discussing Socrates, Livingstone writes that “he did indeed make a contribution to the technique of 
thought which all of us use and which Aristotle describes as the discovery of ‘inductive reasoning and of 
general definitions’. By this Aristotle means that Socrates was the first man who systematically tried to get 
behind particular examples of (e.g.) justice or goodness or eduction to a general definition of what justice 
or goodness or education is. He did it inductively” (ibid., Introduction, p. xxx). 
      Pope Benedict XVI saw a providential dimension to the appearance of this Greek spirit of Reason, 
giving to it a vocation to encounter and collaborate with the message of Revelation – which must not be 
forgotten by believers. He insisted on a high respect for Reason. Cf. "Faith, Reason and the University — 
Memories and Reflections" Regensburg lecture delivered on 12 September 2006 by Pope Benedict XVI. 
970 J. Butler, “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience” (Rom. 2:14), Sermons II and III of his Fifteen 
Sermons. J. Butler, Fifteen Sermons, Preached at the Rolls Chapel, 1726, And A Dissertation of the Nature 
of Virtue. Ed. with an Introduction and Additional Notes by T.A. Roberts. London: S.P.C.K. 1970.         
971 In The Church of the Fathers (1840), to take but one of his Anglican works, Newman has chapters 
which show his care to reach and argue for conclusions on objective evidence. For example, in chapter III 
he means to prove the fact of a miracle in the fourth century, relating to the martyrs Gervasius and 
Protasius. Indeed, the burden of Newman’s writing is concerned with objective reasons for the truth.  
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it are but probabilities? Do not probable reasons lead only to probabilities? When all is 
said and done, did not Butler’s account defend divine Revelation as but highly probable? 
This was an ethical matter: one should not absolutely assent to something which, in the 
last analysis, is doubtful. The conscience was involved.972 
     Soon after arriving at Propaganda College in Rome at the end of 1846, which is to 
say after more than a year as a Catholic, Newman wrote to W. G. Penny about his Oxford 
University Sermons saying that “The chief thing which I think is original is one which I 
have worked on a great deal, but I can't tell how it will be received here; viz that 
antecedent probability is the great instrument of conviction in religious (nay in all) 
matters”.973 So that is Newman’s judgment on the most “original” point in the Oxford 
University Sermons, which he regarded as his best book to that point. He had rejected the 
exclusive requirement of evidential proof, and had presented a thorough case for the 
greater importance of probability. It is the perception of probability which invests what 
evidence there is with its convincing power. In order to set the context, let us (very 
briefly – for out topic is the conscience) present the stage at which Newman had reached 
in this issue by the time of his passing over to Rome, and let us do so by looking briefly 
at one of his last Anglican sermons on the matter.   
      There is not the space here to discuss the rise and development in Newman’s 
mind, up to 1839, of his theory of antecedent probability as being normally the principal 
motive for assent in concrete matters. For our purposes here, I shall regard Newman’s 
position as expressed in 1840 as a sufficient introduction to his idea of valid reasoning to 
faith and the role antecedent probability in it, at the threshold of his Catholic years. My 
                                                 
972 A witness (during the last stage of Newman’s Anglican period) to the problematic character of this issue 
of certainty based on probability is shown at one point in Blanco White’s posthumous 3 volume Life, 
published in 1845 by J. Thom, which Newman read before converting to Rome.  In Blanco White’s attack 
on the certainty of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures (understood as divine Oracles), he states that “the 
authenticity of those writings is only an historical probability” (p. 279). He tells us that the “case is exactly 
parallel to that of the Roman Catholic Divines, when defending the supremacy and infallibility of Peter and 
his pretended successors” He insists that “The foundation of certainty must be certain. Divines would make 
the Eternal fountain of Reason more illogical than the weakest man”. God, Blanco White writes, would not 
have left the foundation of “the intended certainty, to probability and conjecture” (p. 280). Later he states 
that “I do not mean to exaggerate this uncertainty; it is enough that some exists. Certainty cannot be built 
on an uncertain basis. Since God therefore has left all these uncertainties upon the New Testament, He 
could not intend that it should be the foundation of that certainty upon articles of Faith, which is supposed 
to be essential to salvation.” Later he explains that his determination has been “to regulate my whole being 
according to what I clearly understood to be the will of God, as expressed by the spirit of the New 
Testament” (p. 283).  So he decided that it was the spirit of the New Testament that he would live by. (The 
Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, ed. J. H. Thom, Vol. I, 1845, pp. 279-283). 
973 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XI, p. 293.  To W. G. Penny.  Propaganda Dec 13\46. 
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purpose is briefly to set the stage for the Catholic years and his grappling with the 
philosophical difficulty of real-life certitude with its duty to assent. 
 
         In his Sermon, “Implicit and Explicit Reason” 974 (St Peter’s Day, 1840), Newman 
shows he has settled the matter of defining “Reason”. Reason, he insists, is a broader 
faculty than the rationalists conceived, for it embraces Faith. Reason is to be defined as 
“the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception”, or, alternatively, “of 
ascertaining one thing by means of another” (no.7). In real life, reasoning does not go “by 
rule, but by an inward faculty” (no.7). “In other words, all men have a reason, but not all 
men can give a reason”. So then, there is “Implicit Reason” and there is “Explicit 
Reason” (no.9). Thus, reasoning and arguing are distinct, and clarity in argument is not to 
be identified with “reasoning well”.  
          Newman attacks the requirement of formal proof, producible evidence and 
demonstration – Explicit Reason – as the only reasonable basis of assent to a truth (as 
required by, say, Tillotson and Paley – nos.12 and 13).975 In fact, he observes, explicit 
reasons commonly are not the real reasons that lead to religious belief. Considerations 
that appear weak in their explicit form may justly lead by an implicit reasoning process to 
assent to Christianity (no.13). Implicit reasoning may justly lead to belief in God – and an 
instance of this is suggested (at times) in what Newman says of the argument for the 
being of God from the law of conscience. For instance, in his Apologia in 1864 he 
expressed himself as absolutely certain that conscience “proves” to him the being of God, 
but – significantly – he admits difficulty in putting “that certainty into logical shape” 
according to “mood and figure”. 976  
          In the sermon we are briefly considering (“Implicit and Explicit Reason”), of 
critical importance to the implicit reasoning process is the heart’s persuasion. Revelation, 
in a manner “is left to be received or rejected by each man according as his heart 
sympathized in it” (no.14). This, of course, is a reference to the habituation forged by a 
good ethos (discussed previously), but what we are doing here is teasing out the elements 
                                                 
974 J. H. Newman,  Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford.  Sermon XIII. 
975 Cf., G. Zuijdwegt, “Richard Whateley’s Influence on John Henry Newman’s Oxford University 
Sermons on Faith and Reason (1839-1840)”, Newman Studies Journal 10.1 (Spring 2013) 82-95. Zuijdwegt 
shows that Newman’s four Faith and Reason Sermons (on the reasonableness of implicit reasoning on 
antecedent probabilities), including that on St Peter’s Day, 1840, answer the evidentialist position of the 
anti-Tractarians, and especially Whately’s Elements of Logic and Elements of Rhetoric.  
976 J. H. Newman,  Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 206 and p. 250. 
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of his theory of antecedent probability in reasoning. The moral ethos inclines a person to 
expect and desire certain things and it involves certain assumptions. While Newman 
strongly defends the place of inquiry, evidence, logic and argument in religion, 
nevertheless it is “antecedent considerations, presumptions, and analogies, which, vague 
and abstruse as they are, still are more truly the grounds on which religious men receive 
the Gospel” (no.17). His point is that “the reasonings and opinions which are involved in 
the act of Faith are latent and implicit; that the mind reflecting on itself is able to bring 
them out into some definite and methodical form; that Faith, however, is complete 
without this reflective faculty, which, in matter of fact, often does interfere with it, and 
must be used cautiously” (no.38). 
          By the end of his Anglican period, Newman has decided that the act of faith, 
requiring a certain moral temper of mind (or moral ethos), is primarily based on what is 
perceived (with the reasons and evidence before it) to be antecedently likely. It is this, 
rather than formal and producible evidence commensurate with the conclusion, which is 
the ground of the assent of faith. In fact, reason cannot be identified with mere scientific, 
mathematical or evidential reasoning. Reasoning (as more broadly defined above) in real 
life allows a critically important place for antecedent probability. Indeed, this is the basis 
of most of what are recognized as practical certainties in life. But a question remained: 
how can probability, the admitted guide to life, yield absolute religious certitude? How is 
faith of this kind ethical? 
 
          That said by way of introduction, let us now follow Newman into his new Catholic 
environment. The great issue ahead for him would be the possibility of certitude in the 
assent of faith, and it was one of the issues of the age. Can the faith be an objective 
“certainty”, and may one be “certain” about it? – granted that it is probable reasons (and 
not commensurate evidence) which leads a person to the duty to assent to it as being the 
absolute truth. Our interest here is to identify the place of the conscience in this dilemma 
– but it will involve a presentation of the intricate issues with which Newman had to 
grapple. 
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4.3.3:   Probability and the problem of certitude in faith  (Rome)  
 
     4.3.3   (a)   The problem  (1845-1846) 
          A month after his entry into the Catholic Church (9 October 1845), Newman wrote 
to Keble saying that he and Froude were the only persons who had “any part” in setting 
his face “in that special direction which has led me to my present inestimable gain”.977 
Froude had been gone for some years. That he could say this to Keble illustrates 
Newman’s sense of absolute certitude on having entered the Catholic Church. His 
conscience as to the truth was manifestly and completely at peace.  
     Now, what was to be said of the certitude of one who thought he should embrace 
the Catholic Faith, and who had yet to do so? A month after his letter to Keble, on 
December 11, 1845, Newman wrote to A.J. Hanmer from Littlemore stating that “On the 
whole I should say about such cases as yours, Wait till you have such a conviction as 
Bishop Butler would say is sufficient in a practical matter, recollecting that doubt is the 
condition of our nature, and that the merit of faith consists in making ventures”.978  
          Newman is holding to Butler’s account. He is telling Hanmer to wait till he is 
sufficiently sure he should make this venture, not expecting at this point the absence of all 
possible doubt. The way ahead is manifestly not a matter of strict demonstration and 
formal probative evidence. He advises his correspondent to view things in accord with 
Butler’s criterion of conviction: wait till you have practical certainty. Faith, then, for the 
one contemplating assent, involves moral certainty – that which is sufficient for life’s 
decisions. Butler taught that probability is the guide for the conscience in life, not 
evidential proof.  
     But it seems that the certitude of “faith” is not simply the conviction resulting 
from probabilities. That is to say, it is not a mere result of this inference. There is an 
element of “venture” – for, we notice, a “venture” is to be made on the basis of this 
practical conviction. The “venture” is that of believing, and the result of making this 
“venture” seems to be the distinctive certitude of faith. The moral certainty “sufficient in 
a practical matter” is at the threshold of the “venture”. So it is not the same as the 
certitude of faith. Rather, it is a practical certainty that the Faith is very credible – and, 
indeed, a duty. With that conviction that to believe is a duty, the venture of believing is 
                                                 
977 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XI, p. 34  To John Keble Littlemore. November 14. 1845. 
978 Ibid., p. 60. 
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made – but the two steps are formally in some way distinct. Further, making this 
“venture”, based on moral certainty which does not exclude doubt, has “merit.” 
Presumably the venture of faith has “merit” if taken when the grounds for it appear to 
constitute a duty to assent – and one is to be blamed if this venture is not then taken. 
Conversely, it is blameworthy if taken on poor grounds that ought discourage such a 
venture. The “conscience” is not mentioned in this statement, but it is implied in that the 
“venture” of faith has “merit”. Belief in Revelation, then, very much involves the 
conscience. 
       A week later (December 18, 1845) Newman writes to Mrs Anistice. He observes 
that “we were intended to begin with antecedent probabilities and general assumptions, 
and to take large and broad views of the subject, instead of entangling ourselves with 
particular questions”.979 So, beginning with “antecedent probabilities and general 
assumptions,” and considering the question broadly rather than attempting to attain a 
proof for every step, the venture of faith is to be made when there appear to be sufficient 
reasons for what is a practical decision.  
In the same letter to Mrs Anistace he writes that his book just published – The 
Development of Christian Doctrine 980 – “attempts to show that so much may be said for 
the consistency of the Roman system, which is the outward token and test of its 
infallibility, that it is safest and best to submit to it.” 981 Newman’s famous book is 
Butlerian in approach. So, for the one not yet a Catholic, the issue is whether it is “safest 
and best to submit” to the Faith. Is it truly credible, indeed the most credible option 
ahead? For the one still to make the venture, the practical or moral certainty is reached 
when it seems “safest and best”. It is then that the conscience perceives it to be a duty to 
make the venture of faith (in the “Roman system”).  
          It looks as if the judgment that it is “safest and best” includes the judgment that it is 
a “duty” to do so. The good reasons thus perceived embody the “duty”. Fulfilling this 
duty will be meritorious. Importantly for our discussion here, Newman makes antecedent 
probabilities (and general assumptions involving a right moral ethos) the justifying basis 
                                                 
979 Ibid., p. 69. 
980 J. H. Newman, (1845). An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.  Westminster Md.: 
Christian Classics. 1968. 
981 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XI,  p. 69. 
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(or “beginning”) of the duty to make the venture of faith. Probability is decisive in 
evaluating the evidence and reaching what conscience perceives to be a duty.982  
          But as asked earlier, as a theory that justified the certitude of faith, how could 
antecedent probabilities issue in an assent involving certitude? If this is moral certitude 
(prior to the “venture”), how could this be or become the absolute certitude of assent, 
which excludes doubt? On the face of it, such reasoning could only go so far as to support 
not a certainty but a high probability. The Anglican tradition of Butler (which included 
Keble) had defended Faith (against “Reason”) on the basis that probability is the truly 
normal, reasonable (and ethical) guide to life. If the demand is for strict evidence in 
everything, then what all take to be the practical certainties of life by which we are 
guided must be cast overboard.  
          Let that point about practical certainties be granted, but the problem remained: how 
did probability justify absolute certainty in a philosophical sense, which was the point at 
issue in the attacks on Faith by “Reason”?  How can I be absolutely certain about God or 
Christ if all I have are probabilities that at best give only a moral certainty? David Hume 
would have been grinning. 
          Newman does not yet seem to have satisfactorily pierced this intellectual impasse. 
He had now moved into the Catholic intellectual climate. A serious clarification of terms 
would be needed, for in the Catholic doctrinal account Faith involved a state of absolute 
certitude. Moreover, Faith apprehended an objective certainty (which was the content of 
the Faith) and not what was a mere probability. The duty to assent (involving true 
certitude) had to be shown to be truly reasonable, and not a mere fideism or feeling.  
Newman himself had written, as an Anglican, that the safeguard of Faith is a right state of 
heart – specifically, Love. “Faith working by Love” (“fides formata charitate”) ensures 
that the honest mind will be led to Divine Truth.983 Doubtless this is so, but on the face of 
it this did not seem to account for the absolute certitude of faith, nor that the Faith was an 
objective certainty. All it appeared to justify objectively was a very high probability.  
                                                 
982 Newman insists on the complexity of issues and refuses to give quick and simple answers. On February 
8, 1846, he wrote to J. Spencer Northcote refusing to give a simple summary of his Development of 
Christian Doctrine. He went on to observe: "Catholicism is a deep matter, you cannot take it in a teacup ... 
you must consent to think" (J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Volume XI, ed. C. S. Dessain and F. J. 
McGrath. London: Thomas Nelson. 1961, pp. 109-110. 
983  J. H. Newman, “Love the Safeguard of Faith.” May 21, 1839. Sermon XII. No.16. Fifteen Sermons 
preached before the University of Oxford.  Westminster Md.: Christian Classics Inc. 1966,  p. 234.  
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The matter was ominous because the Catholic Church had condemned the opinion 
that “The assent of supernatural faith …. is consistent with merely probable knowledge of 
revelation”.984 The assent of faith did not involve a “merely probable knowledge”. By 
that was meant that it involved absolute certitude in the believer, who assented to the 
Catholic Faith as being an objective certainty. Some sixty years after Newman’s stay in 
Rome, Pope St Pius X in Lamentabili sane exitu (July 3, 1907) condemned, in no. 25, the 
proposition that “the assent of faith rests ultimately on a mass of probabilities” 
(Lamentabili was followed by the more comprehensive Pascendi, on September 8, 1907). 
Pope Pius X was condemning the notion that faith is faith in what is merely “a mass of 
probabilities” – which is to say that Revelation, Christ and the divine character of the 
Church, all these things are “ultimately” but “a mass of probabilities”. This firm teaching 
would probably always have excluded a formal approbation of Butler in Catholic 
apologetics – for Butler’s apologetic would seem to result in the Christian Faith being but 
a high probability.985 This high probability might justifiably be a guide to life, but it did 
not satisfy Catholic teaching, which insisted on Revelation being perceived as an absolute 
certainty. One might even argue that Pius X’s 1907 condemnation in effect found Butler 
to be, in the last analysis, philosophically wanting.986 
Newman did not give his assent in faith to what he regarded as but a probability 
(prescinding from the question of the nature of the reasoning leading to this assent). He 
gave his assent to what he firmly believed was an objective certainty. In this sense his 
faith was based not on a probability but on a certainty. But he had written that the 
grounds of credibility that lead to the venture of faith were, formally, but probabilities. 
Our question in all of this is, where does the conscience fit into this? 
                                                 
984 Pope Innocent XI in 1679.  Cf. Denzinger, Enchiridion, 10th edition, no. 1171. 
985 For the unsatisfactoriness of Bulter and for a discussion of his influence on Newman, as well as for the 
difference between his later thought on Assent and that of Butler (as perceived by one Catholic writer), cf. 
J. L. Murphy, “The Influence of  Bishop Butler on Religious Thought”, Theological Studies 24, no.3 (Sept. 
1963), pp. 361-401. 
986 Of course, this is not to say that Lamentabili formally targeted Butler’s theory of probability. I suspect 
that Pope Pius X had never so much as heard of the Anglican Bishop Butler and his writings. Saint Pius X 
was condemning Catholic Modernism. He certainly did not understand Newman to be a Modernist. At the 
time, Thomas O’Dwyer, Bishop of Limerick, felt obliged to publish a pamphlet defending John Henry 
Newman from the charge of having been condemned in Pascendi. He received a letter from the Pope 
commending his defence of Newman. In this short and decisive Letter of 10 March, 1908, Pius X tells 
Bishop O’Dwyer that “your essay, in which you show that the writings of Cardinal Newman, far from 
being in disagreement with Our Encyclical Letter Pascendi, are very much in harmony with it, has been 
emphatically approved by Us” (Pope Pius X, Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 41, 1908).      
Internet archive 7 March, 2014: http://www.newmanreader.org/canonization/popes/acta10mar08.html 
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          In January 1847 Newman wrote to Wiseman informing him of preparations for the 
translation and publication in French of some of his Oxford University Sermons and his 
Essay on Development. The Sermons were on Faith and Reason. The matter was very 
much on his mind – and he did not want to find himself in hot water. As a neophyte 
Catholic, and as one preparing for ordination, Newman had to look sharp about his 
previous published statements, and he struggled over it in Rome and searched for the 
answer.  
          How could his position on probability in reasoning be reconciled in appearance 
and philosophically with the objective certainty of the Faith, and with the subjective 
certitude that belief involved? He felt compelled to clarify his terms because of his own 
deep respect for Catholic teaching. He was convinced that he would find, in Catholic 
theology and doctrine, the answer to the 
conundrum. In our discussion of the idea of 
conscience (and the duty to believe) in 
Newman, we must deal with this major 
preoccupation of Newman’s to see what place 
conscience came to have in his emerging 
theory of religious assent. 
In Rome, Newman states in a letter to 
Dalgairns that “I use ‘probable’ in opposition 
to ‘demonstrative – ’ and moral certainty is a state of mind, in all cases however produced 
by probable arguments which admit of more or less” – and the cogency of such 
arguments will vary with the individual mind.987 The facts of the case in religious assent 
seem to be Newman’s constant starting point. How does the mind actually, in fact, work 
in the process of attaining certitude? He is clear in his own mind that the reasons leading 
to this certitude of faith are, in themselves and formally, probabilities. Newman notes in 
his letter to Dalgairns that in his Prophetical Office (as quoted in his Development of 
Christian Doctrine) he had written “that there is but probability for the existence of God.” 
This, he continues, “would scandalize the Romans sadly. I might leave it (out?), did it not 
                                                 
987 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XI, p. 289.  Collegio di Propaganda Feast of the Immaculate 
Conception, 1846.  To J. D. Dalgairns.  
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seem to throw light upon other passages. What I meant was, that the moral certainty 
which belief implied arose from probable not demonstrative arguments”.988  
         It is clear from his correspondence that Newman, newly arrived in Rome for 
several months of study prior to ordination as a Catholic priest, is resolved to think with 
the Church and is docile before the Church’s doctrine. In particular, he wishes to test his 
latest special subjects (Faith and Reason, and the development of doctrine) against 
Catholic theology and doctrine. His attitude is very much one of a learner,989 and he has 
great faith in what will be found in the Catholic tradition. “I am curious to know what 
will be the fate of my University Sermons in my own judgment, when I have got up the 
subject catholicly. I think there are a great many truths in them, but I doubt whether 
whatever is true is not found in the received Catholic system; and whatever is original is 
wrong ... The chief thing which I think is original is one which I have worked on a great 
deal, but I can't tell how it will be received here; viz that antecedent probability is the 
great instrument of conviction in religious (nay in all) matters”.990  He has decided that 
conviction in religious matters is not primarily the fruit of demonstrably formal evidence 
but of a right mind and heart acting on evidence from the basis of antecedent 
probabilities. That is, the objective evidence for revelation, such as it is, has this great 
thing going for it: compelling likelihood.  We may note that Newman does not say that 
the only thing which is original is his theory of antecedent probability, but “the chief 
thing.”  
          Newman’s encounter with Wiseman’s article on the Donatists in the Dublin 
Review of July 1839 led to dramatic developments in his view of the early Church and of 
what he came to regard as the true Church. This in turn led to his great book on The 
Development of Christian Doctrine. So too, as we shall see, there were significant 
developments in Newman’s thought on Faith and Reason as a result of his encounter with 
Catholic thought while in Rome. In effect he was led to start to leave Butler behind on the 
matter of the assent of faith. 991 But, as said before, our interest in this is Newman’s idea 
of the conscience in it. 
                                                 
988 Ibid., p. 291 (Postscript). To J. D. Dalgairns. 
989 In 1855 he recollected that “when in Rome, I declined to enter into controversy with old B. [Brownson] 
… (because) .. I had come there to learn my religion, not to hold a theological polemic.”  
(J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. 16, p. 526. To Richard Stanton, August 15, 1855) 
990 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XI, p. 293  (to W G Penny.  Propaganda Dec 13\46) 
991 J. A. Elbert concluded that prior to 1845 Newman held to a theory of faith similar to that of Butler. But, 
he says, it must have undergone a considerable change in the course of his life, because as a Catholic he 
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     4.3.3   (b)     Giovanni Perrone (1847) 992 
 
          Soon after his arrival in Rome, Newman gave his attention to the writings of 
Giovanne Perrone on Faith and Reason.993  In his already-mentioned letter to Dalgairns 
on December 8, he writes that “Perrone has written a Treatise on the connection of 
Reason and Faith which I like very much. I am glad to see I have no view counter to it, 
but there is the subtle question ‘Whether a person need be conscious of his own certainty 
(faith)’ etc. which I cannot find he answers, and I have asked him about it”.994 Newman is 
concerned about the personal certitude of faith, which may be implicit, and the way in 
fact we reason to it. He has also studied Perrone’s treatise995 on it, and will soon engage 
                                                                                                                                                 
was dissatisfied with probability as the guide of life in the matter of divine faith. He demanded certitude. J. 
A. Elbert, Newman’s conception of faith prior to 1845 (Dayton, Ohio. 1933, p. 75), as quoted by J. L. 
Murphy, “The Influence of Bishop Butler on Religious Thought”, Theological Studies 24, no.3 (Sept. 
1963), p. 384.  
     One must be on guard against delineating too sharply the commencement date of Newman’s solution to 
the problem of certitude. The Apologia (pp. 19-24) suggests that during his Anglican period Newman had 
definite intimations of it. In writing of Keble’s account of the certitude of faith based on probability 
(involving “faith and love”), Newman states that while he made use of it, he was dissatisfied. It did not get 
to the root of the difficulty in accounting for certitude logically and philosophically. So he tried to complete 
it by considerations of his own which are to be found in his writings that he cites. His argument was that 
absolute certitude could be the result of an assemblage of converging probabilities – as a point of duty for 
some and not for others. Our project here is not to track this and test exhaustively whether Newman did in 
fact express in his Anglican writings his own solution to the problem. Certainly his full philosophical 
exploration of it was left to the Grammar of Assent. The main purpose of this section is to identify the place 
of conscience in Newman’s view of religious certitude. 
992 Giovanne Perrone (1794 – 1876). After obtaining the doctorate in theology at Turin, Perrone entered the 
Society of Jesus in December 1815. The Society of Jesus had been re-established by Pope Pius VII only a 
year before (after its suppression decades before), and Perrone was appointed to teach theology at Orvieto. 
A few years later he was made professor of dogmatic theology at the Roman College – among  his most 
famous students was Newman, in 1847. The Roman Republic of 1848 forced him to go to England for three 
years, after which he resumed teaching dogma in the Roman College. He spent a period as rector of 
Ferrara, but otherwise taught theology till old age. His numerous dogmatic works include Praelectiones 
theologicae, quas in Collegio Romano S. J. habebat Joannes Perrone. (9 vols., Rome, 1835 sqq.), 
Praelectiones hierologicae in compendium redactae (4 vols., Rome, 1845), Il Hermesianismo (Rome, 
1838), Il Protestantismo e la regola di fede (3 vols., 1853), De divinitate D. N. Jesu Christi (3 vols., Turin, 
1870). 
993 Newman would have known of the Roman standing of Perrone even during his last years as an 
Anglican. I say this because we read in W. G. Ward’s article in the British Critic of July 1843 (his review 
of J. L. Bernard’s The Synagogue and the Church), the following reference to Perrone. Ward writes that M. 
Moehler’s view of the priesthood “was cited with approbation by Perrone, the standard of authority at 
Rome just now.” (W. G. Ward, “Art. I. – The Synagogue and the Church, being an attempt to show that the 
Government, Ministers, and Services of the Church were derived from those of the Synagogue. By Joshua 
L. Bernard, A. M. Curate of St Mary’s, Donnybrook. Fellowes, London.” The British Critic, and Quarterly 
Theological Review, July, 1843, pp. 55-56, footnote 3).  Inasmuch as Ward readily admitted to being deeply 
influenced by Newman at the time, one can take as being likely that Newman was familiar with the 
theological authorities cited and quoted by Ward in his articles in the British Critic. 
    As a result, one may presume that Newman, now in Rome and already from late Anglican days familiar 
with the name of Perrone, would have been keen to study him and to make his personal acquaintance. 
994 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol XI, p. 290. 
995 G. Perrone, Praelectiones Theologicae. Tractatus de Locis Theologicis, Pars Tertia, De Analogia 
Rationis et Fidei. Rome 1842 edition. 
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personally with Perrone on the matter. Some six weeks later he is writing to Bishop 
Wiseman, and in his Postscript remarks that “I have been much interested in Perrone’s 
treatise on the subject and think his book a valuable one in dogmatics – but my opinion of 
his polemics (as far as regards England) does not improve. It was rash to undertake 
England, knowing neither English language nor English character”.996  Perrone had been 
interested in Anglican theological thought, and he relished with absolute confidence the 
challenge of taking on in controversy the best of Anglican authors.  
          Newman was gaining his understanding of Catholic teaching and theology on Faith 
and Reason from Perrone’s work. It is valuable in “dogmatics,” he says – which is to say, 
in the presentation of Catholic doctrine. In this last case, it is a little difficult to identify 
exactly which of Perrone’s works Newman is referring to. But he is studying the matter 
carefully and endeavouring to grasp Catholic teaching and theology. 
          Three weeks later, in a letter to Dalgairns (8 February) he observes that “I suspect 
the distinction is quite acknowledged in Perrone between demonstrative and moral 
proof”.997 Nearly a week later he is writing to Dalgairns again, this time about possible 
misunderstandings in his own writings. Dalgairns says that he could be classed with 
Bautain998 in his disparagement of reason in religion. We must remember that much of 
Newman’s attack on “Reason” as an Anglican did involve its disparagement because he 
was attacking a popular conception of it, one in possession by British philosophers and 
writers who rejected revealed religion. It is clear that in the first half of 1847 there is 
bearing down on Newman a strong Catholic influence on his thought and expression. One 
of the things that was putting Newman on his toes was the Catholic embrace of Reason. 
In Catholic parlance Reason was a positive concept and assisted the assent of faith. 
          Newman responds to Dalgairns by saying that “I don’t think I agree with M. 
Bautain at all – (his opinions and retractations are drawn out in Perrone) but if you think I 
                                                 
996 J. H.  Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XII, p. 21. Jan 17. 1847 
Newman may be referring to Perrone’s Tractatus de Vera Religione (On True Religion against unbelievers 
and heretics), Rome 1840 II, and perhaps his De Locis Theologicis. Rome ed.1841, I, chapters. 3-4. 
997 J. H.  Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XII, p. 32.  To J. D. Dalgairns. 
998 Louis Eugène Marie Bautain (1796 – 1867), Catholic priest, French philosopher and theologian. He 
distinguished reason and faith and exalted faith above reason, holding that revelation supplies facts, 
otherwise unattainable. Following Kantian criticism, he believed that reason can never yield knowledge of 
things in themselves. But there exists in addition to reason another faculty which may be called 
intelligence, through which we are put in connection with spiritual and invisible truth. His main works were 
Philosophie du Christianisme (1835), Psychologie expérimentale (1839), Philosophie morale (1840), 
Religion et liberté (1848),  La morale de l’Évangile, comparée aux divers systèmes de morale (Strassburg, 
1827; Paris, 1855).  
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do, how much more will strangers..” It suggests that Newman has Perrone’s texts by his 
side for consultation in the matter of Catholic doctrine and theology. During the same 
letter he says that “I wish to know what the Church teaches,” and at the end, “I don’t like 
to begin my career in the Catholic Church with a condemnation or retraction”.999  
Newman seems to have regarded Perrone as a very distinguished expositor of Catholic 
theology and doctrine, but not a significantly original theologian. In his letter to Dalgairns 
of February 14 he refers to Father Passaglia as “almost the only divine of Rome”,1000  and 
in a letter to Wiseman on the same day he refers to Father Passaglia as the “only 
prominent theological professor here”.1001 Passaglia declared himself critical of 
Newman’s theory of Development, and Newman does not seem to have had much to do 
with him personally.1002  
          Through acquaintance and conversation with Perrone and a careful study of his 
theological manuals, Newman was identifying Catholic doctrine and theology on his own 
special subjects, on which he was an innovative expert. On February 24 he wrote to 
Dalgairns again, saying that “I am trying to scrape acquaintance with Perrone – whether 
any thing will come of it or not, I don’t know – but if I have an opening, I shall put before 
him as clearly as I can my opinions about Faith and Reason. If he approved, of which I 
don’t despair, I might put what I draw up as a Preface to the Sermons. But perhaps 
nothing will come of all this”.1003 In fact, he did send to Perrone a list of formal 
propositions summarizing his views on Faith and Reason. Early in April Ambrose St 
                                                 
999 J. H.  Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XII, pp. 35-36. To J. D. Dalgairns. 
1000 Ibid., p. 36. 
1001 Ibid., p. 42. This was in February, 1847. However, over time Newman (and possibly while still in 
Rome during 1847) lessened his estimate of Passaglia. In a letter to Richard Stanton of August 15, 1855, 
Newman had this to say of the Jesuit Father Passaglia: “I have always been puzzled myself at people taking 
to Passaglia, as they do. He is a simple minded, amiable man, as well as an able, learned, and eloquent one; 
but he is too rhetorical, too wrapt up in his own notions, and too little ministrative to other minds, (if I may 
so express it) to elicit my own admiration. The more an intellect aims at imitating our Lord, so should it 
more and more take an apron and napkin, and go round wsashing the disciples’ feet. Passaglia seems to me 
ever in the teahcer’s chair.” (J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol XVI, pp. 526-527). 
1002 Carlo Passaglia (May 2, 1812 – March 12, 1887) was an Italian priest, Jesuit theologian and professor 
in the Collegio Romano. In 1854 the Church determined the question of the Immaculate Conception of the 
Virgin Mary, with Passaglia an ardent supporter (but his theory on the ever explicit tradition of the 
Immaculate Conception was not taken up by Pius IX in his proclamation of the dogma. Nor was it 
supported by several bishops close to the Pope). In 1859, when the war between Austria and France (the 
first step towards the unification of Italy) broke out, Passaglia espoused the popular side and boldly 
attacked the temporal power of the pope. For this he was expelled from the Jesuits. Eight days before his 
death he tried to be reconciled to the pope, and made a full retractation. He died at Turin in March 1887.  
       His main works were: an edition of the Enchiridion of St. Augustine (1847); De prærogativis b. Petri 
(1850); Conferences given at the Gésu and published in Civiltà Cattolica (1851); Commentariorum 
theologicorum partes 3 (1850–51); De ecclesia Christi (3 vols, 1853); De æternitate poenarum (1854). 
1003 J. H.  Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XII, p. 55, February 24, 1847.  To J. D. Dalgairns. 
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John wrote to Dalgairns that “N. has struck up quite a close friendship with F. Perrone: 
they embrace each other”.1004    
        So it was probably in March 1847 that Newman had begun seriously discussing 
with Perone his position on Faith and Reason. His opinion of Perrone is shown in his 
desire to gain Perrone’s approbation for his theory of Development as well.1005 It seems 
that he received Perrone’s criticisms of his theory, and regarded them as leaving the 
theory basically untouched. Wilfrid Ward remarks that Newman’s conversations with 
Perrone were of importance for the future, “for Newman could always remember that 
when he had talked out his views he had found substantial agreement between them, 
except that Perrone was unwilling to say 'yea' or 'nay' on certain questions, and did not 
carry his analysis to the point which Newman's penetrating mind desired”.1006 So Perrone 
was very cautious when pressed by the exceptional probing of Newman, which may have 
taken him to lengths about which he was uncertain. Ward’s remark was especially in 
relation to Newman’s conversations with Perrone over the development of Christian 
doctrine, but they may also have applied to his conversations with him on Faith and 
Reason. Newman certainly regarded Perrone as his best and most accessible practical 
guide on Catholic teaching.1007 
                                                 
1004 Ibid., p. 40, footnote 2. Ibid., p. 40, footnote 2.    Newman’s friendship with Perrone endured. On May 
3, 1867 (with many troubles behind him) Newman wrote a long letter to Ambrose St John in which he gave 
some passing news. He writes that “Your welcome letter, notifying your arrival at Rome, got here on 
Wednesday at noon. I have just had a letter from Fr Perrone, so very kind that you must call on him and 
thank him. He says he always defends me.” (J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. XXIII, p. 202). 
1005 Newman’s theory of Development certainly gained influence. Richard Stanton wrote to Newman on 7 
August, 1855. In it he passed on that, when visiting recently in England, Monsignor Talbot (the secretary of 
Pope Pius IX) told W. G. Ward that Newman’s theory of the development of doctrine was “the private 
opinion of the Holy Father himself”.  (J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVI, p. 526, footnote 1). 
1006 W. Ward, The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman based on his private journals and 
correspondence, Two Volumes. 1912.  Vol. 1. ch. 6.   New York, London, Bombay: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., p. 187. 
1007 Newman continued to regard Perrone’s work as very significant. In 1849 when preparations were 
being made for the declaration of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, he said that the Pope had, in a 
way, taken up Perrone. Ten years after this Newman was writing to Dr Gillow of Ushaw College, 
defending his own statement in The Rambler article that “even in the preparation of a dogmatic definition 
the faithful are consulted, as lately in the instance of the Immaculate Conception….” He tells Gillow that 
“Fr Perrone’s work on the Immaculate Conception … made a great impression on myself, when I read it.” 
He then quotes Perrone’s thoughts (in 1847) on the Sensus Fidelium. He recollects that “I had much 
interesting conversation with Fr Perrone on the subject at Rome in 1847” (J. H. Newman, Letters and 
Diaries. Vol. 19, p.135 (May 16, 1859). This was probably in relation to the development of doctrine. 
      Years later, on September 17, 1872. he is writing to Richard Littledale on the Infallibility of the Pope 
not being a habit or state of mind but only an external divine aid guarding him from error when he speaks 
ex cathedra at particular times. For support for his own explanation, he quotes from Perrone’s 
Praelectiones, 1841, Vol II, p. 253, p. 541 (J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXVI, p. 171).  In a 
letter five days later to Arthur Arnold he refers to “Perrone, whose book is the theological hand book for 
students in this day” and proceeds to quote from him (Letters and Diaries, Vol. XXVI, p. 173).   
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      Just as Wiseman, quoting Augustine’s dictum, Securus judicat orbis terrarium, 
had a decisive influence on Newman in 1839, so we may take Giovanni Perrone as an 
important influence on Newman in March, April and May of 1847. This was because 
Newman perceived Perrone as a dependable conduit of Catholic thought and a means of 
harmonizing his views on Faith and Reason with Catholic teaching and its intellectual 
tradition. Precisely as a point of conscience and aware of his duty before the Church’s 
magisterium, Newman was wide open to this influence, and he was fortunate in having so 
good an early theological advisor. However – and this is what we have to say – it is 
difficult to determine exactly what was Perrone’s influence, for it is not formally 
identified in Newman’s correspondence. One wonders whether Newman influenced 
Perrone. As we shall see, in private correspondence when back in England Newman did 
provide light on what he had learnt in this matter from Roman theology – and perhaps, 
then, from Perrone.  
          Newman was ordained a Catholic priest on Trinity Sunday, May 30, 1847 in the 
Propaganda Church by Cardinal Fransoni. His months at Propaganda had been “happy” – 
and he and Ambrose St John had impressed the College with their religious spirit. A 
month later he left the College of Propaganda to begin his (“how dreary … how dreary”) 
five-month Oratorian novitiate at Rome’s Santa Croce 1008 with other members of the 
Maryvale community, during which they had a visit from Wiseman and a personal visit 
from Pope Pius IX himself. In fact, it is his writing of Loss and Gain during these months 
of 1847 which enables us to determine Newman’s position on the conscience gained 
while in Rome. 
 
     4.3.3   (c)    Conscience: Reason and the Will  (Loss and Gain 1847) 
 
           Newman’s first published book following his studies in Rome was his novel, 
Loss and Gain1009 – though it did not then carry his name. It enables us to determine 
where Newman now stood in the matter of Faith and Reason at the end of his studies in 
Rome, and in particular in the question of the place of the conscience in taking the 
practical step of assent – and conscience is our subject. We are thus able to look at the 
action of conscience beyond the general sense of duty and in a specific decision. It 
                                                 
1008 J. H. Newman,  Autobiographical Writings,  p.  256. 
1009 J. H. Newman, (1848). Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert by Cardinal Newman. With an 
Introduction by Meriol Trevor.  London: Burns & Oates.  Universe Book. 1962. 
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followed his months of study in Rome and his consultations with Perrone on Faith and 
Reason and doctrinal development.1010 The novel enables us to see Newman’s position on 
how a practical decision of the conscience (the medieval conscientia) can involve the 
voice of God. 
 
          Before pursuing our discussion on reasoning to an assent to the Catholic Faith, 
there is the more primary level of religious certitude to which we must refer by way of 
introduction, and which has come up before. It is (as was shown in the previous chapter) 
the primary certitude about God issuing naturally from the basic sense of moral 
obligation. In Loss and Gain, Charles Reding's “characteristic, perhaps above anything 
else, was an habitual sense of the Divine Presence; a sense which, of course, did not 
insure uninterrupted conformity of thought and deed to itself, but still there it was – the 
pillar of the cloud before him and guiding him. He felt himself to be God's creature, and 
responsible to Him – God's possession, not his own.”1011 The sense of being “God’s 
creature” and “responsible to Him”1012 suggests the sense of God as intimately connected 
with, and arising from, the habitual conscience, prior to and yet informing its practical 
decisions. This “characteristic” is natural, instinctive and abiding.  
          The most basic religious certitude (as in Charles Reding’s “characteristic, perhaps 
above anything else”) is the sense of God as one’s Maker, to whom one is responsible. 
This is the basis of the further specific certitudes we shall soon discuss. It is a quasi-
immediate sense springing from the conscience by implicit reasoning and not the result of 
a formal proof, as has been shown in the previous chapter on conscience and belief in 
God. Charles represents the normally good person who will naturally have a sense of God 
his Maker, to whom he feels responsible. As has been noticed, in various places in 
Newman’s accounts of the conscience it involves an awareness of God as his Creator. 
                                                 
1010 The first extant reference to the Loss and Gain occurs early in January 1848, with Newman back in 
Maryvale, England. In the sixth edition of 1874, Newman put his name to the book for the first time and 
gave an account of its origins. It was an answer to a novel directed against the Oxford converts sent from 
England to him when he was resident at Sancta Croce preparing to become an Oratorian. ‘Doctrine is 
hardly touched upon,’ he explained. What he is really concerned with is the kind of ‘first principles’ that 
underpin explicit assent to Catholic doctrine. This was one of Newman’s major interests – the foundations 
of belief prior to doctrine and Creed, together with the elements constituting the assent of faith. The book 
was published with an advertisement in February 1848. Written during the closing months of 1847, it may 
be taken as his first published account of his integration of Catholic thought on Faith and Reason with his 
own. 
1011 J. H. Newman,  (1848).  Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert,   p. 131. 
1012 Both of which have come up before and have been analysed at length. 
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We have looked at this in 3.3.2 (c). Charles’s feeling himself “to be God’s creature” and 
responsible to him, was the foundation of his search for and attainment of religious 
truth.1013  
          What we are now considering is the action of the conscience in that process of 
reasoning which arrives at a religious conviction, constituting a practical duty to assent 
to the Catholic Faith. To use the medieval terms and distinctions of Lombard, Phillip, 
Aquinas, Bonaventure and Scotus, we are moving from the religious dimension of 
synderesis to that of conscientia. Loss and Gain, Newman’s first book-length publication 
following his conversion to Rome, tells us about Reding’s reasoning to the practical 
conviction that he ought to assent to Catholic truth.  
          We also notice that early in his Roman stay he was also rethinking where the 
conscience was situated in the mind. In exact Catholic thought, Intellect (Reason) 
embraced the “conscience”. During his early months in Rome when he was considering a 
publication of the Oxford University Sermons and was attempting to correct ambiguous 
statements in it, he observed of the conscience in a letter to Dalgairns that “I think St 
Thomas does place it in the intellect”.1014  A little later in the same letter he quotes his 
                                                 
1013 Without distracting ourselves from Loss and Gain, written while in Rome, we may look ahead briefly 
to the same broad point as illustrated in Newman’s second novel Callista: A Sketch of the Third Century 
(1855) (London: Burns & Oates. Universe Books edition. 1962). There is the striking encounter between 
Callista and the philosopher Polemo. Callista wanted to know more fully, more certainly and objectively, 
the One whom she already knew in her conscience.  She was not a Christian, she admitted ruefully. But she 
did know the “one God” – whom Polemo called “one eternal, self existing something."   
 “Well,” Callista said, “I feel that God within my heart. I feel myself in His presence. He says to me, 
'Do this: don't do that.' You may tell me that this dictate is a mere law of my nature, as is to joy or to 
grieve. I cannot understand this. No, it is the echo of a person speaking to me. Nothing shall 
persuade me that it does not ultimately proceed from a person external to me. It carries with it its 
proof of its divine origin. My nature feels towards it as towards a person. When I obey it, I feel a 
satisfaction; when I disobey, a soreness—just like that which I feel in pleasing or offending some 
revered friend. So you see, Polemo, I believe in what is more than a mere 'something.' I believe in 
what is more real to me than sun, moon, stars, and the fair earth, and the voice of friends. You will 
say, Who is He? Has He ever told you anything about Himself? Alas! no!—the more's the pity! But 
I will not give up what I have, because I have not more. An echo implies a voice; a voice a speaker. 
That speaker I love and I fear” (Callista: A Sketch of the Third Century, p. 174).  
For the purposes of our discussion at this point, Callista had absolutely certain knowledge of God as a 
living Person external to her whom she was bound to obey. The dictate she experiences, commanding her 
to do this and not to do that, is “the echo” of a person speaking to her. She is absolutely certain that this 
dictate “ultimately” proceeds from a person external to her. It carries its own proof of its divine origin – 
meaning that it feels unmistakably as from God. This conviction is not the result of a formal demonstration 
or “evidence”. It involves (being, perhaps, an instinctive implicit reasoning on the admonition of 
conscience) an abiding sense of the interior presence of God in her conscience. Her whole nature responds 
to the dictates of the conscience as to a revered friend. It is what Newman refers to in the passage above 
about Charles Reding. This is the fundamental certitude of life.  
1014 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol XII, p. 31. 
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own statement in the Oxford University Sermons1015 (and giving the reference in the 
sermon: p. 175 [183]) that “Conscience (is) a simple element”. Then he asks, “What does 
St Thomas say to this?”1016  
 
          After the Anglican years, what is now striking in the novel is Newman’s emphasis 
on Reason. He is not now at pains to determine the true meaning of “Reason” (so as to 
show the reasonableness of Faith), nor, as earlier, to subject it to the Conscience. This he 
had been doing with subtlety and depth during his Oxford University Sermons. What the 
interested reader of Loss and Gain will notice is the primary place of Reason. Reason is 
now set forth as paramount in taking a person to the conviction that the Catholic Religion 
is true, constituting a duty to assent.  
          In describing the early stage at Oxford of both Charles Reding and his friend 
Sheffield, Newman writes that “Neither of the friends had what are called views in 
religion: by which expression we do not here signify that neither had taken up a certain 
line of opinion, though this was true also; but that neither of them – how could they at 
their age? – had placed his religion on an intellectual basis”.1017 So it was a defect in the 
religion of these two characters that it had not yet been placed on a satisfactory 
intellectual foundation. Writing of those who have no “view,” Newman says that “they 
are, in fact, the most helpless of slaves; for our strength in this world is, to be the subjects 
of the reason, and our liberty, to be captives of the truth”.1018  
      So “the reason” is now called the master of man, and man finds his “strength in 
this world” by being its “subject.” There appears to be a firm stand with Reason here – in 
continuity, though, with his later Anglican writing in which he explored Implicit Reason, 
and defined Reason (more broadly than mere demonstration and formal evidence) as the 
power to pass from what is known to what is as yet unknown. The point here is that 
Newman appears to have made his own the Catholic insistence on the importance of 
“Reason” in attaining religious faith and knowledge, a stress that serves to protect the 
objectivity of knowledge and the attainment of truth. He has at least temporarily set aside 
an attack on “Reason”.  
                                                 
1015 J. H. Newman, “Faith and Reason contrasted as Habits of Mind”. The Epiphany, 1839.   Fifteen 
Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. Sermon X, no. 14. 
1016 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol XII, p. 31. To J.D.Dalgairns  [8 February 1847]  
1017 J. H. Newman, Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert, p. 9. 
1018 Ibid., p. 10. 
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          Reason brings to light and discovers objective certainties – meaning, things that are 
objectively true and not mere probabilities. In effect, Newman speaks here of the Reason 
here as man’s commander – which is how Butler had spoken of the conscience. How “are 
we to arrive at truth at all,” said Reading, “except by reason? It is the appointed method 
for our guidance. Brutes go by instinct, men by reason”.1019 Previously, it was the 
conscience and fidelity to it that took a man to religious truth, and not the “Reason” (of 
the rationalists). Now it is the Reason which does this.  
      As Reding observes in a later conversation,1020 “surely God wills us to be guided 
by reason; I don’t mean that reason is everything, but it is at least something.  Surely we 
ought not to act without it, against it.” At one point Charles uses the word “prudence” to 
describe the action of reason: “surely we ought to act prudently; that Christ would not 
wish us to act otherwise; .... - that prudence was the divinely appointed means of coming 
at the truth”.1021 This takes time, as Charles observes later in the novel. Reason is now at 
the forefront, rather than “conscience” (previously used as if an original element or 
principle of the mind, a power distinct from “reason”). As we shall soon see, the 
conscience now has a more intimate relationship with Reason than hitherto described. 
 
          Importantly, attaining the truth is not just the upshot of “paper-arguments”. Here 
we have vintage Newman. Conviction as to the truth takes time to attain.  “I wish I knew 
what Christianity was; I am ready to be at pains to seek it, and would accept it eagerly 
and thankfully if found. But it’s a work of time; all the paper-arguments in the world are 
unequal to giving one a view in a moment. There must be a process; they may shorten it, 
as a medicine shortens physical processes, but they can’t supersede its necessity. I 
recollect how all my religious doubts and theories went to flight on my dear father’s 
death. They weren’t part of me, and could not sustain rough weather”.1022 Reason in real 
life is not reducible to mere logic. It is “a work of time”.1023 Much of reasoning is 
implicit, and it includes the perception of probability, led by a sense of duty. 
      Newman has kept to his point that Faith involves personal conviction, which is 
more than a mere accepted and normal position, or a detached, strict demonstration, or 
                                                 
1019 Ibid., p. 24. 
1020 Ibid., p. 63. 
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Ibid., p. 166. 
1023 Ibid. 
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mere “paper arguments”. Moreover, “God works it,” which is to say that grace is needed. 
Charles “drew near to the Cross, took off his hat, knelt down and kissed the wood, and 
prayed a while, that, whatever might be the consequences, whatever the trial, whatever 
the loss, he might have grace to follow whithersoever God should call him.” 1024 So God 
is speaking in the practical judgment of conscience – that is, the specific duty ahead. 
Grace (the supernatural action of God) sustains the reason in its search for religious truth, 
much of which reasoning is implicit. This Newman had said as an Anglican.1025  
          Further, the conviction of faith is a form of sight – the assent of faith is more than 
merely grasping the logical force of premises. Inference is not, as such, assent.1026 
“Conviction is the eye-sight of the mind, not a conclusion from premises; God works it, 
and His works are slow. At least so it is with me. I can’t believe on a sudden; if I attempt 
it, I shall be using words for things, and be sure to repent it. Or if not, I shall go right 
merely by hazard. I must move in what seems God’s way; I can but put myself on the 
road; a higher power must overtake me, and carry me forward. At present I have a direct 
duty upon me, which my dear father left me, to take a good class. This is the path of duty. 
I won’t put off the inquiry, but I’ll let it proceed in that path. God can bless my reading to 
my spiritual illumination as well as anything else...” 1027 
     This emphasis on “Reason” is an emphasis on the mind attaining objective truth, 
but the Reason of real life works gradually and its fruit is conviction – provided the path 
of the seeker is one of duty, which is to say the conscience, and sustained by grace. In his 
second novel (Callista), Newman will show in the progress of Callista towards faith that 
grace is operative all along the journey. In Loss and Gain, Charles sees that if one fulfils 
one’s “direct” duties – if, that is, one is a man of conscience and virtue – Reason will be 
led by “a higher power” who will “carry” a man “forward” to conviction. “At present I 
have a direct duty upon me … to take a good class … God can bless my reading to my 
                                                 
1024 Ibid., p. 164. 
1025 J. H. Newman, “Faith and Reason contrasted as Habits of Mind”, 38 (4.). Epiphany, 1839.   Serm. X.  
Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford.   Westminster Md: Christian Classics. 1966. 
1026 Newman would explore the distinction between inference and assent in his Grammar of Assent. He 
stands for an unequivocal assent being possible on bases other than scientific demonstration. He parts 
company with Locke for whom inferring and assenting are identical acts. A discussion comparing Locke 
with Newman on Assent is given in “A Comparison of John Locke and John Henry Newman on the 
Rhetoric of Assent” by  Edward P. J. Corbett, in Rhetoric Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Sep., 1982), pp. 40-49, 
Publ. by Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 
1027 J. H. Newman, Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert,  p. 166. 
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spiritual illumination as well as anything else”.1028  All this is to say that there is a stress 
on Reason, sustained by God and following the path of duty. Its term is not just a right 
conclusion, but conviction.  
 
    But Newman now brings his account to a critical point, and it involves our special 
subject which is the conscience – but here as operating in the practical judgment on what 
to do. There is a practical decision to be made. In the third part of the novel,1029 Charles 
finally reaches his conviction that “the Church of Rome” is the true Church, which, 
despite all the losses that a change will entail, he has the duty to join for his salvation. 
What are the elements of his conviction? He is in conversation with his tutor Campbell 
who is making a final attempt to dissuade his friend from so calamitous, mistaken and 
appalling a step. Of interest here are Charles’s observations on the relationship between 
reasons for belief and the duty to assent. “If I have good grounds for believing, to believe 
is a duty; God will take care of His own work. I shall not be deserted in my utmost need. 
Faith ever begins with a venture, and is rewarded with sight.”  
          Campbell agrees, but the question, he replies, is “whether your grounds are 
good”.1030 Both, then, are agreed that “good grounds” (for belief) constitute a duty (to 
believe). Reason has taken Charles to the point of perceiving a duty ahead of him, and 
that duty arises from the “good grounds.” Indeed, here we have an important step in the 
account of Reason – i.e., reasoning to faith – and the Conscience. The “good grounds” 
perceived by Reason constitute the duty. As is suggested by the very terms, “good 
grounds” are obviously not a strict demonstration. They are an ensemble of probabilities 
that, in Charles’ case and according to his estimation, point to the truth without it forcing 
assent. This is shown in the divergence between Charles and Campbell. Charles sees the 
grounds, the reasons, as good, while Campbell sees them as not good. There is involved, 
then, the very personal judgment as to what are good grounds. But “good grounds” when 
perceived, constitute the duty. 
          So then, what place does the conscience occupy in this critical movement of the 
reason? Charles sees that, because his reason tells him that the grounds are good, he has 
“a duty” to believe. The conscience, then, would seem to be the mind perceiving the 
                                                 
1028 Ibid. 
1029 Ibid., p. 195. 
1030 Ibid.  
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compelling character of these grounds.1031 As has been said, though involving an 
inference,1032 the “good grounds” are not strictly demonstrative. But they are compelling, 
which is to say obligatory – while leaving him free. As an Anglican, Newman had tended 
to portray the conscience as a faculty distinct from the Reason, indeed as its director or 
commander.1033  The conscience now is not separated from the Reason, but is the Reason 
perceiving the obligatory bearing of the grounds before it. In this perception, Reason 
sanctions the truth of the Catholic Religion. These “good grounds” are perceived as 
compelling – such as to require a certain decision as a point of duty, while leaving the 
person free.1034  
          Charles declares, “I consider that all reason comes from God; our grounds must at 
best be imperfect; but if they appear to be sufficient after prayer, diligent search, 
obedience, waiting, and in short, doing our part, they are His voice calling us on.” So the 
good “grounds” – grounds which are “imperfect” but “sufficient” – are the voice of God 
                                                 
1031 In Walter E. Conn’s paradigm, Newman’s conversion of 1845 involves an abstract theological 
judgment (1841), a concrete judgment of conscience (1843), and a definitive decision (1845). (W. E. Conn, 
"From Oxford to Rome: Newman's Ecclesiastical Conversion", Theological Studies September 2007, Vol. 
68, Issue 3, p. 616). 
1032 In his “Newman’s Reasonable Approach to Faith” (Newman Studies Journal,  Vol. 8 Issue 1, Spring 
2011), John T. Ford shows how Newman presents faith as a reasonable and personal inference. 
1033 When Newman, as an Anglican, sets the Conscience above Reason as its superior (and therefore 
apparently as a principle distinct from Reason), he especially has in mind “what is commonly called 
Reason” – that is, “that narrower signification, which it usually bears, as representing or synonymous with 
the intellectual powers, and as opposed as such to the moral qualities, and to Faith” (“The Usurpations of 
Reason”, nos. 2 and 5. December 11, 1831. Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. 
Sermon IV). So it is Reason as “mere Reason” (no.2), commonly understood as distinct from “spiritual 
discernment” (no. 2), “the cultivated moral perception” (no. 6) and the “moral instincts” (no. 7).  
    However, Newman states in the same sermon that Reason sometimes “stands for all in which man differs 
from the brutes, and so includes in its signification the faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong, 
and the directing principle in conduct.” He adds that “In this sense I certainly do not here use it” (“The 
Usurpations of Reason” no. 5). In principle, then, there was already a basis for Newman’s Catholic 
understanding of the Conscience, as expressed in Loss and Gain. In this, conscience is a function of reason, 
and not an independent and “original principle” of the mind, a “simple element of our nature”, wherein 
there was to be no “substitution of Reason for Conscience” (described in “Faith and Reason contrasted as 
Habits of Mind”. Epiphany, 1839. Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. Sermon X, 
no. 14).   
    But then, having made the point in “Usurpations of Reason” that Reason can stand “for all in which man 
differs from the brutes” (no.5), he goes on in the same sermon to treat the Conscience as “the moral 
perception”, writing that it is “fixed in each individual, and is an original element within us” (no.6). In this, 
Conscience is described and referred to as an original principle.     
    It may be observed that if Reason can stand “for all in which man differs from the brutes”, then in 
principle it would include also the most basic function of conscience, the instinctive apprehension of 
general moral obligation – synderesis. Thus Reason would provide the basis for the initial sense of God. 
   At the threshold of his conversion to Rome (March 30, 1845), Newman wrote to one correspondent, “My 
own convictions are as strong as I suppose they can become: only it is so difficult to know whether it is a 
call of reason or of conscience. I cannot make it out…” (Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 240).  
1034 Walter Conn expresses it thus: “he … came to the existential realization, in a concrete judgment of 
conscience that he must join the Roman Catholic Church, that his salvation depended on converting to it”. 
("From Oxford to Rome: Newman's Ecclesiastical Conversion”, Theological Studies Sept. 2007, p. 616). 
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calling us to act in a certain way. Reason itself comes from God as that faculty enabling 
us to apprehend his voice, represented in the “good grounds”. Charles continues, “He it is 
in that case who makes them seem convincing to us. I am in His hands” (my emphasis) 
.1035 So God, which is to say his grace, is at work in the judgment being made. Thus it is 
that, in this way, the practical dictate of conscience – here presented as a function of 
reason – can be God’s “voice calling us on”.1036 We have reached an important 
explanation of how Conscience, considered now as the judgment on a practical duty, is 
the voice of God. 
         The “good grounds,” perceived as such by the Reason (which is God’s gift), 
represent the voice of God summoning the person to belief. It is, then, the objective truth 
which represents the voice of God. The compelling character of the truth, calling for 
recognition and submission, is the duty which Reason – being, in this function, the 
conscience – apprehends. Newman has identified the practical dictate of the (religious) 
conscience (the medieval conscientia) with Reason’s perception of “good grounds” (for 
belief). He is also showing how the conscience, considered not only as a sense of general 
moral obligation (synderesis) but also as the power to judge morally in a practical matter 
(conscientia), can in its act be the echo of God’s voice.  
          The conscience, understood as man’s basic moral instinct and also as his directing 
principle of practical conduct, is now presented as a function of Reason and not a 
separate principle or faculty of the mind. Philosophically, it sounds Catholic. In this 
account, the conscience is not spoken of as if it is an “original principle” of the mind, 
which is how it is mostly spoken of in his Anglican writings. Reason recognizes and 
sanctions the truth of, and therefore the duty to submit to, Divine Revelation as subsisting 
in the Catholic Religion. 
 
        But a further question now arises, and it is critical. Does the Reason take the 
person to the assent of Faith on the basis of having perceived that there are “good 
grounds”? That is to say, does the conscience, understood as the Reason perceiving the 
duty constituted by these “good grounds,” take a person on to Faith? Where exactly does 
the Reason, acting as the Conscience, take the inquirer? To this point in the account, 
                                                 
1035 Newman, J. H. (1848).  Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert , p. 195. 
1036 Or, to use the words of The Catechism of the Catholic Church, “When he listens to his conscience, the 
prudent man can hear God speaking.” Part III, Section I, Chapter I, Article 6, no.1777.  2nd ed.  
St Pauls Publications/Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Pocket Edition for Australia and New Zealand, 2000. 
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Reason has taken the person to the conviction that there are good grounds for Faith, 
which is to say to the perception that he has the duty to believe. It is to be repeated that 
this perception of the duty is the result of reasoning (involving probability), sustained by 
grace. What of the next practical step, the step of the assent of faith? “The only question 
is, what would He have me to do? I cannot resist the conviction which is upon me. This 
last week it has possessed me in a different way than ever before. It is now so strong, that 
to wait longer is to resist God."1037 Charles has seen the truth, and he is convinced of the 
duty that it constitutes. In the conviction that there are compelling grounds to act, he has 
heard the voice of God.  
          A decision is now to be made.1038 But it is a “venture.” “Faith,” Charles says, “ever 
begins with a venture. It is rewarded with sight”.1039 The critical move is this venture, for 
there has not been a subduing demonstration. Prior to the venture there is not “sight.” 
“Sight” (implying absolute certitude and the absence of any doubt whatsoever) is the 
reward for taking the venture.  To repeat, our question is this: Does reason, which has 
perceived the “good grounds” to believe – right reason, conscientious reason, in a word, 
the “conscience” – empower and enable the subject to take the next step of believing? It 
                                                 
1037 J. H. Newman, Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert, p. 195. 
1038 In his account in the Apologia (p. 222) of his conviction in 1845 about the Church of Rome, Newman 
writes that “I had one final advance of mind to accomplish, and one final step to take. That final advance of 
mind was to be able honestly to say that I was certain of the conclusions at which I had already arrived. 
That further step imperative when such certitude was attained, was submission to the Catholic Church. This 
submission did not take place till two full years after the resignation of my living in September 1843; nor 
could I have made it at an earlier day, without doubt and apprehension, that is, with any true conviction of 
mind or certitude” (my italics). 
     So there were “the conclusions” at which he had arrived. Then there was the stage of being “certain” of 
them. Then there was taking the imperative step which these conclusions, of which he was now certain, 
required. The distinction between the “conclusions” and possessing that certitude which perceived their 
imperative character seems to be expressed in Newman’s letter of March 30, 1845. He writes, “My own 
convictions are as strong as I suppose they can become: only it is so difficult to know whether it is a call of 
reason or of conscience. I cannot make out, if I am impelled by what seems clear, or by a sense of duty.” 
(Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 240). It seems that “conscience” is the perception by the reason of the 
imperative character of what had seemed clear. 
     The “conclusions” were not the result of a demonstration that subdued the intellect. Because of this, it 
then became a question of perceiving the wholly certain bearing of the probabilities (p. 224) they involved. 
This took time to perceive to his satisfaction. The case was then seen to rest on grounds so good as to 
convince the reason as being imperative. This perception by the reason of the imperative character of the 
grounds was the call of conscience – the voice of God to the Self as to the truth. A decision had then to be 
made to assent in faith.  
    With this “submission to the Catholic Church”, which is to say from “the time that I became a Catholic 
… I have had no variations to record, and have had no anxiety of heart whatever. I have been in perfect 
peace and contentment; I never have had one doubt … it was like coming into port after a rough sea” 
(Apologia, p. 247).  
1039 J. H. Newman, Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert, p. 195.  
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does not, and it cannot. At this point, a new factor appears on the scene. It is the will. The 
will is what must now act.  
 
          Late in the novel Charles meets a Catholic priest on the train. Charles says to the 
priest that he feared there was a great temptation operating on many well-informed and 
excellent men, to find fault with the evidence for Catholicity, and to give over the search, 
on the excuse that there were arguments on both sides.1040 This is the problem for the 
modern Englishman – which we may take as a reference to the modern day. There are 
arguments on both sides, whereas in strict “demonstration” there are not. At best, “good 
grounds” are sufficient, but not absolutely subduing. So this lack of subduing reasons, 
this presence of some grounds for an opposite opinion, and because a venture is involved, 
becomes the motive for refusing to assent. This refusal is, actually, a moral matter. This, 
said Charles’s companion in the train,  
“is the grievous deficiency in Englishmen altogether. Englishmen have many 
gifts, faith they have not. …. Nothing will stand in place of it ….  till they have 
faith, they have not the foundation, and their superstructure will fall. They will 
not be blessed … till they begin by an act of unreserved faith in the word of God, 
whatever it be; till they go out of themselves; … till they oblige their will to 
perfect what reason leaves, sufficient indeed, but incomplete. And when they 
shall recognize this defect in themselves, and try to remedy it, then they will 
recognize much more, they will be on the road very shortly to be Catholics."1041  
          They must “oblige their will to perfect what reason leaves”. In the last analysis, 
the assent of Faith requires a personal decision, involving the will (sustained by grace). 
The problem is of a person thinking that he never has “evidence enough to subdue his 
reason”,1042 despite there being good and sufficient grounds.  What, then, makes him 
believe? His reason (or conscience) cannot “make” him believe because the evidence is 
never absolutely subduing. “What is to make him believe? The will, his will ... if belief 
does not then follow, the fault lies with the will.”  This comes from the Catholic priest, 
suggesting that this is what Newman has especially gained from Catholic teaching 
                                                 
1040   Ibid., p. 219. 
1041   Ibid.  
1042   Ibid., p. 217. 
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(during his months of study in Rome). Absolute certitude, apprehending an absolute 
certainty (a factor of true faith), is the fruit of an act of the will, sustained by grace.  
          The Reason can attain to a moral certainty that the Catholic and Roman Church, 
and none other, speaks as the voice of God1043 – and the Catholic Church insisted that the 
Reason can (with grace) attain this certainty. This conviction constitutes a duty to assent, 
and there is no need nor is there a duty to gain better reasons (i.e., it is entirely 
“sufficient”). Nor perhaps is there even the possibility of it. Whence comes, then, the 
absolute certainty of faith? Absolute certainty – ‘eye-sight’ – comes with the embrace of 
the truth which is the fruit of an act of the Will. It is not the perception that one should 
assent on the basis of “good grounds” that brings absolute certainty, but the assent itself. 
That assent depends on an act of the will, which a person must be disposed to make (by a 
good ethos), if assent is to be given.  “Certainty in its highest sense is the reward of those 
who, by an act of the will, embrace the truth, when nature, like a coward, shrinks. You 
must make a venture; faith is a venture before a man is a Catholic; it is a grace after it. 
You approach the Church in the way of reason, you live in it in the light of the Spirit."1044  
          So then, Reason takes a person to the point of seeing that there are very good 
grounds for belief. These good grounds, involving an “habitual moral certainty; I mean a 
conviction”,1045 constitute a duty, and this duty is expressed as a dictate of conscience. It 
is this dictate of the conscience, representing the “good grounds”, which is the echo of the 
voice of God. The Reason sees that a decision to believe should be made, which requires 
an act of the will, which itself depends on the gift of grace. When this decision to believe 
is made, absolute certitude is granted as a grace perfecting the moral certainty to that 
point acquired.1046 This is “certainty in its highest sense”.1047 If belief has not followed 
                                                 
1043   Ibid., p. 218 
1044 Ibid.  
1045 Ibid. 
1046 As said, in Loss and Gain (1848) and in the Discourses to Mixed Congregations (1849) there is a more 
characteristically positive Catholic view of “Reason”, embracing the conscience. But several years later in 
the Apologia (1864), in explaining the gift of Infallibility in the Church, Newman presents a dimmer view 
of Reason. Newman is characteristically very conscious of the fact and action of original sin. He writes of 
it:    
“I am not speaking here of right reason, but of reason as it acts in fact and concretely in fallen man. I 
know that even the unaided reason, when correctly exercised, leads to a belief in God, in the 
immortality of the soul, and in a future retribution; but I am considering the faculty of reason actually 
and historically … I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is towards a simple unbelief 
in matters of religion. No truth, however sacred, acan stand against it, in the long run ….. And in 
these latter days … things are tending … to atheism in one shape or other” (Apologia pro Vita Sua, 
pp. 252-253). 
1047 J. H. Newman, Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert, p. 218. 
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the perception of good grounds, “the fault lies with the will”.1048 It seems that the 
decision of the will is made in some sense at the bidding of the Reason.1049 
 
4.3.4.    Early Catholic years back in England  
 
This is not to say that speaking of the conscience as a function included within Reason 
permanently passed into Newman’s ordinary manner of discourse. But it seems to have 
done so at this point at least at the level of publications, illustrating the influence of 
Roman thought at this stage.1050 Certainly some of this appeared in Newman’s 
Discourses to Mixed Congregations (1849) a year after his return to England, which he 
called “the first work which I publish as a Father of the Oratory of St Philip Neri”.1051 His 
Loss and Gain the year before had not carried his name as author at that point.  
          For instance, in Discourse 2 of the Discourses to Mixed Congregations (1849), 
man has “a divine gift within (him) which we call reason, and which constrains him to 
account before its judgement-seat for what he is doing”.1052 Here, Reason includes (and is 
primarily considered as) the conscience – for it is the “judgment-seat” requiring “him to 
                                                 
1048 Ibid.  
1049 In placing his finger on the critical importance of the decision of the will (understood as an ongoing 
decision of the will too), Newman had identified the decisive element in the highest stages of faith in the 
midst of what spiritual masters have called the dark night of the soul. In such a state, the soul (with the aid 
of grace) perseveres in the decision of the will despite darkness ahead and all around. We see this in, for 
instance, the last year of the life of Therese of Lisieux (1873-1897) when she entered a truly dark night. In 
1925 Pius XI canonized her a saint, and in 1997 John Paul II declared her a Doctor of the Church. 
1050 It looks as if within a few years – by the mid 1850’s when he was publishing his Idea of a University, 
his Calista, and his Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (1856), and later the Apologia (1864) –  
Newman was, more or less, back to his typical way of speaking of the “conscience” as if it were a principle 
in its own right and not just as a function of reason. Obviously this may be read as a preferred mode of 
speaking in view of normal English usage that commonly speaks of the Conscience as if it were an 
independent principle of the mind. When we say that “my conscience tells me this”, it carries a different 
connotation from “my reason tells me this” – as if the conscience is a mental principle distinct from 
“reason”. But to speak of conscience in this way is not formally to pronounce on the philosophical question 
of its place within the reason or otherwise.  
    However, we do notice that in, say, the Idea of a University, Newman states that “Right Reason, that is, 
Reason rightly exercised, leads the mind to the Catholic Faith, and plants it there, and teaches it in all its 
religious speculations to act under its guidance”. Discourse VIII. No.2. “Right Reason” includes 
Conscience. The Apologia’s account (pp. 4-7) of the conversion of 1816 scarcely mentions “the 
conscience” as such. 
    It is also to be noted that the usage of the word “conscience” as if it is distinct from “reason” is present 
even in very important magisterial documents of the Catholic Church, such as the Vatican II “Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World” no.16, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
no.1776 – and in the footnoted references to the conscience by Pope Pius XII, cited in Ch. I. It is a normal 
use of the word. 
1051 Newman, J. H. (1849). Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations. Westminster Md.: Christian 
Classics. 1966, Dedication Preface, p. v. 
1052 J. H. Newman, (1849). “Neglect of Divine Calls and Warnings”. Discourses addressed to Mixed 
Congregations.  Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics. 1966, p. 22. 
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account” before it “for what he is doing”. In Discourse 9 (“Illuminating Grace”), before 
he is brought under the grace of Christ, man “can but inquire, reason, argue, and 
conclude, about religious truth; but afterwards he sees it”.1053  Without grace there would 
be no absolute certainty. The Reason alone is never “absolutely decided”.1054  Man sees 
after making (by an act of the will) the assent of faith, with the aid of grace.  
          We have had to set before our view the issues Newman was determining. But our 
interest throughout lies in the role of the conscience, and in Newman’s correspondence 
the role of the conscience continues to be illustrated – especially in connection with the 
action of the will, the role of probability, and the hotly disputed issue of the possibility of 
certitude.  
 
     4.3.4   (a)   The Will and Probability  (Mrs Froude and Catherine Ward)  
 
          Now in England, Newman replied to Mrs William Froude (Catherine 
Holdsworth), the wife of Hurrell Froude’s younger brother. We see in his correspondence 
the position attained in Rome, and already presented in Loss and Gain. He repeats his 
earlier conviction that there is “no medium between “scepticism and Catholicism” 
(showing in this stark alternative the pivotal issue of certitude). He states that the fact that 
so few of those who were influenced by him had become Catholic indicates that “a 
number of so-called Anglo Catholics who profess to believe secretly doubt”.1055  
Newman does not allow for doubt in the assent of faith. In this critical matter, he has 
moved beyond Butler. Assent involves absolute certitude.  
 The presence, however, of “implicit faith” is allowed, and in this case, “doubt is 
then only endurable, when a person is firmly resolved to embrace the Truth, whatever it 
may be, at whatever cost, when once it is brought home to him, and immediately, praying 
the while that he may, as soon as possible, be brought to the knowledge of it”.1056  
Implied in this advice is the necessity of the will. There must be a readiness of the will, a 
firm resolve, to assent whenever the reason indicates where the truth lies, which is to say 
when good grounds become clear and one’s duty becomes thus manifested. Newman asks 
her to “search your conscience” to see if you “really can say in your heart, that you will 
                                                 
1053 J. H. Newman, “Illuminating Grace”,  Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations,  p. 170. 
1054 Ibid., p. 178. 
1055 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XII,  p. 227,  To Mrs William Froude. June 27, 1848 
1056 Ibid.      
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submit to the Truth, though you cannot prove it, directly your reason tells you where it 
lies”.1057  But grace too is involved, for Newman writes that he supposes that “God’s 
grace is leading you to the Catholic Church”. Faith is God’s gift.1058  
          Newman continues, referring once again to a conclusion, then a conviction that 
there is a duty, and an act of the will.  The critical moment is the conviction representing 
a duty. 
Faith “is not a conclusion from premises, but the result of an act of the will, 
following upon a conviction that to believe is a duty. The simple question you 
have to ask yourself is, 'Have I a conviction that I ought to accept the (Roman) 
Catholic Faith as God's word?' if not, at least, 'do I tend to such a conviction?' or 
'am I near upon it?'  For directly you have a conviction that you ought to believe, 
reason has done its part, and what is wanted for faith, is, not proof, but will. We 
can believe what we choose. We are answerable for what we choose to believe; if 
we believe lightly, or if we are hard of belief, in either case we do wrong”.1059  
     The action of the conscience is manifest in this account. “The simple question 
you have to ask yourself is, 'Have I a conviction that I ought to accept the (Roman) 
Catholic Faith as God's word?'” This judgment is the apprehension of one’s duty. Blanco 
White had seen that the basic position in the Movement being headed by Newman was 
the pivotal role of the will in one’s doctrinal position. Your judgment manifests and is 
due to what you want, and this (for Newman) is the fruit of your moral ethos and moral 
character. In his letter to Mrs Froude, we believe what we choose and are answerable for 
it (but, as he explains in other passages, grace is necessary for the decision. The fruit of 
this grace-sustained decision is absolute certitude). 
          Now, the conscience is the indispensibe basis of the act of will, which is the 
decision to believe following on the perception by the reason of compellingly good 
grounds. If a person feels he ought to believe, then the basis is there. He is at the 
necessary threshold without which an assent is impossible. What is now required is an act 
of the will following upon the dictate of the conscience that he should assent. It seems 
                                                 
1057 Ibid.      
1058 In a later letter, Newman puts the necessity of grace very clearly. “My dear Mrs. Froude, do you pray 
for “effectual grace” -? Suppose I come to a high wall – I cannot jump it – such are the moral obstacles 
which keep us from the Church. We see trhe Heavenly City before us, we go on and on along the road, 
there is no scaling, no vaulting over. Grace enables us to cross it – and that grace is called effectual grace” 
(J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVI, p. 66. To Mrs William Froude, Dublin, March 2, 1854). 
1059 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries, Vol. XII, p. 228.    
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that the Reason, perceiving the duty, somehow bids the will to act, and with grace, it can 
so act. In a further letter to Mrs Froude a week later, Newman adds the following points, 
that “assuming duty proved, still you cannot believe without   1. a creed.  2. an authority 
which will not mislead you”.1060  
        The gist of his thought, as expressed in his correspondence with Mrs Froude 
during the year following his return from Rome, is that Faith “is not a conclusion from 
premises, but the result of an act of the will, following upon a conviction that to believe is 
a duty. …… directly you have a conviction that you ought to believe, reason has done its 
part, and what is wanted for faith, is, not proof, but will. We can believe what we choose. 
We are answerable for what we choose to believe”.1061   
 
          Where does this position of Newman’s come from? On October 12, 1848 – four 
months after writing to Mrs Froude and still in his first year following his studies in 
Rome – Newman writes to Catherine Ward stating that “The Catholic doctrine 
concerning Faith and Reason is this – that Reason proves that Catholicism ought to be 
believed, and that in that form it comes before the Will, which accepts or rejects it, as 
moved by grace or not”.1062 
     That is Newman’s core statement of Catholic teaching in the letter, and it was of 
decisive weight for him. We have therein the source of his newly-developed position. He 
gained, from his Roman study of “Catholic doctrine” on this point, the conviction that 
“Reason” (acting rightly) “proves” that Catholicism ought be believed. It is so credible as 
to be a proof, and therefore a duty. While the conclusion of reason constitutes the 
perceived duty, nevertheless, it is required that the will – moved by grace – act on that 
perceived duty, and thus assent.1063 With this assent will come the absolute certitude of 
faith.  
                                                 
1060 Ibid., p. 232  To Mrs William Froude.  July 3, 1848. 
1061 Ibid., p. 228.  To Mrs William Froude.  June 27, 1848. 
1062 Ibid., p. 289.  To Catherine Ward.  Oct.12/48. 
1063 While to learn of the decisive role of the will in the act of faith according to Catholic theology was 
decisive for Newman, we must not assume that this was his first contact with the idea. It is not our project 
here to trace elements of this position in Newman’s Anglican writings (for our project is the conscience), 
but there is an indirect indication in William G. Ward’s allusion to this position in his last article in the 
British Critic, in October 1843 (on Mill’s Logic). On p. 393 W. G. Ward writes, “There is one fact in the 
constitution of our mind, which we are expecially bound to notice when reviewing a work on logic … and 
which has nevertheless been, to the best of our knowledge, universally denied, even as a fact, by modern 
metaphysicians. We allude to the direct power of the will over the belief…” (W. G. Ward, October 1843 
“Art. III. – A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected View of the Problems of 
Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. By John Stuart Mill. 2 Vols. Parker: London.”) .  
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         Well, let us pause to ask, what in fact did Catholic theology say on the point? St 
Thomas Aquinas is absolutely clear. For example, in the Second Part of the Second Part 
of his Summa Theologiae, Question 2, he asks various questions about belief. His first 
question (article 1) is whether to believe is to think with assent – and he answers in the 
affirmative. In article 9 of this Question 2, he asks whether to believe is meritorious – and 
this takes us to the heart of Newman’s position. Aquinas answers decisively:  
I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 114, 3,4), our actions are meritorious in so 
far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every 
human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be 
meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the 
Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is 
subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can 
be meritorious.1064 
          In Aquinas’ statement here, the assent of faith is defined as “an act of the intellect 
assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God”. St. 
Thomas repeatedly defines the act of faith as the assent of the intellect determined by the 
will.1065 Elsewhere in the Summa Theologiae he states that divine faith is "the act of the 
intellect assenting to a Divine truth owing to the movement of the will, which is itself 
moved by the grace of God".1066   Elsewhere Aquinas refers to St. Augustine. He writes 
that  
“The disposition of a believer is that of one who accepts another's word for some 
statement, because it seems fitting or useful to do so. In the same way we believe 
Divine revelation because the reward of eternal life is promised us for so doing. 
It is the will which is moved by the prospect of this reward to assent to what is 
said, even though the intellect is not moved by something which it understands. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Inasmuch as Ward was a prominent member of Newman’s later Anglican circle and his disciple, one may 
presume that this mention of the role of the will indicates that Newman was quite aware of it at the time 
too. But to read of it later in Catholic theology was decisive for him and placed it firmly in his account of 
belief. That is to say, it was during his period in Rome that the Catholic position on the role of the will in  
belief was fully accepted by Newman and became a firm and settled part of  his position on the assent of 
faith. For more on the topic of the role of the will in Newman’s thinking, there is J. Ferreira, Doubt and 
Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman’s Thought.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1980. 
1064 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Question 2: Of the Act of Faith. Article 9: Whether to 
Believe is Meritorious? In Vol. 2, p. 1186 of St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica in Two Volumes. 
Translated by the Engilsh Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers (undated).  
1065 Aquinas,  De Veritate, xiv, 1; II II, Q. ii, a. 1, ad 3; 2, c.; ibid., iv, 1, c., and ad 2. 
1066 Aquinas,  Summa Theologica. II-II, Q. 4, article 2 
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Hence St. Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joannem, 2): Cetera potest homo 
nolens, credere nonnisi volens [i.e. other things a man can do against his will but 
to believe he must will]”.1067  
          According to Augustine, then, to believe one must will. So then, in his letter to 
Catherine Ward (of October 1848), Newman declares that “Reason proves that 
Catholicism ought to be believed, and in that form it comes before the Will, which 
accepts it or rejects it, as moved by grace or not”.1068 Plainly, the reason, having proved 
that Catholicism ought to be believed, at that point functions as the conscience.  
 
         There is a further critical question, one of great importance, which would occupy 
Newman’s mind, and it appears in this same letter to Catherine Ward. Just what kind of 
reasoning is this? “Reason does not prove that Catholicism is true, as it proves 
mathematical propositions are true; but it proves that there is a case for it so strong that 
we see we ought to accept it. There may be many difficulties, which we cannot answer, 
but still we see on the whole that the grounds are sufficient for conviction”.1069  So then, 
it is not a matter of a strict and overwhelmingly logical “proof”, of evidence manifestly 
commensurate with the conclusion, subduing the intellect as might mathematics. 
     The case for Catholicism is proved by “Reason” in the sense that it is plainly “so 
strong that we see we ought to accept it.” “Reason” in Newman’s use of it here is not the 
abstract Reason of formal evidence and logic, but the reason of the thinking subject who 
decides, to his satisfaction, what is convincing. It is perceived that “on the whole … the 
grounds are sufficient for conviction.” Newman is speaking of converging probabilities 
involving the perception of likelihood. He continues. “If conviction were unavoidable, we 
might be said to be forced to believe, as we are forced to confess that two sides of a 
triangle are greater than the third; but, while there is enough evidence for a conviction, 
whether we will be convinced or not, rests with ourselves.”  
          He then refers to the conversation between Charles and the priest in Loss and Gain, 
prior to Charles’ reception into the Catholic Church. “This is what the Priest means, 
when, on being asked 'If a man has not evidence enough to subdue his reason, what is to 
make him believe?', he answers, 'His will.' And this is just our trial; and one man rejects 
                                                 
1067 Aquinas,  De Veritate.  xiv, 1. 
1068 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XII,  p. 289. To Catherine Ward. Oct 12/48. 
1069 Ibid. 
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what another accepts. On the contrary, were we forced to believe, as we are forced to 
believe mathematical conclusions – there being no option, there would be no trial of our 
affections, nothing morally right in believing, or wrong in not believing”.1070  
          Our point at this stage is bringing into view antecedent probability and its role in 
the perception of “good grounds”, for conscience is at work here.  
“The simple question then with you is” (the priest continues), “[Have] you 
sufficient grounds for being convinced that the Catholic Church is from God? If 
you have, it is nothing to the purpose that you find it difficult to believe. Of 
course you do; for belief is a supernatural act; you must pray to God for the will 
to believe, and the will has the power to command the mind. You can believe 
what you will; the only question is whether your reason tells you ought to 
believe, and I think it does”.1071   
          The will has the power to command the mind to assent to a perceived duty, 
provided it has the grace of God, and this grace will give it the impulse – which can, of 
course, be resisted. Behind all this is the perception of duty. Newman refers to the 
conscience – “I don’t think you will be happy or have an easy conscience till you do 
[believe]. You cannot be a latitudinarian; I will not argue the matter with you, till I have 
cause to suppose it. Nor is it any thing to you what He will do with others; no one is a 
real heretic who is not wilfully so.” 1072 
      As the Catholic priest says to Charles in the train, “Depend upon it, there is quite 
evidence enough for a moral conviction that the Catholic or Roman Church, and none 
other, is the voice of God”.1073 A person can have habitual moral certainty that the 
Roman Catholic Church is the one only voice of God, the one only way of salvation, 
prior to conversion.1074  These are the “good grounds” for assent. This is as far as Reason 
takes him, and “certainty in its highest sense is the reward of those who, by an act of the 
will, embrace the truth, when nature, like a coward, shrinks”.1075  As Newman would 
write to Mrs William Froude on May 20, 1856 “The absolute certainty of faith in the truth 
of what the Church conveys to you from God, is the reward, through divine grace, of 
those souls who, before receiving it, have exercised their mental powers to the best; and 
                                                 
1070 Ibid., pp. 289-290. 
1071 Ibid., p. 290.   
1072 Ibid.  
1073 J. H. Newman, Loss and Gain, p. 218. 
1074 Ibid.   
1075 Ibid.  
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you must throw yourself, in regard to it, on the Power, Love, and Faithfulness of Him 
who calls you”.1076  Passages such as this introduce us further to the significance of 
probability. It was a massive problem for some. 
 
      
4.3.4  (b) Probability and certitude: John Moore Capes and William Froude. 
 
          At about this time, John Moore Capes (1813-1889), an acquaintance of Newman 
and convert like himself, and founder and first editor of The Rambler, had an experience 
which shocked his notions about Catholicism and its doctrine of the certainty of faith. It 
hinged on the matter of probability, which has come up in the correspondence just 
discussed and in Loss and Gain. As we shall see, while Capes saw that the reasons for an 
assent to Catholicism were reasons of probability, he assumed that this had to mean that 
ultimately Catholicism itself was but a high probability.        
       In his book of years later, To Rome and Back,1077 which he wrote after he had 
returned to the Anglican Church – reverting again to the Catholic Church before he died – 
Capes gives us some background to his earlier and well-known articles in The Rambler 
on his sense of certitude as a convert-Catholic. He tells us that at the time of his entry into 
the Catholic Church, the one who received him thought he had been instructed in all its 
doctrines – and he had, bar one. But that one exception was at the root of what came to be 
a massive problem. He had not been instructed in Catholic teaching on the absolute 
certainty of faith. This was that the Catholic religion cannot be reduced to the most 
probable of alternatives, making it most probably true. He had not been told that, until he 
perceived and accepted this, he should not enter the Catholic Church. Faith involved an 
assent to an absolutely certain truth. It involved absolute certitude about an absolute 
certainty. 
       Some four or five years after his reception “one of the most distinguished of 
Catholic theologians” wrote to him, congratulated him on his many articles (in The 
Rambler), but pointed out that in one matter he had mis-stated things. “I had implied that 
the certainty with which a Catholic holds the doctrines of the Church is a moral certainty, 
and not an absolute certainty. The Catholic doctrine, this theologian stated, is to the effect 
                                                 
1076 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XVII, p. 243. 
1077 J. M. Capes, (1873). To Rome and Back. Edinburgh and London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 15 Waterloo 
Place. Printed by Ballantine and Company.  1873.     Internet archive, 10 September 2013: 
http://www.archive.org/stream/toromeandback00capegoog#page/n4/mode/2up 
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that all possibility of doubt as to anything that the Church has decreed is absolutely 
excluded. The idea of probability, even in its highest degree, did not enter, he said, into 
the Catholic belief..” 1078  This distinguished theologian meant that the idea that 
Catholicism was ultimately but probable was not part of Catholic belief. 
        This was a shock to Capes, as he continues to explain. “I, on the other hand, had 
treated Catholic certainty as to detailed doctrines as resting upon a basis of historical 
information, which, from the nature of things, could not possibly be more than probably 
correct. The truth of Christianity itself I regarded as an historical certainty, but only in the 
same manner as all historical questions are certain; depending, that is, upon documentary 
evidence, which never could rise to the certainty of abstract mathematical truth. The 
probability of its truth might, indeed, come very near to absolute certainty; but at the very 
utmost its nature must be historical, that is, moral.”1079  
          So for Capes (himself a mathematician), the only “absolute certainty” could be 
mathematical demonstration. All else that had to do with fact, in the nature of the case 
must be a moral certainty, which he considered as, also in the nature of the case, a high 
probability. “The infallibility of the Church in which I believed was thus exactly 
measured by the degree of certainty of proof on which the historical truth of Christianity 
rested. It was a highly probable infallibility; just as I believed that the truth of Christianity 
and of the Biblical records was in the highest degree probable. The truth of the New 
Testament I knew, like every other reasonable person, was a thing to be proved by 
evidence; and no conclusion drawn from the words of the New  Testament could possibly 
be more certain than the proof  on which the New Testament itself rested.”1080  So, a 
purported “certainty” had to rest on evidential proof. It was the old problem. 
          Without perhaps realizing it, and apart from his possibly not having made an 
authentic assent to the Catholic Faith, Capes’ position on the certainty of Christian and 
Catholic faith depended on his adherence to a particular philosophy of proof and assent, 
which he assumed to be the only one possible. It illustrates the importance of philosophy. 
Capes’s view had been picked up at Oxford from those rejecting the usurpations of 
“Reason”. Butler was the master here – as developed by the great Tractarians.1081 “That 
                                                 
1078 Rev. J. M. Capes,  To Rome and Back, pp. 302-303. 
1079 Ibid., p. 303.        
1080 Ibid. 
1081 One must not, however, imagine that Butler was the absolute originator of the idea of probability being 
the guide in religious belief. Many others saw it. For instance, we read in Joseph Blanco White’s Life a note 
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Catholic theologians could ever have held any other view than this had never even 
occurred to my mind”.1082  Capes’ case illustrated the need for a new philosophy of 
assent if it was to be a question of absolute certainty. The question of whether truth can 
be known with absolutely certainty and propositionally (that is, in and by propositions) 
was and is a major issue for modern philosophy. It was, perhaps, the major issue in Faith 
and Reason for Newman in his Catholic years, and the conscience, which is our interest 
in this investigation, had its place in it. 
          Newman’s answer to Capes was a misile directed at this target. On September 27, 
1858, Newman wrote to Capes that “our conclusion in reason (about the truth etc) is not 
demonstrative, but goes so far towards absolute proof, that it is our duty by an act of the 
will to believe it as firmly as if it were; – somewhat in the same way, that (as I should 
say) we (personally) have no demonstration that we (personally) shall die – but a man 
would be a fool who did not hold it certain.”1083  The reader of this might add that to hold 
(so foolishly) that one will not die is a violation of a duty – perceived by the reason when 
faced with such irresistable probabilities – to assent to such an obvious truth. 
          The crucial thing, then, was not to abandon probability but to preserve absolute 
certainty, and to find how the two are linked. It was here that Newman made his 
philosophical breakthrough, developed in the Grammar (1870), that is famous. Newman 
continues in a letter to Capes a few days later, on October 1, as follows:  
“My dear Capes,  
….. It is a property of the human mind, to be certain speculativé, not merely 
practicé, in certain cases in which no complete proof is possible, but only proof 
that the point in question 'demands our  belief,' or is credibile. I have no 
demonstration that I shall die - but I am as speculative certus of it, as if I had 
demonstration. For the evidence is such and so much, as to make it clear to me 
that I should be a fool not absolutely and implicitly to believe it. ….. I do not 
merely say to myself, ‘It is safe to act as if I believed it.’ I am speculativé 
                                                                                                                                                 
from his “Private Book” on January 26, 1813 (a few years after his arrival in England when regaining 
something of Christian belief – but obviously without any prior contact with Butler), observations on the 
significance of probability for religious belief. He writes, “If we were to withhold our assent from every 
thing against which unanswerable arguments may be started, we must certainly fall into the most absurd 
scepticism… (It is absolutely) out of our power to arrive at that perfect and thorough knowledge, which no 
shadow of doubt can obscure” – it is, rather, a matter of making a reasonable and prudential decision. (The 
Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, written by himself with Portions of his Correspondence, ed. John 
Hamilton Thom, in three vols. Vol. I. London: John Chapman, 1845, p. 260. Republished 1971).  
1082 Rev. J. M. Capes,  To Rome and Back, p. 304.     
1083 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XVIII, p. 464.  To J.M.Capes  The Oratory. Sept 27. 1858 
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certain ….. in consequence of my having just enough evidence to show me that 
I ought to believe it. … Here, it is not, as you seem to say, that, when I believe 
it, my will 'forces' my mind to believe, reason disapproving, but that, when I do 
not believe, my will, reason disapproving, keeps my mind from belief. I cannot 
see that induction is ever a demonstration – but it makes the conclusion 
'credibile' - viz 'claiming belief.' ….. On the other hand, I daily control and 
direct my mind into a firm belief, or speculative certainty, of truths which I 
cannot prove, on the ground that I would be a fool not to believe them, or, that 
reason bids my will to bid my mind to believe. How it is that we are so 
constituted as to be bound by our reason to believe what we cannot prove, is a 
question which I do not pretend to solve”.  1084 
     The point here is that Newman regards the non-demonstrable yet absolute 
certainties of ordinary life (such as that I shall die) as analogous to the undemonstrated 
                                                 
1084 The full letter from Newman to Capes is as follows:  
“My dear Capes,  
As it seems to me, your objection about certainty is more to the point than any thing you have 
printed. My only wonder is that you should not have felt long ago that it is the great 
philosophical difficulty in Catholicism.  
For myself, half my Oxford University sermons are on the subject, and I have a chapter on it in 
my Essay on Development.  
When I came to read Catholic theology, I found that it was solved in a way which I felt to be 
satisfactory. 
It is a property of the human mind, to be certain speculativé, not merely practicé, in certain 
cases in which no complete proof is possible, but only proof that the point in question 'demands 
our  belief,' or is credibile. I have no demonstration that I shall die   but I am as speculative 
certus of it, as if I had demonstration. For the evidence is such and so much, as to make it clear 
to me that I should be a fool not absolutely and implicitly to believe it. It has a claim on my 
speculative belief that England is an island, even though I have no demonstration of it. Reason 
goes just so far, not as to prove it, but as to tell me it is but common sense in me to order my 
mind to believe, or to direct my mind to believe it. I do not merely say to myself, ‘It is safe to 
act as if I believed it.’ I am speculativé certain that intemperate habits lead to loss of health; and 
that, in consequence, not of my having direct proof of it, but in consequence of my having just 
enough evidence to show me that I ought to believe it. Say, a temptation to drink comes and 
obscures this clear conviction, and in consequence I do not believe it. Here, it is not, as you 
seem to say, that, when I believe it, my will 'forces' my mind to believe, reason disapproving, 
but that, when I do not believe, my will, reason disapproving, keeps my mind from belief. I 
cannot see that induction is ever a demonstration – but it makes the conclusion 'credibile'   viz 
'claiming belief.' I cannot understand the state of mind which can love our Lord really with the 
feeling upon it, 'After all, perhaps there is no such person.' It is loving a mere vision or picture, 
and is so unreal as to be degrading. I cannot fancy (you will say perhaps from an idiosyncrasy) 
this existence of devotion without certainty. I could not throw myself upon anyone here below, 
of whom I had the suspicion, ‘Perhaps he is not trustworthy.’ On the other hand, I daily control 
and direct my mind into a firm belief, or speculative certainty, of truths which I cannot prove, 
on the ground that I would be a fool not to believe them, or, that reason bids my will to bid my 
mind to believe. How it is that we are so constituted as to be bound by our reason to believe 
what we cannot prove, is a question which I do not pretend to solve”.     
J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XVIII, pp. 471-472, October 1, 1858. 
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but absolute certainty that is the Catholic Faith. Absolute certainty is possible, then, as a 
result of converging probabilities – provided it is warranted and the mind has the right 
preparedness to perceive it. His observation, that “I cannot see that induction is ever a 
demonstration – but it makes the conclusion 'credibile' – viz 'claiming belief'”, suggests 
two things. Firstly, he regards this reasoning on the basis of probabilities as a form of 
induction and not demonstration. Secondly, this takes the mind to the point of seeing the 
Catholic Faith as credibile (Latin), that is, ‘claiming belief.’ It sees that it is a duty to 
believe, for it is certain. He also mentions the role of the will – but here he adds the detail 
that “reason bids my will to bid my mind to believe” (my italics). So while the will must 
decide to make an assent of the mind once concience perceives the duty to do so, it is the 
mind that bids the will to make this decision.1085 But the main point here is that 
Probability may be the ground of absolute certitude in certain cases, just as absolute as 
that provided by demonstration – although Newman does not here repeat the point, made 
elsewhere, that it is the decision to assent, aided by grace, which results in the absolute 
certitude of faith, or a form of “sight”.  
          In this process, the reason reaches the conclusion that it is one’s duty, by an act of 
the will, to believe just as firmly as if the conclusion were a result of strict demonstration. 
In this act it functions as the conscience, which thus has a critical role. It perceives the 
duty to believe absolutely because the grounds are so good – though they are but 
probabilities. Newman is saying that, whatever of theoretical logic, this is in fact how 
absolute certitude in matters of certain fact may be attained. But the conscience, of itself, 
cannot bring the subject to do what should then be done, which is to assent. The will must 
bestir itself, bidden by the “mind” to do so, and then act. The duty being perceived, a 
decision of the will is made, aided by grace.1086 
         The force of this, though, was not perceived by Capes, who began his drift from 
Catholic practice – leaving the Church, only to return to the Church again eventually. 
This issue of the possibility of certitude was again, a little later, forcefully presented also 
                                                 
1085 This latter point is important as it protects Newman’s position from an ultimate voluntarism – which 
some see as a danger in Scotus’s apparent emphasis on the will, at least in what it may lead to. It was this 
feature of Scotus’s thought which Benedict XVI criticised in his Regensburg Lecture of September 2006. 
1086 The following year (1859) after writing the above letter to Capes, Newman had this to say about him:   
“As to Capes...He told the friend I speak of that he had always held that religious faith was 
proportionate to the evidence – which is contrary to the very idea of faith – and is what Locke sets 
down in his Essay as the true rational faith. And I suspect all his objections  are such as he ought to 
have felt as a Protestant against such Catholic doctrines as the Church of England has retained.” 
(Letters and Diaries, Vol. 19, pp.193-4: To Edward H. Thompson The Oratory Bm August 11. 1859) 
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by Newman’s friend, William Froude (1810-1879), the agnostic younger brother of the 
long-deceased Tractarian Hurrell (and brother of the historian, James Anthony).1087  In 
his letter to Newman on 1 January 1860, Froude stated that “on no subject whatever … is 
my mind, (or as far as I can tell the mind of any human being,) capable of arriving at an 
absolutely certain conclusion”.1088  He continues that “even the highest attainable 
probability does not justify the mind in discarding the residuum of doubt; and that the 
attempt … to enhance or intensify the sense of the preponderance of the probabilities in 
either scale, is distinctly an immoral use of faculties”.1089 To believe on Newman’s basis 
is unethical.  
          Many of Newman’s points to other persons (such as Capes) appear in his 
correspondence with Froude and we do not need to cover them again. But in his 
memorandum of conversations with William Froude, set down on December 14 of that 
year, 1860, we notice the tell-tale basis in Newman’s argument for certitude which is 
pivotal, and it involves the conscience. It has appeared before – and it had appeared in his 
Arians 1090 nearly thirty years earlier. The ultimate sanction for relying on the laws of 
mental certitude as they exist and operate in real life is, for Newman, the fact of the being 
of a moral God ascertained by the conscience. God has made us to attain certitude in this 
way, so it is to be accepted as valid. In response to Froude’s assertion that “in religious 
inquiry we must perform exactly the same method as in scientific – why not?” Newman 
states that he “began by assuming the being of a God who wished me to serve him – that, 
this being assumed, the best evidence I could find was his evidence, and that on which He 
wished me to act – whereas I had no principle, such as conscience is, putting Him before 
me as the guide etc into scientific truth, nor command to pursue science, nor hope of a 
blessing.”1091  It is God who decided how we are to attain real-life certitudes, not our 
epistemological theories. 
                                                 
1087 For an introduction to William Froude’s personal history and the development of his ideas on doubt, 
see D. Leggett, “William Froude, John Henry Newman and Scientific Practice in the Culture of Victorian 
Doubt”, English Historical Review, Vol. CXXVIII, No. 532, June, 2013. Oxford University Press, pp. 571-
595. Froude’s correspondence on certitude with Newman, his friend, is discussed in part II of Leggett’s 
article, pp. 281-288.    
1088  J. M. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XIX, p. 270. 
1089 Ibid.  
1090 J. H. Newman,  The Arians of the Fourth Century, with an Introduction and Notes by Rowan Williams. 
Part I, chapter I, Section III. No.4. Herefordshire and Notre Dame: Gracewing and University of Notre 
Dame.  Published in the Birmingham millenary Oratory Edition.  2001, p. 76. 
1091 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XIX, p. 441. 
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    The ultimate ground for certainty in Newman’s scheme is the awareness of the 
being of a God who wishes us to serve him. It is his long-standing reference to the one 
thing we truly know, which is the Power we are bound to obey. This derives from the 
conscience which, in its dictates, puts God before the subject as his authoritative Master 
and Guide. Conscience, then, testifying to the being of a God whom we are bound to 
obey, is the foundation for Newman’s acceptance of the real-life laws of the mind 
according to which certain knowledge is attained. Being God’s evidence, this is the best 
evidence. As a common instance of this, the mind makes no reserve in stating with 
absolute certainty that “There is a place called India” and that “I shall die” – even though 
this cannot be “demonstrated”.  
          In this absolute certainty obtaining in real life, it is probability that avails. This in 
turn, he noted, depends on the principles of judgments which spring forth from virtue. 
That is to say, a man’s moral ethos accounts for the way he perceives his duty in the face 
of probabilities. The “religious and moral training created principles of judgments – and 
invest[ed] antecedent probabilities with a force that superseded a good deal of the 
evidence for a revelation.” Yet “the antecedent probability of a revelation would be felt 
by one man, not by another”.1092 It is the perception of this probability which invests 
evidence with its power, amounting to a duty to assent. 
 
     4.3.4   (c)   Conscience and probability (Apologia and the Grammar) 
          Our task here has been to identify the action of the conscience, but it has required 
that we set out the issues in what was a major concern of Newman’s defence of religious 
faith during his Catholic years. Our aim here is not primarily to analyse, let alone justify, 
Newman’s surprising thesis on probability, which is now both widely accepted and 
widely denied in philosophical discussions on certitude.1093 His theory on probability was 
                                                 
1092 Ibid.  
1093  In argument, there comes a point where one must face, accept and argue on the basis of first 
principles. Aquinas refers to the fundamental and unproven character of basic principles from which one 
argues.  In his Summa Theologiae he asks whether Sacred Doctrine is a matter of argument. He writes:  
I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their 
principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its  
principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on  to prove something else; as the 
Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). 
However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences 
neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher 
science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its  
principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he  concede nothing, it can have 
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boldly affirmed (but not justified) in his Apologia (1864), where he writes that, in the 
most important and fundamental of religious truths, absolute certitude – just as absolute 
as that attained in demonstration – is possible on the basis of probability. It is reasoning 
in view of antecedent probabilities that yields certitude in life’s most important matters. 
In this, the testimony of the conscience is critical.  
          Newman writes that “I hold this still: I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a 
God; and if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in 
myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that I am quite 
sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, 
All-judging Being in my conscience”.1094 The testimony of the conscience is the root 
conviction – and Newman admits to his difficulty in expressing this “with philosophical 
correctness”.1095 What is clear is that while it is an absolute certitude it is not the fruit of a 
strict demonstration. This great truth of God is not itself a probability, but it depends on 
“probability” – which is to say, on reasons that in terms of formal logic are but 
probabilities.1096 He continues by giving an account of his views in 1843-1844.  
“I am not speaking theologically, nor have I any intention of going into 
controversy, or of defending myself; but speaking historically of what I held in 
1843-4, I say, that I believed in a God on a ground of probability, that I believed 
in Christianity on a probability, and that I believed in Catholicism on a 
probability, and that all three were about the same kind of probability, a 
cumulative, a transcendent probability, but still a probability; inasmuch as He 
who made us, has so willed that in mathematics indeed we arrive at certitude by 
rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we arrive at certitude by 
                                                                                                                                                 
no dispute with him, though it can answer  his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no 
science above  itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits 
some at least of the truths obtained through divine  revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from 
texts in Holy Writ,  and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from  another. If 
our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the 
articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against faith.  
Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a  truth can never be demonstrated, it 
is clear that the arguments brought  against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that 
can  be answered. (S. Th. Prima Pars, Question. 1, article 8, Respondeo).  (my underlines) 
1094 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua,  p. 206. 
1095 Ibid. 
1096 Newman’s Apologia was widely read – including by scientists. Froude wrote to Newman and informed 
him that it had been read by men of science with great interest. What expecially caught their attention was 
how Newman felt he could freely pass from probabilities (which they said can only yield doubt) to the state 
of absolute certaintly. (Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S.: A Correspondence, ed. G. H. 
Harper.  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933. p. 81. 8 October 1864).  Doubtless this expression of 
scientific interest gave impetus to Newman’s preparation of the Grammar. 
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accumulated probabilities, - inasmuch as He who has willed that we should so 
act, co-operates with us in our acting, and thereby bestows on us a certitude 
which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions. And thus I came to 
see clearly, and to have a satisfaction in seeing, that, in being led on into the 
Church of Rome, I was not proceeding on any secondary or isolated grounds of 
reason, or by controversial points in detail, but was protected and justified, even 
in the use of those secondary or particular arguments, by a great and broad 
principle”.1097  
          What he appears to have gained (with conviction) during his early Catholic years 
was his philosophy justifying absolute certitude as a result of probabilities. The “great 
and broad principle” (leading him to “see that the Anglican Church was formally in the 
wrong, and on the other hand that the Church of Rome was formally in the right”1098) was 
that “in religious inquiry we arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities”. The formal 
presentation and philosophical justification of this principle was left to his Grammar of 
Assent (1870) – and our task here is not to pursue his account there. There was no doubt 
in Newman’s mind about the truth of God, his Revelation and his Church. It was for him 
a certainty, but it nevertheless presented numerous difficulties. “Of all points of faith, the 
being of God is, to my own apprehension, encompassed with most difficulty, and yet 
borne in upon our minds with most power”.1099  
          In referring to Keble’s account of religious certitude, Newman wrote to one 
correspondent: “This after all is little more than practical certainty – and Bishop Butler 
seems to encourage it – then my own theory, (which I have since found  is pretty much 
the same as Amort's) was intended to  show how we could be certain on probabilities.” 
1100 Newman’s “theory” on probability was not Keble’s nor Butler’s, but his own. He had 
                                                 
1097 J. H. Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua, p. 207. In 1864 Newman saw his reasoning during the period 
1843-1844 to the conviction that it was his duty to assent to the Catholic Faith as involving accumulated 
probabilities. But what was its result? It was that, since his passing over to the Church of Rome, “I .. have 
had no anxiety of heart whatever, I have been in perfect peace and contentment; I never have had one doubt 
… it was like coming into port after a rough sea; and my happiness on that score remains to this day 
wsithout interruption.” His certitude as to Catholic doctrines was absolute – despite the many “difficulties”. 
“Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt.” Apologia pro Vita Sua, pp. 247-248. Assent involved 
absolute certitude.  
1098 Ibid., p. 208. 
1099 Ibid., p. 248. 
1100 J. H. Newman,  Letters and Diaries. Vol. XXI, p. 129  To Henry James Coleridge  Rednal. June 24/64. 
The editor of the Letters and Diaries gives a reference to Amort in footnote 3: Eusebius Amort (1692 
1775), in his Demonstratio critica religionis catholicae, nova, modesta, facilis, Venice 1744. See G.A, pp. 
411-12. 
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come to see that Keble and Butler brought the believer to but a high probability. In a 
word, it would not do. 
It was especially his correspondence with William Froude that got Newman going 
on his last major and great book – a philosophical classic – which presented an analysis 
of religious assent. The Grammar of Assent was Newman’s most developed philosophical 
answer to the problem of how a true religious assent, which must involve certitude, can 
be made. In respect to the question of the place of the Conscience in Probability and 
Assent, which is our proper topic, there is basically no advance on the particular roles of 
conscience that I have chosen to discuss from the material we have considered. 
 
      4.3.4   (d)   The modern problem 1101  
           Newman summed up the problem of the day in a sermon of 1873: 
 “The elementary proposition of this new philosophy which is now so 
threatening is this - that in all things we must go by reason, in nothing by faith, that 
things are known and are to be received so far as they can be proved. Its advocates 
say, all other knowledge has proof – why should religion be an exception? And the 
mode of proof is to advance from what we know to what we do not know, from 
sensible and tangible facts to sound conclusions. …. Why should not that method 
which has done so much in physics, avail also as regards that higher knowledge 
which the world has believed it had gained through revelation? There is no 
revelation from above. There is no exercise of faith. Seeing and proving is the only 
ground for believing. They go on to say, that since proof admits of degrees, a 
demonstration can hardly be had except in mathematics; we never can have simple 
knowledge; truths are only probably such. So that faith is a mistake in two ways. 
First, because it usurps the place of reason, and secondly, because it implies an 
absolute assent to doctrines, and is dogmatic, which absolute assent is irrational. 
Accordingly you will find, certainly in the future, nay more, even now, even now, 
                                                 
1101 For a general introduction to the historical thinking about probability by philosophers, theologians and 
lawers, a good text is the work by J. Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before 
Pascal.  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.  2001.  James Franklin admires and has been influenced by 
the work of Sydney University philosopher of science, evidence, probability and induction, the late David 
Stove whose books receive increasing posthumous praise. Franklin is David Stove’s literary executor.  
      For an introduction to recent philosophical discussion of truths about reasons for action, one might 
read. T. M. Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons, Oxford University Press, 2014. Thomas Michael 
(“Tim”) Scanlon has been Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity at 
Harvard University’s Department of Philosophy. 
312 
 
that the writers and thinkers of the day do not even believe there is a God. They do 
not believe either the object - a God personal, a Providence, and a moral Governor; 
and secondly, what they do believe, viz., that there is some first cause or other, they 
do not believe with faith, absolutely, but as a probability.1102 
      You will say that their theories have been in the world and are no new thing. No. 
Individuals have put them forth, but they have not been current and popular ideas. 
Christianity has never yet had experience of a world simply irreligious.” 1103   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1102 Newman has put his finger on modernity, leading to postmodernity. Terrence Merrigan quotes 
Zygmunt Bauman, who writes that postmodernity is noted for its abandonment of the quest for certainty. 
We now live with a willingness to live in permanent uncertainty. This in turn involves the death of ethics, 
and thus does personal responsibility fade away.  (T. Merrigan, “Conscience and Selfhood: Thomas More, 
John Henry Newman, and the Crisis of the Postmodern Subject”, Theological Studies; Dec 2012; 73, 4; pp. 
862-864.)  Newman had taken up a truly massive modern problem for the assent of faith. 
     Merrigan himself describes “postmodernity” as involving (with “personal experience” and “the other”) a 
“far reaching relativity” (“The Anthropology of Conversion: Newman and the Contemporary Theology of 
Religions” in Newman and Conversion, ed. Ian Ker, Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark, 1997, p. 118). 
Benedict XVI often spoke of the modern “dictatorship of relativism”. 
1103 Newman, J. H. “The Infidelity of the Future”:  Sermon at the opening of St Bernard’s Seminary, Olton,  
2nd October, 1873. Sermon 9 of Reason for Faith: Nine Sermons from the Cardinal's Autograph 
manuscripts.   Weathamstead Herts: Anthony Clarke\Trabuco Canyon CA: Source Books. Originally 
published in 1957 as The Catholic Sermons of Cardinal Newman. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion   “Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem”  
 
5.1.  Summary 
 
This thesis set out to track the development of Newman’s 
idea of the conscience as the principle, sanction and 
guardian of belief in God and his Revelation. It is not 
meant to be a philosophical evaluation. Rather, it is an 
intellectual biography. We considered the pivotal event of 
his conversion of 1816 which was the foundation of 
Newman’s subsequent journey of conscience, of Christian 
belief, and of intellectual life. It laid the all-important 
initial lines for what followed in terms of belief in God and 
his revelation. In later life he said that this event made of 
him a different person – it made him a Christian by formed 
conviction. At this, his conscience came decisively into play far more than hitherto. 
Essentially, his conversion was a wholehearted assent to Revealed Religion. Conscience, 
understood as the general sense of moral obligation and as the dictate to fulfil this or that 
specific duty, had for its end the assent to truth – and supremely, Revealed Truth.  
Newman showed in extant correspondence (Jan. 1817) a certain understanding of the role 
of the conscience in this event: its principal though not exclusive role was to sanction and 
guard divine revelation. But in view of Newman’s later thought on conscience and the 
assent to Revelation, we may also attribute to the conscience at the time of the conversion 
the role of preparing the boy for the assent that was his conversion, and of enabling a 
recognition by him of the God of Revelation. Though not formally mentioned in his 
correspondence, it is reasonable to assume that at the time he was aware, to a point, of 
these roles. The foundation of this assent was the sense of God present in the sense of 
moral obligation. So it was that the conversion of 1816 immediately introduced the two 
next principal themes of the idea of the conscience in Newman’s life: conscience and 
belief in God, and conscience and belief in divine revelation.  
          The elements of Newman’s formal thought on conscience and belief in God appear 
in his early sermons of 1824. There are immediate references to the natural sense of sin, 
to the natural awareness of the moral system as implying God, and to the sense of a moral 
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providence in the course of the world. We especially noticed that 1825 marks a growing 
attention to the conscience. His finger is on this subject – it is the year of a sermon wholly 
devoted to conscience as the voice of God, and others of his sermons feature the 
conscience and its testimony. The conscience is used in his defence of Scripture miracles. 
By the end of 1825 Newman has stated that the “most striking evidence we have of” 
God’s moral attributes “independent of that afforded by revelation, is one lodged within 
us, the voice of conscience. This, as far as it goes, is truly said to be the voice of an 
observant and Holy Judge.”1104  This sermon of 4 December 1825 constitutes a formal 
signal of his coming defence of religious belief from the conscience and its implicit yet 
clear “vision” of God. It was during the years 1829-1833, the years of his association 
with Keble and Froude before the formal commencement of the Oxford Movement, that 
his theory of the conscience as the principle and sanction of religion openly and explicitly 
emerged into full view. The conscience is presented as the empirical foundation of 
religious certitude as to God, with the defence of the authority of religion being its setting 
and motivation. The Catholic years saw the flowering of the idea of the conscience and 
its testimony to the personal character of God as “Father & Judge”. The indicator and 
manifestation of this are the unmistakable “feelings” which this perception involves. But 
all this presumes the very significant event of his early childhood (1806-1807), a sense of 
his own Self as created. Thus (with the aid of grace) conscience involves, for the one 
duly prepared, the perception of one’s Maker as a Father and Judge.   
          In the progress of the mind from belief in God to belief in Revelation, the 
conscience (with its natural sense of God) prepares the mind for this assent and enables it 
to recognize the God of Revelation. Thus does it recognize, accept, sanction and guard 
the truth of Revelation as the supreme thing for life’s conduct. It recognizes one’s 
sinfulness and accepts Revelation as the answer to sin. It prepares the mind and heart for 
this assent by forging virtue in the subject, which is to say a good moral ethos – without 
which the mind would lack a necessary habituation and desire to accept Revealed Truth. 
It is the person seeking virtue, the man or woman possessed of a right moral ethos, who is 
equipped to judge aright the drift of converging probabilities. In these practical matters, 
such as the decision to embrace a particular religious faith, the conscience serves as that 
function of the reason which perceives the imperative character of good reasons 
                                                 
1104 J. H. Newman, “on natural religion”, December 4, 1825, in John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843, 
Vol. II, ed. Vincent Ferrer Blehl SJ, Clarendon Press. 1993. Sermon 50, no. 119, pp. 373 ff.  
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(involving probability) for accepting something as the absolute truth. Thus the conscience 
is the foundation of the assent of faith in that it is the reason’s perception of the duty to 
assent. In this sense the dictate of conscience – reason’s apprehension of the compelling 
character of the objective truth – is the voice of God. These good reasons constitute the 
voice of God summoning the soul to make the venture of faith. The conscience as such 
cannot take the soul to this assent. The soul, perceiving the duty, must, aided by grace, 
make an act of the will and decide – bidden by the mind to do so.1105 This latter point of 
the mind bidding the will to decide is to be noted. With the decision to assent comes the 
absolute certitude that may be called a form of sight.  
 
5.2    Topics for further Research 
5.2.1.   The Ways to God     Newman insisted on the importance of implicit reasoning. 
This, Newman claimed, can take one to certitude and commonly does so – together, of 
course, with explicit reasoning. What one holds as a real belief may not be demonstrable 
to oneself and to others in a scientific sense. To take but one certainty from everyday life: 
one knows for certain, as a real, practical and pivotal belief affecting a great deal of 
thought and behaviour, that one will die. But this certainty of ordinary life, Newman 
observed, is not the fruit of a strict “demonstration”. It involves much implicit reasoning 
and an instinctive grasp of the bearing of converging probabilities. So, too, the basic yet 
sure belief in God is commonly the fruit of similar reasoning – entailing, among other 
things, the recognition of likelihood. He rejected the claim that only quasi-mathematical 
reasoning can provide absolute certitude. 
         This brings us to the nature of the traditional Ways to God. They are commonly 
presented as formal proofs, as exercises of explicit reason. This was the case in 
Newman’s day as it is in ours. But now, could not the great “Ways” to God be regarded 
as both explicit and implicit? 
          An example of implicit reasoning is that line of reasoning which Newman turns to 
analyse in his “Proof of Theism” (though this is not a traditional Way to God). Newman 
takes the sense of moral obligation and discovers (I suggest), in the thought of one’s own 
self that it involves, a sense both of one’s contingent, transient being, as well as a sense of 
                                                 
1105 J. H. Newman, Letters and Diaries. Vol. XVIII, pp. 471-472, October 1, 1858. To John Moore Capes. 
This point that the mind bids the will to decide is to be noted. The will does not blindly decide. 
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subjection to a Power one must obey. There appears to be an instinctive, natural, implicit 
step of the reason from the transient and continent being that is oneself to the Necessary 
Being that is one’s First Cause – and which appears as a moral Power one must obey. 
This is because one’s sense of personal (and contingent) existence is part of one’s 
awareness of moral obligation.  
          Perhaps we ought be seeing the classic proofs as ways to God which the mind takes 
easily and almost instinctively, and which even a child would tend to take – indeed, 
mankind generally (though their further elaboration will vary immensely). I remember 
watching a movie once in which a child asked his puzzled mother this question: Why isn’t 
there nothing? Presumably in some sense this child implicitly reasoned to a Creator – or 
could have, if helped. In these profound matters of the connecting of reality with God, the 
“proof” is quasi-immediate to the honest and unprejudiced mind (with a right ethos). A 
child can make the connection, and some children do so quite early in rational life. This 
was certainly the case with Newman.1106 Thus they sense with instinctive certitude the 
reality of God. They then accept and recognize him in what they are subsequently told or 
read with a greater elaboration that may include many errors. It is something not 
mathematical or physical. It is a movement of the reason instinctively reflecting on the 
obvious lack of necessity of the existence of things. It is a “proof” where the conclusion 
is so close to the principles that it may not seem a proof at all. The reasoning is so natural 
and elementary. Of course, further deliberation is then advisable to double-check, as it 
were, and review the validity of the reasoning.  
          Aquinas calls his presentation the “Five Ways” to God (not Five Proofs). This term 
– “Ways” – does not, in its strict meaning, place the idea of formal evidence and proof at 
the forefront, as if one cannot reach the sure knowledge of God without having concluded 
from formal, commensurate evidence. They are ways to God. Aquinas does provide 
demonstrations, but could not this be a further stage of “proof”, which we might call 
formal proof and evidence? 
          Newman was reacting to a strong English tradition arising since the Enlightenment 
which demanded strict evidence for personal certitude, and which seems to have 
interpreted the traditional “Ways” to God as being nothing but logical steps constituting 
                                                 
1106 As said before, in Newman’s retreat notes for April 1843 (during his meditation on the end of man, on 
April 8) we read that “The thoughts that struck me most were, - that God put it into my heart, when 5 or 6 
years old, to ask what and why I was”. Autobiographical Writings, p. 223 (“Early Journals: Original 
Notes”).    
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strict evidence justifying certitude. This is still widely thought. That is to say, prior to the 
conclusion of this strict logic, certitude could not be claimed. But I for one doubt that 
Aquinas (and we must consider him a signally major expositor of Aristotle) claimed this 
himself. I cannot imagine that he would insist that ordinary certitudes of life and the 
religious certitudes of the common man (and those of children), must be the fruit of strict 
and formal evidence perceived as such by the believing subject. A topic of further 
research would be the extent to which the great “proofs” of God’s existence and nature 
can be regarded as involving implicit reasoning that produces certitude prior to treating 
them as demonstrations. There has been much modern discussion of a reasonable belief 
in God that is not evidential. 1107 
          So then, a further point of research would be, what is the real nature of the 
reasoning commonly involved in the traditional Ways to God (as explicated by, say, 
Aquinas). Then, connected with this is the question, how may this compare with the Way 
to God preferred by Newman, based on the natural intimations of the conscience, which 
he sees as able to lead to belief in God and on then to the assent to Revelation? There 
may be a lot more in common than one might expect.  
           Take but one example. At the end of chapter IV his great work, Orthodoxy,1108 G. 
K. Chesterton speaks of the importance of “subconscious convictions”. They have their 
roots in “ultimate attitudes towards life”. These are “the soils for the seeds of doctrine.” 
Significantly,  
“These in some dark way I thought before I could write, and felt before I could 
think; that we may proceed more easily afterwards, I will roughly recapitulate 
them now. I felt in my bones; first, that this world does not explain itself…. 
                                                 
1107 Alvin Plantinga, perhaps America’s leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God, is noted for his 
Reformed epistemology. This argues that belief in God can be rational even when held without evidence or 
arguments in favor of God's existence. Plantinga argues that belief in God is “basic”, much like belief in the 
past, other minds, our memories, or self-evident beliefs: we do not hold them on account of evidence or 
argument, and yet our belief in them is accepted as perfectly rational. It does not need to be inferred from 
other truths in order to be reasonable. This theory sees its roots in Calvin’s assertion of a sensus divinitatis 
(The Institutes). Plantinga would perhaps categorize the “basic belief” in God as a matter of experience – 
one that seems or feels “right”. This is a little difficult to compare exactly with Newman’s position, except 
for his rejection of the requirement of formal evidence for belief in God to be reasonable belief. For 
Newman a basic and natural belief in God involves, broadly, inference, but usually implicit inference. But 
this does not exclude subsequent formal reasoning which has its due importance. 
1108 Publishers Weekly, which has been published continuously since 1872, once described this book of 
Chesterton’s as one of 10 "indispensable spiritual classics" of the past 1500 years. Philip Zaleski, author 
and journalist, said it was his favorite on the list of top 100 spiritual classics of the twentieth century. 
Christianity Today called it "One of the top 10 Christian books of the twentieth century." These 
assessments of this famed book of Chesterton’s have been often repeated. 
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Second, I came to feel as if .. (the world) .. must have a meaning, and meaning 
must have some one to mean it. There was something personal in the world … 
Third, I thought this purpose beautiful …. Fourth, …  we owed, also, an 
obedience to whatever made us.”  
He ends the chapter with this statement: “All this I felt and the age gave me no 
encouragement to feel it. And all this time I had not even thought of Christian 
theology”.1109  So Chesterton felt these convictions in his bones before he could write or 
think – and on their basis he could afterwards proceed. In the following chapter of the 
same book, Chesterton writes that “Instinct after instinct was answered by doctrine after 
doctrine.”1110 All this is to say that prior to formal reasoning and faith, man may 
instinctively start with what suggests God to him – and this is answered by, fulfilled and 
recognised in doctrine which he then learns or reads. 
          Leo Elders writes that “St Thomas (Aquinas) indicates that man spontaneously 
reaches the insight that there exists a common Cause of all things, a Being which 
exercises a universal providence” – and he gives references to I.13,10;  I.13,8;  II-II.85,1;   
In III Phys., lectio 6, n.335. He continues, “Obviously at this level such an idea of God is 
most imperfect and the identification provisional, so that further analysis is required 
(questions 3 to 11)”.1111 Still, it is a true insight, though spontaneous. 
          To take but one of these references – II-II. Question 85, article 1, we read the 
following: “I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being 
…and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name of God”.1112 
The fact of implicit reasoning is clearly suggested – by the fact that it is “known to all”. 
1113 These “all” would include what Newman in his writings refers to as societies and 
religions of “barbarism.”1114 Indigenous and primal societies are absolutely certain of the 
                                                 
1109 G. K. Chesterton,   Orthodoxy.  UK: John Lane. The Bodley Head Ltd. 1908,  pp. 115-116. 
1110 Ibid., Chapter V,  pp. 142-144. 
1111 L. J. Elders SVD, The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas. Leiden:E.J.Brill. 1990,  p. 131. 
1112 St Thomas Aquinas,  St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica in Two Volumes. Translated by the 
English Dominican Province. (undated) Volume II.  S. T., II-II, q. 85, art. 1.  New York: Benziger Brothers, 
p. 1555. 
1113 For further discussion of the certitude that is possible in implicit reasoning by a great philosopher of 
the twentieth century, read J. Maritain, Eléments de Philosophie, vol. 2: L'ordre des concepts -1: Petite 
logique, Paris: P. Téquil, 1946 (fourth edn.), Ch. 1, pp. 1-58. 
1114 As in the Grammar of Assent, p. 308 (Image Book). Newman contrasts “the religion of barbarism” 
favourably against the “artificial religion” of “philosophy” and “so-called civilization” which “is not a 
development of man’s whole nature, but mainly of the intellect, recognizing indeed the moral sense, but 
ignoring the conscience” (ignoring the sense of sin which involves implicitly the thought of a judgement). 
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existence of the Supernatural and its power, but their (“natural”) reasoning is, obviously, 
mainly implicit and expressed in myth and ritual.  
          Newman also insisted on the great importance of a moral character (ethos) in right 
reasoning, be this reasoning implicit or explicit. A work of investigation would be the 
relationship between moral ethos (or virtue) and right implicit reasoning. The attainment 
of moral and religious truth depends on a rightly prepared, a rightly disposed, a well-
functioning conscience – and heart. That is, the basic requirement is virtue. This idea is 
persuasive, but must be handled carefully. One could not assume that a dutiful 
conscience, baldly stated, will result in reasoning that takes one to Orthodoxy. 
 
5.2.2.  The common experience of the conscience.      
Newman believed that the voice of mankind bore him out, that the conscience of man 
provides a sense of God as Lawgiver-Judge and Father-Friend. An important question for 
further research is, What is the common experience of conscience? Newman, in his 
Notebook “Proof of Theism” searches for support for his position in testimonies from 
classical literature (Notebook, p. 54). He asks “whether this feeling of conscience, as 
involving a Personal Governor is peculiar e.g. to Anglo-Saxons. Have the Germans it? 
Have the Chinese …” (Notebook, p.60). We might say that if the basis of the belief is the 
general sense of moral obligation, then it is to be expected that the “Power” behind this – 
if it is perceived that there is such a “Power” – would have notes akin to a Lawgiver and 
Judge, and to a Father and Friend. The basic sense would be of some kind of judgment on 
oneself. The degree to which these images are explicit or vague would depend on the 
culture of the society. But it is an important question. The question is: what are the facts 
of the case? 1115 What is it that is commonly apprehended in and through the workings of 
conscience? Does Newman attribute to the conscience meanings which it has in ordinary 
usage and experience? Or does his perception assume a theistic belief gained elsewhere? 
                                                 
1115 E. J. Tyler, The Nature of God according to Conscience in the thought of John Henry Newman. 1996. 
Doctoral thesis presented to Charles Sturt University, Australia, containing an extensive survey of the 
literature precisely on this point. It also takes a couple of test cases, such as the Australian Aborigines and 
the African Nuer. It discovers that the evidence is favourable, but mixed. As a matter of fact, Newman had 
followed with some interest popular reports on the religion of the far-away Australian Aborigines. They get 
a mention even in the Grammar of Assent. Supporting his discussion of natural religion (and the role of the 
natural conscience in it), he quotes there a Penny Cyclopaedia article, which asserted that the idea of 
Atonement was broadly present “among the various tribes of Africa, the islanders of the South Seas, and 
even that most peculiar race, the natives of Australia, either in the shape of some offering, or some 
mutilation of the person” (J. H. Newman, A Grammar of Assent, Image Book, 1955, p. 306). 
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We need to relate Newman’s idea of the conscience with the general and ordinary idea. 
What is “the voice of mankind” on the matter?  
 
5.2.3.  The philosophy of conscience.      
In his brief history of philosophy at Oxford, Anthony Quinton observes1116 that 
philosophy, beginning in Oxford in the early 13th century with Robert Grosseteste, 
flourished in the 14th century with Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. But after the 
Black Death, Wyclif and ecclesiastical control, philosophy was dormant in Oxord for 500 
years – until the 19th century with Green and Bradley. Hobbes and Locke studied in 
Oxford but turned to philosophy only a considerable time after leaving it. But, Quinton 
writes, two other philosophers taught at Oxford in the middle of the 19th century in an 
isolated and philosophically uninfluential way: Newman (drawing on Aristotle, the 
British empiricists and Butler) and H.L. Mansel, disciple of William Hamilton. Quinton 
is inaccurate in his dating, but Newman in the years of his prominence at Oxford (1828-
1840) is regarded by Quinton as the most important philosopher of religion in Oxford 
itself between Scotus and his own appearance at Oxford nineteenth century.1117 Without 
diverting to discuss the matter, I would assert that Newman was clearly superior to 
Mansel (who is virtually forgotten).1118 In view of the kind and temper of Oxford 
philosophers after him, it may be that he will come to be seen as the greatest Christian 
philosopher of religious faith speaking and writing at Oxford since Scotus – perhaps at 
                                                 
1116 A. Quinton, “Oxford Philosophy” in Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy.  
2
nd
 ed.   New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. 
1117 This was also the view of William Gladstone. We read in Notes from a Diary 1873-1881 (Vol. II ) by 
Sir Mountstuart E. Grant Duff (London: John Murray 1898), Newman referred to as the “master mind” of 
the Oxford Movement (p. 23, date March 17, 1878). The next year (p. 121, March 13, 1879) Duff records 
his conversation at table with Rippon, Gladstone and others. “The conversation turning upon Newman, 
Gladstone said: ‘I do not believe there has been anything like his influence in Oxford, when it was at its 
height, since Abelard lectured in Paris. I myself, in my undergraduate days, saw just the commencement of 
it. It was  beginning to be the custom to go and hear him on Sunday afternoon at St Mary’s’.”  
Internet, January 12, 2014:  https://archive.org/stream/notesfromadiary07duffgoog#page/n30/mode/2up 
1118  In December 1859 Newman, writing to Charles Meynell, refers to his Oxford University Sermons 
(with its philosophy of religion and faith). He writes that “My Oxford University Sermons, preached out as 
long ago as 17 years, are now (in some passages) attracting attention at Oxford”.  
   In respect to H. L. Mansel, Newman has this to say:  “I have read a good deal of Mansel's Book (footnote: 
Mansel’s The Limits of Religious Thought examined in Eight Lectures) - enough  to show me that, as far as 
I may do so, without risk of false doctrine or temerity, I agree with it. Nay it seems to me taken from my 
own Protestant teaching. This does not hinder me from feeling a serious objection and fear of some things 
which he has said. (Letters and Diaries, Vol. XIX,  to Charles Meynell  Dec 20. 1859, pp. 256-257) 
   The following month, in a letter to Meynell, Newman wrote that “you corroborate my own impression, 
that what Mr Mansel has said, I have said before him - and thirdly because you  think that I have avoided 
many of his errors.” (Letters and Diaries Vol. XIX, To Charles Meynell  The Orat. Bm., Jan. 23/60, p. 294) 
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least till the work at Oxford of Father Martin D’Arcy S.J. and Elizabeth Anscombe.1119 
He ought to be seen as, after Scotus, the light that revived Christian philosophy at Oxford 
and remained its second founder. The true significance of Newman as a philosopher of 
religion precisely at Oxford awaits further study.1120  
          While Quinton regards Newman’s philosophy of religion as “uninfluential”, he was 
followed by W.G. Ward who quickly took up his ideas on the role of the conscience in 
religious knowledge and faith. He drove them hard not only in the fourth decade of the 
century at Oxford itself till his own withdrawal from that scene, but decades later too – 
especially during his protracted controversy with John Stuart Mill during the 1870s. One 
of the distinctive things about Newman’s idea of the conscience as a Way to God is that it 
is a Way to God that serves as a natural springboard to Revelation. That is, in Newman’s 
approach it is the most natural thing in the world to believe in Revelation if one has 
recognized God in the Conscience – granted grace, of course. The richness of the 
Conscience is awaiting modern rediscovery by philosophers, and when it is rediscovered, 
John Henry Newman will be there with a trail already blazed.1121  
 
 
                                                 
1119 Father D’Arcy (at Campion Hall, Oxford, from 1932 to 1945) left Oxford in 1945 for wider work.  
         G. E. M. Anscombe, becoming a Catholic in 1940 while still an undergraduate at Oxford, went on to 
be a Fellow at Oxford’s Somerville College from 1946 to 1970, and had a growing philosophical influence 
there. In 1970 she moved to Cambridge to be Professor of Philosophy, where significant work across a 
variety of philosophical issues followed. Like her husband Peter Geach she studied Wittgenstein (who, 
though different, has been coupled with Newman in his attention to the problem of certitude). Anscombe  
made ground-breaking interventions on the current state of philosophy of the time which helped revitalize 
modern Thomism – particularly in her attack in 1958 on modern moral philosophy (‘Modern Moral 
Philosophy’, Philosophy 33 (1958), pp. 1-18).  She rejected Utilitarianism and the Kantian categorical 
imperative, and proposed abandoning the attempt to make sense of duty or obligation in these terms. 
Rather, there should be a return to Plato and Aristotle. In this way a basis would be laid with an account of 
human nature and human action. Her dramatic call, recognized by such persons as Alasdair MacIntyre, has 
led to a renewed interest in “virtue ethics.” This in turn has emphasised a focus on the virtues that go to 
making the kind of people whose character would invite us to trust and consult them. It is the virtuous 
character that recognizes what is virtuous. In turn the doing of what is thus perceived enables the 
flourishing of virtue. But thus we are brought to the conscience and the “right moral ethos” that is 
necessary for the conscience to apprehend the truth. This is exactly what Newman was on about, drawing 
inspiration from (Scripture, the Fathers and) Aristotle. It seems to me that John Henry Newman had, in this 
respect, anticipated Elizabeth Anscombe at Oxford. 
1120 Despite D’Arcy and Anscombe (and others), I believe that Newman, while at Oxford, was the greatest 
philosopher at Oxford since Scotus, in respect to the premier issue in English philosophy of religion, the 
reasonableness of religious faith. He regarded his Oxford University Sermons as his best Oxford book.  
1121 The prominent British philosopher and historian of philosophy, Sir Anthony Kenny, himself an ex-
Catholic priest and religious agnostic (having declared he does not know whether or not there is a God), 
sees Newman’s thought on the philosophy of religious certainty as very significant. The other British 
philosopher of certainty Kenny highlights and leans to is Wittgenstein.    Internet archive, Feb. 7, 2014: 
(“The Philosopher’s Magazine”, June 29, 2009)  http://philosophypress.co.uk/?p=356). 
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5.3   Conclusion:   Newman and the Supernatural 
What might we say as a result of this investigation? Just as the ways to God from external 
things generate controversy and argument when they are put into form and offered as 
“proofs”, so does the way to God from the perception, by the conscience, of moral 
obligation. Each person must live with the controversy and make up his own mind. But 
Newman’s way has this advantage that the phemonenon of conscience and its insistence 
on duty bears down on a person with importunity. Perhaps it does so just as much as the 
phenomenon of the external world. The moral realm is powerful indeed.1122 The observer 
of the ordinary affairs of humanity cannot but be struck by the all-pervading presence of 
the ethical dimension – the fact and sense of duty – in any account of the course of 
society and the life of an individual. For instance, it looms large in Kant. Conterminous 
with this is the widespread perception of a certain sacredness and ultimate character of 
the voice of conscience. Newman asked, what are the implications of this common 
phenomenon? He replied that it involves a sense of God, which may or may not be 
recognized, accepted or allowed.  
          In the formal judgment of the Church, a Church which puts high store on valid and 
objective philosophy, the Church which received Newman into her ranks and awarded 
him her highest honours (the cardinalate in his lifetime and beatification over a century 
after his death), the way to God via the conscience has a broad validity. The Catechism of 
the Catholic Church states that among the proofs for the existence of God, understood as 
“converging and convincing arguments” allowing us to attain certainty (no. 31), there is 
the “voice of conscience” – together with other ways originating in the human person 
(no.33).  
          Newman’s approach to an apologetic for belief in God and assent to his Revelation 
begins from one of the deepest and most universal of human experiences – the general 
sense of moral obligation1123 and what human beings readily perceive this to imply.1124 
                                                 
1122 In his various writings, J. Buziszewski argues forcefully that we cannot not know the natural moral 
law. Basic moral ignorance of this has its roots in the will. For example, there is J. Buziszewski’s article, 
“The Revenge of Conscience”, in First Things, June 1998. The Institute on Religion and Public Life. 
Internet on 23 January, 2014: http://www.firstthings.com/article/1998/06/001-the-revenge-of-conscience 
1123 Terrence Merrigan, quoting Fred Lawrence who interprets Bernard Lonergan, writes that 
consciousness, which includes the experience of conscience, might be described as a pure experience 
distinct from self-knowledge. (T. Merrigan, “Conscience and Selfhood: Thomas More, John Henry 
Newman, and the Crisis of the Postmodern Subject”, Theological Studies; Dec 2012; 73, 4; pp. 841-869. 
Marquette University). The point here is that the conscience is a basic given of consciousness and the 
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The inchoate sense of God and the instinctive desire for him and his Revelation begins, 
by intention of the Creator, there. Such is Newman’s claim. Scattered throughout his 
varied and numerous works, Newman provides an account of the rise from the conscience 
of a natural belief in God which serves as a foundation of and impetus for belief in his 
Revelation.1125 It is the natural foundation of it in the sense that it is oriented to it from 
the beginning – depending, though, on the sustaining action of grace.1126 Despite the 
multifarious purposes of his writings in which his theory of the conscience appears, a 
remarkable consistency is portrayed, from its beginnings to the end.1127 This coherence of 
exposition in such a variety of genres and contexts, despite his never having published a 
book on it, is a convincing point in its support.  
         Newman, beginning empirically and with ordinary human experience (of the 
conscience), set man’s course from the beginning (assuming the aid of grace) towards life 
in the Trinity. Grace is at work in the heart of human nature, which is to say from the 
beginnings of the natural and implicit apprehension of God. Ferreira writes that 
                                                                                                                                                 
starting point of a sense of God implicated in it – requiring, if it is to be made intelligible, many other 
supplementary sources of knowledge, such as experience and personal reflection.  
       Merrigan’s account on pp. 850-851 does not, though, seem to me to have considered sufficiently the 
implications of Newman’s long-standing sense of creation and a Creator, which I have suggested in 3.3.2 
(c) is best seen as grounded in his sense of self as present precisely in his sense of moral obligation.  
1124 It is important to see in Newman’s stress on the basic sense of moral obligation an innate and 
instinctive objectivism. It is objective duty, duty as sensed to be objective and imposing on the subject, 
which is apprehended instinctively by the subject. This apprehension is the act of conscience. That is to say, 
the basic act of the conscience is the self being conscious of being imposed upon by objective duty. This is 
the foundation of the real and concrete experience of an objective God obliging the subject. 
1125 Terrence Merrigan writes that in Newman’s thought “the possibility of faith in a particular revelation is 
dependent on that more fundamental religious disposition which is within the reach of everyone” 
(“Merrigan, Terrence. “The Anthropology of Conversion: Newman and the Contemporary Theology of 
Religions” in Newman and Conversion, ed. Ian Ker, Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark, 1997, p. 137). 
1126  If we understand the conscience as the seat of a great and radical drive for self-tanscendence taking 
the person, with the aid of grace, to divine faith, Walter Conn’s psychological approach to conscience in 
Newman can be useful. He urges an understanding of the conscience “not only as the morally conscious 
self or as a fundamental mode of self awareness, but precisely as the dynamic core of conscious subjectivity 
which constitutes the very being of the person, driving him or her towards the authenticity of self-
trnanscendence” (my italics). (W. E. Conn, Conscience & Conversion in Newman: A Developmental Study 
of Self in John Henry Newman, Milwarkee Wisconsin: Marquette University Press. 2010, p. 126).  
       In what may be seen as complementary, Terrence Merrigan presents the conscience in Newman (and 
Saint Thomas More) as that by which the true self or inner man attains a new and integrated self-
actualization. This involves the conscience being completed and sustained by divine faith. (“Conscience 
and Selfhood: Thomas More, John Henry Newman, and the Crisis of the Postmodern Subject”, Theological 
Studies, Dec 2012; 73, 4; p. 856). 
1127 José Morales stresses this consistency when he writes in his long article that the doctrine of 
Conscience, occupying a central place in the works of Newman, constantly appears in his writings and 
gradually undergoes a harmonious and enriching development, free from contradictions and ruptures. (J. 
Morales, "Una visión cristiana de la conciencia". Persona y Derecho, 5 (1978), pp. 539-591. Revista de 
fundamentación de las Instituciones Jurídicas y de Derechos Humanos, Universidad de Navarra, Spain.) 
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“Newman tended to see grace as influencing all our actions in some sense”.1128  Most 
importantly, Nature is to be understood not merely in natural terms and with a natural 
finality, but as having a supernatural calling, and containing (in grace) a supernatural 
involvement. Perhaps we could adopt Lee Yearley’s way of putting it, that in Newman 
there is but “one religious sphere containing various distinctions”.1129 This can help us 
appreciate the statement of The Catechism of the Catholic Church that “The desire for 
God is written in the human heart, because man is created by God and for God; and God 
never ceases to draw man to himself” (no. 27). 
          It was mentioned earlier that Newman could perhaps 
be regarded as the greatest Christian philosopher of religion 
at Oxford since Scotus. This reference to Scotus reminds us 
of a key element in Scotus’s theology. In his General 
Audience of July 7th, 2010, the theologian-pope, Benedict 
XVI, praised John Duns Scotus. He recalled that for Scotus 
the Incarnation of the Son of God is “the greatest and most 
beautiful work of the entire history of salvation, that it is not 
conditioned by any contingent fact…” 
          Pope Benedict reminded his audience that, unlike 
many Christian thinkers of the time, Scotus held that the Son of God would have become 
man even if humanity had not sinned.1130 Scotus writes in his “Reportatio Parisiensis”:  
“To think that God would have given up such a task had Adam not sinned would be quite 
                                                 
1128 J. Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman’s Thought.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1980,  p. 136 
1129  L. H. Yearley, The Ideas of Newman: Christianity and Human Religiosity.  University Park and 
London: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1978, p. 3. 
1130 This does not seem to have been the opinion of St Thomas Aquinas. In  the Summa Theologiae III, 1, 
article 3, Aquinas asks: Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate? He replies:  
     On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, 
"For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, 
the Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Timothy 1:15, "Christ Jesus came into this world to save 
sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take 
away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine." 
     I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not 
sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent 
ought rather to be given to this opinion. 
     For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only 
through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since 
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of Incarnation, it is 
more in accordance with this to say that the work of Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; 
so that, had sin not existed, Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to 
this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate. 
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unreasonable! I say, therefore, that the Fall was not the cause of Christ’s predestination 
and that if no one had fallen, neither the angel nor man, in this hypothesis Christ would 
still have been predestined in the same way” (in III Sent., d. 7, 4). In the firm opinion of 
Duns Scotus, the Incarnation of the Son of God, planned from all eternity by God the 
Father at the level of love, is the fulfilment of creation and enables every creature, in 
Christ and through Christ, to be filled with grace and to praise and glorify God in 
eternity.  
          So Christ is the fulfilment of creation by the eternal plan of God. In our 
understanding of Man and Creation, Christ has the primacy. Scotus begins with God’s 
plan for creation and nature, and not from Man’s need. Irrespective of his having sinned 
and needing a Redeemer, Man was created for Christ according to God’s plan from 
eternity. Man’s nature has, we may then conclude according to this thesis, a supernatural 
finality.1131 Christ is the final end of man by nature, and it was eternally intended to be so, 
irrespective of the Fall. Although (of course) Duns Scotus knew that in fact, because of 
original sin, Christ redeemed us with his Passion, Death and Resurrection, he affirmed 
that the Incarnation is not conditioned by any contingent fact. It is God’s original idea of 
ultimately uniting with himself the whole of creation, in the Person and Flesh of the Son. 
I do not mean to claim that Scotus was absolutely original in this – that is a further 
question.1132 I am suggesting that this view, for which he is famous, has implications for 
our understanding of the finality of man at the heart of his nature.1133  
                                                 
1131  While St Thomas seems to think that the Incarnation is a response to the Fall of man, he does see 
man’s nature having a supernatural finality. In his Treatise on Sacred Doctrine (“The Nature and Extent of 
Sacred Doctrine”) in his Response, he writes: “I answer that … Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to 
God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen,  O God, besides Thee, 
what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait  for Thee" (Is. 66:4).” S. Th. Prima Pars, I, I, Respondeo. 
1132 D. P. Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the Absolute 
Predestination of Christ in light of Robert Grosseteste”. The Heythrop Journal 52 (2011), pp. 374–339.  
Washington Theological Union, Washington DC, USA.      
1133 Pope Benedict does not praise the thought of Scotus without qualification. The apparent dominant 
emphasis of Scotus on the priority of the will (or “voluntarism”) appears to Benedict to be problematic, at 
least in what it could lead to. In his famous Regensburg Address of September 12, 2006, he had this to say:  
“In all honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would 
sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called 
intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later 
developments, led to the claim that we can only know God's voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm 
of God's freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. 
This gives rise to positions which clearly approach those of Ibn Hazm and might even lead to the image 
of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. God's transcendence and otherness 
are so exalted that our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, 
whose deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions. As 
opposed to this, the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal 
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        The sense of God at the heart of man’s sense of himself as being subject to moral 
obligation, as expounded by Newman, would seem to be a result and a manifestation of 
this natural finality towards the Supernatural. Newman’s account of the conscience can  
be seen as illustrating and exemplifying this well-known thesis of Scotus.1134 From his 
natural core and from the beginning Man is set on the path to involvement in the life of 
the Holy Trinity. This is because the conscience is the “aboriginal vicar of Christ”.1135 By 
its nature the conscience is meant to take the soul to God in Christ and by faith in him – 
with grace sustaining all the way. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which - as the Fourth Lateran 
Council in 1215 stated - unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of 
abolishing analogy and its language. God does not become more divine when we push him away from us 
in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as 
logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf.” (Pope Benedict XVI, “Faith, 
Reason and the University Memories and Reflections”, Lecture at Meeting with the representatives of 
science, Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg, Germany, September 12, 2006).    
Internet archive, Nov. 6, 2013:  
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html 
1134 There is little evidence that Newman studied much, if any, of Scotus.  
1135 Thus does Newman put his finger on a central element of human nature which shows forth the imago 
dei/imago Christi. It is in Christianity that the dignity of each person comes to its fulfilment. 
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Copies of sermon manuscripts 
(referred to in thesis footnotes) 
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With the exception of the last (Appendix no. 11), the copies of the sermon 
manuscripts that now follow have been published in Volume V of John 
Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Sermons preached at St Clement’s 
Oxford, 1824-1826 and two charity sermons, 1827.   Edited from previously 
unpublished manuscripts by Francis J McGrath FMS.   Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 2012. The last sermon (Appendix no. 11) has been published in 
Volume III of this 5 volume series. 
These sermons of Newman’s were preached in 1824-1825, representing his 
later Evangelical period. One is included of 1827. I also include a sermon of 
Charles Simeon’s (copied from the on-line edition of Simeon’s sermons) 
which may have been, partially, a basis of Newman’s sermon on Conscience 
in June of 1825.  
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Copies of manuscripts of some sermons 1824-1827 
(The photocopy of the MS sermon follows the sermon’s title page) 
 
                                         ------------------------------------ 
 
1     
            
 
 (Parable of the Pharisee and the publican)   
McGrath,ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843.  Vol V, pp. 
76. 
 Sermon (13,) no.15    Reference : B.O.A. A.17.1, pp.18  
(p.3 of the copy below is missing. Its text can be read on p. 77 of McGrath, Vol V, p. 77) 
--------------------------------------------------- 
St Clements S. A. August 29. 1824.       No. 15. 
    (Consulted Whitby, Scott, Pearce, Dodderidge, Horne, Trapp)  
           Luke xviii, 9 & 10 – 
     And he spoke this parable unto certain wh trusted in themselves that they 
were righteous, and despised others: - Two men went up into the temple to 
pray; the one a Pharisee, the other a publican. –     The object of this parable, 
…..     
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2.        
 
 
 
 
      
             Character of God and His holy law    
      McGrath, ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843.  Vol V., pp. 92 
      Sermon 15, no.17.  Reference:  B.O.A., B.3. Box 6. P.3-7, 14-16. 
(only several pages available: pp. 3,4,5,6,7,14,15 and 2 others – perhaps parts of p. 15 and p. 16.  
A guide to this can be found in the footnotes of McGrath’s text, Vol. V, pp. 92) 
           -------------------------------------------------------- 
            Sept 12. 1824        No. 17. 
           Mark 12:  28-30 
          And one of the scribes came, and having heard them reasoning 
together, and perceiving that he had answered them well, asked him, Which 
is the first commandment of all? And Jesus answered him, The first of all the 
commandments is, Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord: And thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with 
all thy strength: this is the first commandment 
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3.      
 
 
 
              
        (Faith connected with, and confirmed by the inward witness) 
 McGrath ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843.  Vol. V. pp.196. 
(Note: McGrath ed. has as a footnote (p.196, footnote 1): 
 Preached Sunday morning  27 Mar. 1824. Sunday before Easter.  
 I am not sure of McGrath’s source for this dating in 1824. As one can see 
on the text that follows, on p.1 of the manuscript Newman writes:  
                           St Clements S.M.  March 27. 1825)   
 
Sermon 51, no.67, v, 6. Reference B.O.A., A.17.1, pp.28  
            --------------------------------------------- 
St Clements S.M.  March 27. 1825    No. 67, v, 6 
 
1 John v.10  
He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself. 
    With this morng’s discourse is …… 
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4.           
 
 
          
 The following was Newman’s first sermon given over wholly to the 
Conscience. To a point he drew on the Evangelical Charles Simeon’s 
sermon on the conscience – some passages of which are reproduced 
following this one. 
 
“Conscience, its Use etc.”      
McGrath ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V. 
pp.236. 
Sermon 58, no. 85     
Reference:   B.O.A., B.3. Box 4,  General Theology (a), pp.22. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
      St Clement’s   S. A.  June 20.  1825.     No.85. 
      1 Sam iii, 10     
     And the Lord came & stood & called as at other times, Samuel, Samuel. 
    Then Samuel answered, Speak, for Thy servant heareth. 
 
                      These words have been just read to you ….. 
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5.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (Charles Simeon’s sermon: “A Good and Evil Conscience”) 
 
  For the previous sermon (his first that was wholly on the Conscience), 
Newman drew on the Evangelical Charles Simeon’s sermon, “A Good 
and Evil Conscience”. But there were clear differences between the two. I 
now present Charles Simeon’s Sermon CCCCXVIII. “A Good and Evil 
Conscience” in Helps to Composition. Vol IV, pp.299-303. (Simeon, Rev. 
Charles M.A. (1810). Helps to Composition or, Six Hundred Skeletons of 
Sermons; several being the substance of sermons preached before the 
University. Vol IV.    First American Edition.  
Philadelphia: Printed for and published by William W. Woodward.) 
 
Internet Archive at 11 am, 21 September 2013.   
http://www.archive.org/details/helpstocomposit00simegoog 
 
 
    “A Good and Evil Conscience”   1 John. iii. 20, 21. If our heart 
condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things. 
Brethren, if our heart condemn us not:, then have we confidence toward 
God.      
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6.   (Thesis text:  3.1.2.)     
 
 
            
  God does not govern us by judgments        
  McGrath ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V. pp. 260.   
  Sermon 62, no.92.     Reference B.O.A., B.3. Box 4, General Theology (a). pp. 20.   
  ---------------------------------------------- 
    St Clement’s S. A.  July 24,  1825.     
                                                    Whateleyan    No. 92 
     1 Kings xvii, 17,18.   
“And it came to pass after these things, that the son of the woman, the mistress of 
the house fell sick, & his sickness was so sore, that there was no breath left in him. 
And she said to Elijah, What have I to do with thee, O thou man of God? art thou 
come unto me to call my sin to remembrance & to slay my son?” 
 
  Last Sunday I signified my intention of considering this afternoon… 
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7.   (Thesis text: 4.2.3.  (b) )    
 
 
 
 
     McGrath ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V. pp. 305. 
    Sermon 69, no.106   Reference B.O.A., A.17.1 pp. 21.  
     --------------------------------------------------------------- 
    No. 106 
    S 2 - state of the heathen world an evidence of the need of a revelation.-       
    St Clements S.M.     Sept 18. 1825     
    Jer ii,19      
    Thine own wickedness shall correct thee, & thy backslidings shall reprove 
    thee – know therefore & see, that it is an evil thing and bitter, that thou 
    hast forsaken the Lord thy God, & that My fear is not in thee, saith the 
    Lord God of hosts. – 
 
         Last Sunday we in some degree … 
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8.   (Thesis text: 3.1.1. [b])     
 
 
              
     McGrath ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843 Vol. V. pp.313 
     Sermon 70, no. 108   Reference B. O. A.,  A.17.1, pp.21  
          --------------------------------------------------------------- 
     No. 108 
     S.3. on the principles common to all revelation 
     St Clement’s S.M.     Sept 25. 1825 
                  Hebr: xi,6    
      Without faith it is impossible to please Him - for he that cometh to God, 
      must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently 
      seek Him. - 
 
      Before proceeding, to consider the doctrines common  
      to all revelation, …… 
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9.       (Thesis text 4.2.3. [b])     
 
 
       
      McGrath ed. John Henry Newman 1824-1843. Vol. V. pp. 326. 
      Sermon 72, no.110        Reference B.O.A., A.17.1. pp.20 
            --------------------------------------------------------- 
      No. 110 
      S.4. - On the feelings produced in common by all revelation. (2) -     
      St Clements   S.M. Oct 16 - 1825 
 
                 Hebr.: xi,6 
      Without faith it is impossible to please Him - for he that cometh to God, 
      must believe that He is and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently 
     seek Him. - 
 
              Let us finish the subject to wh I invited yr attention, ….. 
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10.    (Thesis text:  3.1.1. [b] )    
 
 
                
     McGrath ed. John Henry Newman Sermons 1824-1843. Vol. V.  pp.335. 
     Sermon 73, no. 111    Reference B.O. A.,   A.17.1  pp. 22 
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
     No. 111 
     S.5. on the compatibility of spiritual feelings with scanty knowledge in 
the ancient believers. - 
     St Clements S.M. - Oct 23. 1825 
 
             Hos vi, 3 - 
     Then shall we know, if we follow on to know the Lord - His going forth 
is prepared as the morning; and He shall come unto us as the rain, as the 
     latter & former rain unto the earth.  
 
                Having considered the doctrines common to every revelation …. 
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11.      (Thesis 3.2.2) 
 
 
 
 
     Francis J. McGrath and Dom Placid Murray, editors.  John Henry 
Newman Sermons   1824-1843 Volume III.   Oxford University Press.  2010.   
 
     Sermon No. 161.  Reference A.50.1  
            ------------------------------------------------ 
     No. 161 
     On the Xtian law of liberty.  
     (?) Chapel    S.M. Sept 2. 1827 
     St Mary the Virgin, Oxford.  S.A.  May 25. 1828. 
                        This is a Whateleyan Sermon 
 
     2 Cor.iii.17    Now the Lord is that Spirit - and where the Spirit of the 
Lord is, there is liberty. 
 
     In these words is concisely stated the peculiar and distinguishing 
     excellence of the Xtian covenant, …. 
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